Opinion
CIV-20-412-JD
03-22-2023
AARON DAVID WALDON, Plaintiff, v. BRIAN MAUGHN, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state pre-trial detainee appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the sufficiency of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's action be dismissed.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is currently confined at the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Doc. No. 1 (“Comp.”). In his Complaint, Plaintiff names eight Defendants: County Commissioners for Oklahoma County Brian Maughn, Carrie Blumert, and Kevin Calvey, District Attorney David Prater, Assistant District Attorney Kelly Collins, Oklahoma County District Judge Heather Coyle, criminal defense attorney Anthony Coleman, and Oklahoma County Sheriff P.D. Taylor. Id. at 1-3.
Plaintiff was arrested on June 11, 2018, based on an arrest warrant issued by the Oklahoma County District Court, and was booked into OCDC. Id. at 4. On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff posted bond in the amount of $25,000 and was released. Id. Between August 2, 2018 and December 4, 2019, Plaintiff appeared at nine court appearances. Id. During this time according to Plaintiff, he retained private defense counsel, Defendant Coleman, on the advice of Defendant Prater. Id. at 45.
On December 3, 2019, Defendant Coleman received a text message from an unknown number at 11:08 p.m. stating that Defendant Coleman should call the sender if he did not want to be caught off guard in court the next day. Id. at 9. Defendant Coleman opted not to contact the person because he did not know the sender's identity or the nature of the alleged information they would share, and he had a number of cases set for court the following day, including a hearing in Plaintiff's case. Id. at 5, 9. During that hearing, Defendant Collins advised the court that the District Attorney's Office had received a call from a “concerned citizen” stating that Plaintiff was a flight risk. Id. at 5. In Judge Coyle's chambers, along with Defendants Prater and Collins, Defendant Coleman responded to the text message sender asking the person to call him. Id. at 9. When the person called, Defendant Coleman placed him on speaker phone. Id. at 9-10. Judge Coyle increased Plaintiff's bond from $25,000.00 to $300,000.00. Id. at 5.
On December 17, 2019, the state court held a hearing on Plaintiff's request for a bond reduction. Id. The concerned citizen caller was “uncooperative” and did not appear at the hearing. Id. Investigator Darren Gordon testified as to the recorded telephone calls from the concerned citizen. Id. Investigator Gordon also seized Plaintiff's vehicle from property rented and maintained by Plaintiff's employer and seized Plaintiff's cell phone during the hearing. Id. A bondsman was present and was prepared to post a bond up to $100,000.00. Id. The court denied Plaintiff's request for bond reduction. Id.
On January 3, 2020, OCDC placed Plaintiff into protective custody for safety reasons, moving him to the 10th Floor and into a cell with inmate Casey Wilson. Id. at 6. Plaintiff requested to be moved several times because he is a small man and Inmate Wilson is an aggressive, large gang member of the Irish mob with a violent history. Id. Plaintiff never received a response on his numerous requests to be moved, or said requests were denied. Id. at 6-8. Inmate Wilson sexually harassed Plaintiff, requesting sexual favors and making sexual innuendos, and on two occasions touched his buttocks. Id. at 6. Inmate Wilson also threatened Plaintiff if Plaintiff ever called the sexual assault hotline. Id.
Inmate Wilson forced Plaintiff to call Inmate Wilson's spouse, Lisa Northcutt, and manipulated Plaintiff into signing a Power of Attorney that Ms. Northcutt could use to get money out of Plaintiff's bank accounts. Id. at 7. Ms. Northcutt ultimately stole Plaintiff's funds from his bank accounts. Id. at 7-8.
On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff contacted the sexual assault hotline and “advised Officer Davis, sent request to Sgt. Compton, Sgt. Dave, OKCPD, and had no response.” Id. at 7. On February 17, 2020, Sgt. Ponder, the Prison Rape Elimination Act investigator, visited with Plaintiff and ordered him moved to a different cell. Id. Plaintiff has still not been moved, although documentation falsely indicates otherwise. Id.
By this action, Plaintiff asserts Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Prater and Collins, arguing Detective Gordon's unlawful search and seizure of his vehicle and his cell phone were done at their request. Id. at 11. He also asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against Judge Coyle based on the setting of Plaintiffs bond at $300,000.00, which he contends is excessive and unlawful. Id. Plaintiff asserts a Sixth Amendment claim against his defense attorney, Defendant Coleman, based on ineffective assistance of counsel because he “received an unknown text message about [P]laintiff and turned such information over to Prosecutor and withdrew as counsel.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against Sheriff Taylor based on Plaintiff's placement in a cell with Inmate Wilson that left him vulnerable to sexual assault and extortion, as well as lack of law library access. Id. at 10, 11. Although named as Defendants, Plaintiff does not assert any specific claims against Oklahoma County Commissioner Defendants Maughn, Blumert, and Calvey.
II. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity or proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(a). After conducting an initial review or at any time during the proceeding, the court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it presenting claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
In conducting this review, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
III. Claims Against Defendants Coyle, Prater, Collins, and Coleman
State records clearly indicate, as does Plaintiff's Complaint and additional filings, that the state criminal proceeding underlying Plaintiff's arrest and pending criminal charges is ongoing. As a result, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Coyle, Prater, Collins, and Coleman as they seek relief related to ongoing criminal proceedings.
See Oklahoma State Court Network, District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2018-3202. https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&number=CF 2018-3202&cmid=3671 794
In Younger, the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts should not intervene in state criminal prosecutions begun before institution of a federal suit when the state court proceedings are: (1) ongoing, (2) offer an adequate forum for a defendant's federal claims, and (3) implicate important state interests. Id. at 43-44; see Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). “[T]he district court must abstain once the conditions are met, absent extraordinary circumstances.” Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Prof'l Licensing of Dep't of Commerce, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). Also, “Younger governs whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court's ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.” Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002).
Exceptions exist for “bad faith or harassment,” prosecution under a statute that is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional, or other “extraordinary circumstances” involving irreparable injury. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-55; Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999). A petitioner has a “heavy burden” of establishing an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Application of the relevant factors to the present case warrants dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Coyle, Prater, Collins, and Coleman. First, as noted, Plaintiff's criminal case is currently ongoing. See, supra. Second, the Oklahoma courts provide an adequate forum to hear Plaintiff's claims. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (noting “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”). Third, Oklahoma has an important state interest in the resolution of claims raised by Plaintiff. See In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “state control over criminal justice” is “a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” of federalism). If the court found Defendants had acted unlawfully in prosecuting and/or representing Plaintiff or overseeing Plaintiff's criminal proceedings, it could likely result in substantial disruption of the ongoing state process. See Buck v. Myers, 244 Fed.Appx. 193, 198 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A finding in this case that the defendants violated [the plaintiff's] constitutional rights would have a preclusive effect in the state-court proceedings.”).
Finally, Plaintiff's Complaint and the state record of his criminal proceedings do not suggest bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances as outlined in Younger. Instead, Plaintiff's allegations constitute personal disagreement with the court's rulings and the actions of the prosecution in litigating his criminal charges as well as with defense counsel's representation. Thus, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the Younger doctrine.
IV. Claim Against Defendant Coleman
Defendant Coleman is a private attorney who previously represented Plaintiff during his state court criminal proceeding. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Coleman provided ineffective assistance of counsel based on the December 3 & 4, 2019 events because he “received an unknown text message about [P]laintiff and turned such information over to Prosecutor and withdrew as counsel.” Comp. at 9-10, 11.
In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the defendant deprived him of a federally protected right while acting under color of state law. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2002); >k Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 268 F.3d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defense attorney, specifically a public defender, does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when representing a defendant in a state court criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-25 (1981).
The Court explained that when an attorney acts as an advocate for his client, he does not act on behalf of the state or in concert with it, but characteristically opposes the representatives of the state by advancing the interests of his client. Id. at 318-19. Thus, he does not act under color of state law. See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.6 (1983) (stating that even though defective performance of defense counsel might cause trial process to deprive defendant of constitutional right, the lawyer does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983); Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1995) (assigned counsel who allegedly inordinately delayed filing of criminal appeals did not act under color of state law), superseded on other grounds by statute, Fed. Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996).
Plaintiff's Complaint indicates Defendant Coleman was retained counsel. Comp. at 4-5. Thus, “there is even less support for the argument that Defendant [Coleman] was acting under color of state law than in the case of a public defender who actually is paid by the state.” Boarts v. Schultz, No. 2:03-CV-710DAK, 2005 WL 724168, at *2 (D. Utah March 28, 2005); see also Russell v. Millsap, 781 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that private retained defense attorney does not act under color of state law). Accordingly, as Defendant Coleman was not acting under color of state law during any time relevant to Plaintiff's claim against him, said claim should be dismissed.
V. Claim Against Judge Coyle
As established in Plaintiff's Complaint, Judge Coyle is a state district judge in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Comp. at 2, 4-5, 11. Plaintiff alleges Judge Coyle violated his constitutional rights by setting an excessive bond based upon hearsay evidence. Id. at 4-5, 11. Plaintiff's claims against Judge Coyle should be dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity.
“Personal immunities . . . are immunities derived from common law which attach to certain governmental officials in order that they not be inhibited from ‘proper performance of their duties.'” Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 302-03 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 225 (1988)). It is well established that judges sued for damages under § 1983 are absolutely immune from liability for their “judicial acts” so long as they do not act in the absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam). A judge is protected by judicial immunity even if her action was in error or done maliciously or was in excess of her authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. The Supreme Court has explained that judicial immunity benefits the public in that a judge should be free to exercise her functions with independence and without fear of the consequences. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. “His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.” Id.; Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225 (stating that appellate procedures are established as the standard system for correcting judicial error).
Judicial immunity is overcome only when a judge performs nonjudicial acts, i.e., acts not taken in a judicial capacity or when she acts in the absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Whether an act is a “judicial act” depends on the nature of the act itself and the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
In the present case, Judge Coyle, as a state district court judge, has jurisdiction over criminal cases. Thus, she was not acting in the absence of jurisdiction. Further, judges routinely perform acts such as setting or revoking bond during criminal proceedings. Thus, the acts of which Plaintiff complains were “judicial acts,” since they were actions taken in Judge Coyle's judicial capacity and were actions normally performed by judges. Accordingly, Judge Coyle is absolutely immune from suit for damages under the facts alleged by Plaintiff.
VI. Defendants Maughn, Blumert, Calvey, and Sheriff Taylor
Although Plaintiff names Oklahoma County Commissioners Maughn, Blumert, and Calvey and Sheriff Taylor as Defendants in this matter, see Comp. at 1-2, 3, he does not set forth any actions on their part that may have violated his constitutional rights. Personal participation is necessary for individual liability under § 1983. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (“Personal participation is an essential allegation in a [§] 1983 claim.”). Plaintiff does not allege these Defendants personally participated in any of the actions or events underlying his claims. Indeed, Plaintiff's only reference to the County Commissioners is to list them as Defendants. Comp. at 1-2.
Further, while Sheriff Taylor clearly holds a supervisory position with regard to the OCDC, a supervisor may only be held liable if he is affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation. “Section 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). As a result, government officials have no vicarious liability in a § 1983 suit for the misconduct of their subordinates because “there is no concept of strict supervisor liability under section 1983.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted).
Instead, a supervisor is liable only if he is “personally involved in the constitutional violation, and a sufficient causal connection [] exist[s] between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.” Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also Schneider v. Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring a plaintiff to show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the constitutional violation). “Thus, [] Plaintiff must base supervisory liability ‘upon active unconstitutional behavior' and ‘more than a mere right to control employees.'” Davis v. Okla. Cty., No. CIV-08-0550-HE, 2009 WL 2901180, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 3, 2009) (quoting Serna, 455 F.3d at 1153). Plaintiff fails to allege any affirmative link between Sheriff Taylor and the events or circumstances underlying his claims.
Plaintiff indicates he requested to be moved away from Inmate Wilson based on his fears of sexual assault but never received a response. Comp. at 6-8. Although he vaguely identifies a few of the officials to whom he might have made such a request, stating that he reported or advised them of his reports to the sexual assault hotline, see id. at 7, he does not specifically identify the OCDC officials who ignored his requests, nor does he name those individuals as defendants in this matter.
Based on Plaintiff's failure to allege any link between these Defendants and his claims, it is recommended the Court dismiss Defendants Maughn, Blumert, Calvey, and Sheriff Taylor. Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of § 1983 claims because the complaint did not indicate personal participation by the named defendants).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Coyle, Prater, Collins, and Coleman should be dismissed without prejudice based upon the Younger doctrine. Alternatively, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Coleman should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff cannot show that he was acting under color of state law and Plaintiff's claims against Judge Coyle should be dismissed with prejudice based upon judicial immunity. Finally, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Maughn, Blumert, Calvey, and Sheriff Taylor should be dismissed without prejudice based upon Plaintiff's failure to allege personal participation in the events and circumstances underlying his claims.
Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by August 4th, 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and F. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.