Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-00560-MR
02-02-2018
CHARLES ABNER WALKER APPELLANT v. DELORA WALKER APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Otis Doan, Jr. Harlan, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Christopher F. Douglas Pineville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT COSTANZO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-00354 OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, MAZE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Charles Abner Walker appeals from a decree of dissolution entered by the Bell Circuit Court which ordered him to pay maintenance to Delora Walker. He argues that Delora has sufficient property and income to meet her reasonable needs, and consequently, the trial court's award of maintenance to her was an abuse of discretion. He also takes issues with the sufficiency of the trial court's findings. We conclude that the trial court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hence, we find no abuse of discretion, and therefore, affirm the award of maintenance.
The underlying facts of this action are not in dispute. Charles and Delora Walker were married in 1971 and separated in June of 2013. At the time of their separation, they had no minor children. On September 4, 2014, Charles filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. In her response, Delora requested that the trial court award her temporary maintenance. The trial court granted her motion and ordered Charles to pay maintenance in the amount of $600 per month.
During the marriage, the parties acquired a considerable amount of real and personal property. The parties entered into a settlement agreement with respect to that property. The only disputed issue concerned Delora's request for maintenance.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree of dissolution. The court found that the parties' settlement agreement was conscionable, and incorporated it into the decree. With respect to maintenance, the trial court found that Delora lacked sufficient property and income to provide for her reasonable needs. The court also found that Charles has sufficient income to support himself and to pay maintenance to Delora. The court further noted that Charles was receiving a workers' compensation award which would cease at some point in the future. Consequently, the court ordered Charles to pay maintenance for sixty months, at the rate of $600 per month until his workers' compensation award ceased, and thereafter at the rate of $300 per month for the balance of the award. Charles now appeals from this order.
Charles argues that Delora failed to establish that she was entitled to an award of maintenance. KRS 403.200 provides that a trial court may grant maintenance to either party in a divorce action only if it finds that a party seeking maintenance "[l]acks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and ... [i]s unable to support himself through appropriate employment...". KRS 403.200(1). Under this statute, the court must first make relevant findings of fact and then determine maintenance considering those facts. Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Ky. 1992). "In order to reverse the trial court's decision, a reviewing court must find either that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the trial court has abused its discretion." Id.
Kentucky Revised Statutes. --------
Charles points out that Delora received substantial assets as part of the property settlement agreement, including both real property and a savings account. In addition, Delora testified that she received social security disability benefits of $1,142.90, less her health insurance premium of $104.90, bringing her total monthly income to $1,038.00. In contrast, Charles maintains that Delora only has about $1,000 in monthly expenses. Given this evidence, Charles argues that Delora was not entitled to maintenance.
However, a spouse seeking maintenance is not required to exhaust all assets to support herself at the level established during the marriage. Id. at 827. Delora's liquid assets consisted of a savings account with approximately $100,000, and a checking account with a balance of approximately $3,000. In addition, she received the marital residence valued at approximately $120,000, and other real estate valued at approximately $5,000. There was no evidence that this property could produce any significant income except by immediate liquidation. An award of temporary maintenance allows time for Delora's assets to appreciate so that she can support herself in later years.
Furthermore, while Charles asserts that Delora only had approximately $1,000 in necessary monthly expenses, she actually claimed total monthly expenses of about $2,400. In addition, Delora also testified that she would lose coverage under Charles's insurance for her prescriptions and those expenses would increase by approximately $600 a month. In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Delora was entitled to maintenance under the criteria set out in KRS 403.200(1).
Upon finding that a spouse is entitled to maintenance, KRS 403.200(2) directs the court to determine the amount and duration of such maintenance, "after consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
In determining the amount of maintenance, the trial court only addressed Charles's ability to meet his reasonable needs while paying maintenance to Delora. Charles complains that the trial court failed to address any of the other applicable factors. However, the amount and duration of the maintenance award are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Ky. 1990). "As an appellate court ... this Court is [not] authorized to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court on the weight of the evidence, where the trial court's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Leveridge v. Leveridge, 997 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1999), citing Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1990).
Although the trial court's failure to make findings on those factors hinders our review, we conclude that the record clearly shows that the trial court considered those factors. In particular, the parties agree that this was a long-term marriage of forty-two years. The parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during the marriage. While both parties are unable to work and are receiving disability benefits, Delora has substantially fewer assets and far less income than Charles. Likewise, her age, health, and limited work-experience limits her ability to acquire additional assets.
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded her only temporary maintenance over a five-year period. Furthermore, the trial court specified that Charles's maintenance obligation would be reduced in half once his workers' compensation benefit expires. Based on the evidence before the trial court, we cannot find that the amount and duration of the maintenance award amounted to an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Bell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Otis Doan, Jr.
Harlan, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Christopher F. Douglas
Pineville, Kentucky