Opinion
Case No. CV 13-1537 JCG
02-12-2014
WYNTON K. WALLERS, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Wynton K. Wallers ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability benefits. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly evaluated the medical evidence. (Joint Stip. at 3, 13-16.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff for the reasons stated below.
A. Evaluation of the Medical Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical evidence when he adopted the opinion of the state agency consultant over the opinions of Plaintiff's treating and examining physicians. (Id.)
1. Standard
In evaluating medical opinions, the law distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians:
(1) those who treat the claimant;Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).
(2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant; and
(3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant.
"As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant." Id.; accord Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). This is so because a treating physician "is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
Where the treating physician's "opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for 'clear and convincing' reasons." Benton, 331 F.3d at 1036. "Even if the treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the [ALJ] may not reject this opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record[.]" Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citation omitted); accord Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).
The ALJ can meet the requisite specific and legitimate standard "by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2. The ALJ Improperly Adopted Non-Treating, Non-Examining State Agency Consultant Dudley's Opinion
The ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is not legally sufficient and/or supported by substantial evidence because he improperly adopted the opinion of non-treating, non-examining state agency consultant Dudley. Two reasons guide this determination
First, Dr. Dudley's opinion, standing alone, does not constitute substantial evidence here. Erickson v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 813, 818 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the non-examining physicians' conclusion, with nothing more, does not constitute substantial evidence[]") (citation omitted); see Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (physician's "views carried only minimal evidentiary weight" where in the form of a checklist and lacking supportive objective evidence). Here, Dr. Dudley did not treat, examine, or even meet Plaintiff. He submitted his conclusions in checklist form, only partially completed, with no supporting evidence. (See AR at 272-75.) As such, the ALJ's reliance thereupon was improper. (See id. at 29 ("I find Dr. Dudley's opinion to be most consistent with the evidence in this case []. Accordingly, I find that [Plaintiff's] mental impairments are not severe.").)
Second, assuming arguendo that the ME's opinion was legally sufficient to constitute substantial evidence, here, the ME's opinion is internally inconsistent. See Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 168 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (internally inconsistent physician's report is properly discounted). In particular, Dr. Dudley rated Plaintiff as moderately impaired in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out instructions, complete a normal workday without interruptions, interact appropriately with the public, and respond to changes in the work setting. (AR at 272-74.) Nevertheless, in his one-sentence summation, Dr. Dudley wrote that Plaintiff "retains the ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple work-related tasks . . . and has no significant limitations in the ability to sustain concentration/persistence/pace, relate to others, or otherwise adapt to the requirements of the normal workplace. (Id. at 275.) The ALJ's selective reading of this contradictory report constitutes error. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ failed to provide substantial evidence for his decision where ALJ "selectively focused on aspects of [physician's] report which tend[ed] to suggest non-disability").
Further, if the ALJ truly wished to rely on Dr. Dudley's report, he had a duty to further develop the record to resolve its ambiguities. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (duty to develop record is triggered "when there is ambiguous evidence"). This is particularly so where, as here, the treating and examining opinions support the portion of Dr. Dudley's report that the ALJ ignored. (See AR at 678-80 (treating physician Pariewski's opinion), 642-46 (examining physician Goldsmith's opinion).) Accordingly, the ALJ's review of the medical evidence is not supported by substantial evidence.
Alternatively, the ALJ could have properly discredited Dr. Dudley due to the inconsistencies in his report. See Morgan, 168 F.3d at 603.
Instead, the ALJ used his selective reading of Dr. Dudley's report to impeach Plaintiff's treating and examining physicians. (See AR at 28-29.)
B. Remand is Warranted
With error established, this Court has discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Where no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004). But where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, or it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See id. at 594.
Here, remand is required because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence. The ALJ shall reassess the medical opinions in the record and provide sufficient reasons under the applicable legal standard for accepting or rejecting any portion of the medical opinions. In addition, to the extent the evidence is ambiguous, the ALJ shall obtain additional information and clarification regarding Plaintiff's mental and physical limitations during the period at issue.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits and REMANDING the matter for further administrative action consistent with this decision.
In light of the Court's remand instructions, it is unnecessary to address Plaintiff's remaining contentions. (See Joint Stip. at 6-20, 29-33.)
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Hon. Jay C. Gandhi
United States Magistrate Judge