Opinion
11-10-2016
In the Matter of the Application for Discharge of Melvin WALLS, Consecutive No. 76930, from Central New York Psychiatric Center Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Section 10.09, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of New York, New York State Office of Mental Health and New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondents–Respondents.
Emmett J. Creahan, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Utica (Patrick T. Chamberlain of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of Counsel), for Respondents–Respondents.
Emmett J. Creahan, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Utica (Patrick T. Chamberlain of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of Counsel), for Respondents–Respondents.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, DeJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM: By order entered in December 2013, Supreme Court determined after an annual review hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.09(d) that petitioner is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The court continued petitioner's confinement in a secure treatment facility. Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in Matter of State of New York v. Donald DD. , 24 N.Y.3d 174, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610, 21 N.E.3d 239, petitioner's counsel moved to vacate the above order pursuant to CPLR 5015(a), contending that the evidence submitted during the annual review hearing is not legally sufficient to support a finding that petitioner suffers from a mental abnormality. The court denied the motion. We affirm.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's CPLR 5015(a) motion (see Matter of State of New York v. Richard TT., 132 A.D.3d 72, 75, 14 N.Y.S.3d 824, affd. 27 N.Y.3d 718, 37 N.Y.S.3d 765, 59 N.E.3d 500 ). Contrary to petitioner's contention, the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that he has “a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03[i] ). Here, respondents' expert testified that petitioner has such a predisposing condition based on diagnoses of personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with antisocial traits, combined with cocaine and alcohol abuse. Respondents' expert also stated that petitioner exhibited behavior markers of an abnormal sexual interest in nonconsensual sexual behavior. In view of the foregoing, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents (see Matter of State of New York v. John S., 23 N.Y.3d 326, 348, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532, 15 N.E.3d 287, rearg. denied 24 N.Y.3d 933, 993 N.Y.S.2d 544, 17 N.E.3d 1141 ), we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a finding of mental abnormality (see § 10.03[i] ; Matter of State of New York v. Dennis K., 27 N.Y.3d 718, 749–750, 37 N.Y.S.3d 765, 59 N.E.3d 500 ; Matter of State of New York v. Charada T., 23 N.Y.3d 355, 359, 362, 991 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 N.E.3d 362 ; Matter of Vega v. State of New York, 140 A.D.3d 1608, 1608–1609, 34 N.Y.S.3d 810 ; Matter of State of New York v. Williams, 139 A.D.3d 1375, 1377, 31 N.Y.S.3d 362 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.