Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:21-CV-235-RWS
2023-09-06
Jibri WARD-RICHARDSON and Yesenia Robaina, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant.
Aaron Marcus Kappler, Thompson, O'Brien, Kappler & Nasuti, P.C., Richmond Hill, GA, Jeffrey Andrew Reynolds, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs. Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas L. Azar, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Thompson Coburn, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendant.
Aaron Marcus Kappler, Thompson, O'Brien, Kappler & Nasuti, P.C., Richmond Hill, GA, Jeffrey Andrew Reynolds, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs. Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas L. Azar, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Thompson Coburn, LLP, St. Louis, MO, Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendant. ORDER RICHARD W. STORY, United States District Judge
This case comes before the Court on Defendant FCA US LLC's ("FCA") Motion to Dismiss Based on Mootness [Dkt. 33], which is fully briefed. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Court enters the following Order.
BACKGROUND
The Court adopts the full factual recitations and procedural histories set forth in its prior orders [Dkts. 16, 26] and now briefly summarizes only the developments that gave rise to the instant motion.
This case stems from alleged defects in the "electrical and/or computer system" installed in the 2021 Jeep Wrangler 4xe model, which FCA manufacturers and sells through licensed dealerships across the United States (the "Class Vehicles"). [Dkt. 17, at ¶ 3]. Plaintiffs Jibri Ward-Richardson and Yesenia Robaina (collectively, "Plaintiffs") initiated this suit on November 3, 2021 [Dkt. 1], seeking both equitable and legal relief on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals. [Dkt. 17, at ¶ 3]. Specifically, Plaintiffs pray for (i) an order declaring the Class Vehicles' electrical/computer system defective; (ii) an order requiring FCA to recall the Class Vehicles and replace the defect free of charge; (iii) an order declaring FCA's conduct unlawful and permanently enjoining FCA from engaging in such conduct; (iv) an order requiring FCA to either disgorge all ill-gotten gains received from the sale or lease of Class Vehicles, or requiring FCA to make full restitution to all owners/lessors of Class Vehicles; and (v) an award of actual, compensatory, and punitive damages for the diminution in value the Class Vehicles sustained as a result of the defect. [Id. at Prayer for Relief].
FCA has already filed two motions to dismiss in this matter. [Dkts. 8, 20]. Most recently, the Court granted FCA's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (the "FAC") in part and dismissed eight of the ten claims asserted therein. [See Dkt. 26, at 39]. In doing so, the Court allowed only Counts I (fraudulent concealment) and VIII (violation of state consumer protection acts) to proceed to the extent those claims seek relief under Georgia and Virginia law. [Id.; see also id. at 14 & n.3 (dismissing claims for attorney's fees, punitive damages, and injunctive relief, but permitting Plaintiffs to seek the same as remedies for the surviving claims)].
Shortly thereafter, FCA initiated a voluntary recall of 62,909 model-year 2021-2023 Jeep Wrangler vehicles, including the Class Vehicles ("Recall ZB7"). [See Dkt. 33-1, at 2 (citing Part 573 Safety Recall Report 22V-865 (Nov. 23, 2022) [hereinafter Ex. A], https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2022/RCLRPT-22V865-9895.PDF)]. Recall ZB7 is being carried out under the supervision of the NHTSA. [See id. at 3 (citing Letter from Alex Ansley, Chief of Recall Mgmt. Div., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Dec. 2, 2022) [hereinafter Ex. B], https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2022/RCAK-22V865-1952.pdf)].
FCA asks the Court to take judicial notice of certain documents created and distributed as part of Recall ZB7: (i) the Recall Report it submitted on November 23, 2022; (ii) a December 2, 2022 acknowledgement letter authored by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (the "NHTSA"); and (iii) a notice letter FCA distributed to all owners/lessors of affected vehicles. [Dkt. 33-1, at 2 n.2]. Plaintiffs do not contest this request. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of each. See Lamonte v. City of Hampton, Ga., 576 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1327 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2021) ("It is established law that a court may take judicial notice of government websites."); Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.) (taking judicial notice of NHTSA recall documents).
On December 22, 2022, FCA sent letters to all owners/lessors of affected vehicles, including Plaintiffs, announcing Recall ZB7. [See id. at 4 (citing ZB7/NHTSA 22V-865, Important Safety Recall: Loss of Motive Power (Dec. 22, 2022) [hereinafter Ex. C], https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2022/RCONL-22V865-8324.pdf)]. Those letters acknowledge the existence of a dangerous defect that may cause affected vehicles to experience an "engine shutdown condition." [Id. at 4 (quoting Ex. C)]. The letters also provide that FCA will repair the defect for free and reimburse all owners/lessors of affected vehicles who already paid to repair the defective condition on their own. [Id. at 4-5]. Specifically, the relevant portions of the letters state as follows:
[Ex. C (footnotes omitted)].
HOW DO I RESOLVE THIS IMPORTANT SAFETY ISSUE?
FCA US will repair your vehicle free of charge (parts and labor). To do this, your dealer will update vehicle control software on all affected vehicles . . . .
. . . .
WHAT IF I ALREADY PAID TO HAVE THIS REPAIR COMPLETED?
If you have already experienced this specific condition and have paid to have it repaired, you may visit www.fcarecallreimbursement.com to submit your reimbursement request online. Once we receive and verify the required documents, reimbursement will be sent to you within 60 days . . . .
FCA now seeks dismissal a third time, arguing that Recall ZB7 renders Plaintiffs' claims moot and deprives this Court of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). [Dkt. 33]. For the following reasons, the Court agrees.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) permits parties to move for dismissal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Such motions can be made facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). "Facial attacks" focus on the pleadings and require courts to determine whether the allegations (which the court must accept as true) establish an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curium). "Factual attacks," on the other hand, challenge jurisdiction based on surrounding circumstances and allow courts to consider materials outside the pleadings when determining whether jurisdiction exists. Id. Here, FCA presents a factual attack based on mootness, a corollary to Article III's justiciability requirement. See Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharm. v. Bd. of Regents, 633 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2011).
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the consideration of only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Mingkid v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 468 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2006). The "case or controversy" requirement subsists throughout the entirety of litigation and provides that a court may retain jurisdiction over a lawsuit only when the parties have a "personal stake in the outcome." See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1253-54. Article III thus prohibits federal courts from retaining jurisdiction over a case when the court's decisions "cannot affect the rights of the litigants"—i.e., when the case becomes moot. Id.; Ga. Ass'n of Latino Elected Offs., Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections, 36 F.4th 1100, 1117 (11th Cir. 2022).
The central question raised by the mootness doctrine is whether changes in the circumstances that existed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Consol. Utils. & Commc'ns, Inc., 846 F.2d 803, 810 (1st Cir. 1988). When that question is answered in the affirmative, courts must dismiss those claims (or the case entirely) for lack of jurisdiction. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004); Westmoreland v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987).
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs initiated this suit seeking both equitable (e.g., injunctive and declaratory) and legal relief to correct alleged defects in the Class Vehicles. At the time Plaintiffs initiated suit, FCA had not yet recalled the Class Vehicles. Now it has, and now FCA contends that Recall ZB7 moots Plaintiffs' claims and deprives this Court of jurisdiction because the recall provides the exact relief Plaintiffs seek. [Dkt. 33]. In support, FCA relies on the prudential mootness doctrine. [Dkt. 33-1, at 6-7].
The prudential mootness doctrine allows courts to withhold requested relief when a once-live controversy becomes "so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity . . . counsel the court to stay its hand." Ingaseosas Int'l Co. v. Aconcagua Investing, Ltd., 479 Fed. Appx. 955, 962 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The doctrine "often makes its appearance in cases where a plaintiff starts off with a vital complaint but then a coordinate branch of government steps in to promise the relief [the plaintiff] seeks." Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1211 (affirming dismissal, holding a voluntary recall conducted under the supervision of the NHTSA mooted defective vehicle claims). Still, courts may maintain jurisdiction over a case that otherwise appears to be prudentially moot if the plaintiff alleges a cognizable danger that the proffered relief will fail. Id. at 1211-12 ("If the party seeking relief can show that 'there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation,' . . . we will continue with the case even in the face of a simultaneous remedial commitment from another branch [of government]." (quotation omitted)).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Recall ZB7 provides the equitable relief they pray for: through the recall, FCA (i) acknowledges the existence of a defect in the Class Vehicles' electrical/computer system; (ii) recalls the Class Vehicles and promises to repair the defect in those vehicles free of charge; and (iii) invokes NHTSA's oversight authority, subjecting itself to penalties if it fails to comply with federal safety regulations. See id. at 1211 (observing that the NHTSA may impose penalties for noncompliance (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 30120, 30165)); Cheng v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2013 WL 3940815, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) ("Through the statutory authority conferred upon it, NHTSA 'has the ability to ensure [FCA]'s full compliance through fines."). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that Recall ZB7 does not moot their claims because (i) the prudential mootness doctrine does not apply to claims for monetary relief, and (ii) there remains a cognizable danger that Recall ZB7 will prove ineffective. [Dkt. 36, at 2-3, 5-6]. The Court addresses both arguments in turn.
A. Prudential Mootness & Claims for Monetary Relief
Plaintiffs first contend the prudential mootness doctrine does not apply here because, through the FAC, they seek both equitable and monetary relief (in the form of diminished-value damages). According to Plaintiffs, the prudential mootness doctrine permits courts to withhold only the former, not the latter. [Dkt. 36, at 3-5]. FCA counters by arguing that prudential mootness must apply here because Recall ZB7 provides the exact relief Plaintiffs seek, namely free repairs and reimbursement; otherwise, FCA submits, any additional relief this Court could award would constitute an impermissible double recovery. [Dkt. 38, at 2-3]. The Court finds FCA's argument persuasive.
Plaintiffs also seek emotional distress damages. [Dkt. 17, at ¶ 121]. Plaintiffs cannot recover such damages here, however, because they do not allege that they suffered a physical injury, which is a prerequisite for recovery of such damages under both Georgia and Virginia law. See Jones v. Kroger Co., 2023 WL 2763142, at *5-6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2023) (applying Georgia law and dismissing claims for emotional distress damages where plaintiff did not suffer a physical injury); Hayes v. Fay Servicing, LLC, 2023 WL 2760429, at *6 (W.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2023) (applying Virginia law and reaching the same conclusion).
The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether the prudential mootness doctrine applies to claims seeking monetary relief. As a result, the parties rely primarily on out of circuit cases that have considered the question. A review of those cases (and the Court's independent research), however, reveals that no bight-line rule exists. Instead, it appears the answer turns on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
In their response, Plaintiffs lean heavily on McCabe v. Daimler Ag, 2015 WL 11199196 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2015), which found that the prudential mootness doctrine did not moot claims for monetary relief. McCabe, like the present case, involved allegations that certain vehicle models manufactured by the defendant were defective. Id. at 4. The plaintiffs there asserted claims for both equitable and legal relief, arguing they sustained harm resulting from the diminished value of the defective vehicles. Id. The manufacturer moved to dismiss the complaint as prudentially moot, arguing that an extended warranty that promised to reimburse owners who already paid to repair the defect afforded plaintiffs with complete relief. Id. The warranty at issue, however, conditioned reimbursement on manufacturer approval. Id. Therefore, the court found that the warranty did not adequately compensate plaintiffs for their diminished value damages. Id. (declining to dismiss the case as prudentially moot because "there are still prayers for money damages that are not addressed by the extended warranty").
McCabe is distinct from the instant case for multiple reasons, however. Most importantly, the McCabe court did not definitively hold that the prudential mootness doctrine could never apply to claims seeking monetary relief—it found only that the doctrine did not apply to the unique facts presented in that case. See id. at *4-5. As a result, this Court is not compelled to follow suit.
Instead, the Court finds FCA's cases more persuasive. Namely, the Court finds Hadley v. Chrysler Group LLC, 624 Fed. Appx. 374 (6th Cir. 2015), which was decided five days after McCabe, most instructive. Like Plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Hadley sought equitable relief and monetary damages for the diminished value of their vehicles resulting from a defective airbag system. Id. at 375, 377 ("The amended complaint states that the plaintiffs suffered injuries in the form of the diminished value and loss of enjoyment of their vehicle, the cost of having their airbag system diagnosed or repaired, and the expense incurred from having to obtain alternative means of transportation."). Before the plaintiffs filed suit, however, the defendant manufacturer initiated a voluntary recall that, like Recall ZB7, (i) acknowledged the existence of the defect, (ii) promised to repair the defect, and (iii) promised to reimburse owners of affected vehicles who already paid to repair the defect. Id. at 379. The Hadley court held that the recall not only mooted plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but also that it "removed the defect upon which the plaintiffs' diminished-value injury claim [was] based." Id. at 378. As a result, the court dismissed all claims. Id. at 380.
Recent district court cases have followed Hadley's lead in circumstances that are "highly analogous"—if not identical—to those present in the instant case. The Court finds two of those recent decisions to be particularly persuasive. See Sharp v. FCA US LLC, 637 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Mich. 2022); Flores v. FCA US, LLC, 2020 WL 7024850 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2020). In both instances, the court dismissed claims seeking equitable and legal relief as prudentially moot due to voluntary recalls that promised to repair defective vehicles and reimburse owners who already paid to repair the alleged defect. See Sharp, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 460-61 (noting that plaintiffs alleged benefit-of-the bargain damages in addition to claims seeking equitable relief); Flores, 2020 WL 7024850, at *2 (indicating that plaintiffs "request[ed] restitution, damages, and appropriate injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief"). Therefore, both courts found that the recall removed the defect upon which the plaintiffs' claims for damages were based, and thus dismissed the claims as prudentially moot. Sharp, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 469; Flores, 2020 WL 7024850, at *4-5 ("Defendant has established that Plaintiffs have no claim for actual damages [due to the recall], therefore prudential mootness applies."). Like Hadley, these cases are directly on point.
Just as in Hadley, Sharp, and Flores, Plaintiffs assert claims for monetary relief in addition to claims for equitable relief. In fact, Plaintiffs here allege the exact same monetary harm the Hadley plaintiffs alleged: diminished value of their vehicles due to their defective condition. [Dkt. 17, at ¶¶ 6, 35, 87, 91, 121; see also Dkt. 36, at 4]. And just like the recalls at issue in Hadley, Sharp, and Flores, Recall ZB7 (i) acknowledges the existence of a defect in the Class Vehicles' electrical/computer system, (ii) promises to repair the defect, and (iii) promises to reimburse owners/lessors of Class Vehicles who have already paid to repair the defect. [See Ex. C]. Therefore, Recall ZB7 promises to remove the very defect that forms the basis of Plaintiffs' diminished-value claim. [See, e.g., Dkt. 17, at ¶ 91 ("[T]he defective electrical/computer systems diminish the value [of] the Class Vehicles.")]. As a result, Recall ZB7 provides the exact relief (both equitable and monetary) Plaintiffs seek through the FAC. See Hadley, 624 Fed. Appx. at 378; Sharp, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 469; Flores, 2020 WL 7024850, at *4.
Moreover, Recall ZB7 invokes the oversight powers of a coordinate branch of government—the NHTSA. The NHTSA is vested with statutory authority (and responsibility) to monitor "each safety recall to make sure owners receive safe, free, and effective remedies from manufacturers according to the Safety Act and Federal regulations." Pacheco v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 2603937, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-1273 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2023). The NHTSA is also vested with the power to impose penalties against FCA if it fails to comply with federal safety regulations. See Cheng, 2013 WL 3940815, at *4.
Considering the NHTSA's involvement, this case now contains all the "traditional ingredients" of a prudentially moot case:
[Plaintiffs now have] in hand a remedial commitment from our coordinate branches [of government]. By filing documents with NHTSA notifying it of a defect, [FCA] set into motion the great grinding gears of a statutorily mandated and administratively overseen national recall process. By virtue of its filing, [FCA] is now obliged by statute to notify all relevant registered owners of the defect. The company has assumed as well the statutory duty to "remedy the defect or noncompliance without charge when the vehicle or equipment is presented for remedy." And [FCA] has subjected itself to continuing oversight of (and potential penalties imposed by) NHTSA.Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1211 (citations omitted). Given the assurances provided by Recall ZB7 and NHTSA's oversight,
there remains not enough value left for the [Court] to add in this case to warrant carrying on with the business of deciding the merits. Congress and the
Executive have committed to ensure [Plaintiffs] precisely the relief [they seek]. At best, we might duplicate [the NHTSA's] efforts and waste finite public resources in the process. At worst, we might invite inter-branch confusion and turf battles over the details of carrying out an agreed objective. Our intervention would, as well, surely add new transaction costs for [FCA] and perhaps reduce the incentive manufacturers have to initiate recalls (as [FCA] did here), all while offering not even a sliver of additional relief for [Plaintiffs] and members of the class [they seek] to represent.Id.; see also id. at 1210 (noting that "once the plaintiff has a remedial promise from a coordinate branch in hand, we will generally decline to add the promise of a judicial remedy to the heap").
As a whole, Recall ZB7 provides Plaintiffs with "precisely the relief" they seek through the FAC. Therefore, any additional relief that this Court could award would constitute an impermissible double recovery. See Sater v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 2016 WL 7377126, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) ("Permitting [the plaintiff] to retain benefit-of-the-bargain damages for the difference in value between a non-defective truck and the defective truck, even though [the defendant] has repaired his truck, would afford him precisely the type of double-recovery windfall . . . courts have held is impermissible."). Accordingly, the Court finds that, under the facts and circumstances presented here, the prudential mootness doctrine applies to Plaintiffs' claims for diminished-value damages (in addition to their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief). It follows then that FCA's motion is due to be granted—and the FAC dismissed—unless Plaintiffs can establish a cognizable danger that Recall ZB7 will prove ineffective.
B. Cognizable Danger Recall ZB7 Will Fail
Plaintiffs next contend that, even if the prudential mootness doctrine applies, Recall ZB7 does not moot their claims because there is a cognizable danger that the recall will prove ineffective. [Dkt. 36, at 1-2]. The Court disagrees.
As explained above, courts may maintain jurisdiction over a case that is otherwise prudentially mooted by subsequent developments if the party seeking relief can establish a cognizable danger of a recurrent violation. See, e.g., Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1211-12. "To carry the burden of showing a 'cognizable danger' [exists], a plaintiff must point to 'something more than the mere possibility' " that the proffered remedy will fail. Id. at 1212 (quotation omitted); see also Hadley, 624 Fed. Appx. at 379-80 (noting that mere speculation and hypothetical possibilities of failure are insufficient). Plaintiffs fail to do so here.
Plaintiffs argue that "evidence suggests" Recall ZB7 has been ineffective to date. [Dkt. 36, at 2, 5-6]. In support, Plaintiffs cite to (and presumably request the Court to take judicial notice of) supposed consumer complaints posted to online forums. [Id. at 6 & nn.1-2]. But those forums do not meet the criteria required for judicial notice; as such, the Court declines to consider them at this time. See Varner v. Domestic Corp., 2017 WL 3730618, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2017) (declining to take judicial notice of consumer complaints posted on the NHTSA's website and noting that "courts have rejected requests to take judicial notice of online customer reviews").
The Court notes, however, that even if it were to take judicial notice of the complaints Plaintiffs cite, those complaints would not affect the Court's analysis or change the outcome. [See also Dkt. 38, at 6 n.7 (explaining that the "complaints" actually illustrate how Recall ZB7 has already proven effective because it allows the Class Vehicles to better detect unrelated issues)].
Moreover, as explained above, Recall ZB7 is being carried out "under the watchful eye of the NHTSA," a coordinate branch of government vested with the authority to monitor Recall ZB7 and ensure that FCA follows through with the promises it made to consumers therein. See Pacheco, 2023 WL 2603937, at *3. The assurances provided by NHTSA's statutorily mandated oversight outweigh Plaintiffs' speculation that Recall ZB7 will ultimately prove unsuccessful in correcting the challenged defect. See Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1210.
Plainly stated, Plaintiffs present no evidence that the Court may properly consider at this juncture suggesting—let alone proving—that Recall ZB7 will be unsuccessful. They do not contend that they were turned away from FCA dealerships when they presented their Class Vehicles for repairs. Compare Philips v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 693283, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016) (finding plaintiffs adequately established a cognizable danger the subject recall would fail where plaintiffs presented their vehicle for repair on multiple occasions but defendants "repeatedly failed to deliver upon th[eir] promise" to repair the defect). Nor do they contend that the NHTSA has abdicated its duties or will otherwise "fall[ ] down on the recall job . . . in a way that might make us concerned about [its ability to complete] its work in this case." Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1215 (holding plaintiffs failed to establish a cognizable danger the subject recall would fail where plaintiff offered "no facts suggesting any perceptible chance the [NHTSA] won't complete the work it has started" in overseeing the recall). Instead, Plaintiffs "offer only a hypothetical possibility that their vehicles will not be adequately repaired. This is insufficient for the Court to proceed with the case." Sharp, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 468-69; see also Hadley, 624 Fed. Appx. at 380 ("The plaintiffs' assertion that the [recall] may not be effective does not evidence an actual or imminent injury. On the record before us, it instead evidences a hypothetical possibility that plaintiffs' vehicles [will not be] adequately repaired.").
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to carry their burden of establishing a cognizable danger that Recall ZB7 will prove unsuccessful. The Court, therefore, declines to "keep this litigation open indefinitely waiting for an indication that the repair was not successful," and instead dismisses the case as prudentially moot. Hadley v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 2014 WL 988962, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2014), aff'd, 624 Fed. Appx. 374 (6th Cir. 2015).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, FCA's Motion to Dismiss Based on Mootness [Dkt. 33] is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' FAC [Dkt. 17] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of September, 2023.