Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC381871, Conrad Aragon, Judge.
Law Office of Bryce C. Anderson and Bryce C. Anderson; Paul & Hanley, Dean Hanley and Deborah R. Rosenthal for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Poole & Shaffery, Charles W. Jenkins and Karl W. Kime for Defendant and Respondent Gardner Denver, Inc.
Gordon & Rees, Michael Pietrykowski, Glen T. Tsurudome and Don Willenburg for Defendants and Respondents The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Ingersoll-Rand Company and Leslie Controls, Inc.
McKenna Long & Aldridge, Farah S. Nicol, Margaret I. Johnson, William J. Sayers; Prindle, Decker & Amaro and Kenneth D. Prindle for Defendants and Respondents Metalclad Insulation Corporation and ITT Corporation.
Liner Yankelevitz Sunshine & Regenstreif, Kevin C. Mayer, Peter E. Garrell and Emily K. Ayers for Defendant and Respondent Union Carbide Corporation.
K&L Gates and Robert E. Feyder for Defendant and Respondent Crane Co.
Morris Polich & Purdy, Joni Lynn Loomis, Paul A. Johnson and Richard H. Nakamura, Jr., for Defendant and Respondent Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc.
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal challenges the trial court’s order staying, on the grounds of forum non conveniens, an asbestos exposure personal injury lawsuit filed by two Washington residents against more than three dozen defendants. The trial court concluded that Washington was the appropriate forum to adjudicate the matter and stayed the California action. We conclude the motion was properly granted and therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Lawsuit
The complaint, amplified by discovery responses, sets forth the following. William Wangen was born in Seattle, Washington in 1932. Except for the four years he served in the military, he lived his entire life in Washington. In 2006, Wangen purchased a home in Arizona. Since then, he and his wife split their time between their homes in Washington and Arizona.
Wangen served in the United States Navy aboard the USS Wiltsie from July 1950 to May 1954, including three six-month combat tours in Korea. Wangen’s duties included ship maintenance and repair. This work put him into immediate contact with asbestos containing products manufactured by many different companies.
During Wangen’s tour of duty, the USS Wiltsie ported several times at the Long Beach and San Diego Naval Shipyards for maintenance and repair. During these visits, Wangen suffered further occupational exposure to asbestos. These port visits were the only times Wangen ever spent in California. Wangen claims that he was at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard for a period of 12 to 18 weeks at some point between January 1951 to December 1952 and for an undetermined amount of time at the San Diego Naval Shipyard between January 1951 and December 1954.
Following his discharge from the Navy, Wangen returned to Washington. While living there, Wangen had multiple occupational and non-occupational exposures to asbestos. Those exposures include a job at a service station and auto repair shop (1955), a job at a shipyard (1963 to 1975), car repairs for friends and family (1950 through the 1990s), house repair and remodeling (1962, 1970, 1974, 1976), and use of a hair dryer (over the course of his life).
In October 2007, Wangen was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Since then, he has undergone various tests and treatments. All of his treating physicians are in Washington. All of his medical visits have occurred in Washington with the exception of visits to the Mayo Clinic in Arizona. Wangen has received no medical care in California.
In December 2007, Wangen filed his personal injury action in California naming over three dozen defendants. The complaint alleges more than ten causes of action, each derivative of Wangen’s exposures (occupational and non-occupational) to asbestos from 1950 to 1994.
Wangen’s complaint includes his wife (Mary Jo Wangen) who sues for loss of consortium. For purposes of clarity, we use the singular “Wangen” to refer to plaintiffs.
2. Defendants’ Forum Non Conveniens Motions
In January and February 2008, nine defendants moved to stay or dismiss the action on forum non conveniens ground. At the time of motion, there were more than 30 active defendants in the case.
In regard to the evidence to be produced at trial about damages, defendants noted that all of Wangen’s treating physicians were in Washington. In addition, relying upon Wangen’s allegations that he had been exposed to asbestos for a 40-year period in Washington but, at most, had been exposed in California for several years, they urged that most of the relevant liability evidence (witnesses and documents) about his work history and exposure to asbestos-containing products would be in Washington. From that premise, defendants argued that were the case to remain in California, they would be burdened with the cost first of obtaining a commission from a California trial court to subpoena and depose the many non-party witnesses (Wangen’s former co-workers and treating physicians) in Washington (Code Civ. Proc., § 2026.010, subd. (f)) and then of traveling to Washington to depose those witnesses. As for Wangen’s ability to bring suit in Washington, defendants stated a lawsuit there would be timely because Washington state law provides for a three-year statute of limitations for asbestos claims and Wangen had been diagnosed less than a year earlier. (Rev. Code Wash. § 7.72.060.) In regard to Wangen’s ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over the named defendants, the defense argued that most of the defendants were amenable to service in Washington.
Wangen filed opposition to the defense motions. On the issue of location of witnesses, a declaration from counsel (Robert Barrow) averred that counsel and Wangen had “identified approximately 71 [unnamed] potential witnesses who could have relevant information related to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, San Diego Naval Shipyard, and the USS Wiltsie between 1950 and 1954.” (Italics added.) According to counsel, they had identified the last place of residence of the witnesses as follows: 38 in California, 1 in Washington, 5 in Texas and the remaining 27 in 18 other states. The opposition made no representation about the extent to which other witnesses and documentary evidence were in Washington. The motion urged that Washington was not a suitable alternative forum for the lawsuit because “[t]here is no evidence that [Wangen] could obtain a valid judgment against all 40 of the defendants in [that state].”
3. The Trial Court’s First Ruling
Following a hearing conducted on March 19, the trial court ruled:
“On balance, and contingent upon further proof, it appears that Washington State is the better forum, and, given the preponderant links of Washington State to this action, that in relation to that state, California is a seriously inconvenient forum.
“Both plaintiffs, William and Mary Jo Wangen have been residents of Washington State for 50 years; the majority of plaintiff William’s exposure and employment, but for a stint in the U.S. Navy some 50 years ago, was in that State, William’s treating physicians reside there, and plaintiffs’ potential witnesses, including co-workers and former employees, reside there as well, many of whom defendants will be unable to compel to travel to California to give testimony.
“Defendants make an offer of proof, only, since the documentation on which they rely is unauthenticated, that as many as 36 of the 41 defendants are amenable to service in Washington. Because there is no competent evidence of the point, each defendant is ordered to submit by March 26, 2008 a declaration from a competent witness either affirming or denying that each defendant who has appeared in the action is, or is not, ‘present’ in the State of Washington for jurisdictional purposes. Depending upon this evidence, the action [will] be stayed, not dismissed, or the motion will be denied.”
4. The Parties Offer Further Evidence
Thereafter, evidence was presented about the various defendants’ amenability to service in Washington, the details of which are set forth below in the trial court’s ruling.
Wangen, in an effort to substantiate his claim that relevant witnesses resided in California, submitted declarations from only two individuals: Jim Faber and Walter Putzel. Each man now lived in California and averred that travel to Washington to participate in the case “would pose a serious inconvenience,” including incurring meal and travel costs. Each had served aboard the USS Wiltsie with Wangen. Faber explained that “during combat tours when gunners would fire six 5 inch guns in rapid-fire sequence,” the ship would shake, “causing asbestos to [rain] down from the overhead piping.” In addition, both Faber and Putzel averred that they and Wangen performed routine maintenance and repair on the ship, including removal, repair or replacement of parts and insulation on pumps, valves and pipes.
5. The Trial Court’s Second Ruling
Following a hearing conducted on April 1, the trial court issued a minute order granting the defense motion. It explained:
“At the hearing on March 19, the court granted the motion, conditional upon the filing by March 26, by each defendant who had generally appeared in the action, a declaration by a competent and qualified corporate representative attesting to each responding party’s amenability to service in the State of Washington.
“Twenty-five defendants submitted the required declarations, 2 submitted declarations showing that they were not amenable to service in Washington (Soco and Plant Insulation); and another 10 submitted no declaration (Waldron, Conair, Garlock, Buffalo Pumps, Crane, Parker-Hannifin, Quintec Industries and Asbestos Corporation). Of these 10 who did not submit declarations, three have not appeared in this action (Parker-Hannifin, Waldron, and Asbestos Corporation), which means that the total of all parties defendant to be considered in assessing the numerosity of defendants who are amenable to service in Washington is thirty-seven (37). Of that total number, twenty-five, or 74%, are, by their own admission, amenable to service there.
Soco West, Inc. presented a declaration from an Assistant Vice President who averred that she was “informed and believe[d] that Soco West, Inc. is not subject to jurisdiction in the State of Washington.”
“The parties should note that the court is not finding that any of the 7 defendants who appeared but did not submit declarations are not amenable to service in Washington. The court merely notes that there is an absence of evidence on this point. At the same time, as to the 2 defendants who deny they are amenable to service in Washington, the court does not find that the courts of the State of Washington lack jurisdiction over them. The self-serving declarations of those 2 defendants (Soco and Plant Insulation) will not in any way prevent or preclude an adjudication against them on this point in that State’s courts.
“Plaintiffs rely on American [Cemwood Corp.] v. American [Home Assurance Co.] (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431 (and other cases) for the proposition that all defendants must be ‘present’ in the alternative forum, and that unless defendants show that all are in fact amenable to service there, the motion must be denied, without considering any other factors. But the same court also cited with approval the Hansen v. Owens[-Corning Fiberglas Corp.] (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 753, deferring to that court’s opinion in the context of asbestos litigation. The Hansen opinion specifically held, in the asbestos litigation context, that ‘a moving defendant need not show that all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in the same alternative forum.’ (American, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 439.) While the Hansen case involved some 200 defendants, we do not read the opinion to hold that the defendants named in an asbestos case must be that numerous. In our case, thirty-seven is sufficiently high a number to invoke the same considerations of inconvenience described in the Hansen opinion. Plaintiffs also argue that, as a matter of fact, witnesses preponderate in this State, and, for that reason, that no economies will be realized, and no burden and inconvenience avoided, by moving this case to Washington. But the plaintiffs’ evidence here does not withstand scrutiny. In his declaration, Mr. Barrow, counsel of record for plaintiffs, avers, on information and belief, that there are some seventy-one (71) ‘potential’ witnesses to William’s exposure some 50 years ago in the naval shipyards in California. Of these 71, Mr. Barrow avers, again on information and belief, that some 38 reside in California.
“There are at least 2 problems with this argument. First, Mr. Barrow presents his informed opinion, not evidence. Second, he provides no context to allow independent assessment of whether 38 such witnesses is so great in relation to the total universe of ‘potential’ witnesses that only California is a suitable forum.
“In the final analysis, plaintiffs offer competent evidence of only 2 witnesses (Faber and Putzel), residents of California, who have knowledge of William’s exposure in this State. It is not disputed that after William’s brief stay in California over 50 years ago, all his other exposure was during his employment in Washington. His treating physicians are in Washington, together with his medical records from 1954 (when he became a Washington State resident) until the present.
“For all of these reasons, together with the other (public policy) factors discussed in Hansen, the motion to stay is granted, and the action will be stayed depending on plaintiffs’ ability to establish, in the Washington court, that not all of the defendants are subject to jurisdiction in that State.”
Several days later, the trial court issued a formal order staying the action. It reads:
“The defendants’ motion to stay or dismiss the action on forum non-conveniens grounds having been granted, the court having found that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in the State of Washington, the captioned matter is hereby stayed; provided, however, that the stay shall be lifted upon evidence that complete relief may not be had by plaintiffs William and Mary Jo Wangen in the courts of the State of Washington.”
Wangen initially filed a petition for writ of mandate to contest the trial court’s order. (Wangen, et. al. v. Superior Court (Gardner Denver, Inc.), B207226.) We summarily denied the petition because the remedy at law is adequate: the challenged order is appealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(3)).
DISCUSSION
Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine by which a trial court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction to hear a case when it believes that the case may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751 (Stangvik).) The doctrine is codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30. The statute provides, in relevant part: “When a court upon motion of a party . . . finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.30, subd. (a).) When, as here, the trial court grants a stay on grounds of forum non conveniens, it retains jurisdiction over the case and may resume the proceedings upon a proper showing. (Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 857.)
The defendants, as the moving parties in a forum non conveniens motion, bear the burden of proof. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) In ruling upon the motion, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis. First, it must determine whether there is a suitable alternative forum. If it finds that there is, it then must weigh the private interests of the litigants and the interest of the public in keeping the case in California. (Ibid.) We analyze each step separately.
A. Suitable Alternative Forum
A state other than California is a suitable alternative forum for the lawsuit “if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the case on the merits.” (Chong v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037.) Suitability of a forum is a legal question which we review de novo. (Roulier v. Cannondale (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186; American Cemwood Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 431, 436 (Cemwood).)
Here, the crux of the controversy is whether the moving parties must establish that the alternative forum (Washington) can exercise personal jurisdiction over each and every defendant before the forum non conveniens motion can be granted. In that regard, Hansen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 753 (Hansen) is instructive. Hansen was an asbestos case with 200 named defendants. (Id. at p. 756.) One defendant moved, pursuant to the forum non conveniens doctrine, to stay the litigation because Montana, where the plaintiff had lived and where most of the asbestos exposure allegedly occurred, was a suitable alternative forum. (Id. at pp. 756-757.) The moving defendant was amenable to service of process in Montana and the “vast majority of [the] defendants [had] contacts in both California and Montana.” (Id. at p. 757.) However, at least three other defendants did not consent to jurisdiction in Montana and it was not known whether they had sufficient contacts with Montana to subject them to personal jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 758.) The trial court granted the motion to stay the California litigation subject to the following condition. After the plaintiff filed suit in Montana, he could return to the California trial court and request the stay be lifted if he could conclusively show that Montana was not a suitable alternative jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 756-757.)
Wangen makes no claim that his lawsuit would be time-barred in Washington.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order. It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the moving party was required to prove that all defendants were amenable to service in Montana. It explained that it was “aware of no authority that a moving defendant must show all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in a particular alternative forum.” (Id. at pp. 758-759.) It concluded, after analyzing the cases relied upon by the plaintiff for that proposition, that none “state[d] or implie[d] all defendants must be subject to jurisdiction in an alternative forum before an order staying an action can be affirmed.” (Id. at p. 759.) Given the lack of specific precedent on the issue, the Hansen court reasoned: “In asbestos cases such as this, where there are 200 named defendants, it is unreasonable to expect the moving defendant to prove all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in a particular alternative forum. Given the early stage for bringing a forum non conveniens motion, it would likely be unclear in many cases whether all defendants were even subject to jurisdiction in California.” (Id. at p. 759.) Because the trial court had stayed the action pending a determination that all defendants were subject to jurisdiction in Montana, the appellate court upheld its ruling.
This case is very similar to Hansen because it involves an asbestos claim against multiple defendants. Although Hansen involved 200 defendants and this case involved 37 defendants at the time of the trial court’s ruling, we do not think that numerical difference is a material distinction. We believe that the governing principle remains that in such a large multi-defendant action, the moving defendant need not show that all defendants are subject to jurisdiction in the same alternative forum before an action can be stayed based upon the principle of forum non conveniens. (Hansen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 758-759.)
Here, at the time the trial court ruled upon the motion, there were 37 defendants. Twenty-five submitted declarations showing that they were amenable to service in Washington. Two submitted declarations disputing jurisdiction, but the trial court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, expressly declined to credit those declarations. Ten defendants failed to submit any declarations but three of those defendants had not yet even appeared in the action. Consequently, there was no showing that any one of the defendants was not subject to Washington jurisdiction. There was, however, an affirmative showing that 74 percent of the defendants were amenable to service of process in Washington. This showing was sufficient to grant the motion to stay the California action since the trial court explicitly gave Wangen the right to move to lift the stay if he could show that he could not obtain complete relief in Washington. In sum, applying a de novo standard of review, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that Washington was a suitable alternative forum.
Although we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s ruling about suitability of the alternative forum, we review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (See Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694 [although an appellate court reviews a summary judgment de novo, it reviews the trial court’s rulings on evidentiary objections by applying the abuse of discretion standard].)
After the trial court granted defendants’ motion, Wangen filed an action in Washington against all of the defendants named in the California lawsuit. Two of the defendants, Plant Insulation Company and Soco West Inc., moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Washington trial court granted their motions over Wangen’s opposition. Wangen now asks us to take judicial notice of those two rulings. Wangen argues that the orders are relevant “in that they tend to prove both legal error committed by the trial court [in not crediting the declarations from representatives of those two corporate defendants that the entities were not subject to Washington jurisdiction] and the prejudice to [Wangen] resulting from the error” because he “will be forced to abandon [the] case against these two defendants, or pursue a separate action against them in California.”
Wangen’s contrary arguments are not persuasive.
First, Wangen relies heavily upon Cemwood, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 431. There, the plaintiff insured filed an action in California against five of its insurers for declaratory relief and damages. The insurers were located in four different states; the plaintiff insured’s parent corporation was located in Canada. Two of the defendant-insurers filed an action against the plaintiff in Canada and moved to dismiss or stay the California action on the basis of forum non conveniens. The trial court did not determine whether all five defendants named in the California action were subject to jurisdiction in Canada. Instead, it granted the motion to stay subject only to the condition that the defendants agree to toll the statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 434-435.)
The plaintiff appealed, contending that Canada was not a suitable alternative forum because the defense had failed to establish that all five defendants could be sued in Canada. The appellate court agreed, distinguishing Hansen in two important regards. One was that Hansen involved 200 named defendants whereas the case under review involved “but five defendants” so “it would not be unreasonable here to expect [the two moving defendants] to prove the three other defendants are subject to jurisdiction in a particular alternative forum.” (Id. at p. 440.) The second distinction was that the Hansen trial court had stayed the California action pending a determination that all defendants were subject to jurisdiction to Montana whereas the Cemwood trial court had not conditioned its ruling on any subsequent determination about the other defendants’ amenability to service in the alternative forum. These two distinctions render Wangen’s reliance upon Cemwood misplaced.
Further, contrary to what Wangen argues, there is no “split of authority [between Hansen and Cemwood] when multiple defendants are involved” because the two cases can, in fact, be reconciled. Each case’s holding is consistent with accepted forum non conveniens principles. Ordinarily the burden is on the moving defendant to demonstrate that the defendants are subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. However, if that showing cannot be made in a large multi-defendant lawsuit, then the action may be stayed (but not dismissed), pending a determination about the alternative forum’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. We therefore decline Wangen’s invitation to reverse the trial court’s order either by “reject[ing] Hansen in favor of American Cemwood” or “by limiting Hansen to itsfacts” to a case involving (at least) 200 defendants.
Lastly, Wangen advances for the first time on appeal a constitutional attack on the trial court’s ruling. He relies upon the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution (art. IV, § 2, U.S. Const.) and the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions (14th Amend. to the U.S. Const. and art. I, § 7 of the Cal. Const.). Wangen argues: “If the approach of the Hansen decision to the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to be used as a special exception for asbestos cases, trial courts in California will be discriminating against plaintiffs who have asbestos-related claims (which usually, if not always, involve large numbers of defendants) and in favor of plaintiffs who have other types of claims with fewer defendants[,] . . . precisely the type of distinction which . . . would violate the privileges and immunities clause.” Wangen also argues that “because the Hansen rule applies to types of cases and groups of non-residents, it makes a distinction which arbitrarily denies one class of non-residents access to California courts in violation [of the equal protection clauses].”
Putting aside the fact that Wangen’s failure to advance this constitutional claim in the trial court constitutes a forfeiture of the right to raise it on appeal (Feduniak v. California Costal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1381), the argument is not persuasive. A distinction is not being drawn between an asbestos case and all other cases. Instead, the distinction is being drawn based upon the fact that the case (which could involve any theory of liability) has many defendants so that it would be unreasonable to expect a moving defendant to establish that all defendants were subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum.
B. Balancing of Public and Private Interests
After the trial court determines that another state constitutes a suitable forum, it must next “consider the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California.” (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) The private interests include the “ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. The public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Ibid.) The trial court’s ruling on this step is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Cemwood, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 436.)
On this record, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that both the private and public interests weigh in favor of trying the case in Washington. Wangen is a lifelong resident of Washington. Wangen’s claim that “the majority of his claimed exposures [to asbestos] occurred in California” is simply not supported by the record. His initial multi-year exposure occurred on board the USS Wiltsie while serving off of Korea. His contact with asbestos products in California was serendipitous. During his military service more than 50 years ago, his ship docked on several occasions in California ports for repair and maintenance during which time he suffered additional exposure to asbestos. After he completed his service, he returned to Washington. There, according to his own allegations, he was exposed to asbestos-containing products in multiple environments over a 40-year period. Thus, the logical (if not only reasonable) inference is that the majority of his exposure occurred in Washington and most of the evidence (witnesses and documents) relevant to proving the liability portion of his claim would be found in Washington. Further, Wangen was diagnosed with mesothelioma in Washington and received (with the exception of visits to the Mayo Clinic in Arizona) all medical treatment there. Thus, the vast majority of the relevant medical records and witnesses are in Washington; none are in California. Lastly, California residents should not be expected to serve as jurors in a case involving injuries incurred primarily outside of California by a non-resident. (Hansen, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 760.) In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public weighed in favor of trying this case in Washington.
Wangen concedes that in engaging in the balancing process, a determinative factor “is where the majority of exposure occurred . . . because in an asbestos case, it is the exposure that gives rise to defendants’ liability by representing where defendants breached their duties to plaintiff and where defendants’ misconduct caused plaintiff to sustain injuries that would later manifest.”
Wangen was able to identify only two California residents who would testify on his behalf about his contact with asbestos in the California ports as well as aboard the USS Wiltsie while engaged in combat off of Korea.
We reject Wangen’s suggestion that defendants did not make a sufficiently particularized showing on this point. Case law does “not require an extensive evidentiary showing. The principal evidentiary showing . . . require[d] is that trial may be had in the alternative forum and that some form of relief may be granted [in that forum] . . . . Examination of the private and public interests at stake involve more general considerations.” (Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1542, italics added; see also Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1461-1462.) Here, the trial court had Wangen’s discovery responses detailing his 40-year exposure to asbestos in Washington and the medical treatment he received in Washington, Wangen’s offer of proof re two California witnesses, and the undisputed nature of the lawsuit. This was sufficient to permit the trial court to soundly exercise its discretion regarding the balancing of public and private interests.
DISPOSITION
The order staying further proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.
Plant Insulation Company presented a declaration from its general counsel. Based upon his personal knowledge, he averred that the company was not a Washington corporation and had never done business in the state.
Later, Wangen filed another petition (Wangen v. Superior Court (Union Carbide Corp. et al.), B211772) to challenge the trial court’s order denying his motion to lift the stay. We summarily denied the petition, finding Wangen “failed to state sufficient facts or legal authority demonstrating entitlement to the extraordinary relief sought.”
The trial court’s decision to not credit the two declarations was not an abuse of discretion. The one tendered by Soco West, Inc., based entirely on information and belief, was patently conclusory. Although the one tendered by Plant Insulation Company was detailed and based upon the declarant’s personal knowledge, it failed to address all bases upon which a Washington trial court could exercise personal jurisdiction under Washington’s expansive long-arm statute. (Rev. Code Wash. § 4.28.185.)
We deny the request. “Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.’ [Citation.] No exceptional circumstances exist that would justify deviating from that rule[.] [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 4.)
Here, the trial court’s order explicitly gives Wangen the option to request that the stay be lifted by presenting evidence that he cannot obtain complete relief in Washington. Accordingly, Wangen’s remedy is to present the two rulings to the trial court and request lifting of the stay. We express no opinion as to how the trial court should rule upon that request if it is made.
And contrary to what Wangen suggests, there is no requirement that the trial court engage in a detailed on the record analysis of every potential factor before it rules on the motion. (Ibid.) Consequently, that the trial court in this instance did not discuss other factors mentioned by decisional law before it granted the motion does not undermine the soundness of its ruling.