Opinion
No. 13-03-055-CV
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed August 26, 2004.
On appeal from the Probate Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices HINOJOSA and CASTILLO.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a declaratory-judgment action. McAllen National Bank, as dependent administrator of the appellee, the Estate of Teresa Canales Guerrero, originally asked the trial court to declare whether a purchase-and-sale contract between appellant Lance Walker ("Walker") and Teresa Canales Guerrero ("Guerrero") was valid and enforceable. Walker later counterclaimed for declaratory relief to enforce the contract. The trial court declared the contract void. Walker appealed. We ordered a stay of further proceedings in the probate court pending the disposition of this appeal. By one issue, Walker claims error in the trial court's conclusion that the contract is void, arguing there was no evidence the contract was illegal or otherwise against public policy. We affirm.
Esteban and Nadia Guerra are co-administrators of the Estate on this appeal.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
This is a memorandum opinion. The parties are familiar with the facts. We will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of our decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
During December 2001, Walker negotiated with Guerrero and her husband for the purchase of an extensive tract of real estate. Sometime in late January or early February 2002, Walker delivered a completed "farm-and-ranch" form contract to Guerrero. He brought along a $25,000 earnest-money check dated January 25, 2002. The trial court admitted the original of the contract into evidence at trial. The contract reflects an initial typed sales price of $2,498,914. The typed sales price is marked out and the handwritten number $2,583,114 substituted. Walker's initials appear beside the interlineation. Guerrero's initials do not. Both Walker and Guerrero's initials appear on the bottom of each page. Their signatures appear on the signature page of the contract.
It is not clear from the record who interlineated the higher purchase price or when the interlineation was made. At trial, Walker argued that Guerrero's initials next to the interlineation were unnecessary because the change reflected a higher purchase price. The Estate countered that the absence of Guerrero's initials also could indicate that the higher purchase price was not high enough.
The contract provided for a closing date by February 28, 2002. The time period within which the contract required Walker to obtain financing ran from its effective date. However, the effective date was not filled in. Guerrero wanted to "review" the contract, Walker explained without objection, and probably wanted to "kick it around." As a result, Guerrero kept the original of the contract. Walker kept the earnest-money check and left.
The trial court sustained a number of objections to testimony that sought to introduce statements Guerrero made before signing the contract. See Tex. R. Evid. 601(b) (the "deadman's statute").
McAllen National Bank introduced the original of the contract into evidence.
The contract called for Walker to deliver the $25,000 earnest money to the title company. He did not do so at the time. Guerrero died on February 13, 2002 without delivering the contract to Walker or to the title company. Walker did not deliver the earnest money to the title company until October 31, 2002. He delivered a copy of the contract along with it. The original contract remained in the hands of Guerrero's estate until introduced at trial.
Trial was to the court. The final judgment recited:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECLARED BY THE COURT THAT THE FARM AND RANCH CONTRACT SIGNED BY LANCE WALKER AND TERESA CANALES GUERRERO, Deceased, that is attached to McAllen National Bank's Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment, is not enforceable and is void and of no effect to the record title of real property. . . .
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment if it finds support in the evidence on any theory applicable to the case. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984); Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (citing Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987)).
Walker filed both a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and a notice of past-due findings. He does not complain on appeal about the omission.
III. ANALYSIS A. Applicable Law
The material terms of a contract for sale include: (1) identification of the property being sold; (2) the consideration or price paid for the property; and (3) the parties' consent to exchange the property for the agreed price. John Wood Group USA, Inc. v. ICO, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The requisites of a valid contract are: (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) each party's consent to the terms; and (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent it be mutual and binding. Adams v. H H Meat Prods., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 771 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). No binding contract is formed where material terms are open for future negotiation. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. 1992).
"Meeting of the minds" means the parties' mutual understanding and assent to the expression of their agreement. Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied). We base our determination of whether there was a meeting of the minds on an objective evaluation of what the parties said and did rather than on their subjective states of mind. Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2000, no pet.); Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). In determining the intent of the parties, we look "to the communications between the parties and to the acts and circumstances surrounding these communications." Angelou, 33 S.W.3d at 278.
B. Application of the Law to the Facts
Considering only evidence of the parties' objective communications and conduct, we find that this record does not support any conclusion they came to a meeting of the minds. Guerrero did not initial the interlineated sales price. The effective date of the contract remained blank. Walker testified that Guerrero retained the original of the contract to "review" and "kick around." Guerrero did not deliver the contract to Walker or to the title company. Walker did not deliver the earnest-money check to the title company until months after Guerrero's death. We conclude that the parties did not reach a mutual understanding and assent to the interlineated purchase price on the farm-and-ranch form contract as an expression of their agreement. See Weynand, 990 S.W.2d at 846. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence does not support the conclusion that Guerrero and Walker formed a contract. See H H Meat Prods., 41 S.W.3d at 771.
On appeal, Walker argues that only a contract that is illegal or against public policy is "void." We do not find it necessary to address his contention. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1. The evidence supports the declaratory judgment on the legal theory that the parties did not come to a meeting of the minds as to a material term and, therefore, did not form a contract. See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717; see also Creavin, 773 S.W.2d at 702. Thus, we do not determine the correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the contract is unenforceable and void. We overrule Walker's sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We overrule all pending motions as moot. We affirm the declaratory judgment of the trial court. This Court's stay order dated February 20, 2003 is hereby LIFTED.