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holding that Title II of the ADA as applied to the facts of that case was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Summary of this case from Doe v. Division of Youth and Family Serv.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1228.
November 18, 1999.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Donald Vaughn ("Vaughn"), William Conrad ("Conrad"), Tyrone Reddick ("Reddick"), Eric Thompson ("Thompson"), James Yankura ("Yankura"), Robert Cavalari ("Cavalari") and Richard Eldridge ("Eldridge") (collectively referred to as "the Defendants") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
In this action, the Plaintiff, Ronald Wesley ("Wesley"), an inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Graterford, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12134 ("ADA"). He alleges that on two separate occasions he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability, namely asthma, in violation of the ADA and that Graterford's practice of locking the shower room door at the end of the scheduled shower period with inmates still inside constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
According to the Complaint, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on October 19, 1996, Wesley entered the B-Block shower room at Graterford. Shortly after Wesley entered, Corrections Officer Cavalari locked the shower room door. Upon completing his shower, Wesley began knocking on the door to be let out, but he was not immediately heard. The cell block was very noisy due to "block out," a time where all of the inmates in a block are allowed out of their cells. Accordingly, no one came to open the door for him. During this time, the shower filled with a thick layer of steam. Due to his asthma, Wesley began feeling lightheaded, numb and dizzy. Another inmate who saw Wesley's distress retrieved Yankura, a B-Block sergeant, who immediately opened the shower door. Wesley took a few steps and then went limp. He began hyperventilating and suffered an asthma attack. Wesley was placed on a gurney and two nurses transported him to the dispensary where he received medical assistance. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Wesley was able to return to his cell.
According to the Complaint, the showers quickly become steamy because the inmates have no control over the hot and cold water valves. The only way to reduce the build-up of steam is to open the window or the door. On October 19, 1996, however, Wesley was unable to open the window because the knob on the window lacked a "carter pin," causing the knob to loosely spin in his hand without engaging the window.
Exactly two years later, on October 19, 1998 at approximately 7:00 p.m., Wesley was again locked in the shower. When he finished showering, Wesley tried to leave but he was unable. Meanwhile, the steam build-up in the shower began to hinder his ability to breathe and he experienced numbness in his extremities. As a result, he was unable to knock at the door. Wesley began hyperventilating and suffered an asthma attack. Approximately ten minutes later, Eldridge appeared and opened the shower door. Wesley was able to walk to his cell where he used his asthma inhaler. About fifteen minutes later, the tightness in his chest subsided and his breathing returned to normal. He then got dressed and went to find Eldridge. He asked him, "Why did you lock me in the shower room when I told you I had asthma?" Plaintiff's Complaint ¶ 30, at 10. Eldridge responded, "I'm just following orders." Id.
During this time, Wesley was housed in D-Block. He alleges he was locked in the D-Block shower by Corrections Officer Eldridge.
The next day, Wesley complained to Reddick, the D-Block Lieutenant. Reddick responded that the officers locked the shower doors at "closing time," namely the end of the shower period, to keep other inmates from entering the shower. Wesley was dissatisfied with Reddick's response so on October 21, 1998, he filed an inmate grievance. Conrad, the D-Block manager, responded to the grievance stating, "We no longer lock inmates in the showers at shift change, 2 p.m." Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit B. Wesley, finding Conrad's response "unacceptable," wrote a memorandum to him stating that while the first shift officers no longer locked inmates in the shower at the 2:00 p.m. shift change, the second shift officers continued to do so at 7:00 p.m. Wesley then appealed to Vaughn, the Superintendent of Graterford, requesting further review of the matter. Vaughn replied that the showers were only locked at 3:30 p.m. for lock up and that the showers were no longer locked for the 2:00 p.m. shift change. Still dissatisfied with his response, Wesley made a formal request for final review by the Central Office Review Committee of the Department of Corrections requesting official termination of the "routine dangerous practice" of locking the shower doors at 7:00 p.m. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit H. Finally, Wesley filed suit in this Court against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory damages.
Graterford has three scheduled shower periods: 9:15 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.; 1:15 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.; and 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Wesley's claim arises from the practice of locking the door at the end of the 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. period. Apparently some blocks also locked the shower doors at 2:00 p.m. when the guards changed shifts.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court may consider those facts alleged in the complaint as well as matters of public record, orders, facts in the record and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1391 (3d Cir. 1994). The court must accept those facts as true. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1983). Moreover, the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Tunnell v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971, 975 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1975). In addition to these expansive parameters, the threshold a plaintiff must meet to satisfy pleading requirements is exceedingly low; a court may dismiss a complaint only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
III. DISCUSSION A. Statute of Limitations
Wesley alleges that on two separate occasions, October 19, 1996 and October 19, 1998, the Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his asthma. Additionally, he alleges that Graterford's practice of locking the shower room doors is discriminatory under the ADA and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Defendants move to dismiss Wesley's ADA and § 1983 claims based on the October 19, 1996 incident, arguing they barred by the statute of limitations.
Neither § 1983 nor the ADA contain a limitations period. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987); McKellar v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., No. CIV. A. 98-CV-4116, 1999 WL 124381, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 1999). When Congress has not specified a limitations period for a federal cause of action, the court must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985); 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir. 1996). For both § 1983 and the ADA, the most appropriate statute of limitations is that for personal injury.See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 662 (finding actions for discrimination are properly characterized as personal injury claims); Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276 (holding state personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions). In Pennsylvania, personal injury actions must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5442 (1981 Supp. 1997). Therefore, causes of action raised under both the ADA and § 1983 must be commenced within two years of the alleged wrong. Under appropriate circumstances, however, that rule is subject to state statutory tolling laws as well as equitable tolling doctrines. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) ("Limitations periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by reference to the appropriate "state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules." (quoting Board of Regents, Univ. of N Y v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980))); 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 101 F.3d at 324-25 (finding that under appropriate circumstances, continuing violation and other equitable tolling doctrines may apply).
Wesley alleges that he is not barred from recovering for the October 19, 1996 incident pursuant to the continuing violation theory. Under this theory, "[i]n most federal causes of action, when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period." Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). With regard to Wesley's § 1983 and ADA claims for damages, there is no evidence of a continuing violation. There are merely two separate instances of conduct which occurred two years apart. Applying the two-year statute of limitations to Wesley's damages claims resulting from the October 19, 1996 incident, the statute ran on October 19, 1998. Wesley filed his Complaint on January 25, 1999. Accordingly, he is barred from damages relief under both the ADA and § 1983 for both his discrimination and Eighth Amendment claims for the October 19, 1996 incident.
Wesley also argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he is a "legally disabled prisoner." Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ¶ 2, at 8. In Pennsylvania, however, unlike some other states, imprisonment does not toll the statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533.
Wesley's § 1983 and ADA claims for injunctive relief, however, set forth a continuing violation sufficient to invoke equitable tolling. He claims that the officials at Graterford were aware of and acquiesced to a practice of locking the shower room doors at the end of the shower period. He alleges that this practice has continued since the October 19, 1996 incident at least until the October 19, 1998 incident. The October 19, 1998 incident falls within the limitations period, therefore the continuing violation theory applies. Wesley's § 1983 and ADA claims asking that the Court enjoin this practice, then, are not barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Discrimination Claim
The Defendants argue further that Wesley fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for violations of his rights under Title II of the ADA. They request dismissal of his ADA and § 1983 claims to this end.
1. ADA Claims
The Defendants move first to dismiss Wesley's claims based on the ADA. They raise three arguments in support of their motion: first, that the Defendants' cannot be liable in their individual capacity under the ADA; second, that their conduct does not amount to a violation of the ADA; and third, that Wesley's claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
a. Individual Liability Under the ADA
Turning to the Defendants' first argument, Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A "public entity" is defined as "any state or local government, . . . any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," and public railroads. Id. § 12131(1).
As applied to the instant case, the Court finds that the Defendants, acting in their individual capacities, are not public entities within the meaning of the ADA. See Magagna v. Salisbury Township Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 98-1033, 1998 WL 961906, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 29, 1998) (dismissing Title II ADA claim against private individual). Therefore, they cannot be liable in this capacity for either damages or injunctive relief and the Defendants' motion is granted as to this issue.
b. Failure to State an Actionable ADA Claim
The Defendants argue secondly that Wesley's ADA claim against them in their official capacities must be dismissed because he fails to state an actionable claim. They allege that only one of the Defendants even knew that Wesley had asthma, and that even if they all knew, their actions were not because of his disability. As stated above, the ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a qualified person with a disability from participating in or denying him the benefit of services, programs or activities, or otherwise discriminating against him because of the disability.See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The statute makes it clear that this includes both intentional and benign discrimination. See id. § 12101(a)(5) (setting forth wider range of discrimination than merely intentional exclusion); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the protections of the ADA are not conditioned on a finding of intentional or overt discrimination and seemingly neutral practices which nonetheless have a discriminatory effect on disabled individuals are actionable. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 335.
Although Graterford's alleged practice of locking the shower room doors at the end of the shower period even though inmates are still inside applies equally to all persons in the shower at that time, it burdens those persons with respiratory disabilities greater than those without such disabilities. The build-up of steam in the shower exacerbates an asthmatic's condition, and, according to the Complaint, presents a health risk to the disabled individual. The potential risk to a non-asthmatic individual is not as great. Therefore, because there is a disparate effect on disabled persons, the practice of locking the shower doors at the end of the shower period discriminates against Wesley by reason of his disability in violation of Title II of the ADA. Accordingly, he states an actionable violation of his rights under the ADA.
c. Eleventh Amendment
The Defendants argue finally that Wesley's ADA claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Despite its plain language, however, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to bar suits by citizens of a state against his own state as well. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action in federal court when "the state is the real, substantial party at interest and any relief will effectively run against the state." Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity, as in the instant case, is deemed to be against the official's office and therefore no different from a suit against the state itself. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); DeMarco v. Department of Corrections, No. CIV. A. 99-2310, 1999 WL 997751, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 2, 1999).
There are three exceptions to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, a state can waive its rights under the Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). There is no dispute that Pennsylvania has not consented to suit in federal court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8512(b) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."). Second, pursuant to Ex Parte Young, state officials acting in their official capacity are subject to suit in federal court for prospective relief, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). Third, under certain circumstances, Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). The Court finds that Wesley's claim for injunctive relief falls under the Ex Parte Young exception, but his damages claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in their official capacity when the state is the real party in interest. See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101. Whether such a suit is deemed to be against the state depends on whether the plaintiff seeks retroactive or prospective relief. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10; Young, 209 U.S. at 166-68. Retroactive relief is typically in the form of money damages, thereby implicating the government entity. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The claim is deemed to be against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Claims for prospective injunctive relief, however, merely compel the state officer's compliance with federal law in the future. See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997). The suit is not deemed to be against the state, then, and these claims are not so barred.
Wesley's present claim seeks that the Defendants be enjoined from continuing the practice of locking the shower room doors at the end of the shower period while inmates are inside. He seeks, in essence, compliance in the future with the mandates of the ADA. Accordingly, his claim for injunctive relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to the Ex Parte Young exception.
The Court additionally finds that Wesley has alleged facts sufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing. See O'Brien v. Werner Bus. Lines, Inc., No. 94-6862, 1996 WL 82484, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 27, 1996). In order to have standing, a plaintiff must have and actual or imminent injury in fact, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of and it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). When a plaintiff seeks redress for a past wrong, there is not necessarily a present case or controversy unless accompanied by present adverse effects. See Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983).
Wesley alleges a continuing practice of locking the shower doors at the end of the shower period even though inmates are inside. He claims he suffered injury in the form of asthma attacks and that the threat of such an injury exists because the practice is ongoing. This injury is causally related to the challenged practice. Finally, a favorable decision enjoining the Defendants from this practice would alleviate this threat. Taking the allegations in Wesley's Complaint as true, the Court finds that he has standing to seek injunctive relief.
While the Ex Parte Young exception applies to allow Wesley's claim for injunctive relief, the Court finds that the abrogation exception does not apply in this circumstance and Wesley's claim for damages is therefore barred. The Supreme Court has held that Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity provided that two requirements are met: first, Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate states' immunity and second, Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of power.See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. It is undisputed that Congress' intent to abrogate states' immunity under the ADA is manifest. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ("A state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir.),petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Sept. 8, 1999) (No. 99-424); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 135 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 199 S.Ct. 58 (1998). Congress must also have acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Congress has the power to abrogate pursuant to its Article I powers, but held that the Fourteenth Amendment includes such a power. See id. at 55-73. The Court found that the principle of state sovereignty that the Eleventh Amendment embodies is limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 71-72; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
Necessarily, a statute which purports to abrogate a state's immunity must be a constitutional exercise of Congress' § 5 power. This means that Congress must have actually acted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55-56. Congress can do so not so much by reciting the words "section 5" or "Fourteenth Amendment" but by enacting a law that validly exercises its power, which is to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). Congress has not acted constitutionally, however, if it goes beyond its power to remedy violations of constitutional rights and instead defines the substance of those rights. See id.
The Supreme Court in City of Boerne set forth a test to determine whether Congress acted remedially or definitionally, or in other words, whether it exercised its § 5 power appropriately.See id. at 519-20. To be a constitutional exercise of § 5 power, "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id. at 520. The end targeted must be "constitutional violations" or laws that "have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." Id. at 532. The means must be congruent and proportional to any such violation. See id. In making this determination, however, courts must afford Congress wide latitude, keeping in mind that Congress has not only the power to remedy constitutional violations but also to act prophylactically in response to persistent and pervasive constitutional violations.See id. at 519-20.
Before applying this test to the instant case, the Court notes preliminarily the scope of its constitutional review. The Defendants would have the Court analyze and ultimately hold that Title II of the ADA in its entirety is not a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power. This approach, however, requires that the Court unnecessarily rule on the constitutionality of every provision in Title II. Such an analysis conflicts with the fundamental notion that "in the process of constitutional adjudication, . . . [the court] ought not . . . pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104 (1944). Further, "[b]ecause the `abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States,' courts must exercise great care before finding abrogation." Brown, 166 F.3d at 704 (quotingDellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989)). Finally, this approach is supported by the fact that the Third Circuit, to this Court's knowledge, has not addressed Eleventh Amendment abrogation and the ADA. Therefore, this Court's analysis is limited to determining whether Title II of the ADA is a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power in the specific context of the Defendants' practice of locking the shower room doors at the end of the shower period with inmates inside. The Court finds that with regard to this practice, the ADA is not congruent and proportional and therefore is not an appropriate exercise of Congress' § 5 power. Thus, Congress did not validly abrogate Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity in this circumstance.
In applying the City of Boerne congruence and proportionality test, other courts that have addressed the issue have found that the ADA is an appropriate exercise of § 5 power because its purpose is simply to enforce those laws and practices that violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Dare v. California, No. 97-56065, 1999 WL 717724, at *5 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1999); Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Pub. Safety Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1999); Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 437. With regard to disabled individuals, it is generally agreed, based on the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, that classifications made on the basis of physical disability are subject to rational basis review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting ADA does not "alter the standard for constitutional equal protection claims"), aff'd, 91 F.3d 586 (1996), and cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997). A law or classification will fail under the rational basis test if it is irrational or motivated by the desire to harm a particular group. See Bankers Life Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988). Therefore, these courts reason that the ADA is constitutional because it seeks only to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on laws and practices that are motivated by arbitrary and irrational discrimination. In this particular circumstance, however, the ADA goes farther and bans an otherwise constitutional practice.
The Court cannot say that a prison's practice of locking shower doors with inmates still inside for the purpose of keeping other inmates from entering after the shower period has ended is irrational, arbitrary or motivated by a desire to harm disabled individuals. Wesley acknowledges that this is Graterford's stated purpose for locking the shower doors. The Court will not second-guess what on its face seems to be a rational reason for such a practice. Further, there is no evidence that the practice was motivated by a desire to harm Wesley or other inmates with respiratory disabilities. Wesley alleges that each of the Defendants knew of his asthmatic condition, but he does not allege that any of them knew the danger created by the build-up of steam. At most, the practice constituted a benign form of discrimination which disproportionately affected Wesley because of his asthmatic condition; it was not an intentional effort to discriminate against him. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that this practice violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Because this practice nonetheless violates the ADA, however, the Court finds that the ADA, as applied to this specific circumstance, is not a congruent and proportional response to this instance of discrimination against disabled individuals. As such, it is not a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power and the second prong of Seminole Tribe is not met. Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity, therefore, has not been abrogated and Wesley's claim for damages for violations of the ADA must be dismissed.
2. Section 1983 Claim Based on Violations of the ADA
The Defendants also argue that Wesley fails to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 for violations of his rights under the ADA. They argue that in their official capacities they are not "persons" subject to liability under § 1983 and that the Eleventh Amendment further bars any claim against them in their official capacities.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person acting under color of state law who deprives an individual of rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a state, its agencies and its officials acting in their official capacities are sued for damages, they are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and cannot be liable. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. When officials acting in their official capacities are sued for injunctive relief, however, they are subject to liability under § 1983. See id. at 71 n. 10 ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because `official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'" (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985))).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that all of the Defendants are officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Therefore, they are not subject to liability under § 1983 for damages in their official capacity and Defendants' motion is granted as to that issue. Wesley states a claim, however, against the Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief.
Further, based on the previous discussion of the Eleventh Amendment, the Defendants' argument that they are immune from this claim in their official capacities is inapposite. The only claim against them in their official capacities that remains is for injunctive relief, and that falls squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception. Therefore, Wesley's § 1983 claim against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages is dismissed, but his claim for injunctive relief remains. Wesley's claim against the Defendants in their individual capacities remains as well.
The Defendants did not raise any argument in support of their motion to dismiss Wesley's claim against them in their individual capacity pursuant to § 1983 for violations of the ADA. The Court, therefore, denies their motion with regard to this issue.
C. Section 1983 Claim Based on Violations of the Eighth Amendment
Finally, the Defendants argue that Wesley fails to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. They reiterate that in their official capacities, they are not "persons" subject to liability under § 1983 and that the Eleventh Amendment further bars such a claim. For the reasons discussed above, the Court agrees and dismisses Wesley's § 1983 claim against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages, but not for injunctive relief. But, as discussed below, Wesley fails to state an actionable violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, so this claim, along with his claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities, will be dismissed.The Defendants argue that they are not liable in their individual capacities because they were not personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing or alternatively that Wesley fails to state an Eighth Amendment violation. A person can be individually liable under § 1983 so long as he or she had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal involvement exists where the defendant participated in or had personal knowledge of and acquiesced to the deprivation of federally guaranteed rights. See id. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See id.
Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, as the Court must, each of the Defendants had personal knowledge of the practice of locking the shower room doors at the end of the shower period, and yet allowed it to continue. Therefore, Wesley states facts sufficient to hold the Defendants individually liable. But, his claim fails nonetheless because the practice that he challenges does not amount to an actionable Eighth Amendment violation.
The Eighth Amendment creates an affirmative duty on the state to provide for the basic human needs, including medical care and reasonable safety, of those incarcerated. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). There is an Eighth Amendment violation when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). For an inmate to prevail on such a claim, he must prove first, that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and second, that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38; Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 746.
The crux of Wesley's claim is that the practice of locking the shower doors at the end of the shower period creates a substantial risk of serious harm in the form of sexual assaults, danger in the event of fire and overexposure to steam inhalation. What Wesley fails to allege, however, is that this is the only time at which he can shower, or, in other words, that being locked in the shower at 7:00 p.m. is unavoidable. According to Wesley's Complaint, the doors are locked at the end of the shower period to keep other inmates from entering after the shower period has ended. In light of the fact that Wesley voluntarily showers at the end of the shower period, the Court cannot say that this practice creates a substantial risk of serious harm.
Further, there is no indication that the Defendants knew of and disregarded the risk allegedly created by locking the shower doors. In order to violate the Eighth Amendment, a defendant must both be aware of facts from which he or she could infer that a substantial risk of harm exists and actually draw that inference.See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Wesley alleges that all of the Defendants had knowledge of his "chronic allergic asthmatic respiratory disability," but he fails to allege that any of them knew or had reason to know that overexposure to steam would aggravate that condition. Plaintiff's Complaint, at 11A-11D. Further, as the Defendants point out, he fails to allege that they knew the window in the B-Block shower room could not be opened to vent some of the built-up steam. Finally, Wesley does not allege that any of the Defendants ignored his pleas to open the door or denied him medical attention following the incidents. Indeed, he acknowledges that Yankura and Eldridge, in B-Block and D-Block, respectively, let him out of the shower as soon as they were made aware that he was locked inside and that he received the appropriate medical attention immediately thereafter. Regarding Wesley's claims that locking the shower doors creates a fire hazzard and exposes him to the risk of sexual assault, he has similarly failed to allege that the Defendants had any knowledge of these dangers. Accordingly, there is nothing upon which the Court can find that the Defendants either had facts sufficient to draw the inference that Wesley would suffer serious harm or that the Defendants actually drew that inference. The Defendants' motion is therefore granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that all of Wesley's claims for damages based on the October 19, 1996 incident are barred by the statute of limitations and are therefore dismissed. Similarly, Wesley's claim pursuant to the ADA for discrimination on the basis of his disability for damages and injunctive relief against the Defendants in their individual capacities is dismissed. Wesley states a claim, however, pursuant to the ADA against the Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief only. But, Wesley's ADA claim against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Further, Wesley's § 1983 claim for damages for violations of the ADA against the Defendants in their official capacities is dismissed, but the Defendants' motion is denied as to Wesley's claim for injunctive relief. Wesley states an actionable claim for both damages and injunctive relief, however, pursuant to § 1983 against the Defendants in their individual capacities for violations of the ADA.
Finally, Wesley has failed to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment for damages and injunctive relief against the Defendants in either their individual or their official capacities. Therefore, the Defendants motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November, 1999, in consideration of Defendants' Donald Vaughn, William Conrad, Tyrone Reddick, Eric Thompson, James Yankura, Robert Cavalari and Richard Eldridge Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) and Plaintiff Ronald Wesley's response thereto, it is ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. All claims for damages based on the October 19, 1996 incident are dismissed as time-barred. The ADA claim against the Defendants in their individual capacities for both damages and injunctive relief is dismissed. The ADA claim against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages is dismissed. The § 1983 claim for violations of ADA rights against the Defendants in their official capacities for damages is dismissed. The § 1983 claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment against the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities for both damages and injunctive relief are dismissed.
2. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED IN PART. Wesley states a claim pursuant to the ADA against the Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief. He further states a claim pursuant to § 1983 for violations of his rights under the ADA against the Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief. Finally, he states a claim pursuant to § 1983 for violations of his rights under the ADA against the Defendants in their individual capacities for both damages and injunctive relief.