Opinion
No. 06-05-00127-CV
Submitted: November 22, 2005.
Decided: November 23, 2005.
On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court, Harrison County, Texas, Trial Court No. 03-0913.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Whipering Pines Lodge I, L.L.P. and Whispering Pines Health-Care, L.C., have brought a restricted appeal of a default judgment rendered against them April 18, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 42.3, we notified the parties that the judgment being appealed may not be final. See Tex R. App. P. 42.3. The appellants have filed a response in which they agreed that the complained-of judgment was not a final judgment. Because the trial court's judgment is not final, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The defendants in the underlying lawsuit are Whispering Pines Lodge, an assumed name for EMSCO of Longview, Inc.; Whispering Pines Lodge, L.L.C.; Whispering Pines Lodge I, L.L.P.; Whispering Pines Health-Care, L.C.; Texas Heirs, Inc. d/b/a Whispering Pines Lodge; Ethel Paris; and Tonia Oliver. The record contains evidence of two default judgments. On April 18, 2005, the trial court rendered a default judgment against Whispering Pines Lodge, L.L.C.; Whispering Pines Lodge I, L.L.P.; and Whispering Pines Health-Care, L.C., and specifically noted the judgment pertained only to those defendants. On August 8, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment against Whispering Pines Lodge, an assumed name of EMSCO of Longview, Inc., and specifically noted the judgment pertained to that defendant only. The record does not contain evidence of a judgment against Ethel Paris; Tonia Oliver; or Texas Heirs, Inc. d/b/a Whispering Pines Lodge, or other order making the default judgments final.
Generally, only final judgments of trial courts are appealable. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1985). A restricted appeal requires that the judgment being appealed be final and appealable. See Tex.R.App.P. 30; Etter's Welding, Inc. v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank, 687 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ.). Because the trial court's judgment does not dispose of all parties and claims, the complained-of default judgment is not a final judgment.
The Legislature has authorized the appeal of a number of interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The complained-of order does not fall within a category of authorized interlocutory appeals.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.