From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Wakeland v. Wakeland

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Jan 4, 2006
No. 04-05-00239-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 4, 2006)

Opinion

No. 04-05-00239-CV

Delivered and Filed: January 4, 2006.

Appeal from the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-CI-15627, Honorable Janet Littlejohn, Judge Presiding.

Affirmed.

Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Robin G. Wakeland appeals a no-evidence summary judgment granted in favor of Gloria S. Wakeland and William R. Wakeland. Robin presents five issues contending: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Robin's motion to compel tax returns and motion to extend the discovery deadline; and (2) the trial court erred in granting the no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion.

Background

Gloria and William, Robin's parents, agreed to lend her $54,133.00 to purchase land and build a house in New Mexico. Robin signed a mortgage lien in an effort to grant her parents a first lien to secure the loan. Robin was sued by an unrelated third party who obtained a judgment against her. A court in New Mexico subsequently determined that the judgment creditor's lien had priority over the mortgage lien due to a technical defect in the mortgage lien instrument that Robin had drafted and filed.

On October 28, 2002, Robin sued Gloria and William for breach of contract alleging that they owed her various duties under the mortgage lien, including a duty to protect their lien, appeal the New Mexico court's judgment, etc. On February 28, 2005, Gloria and William moved for a no-evidence summary judgment asserting that no evidence existed as to any contractual duty owed to Robin under the terms of the mortgage lien other than the duty to loan the money which had undisputedly been loaned to her. The trial court granted the no-evidence motion, and Robin appealed.

Discussion

Robin initially asserts that the motion for no-evidence summary judgment failed to specifically challenge an element of her breach of contract claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (requiring motion to state elements as to which there is no evidence). The no-evidence motion, however, challenges the contractual duty element of Robin's claim in which she asserts that the mortgage lien gave rise to a laundry list of contractual duties, including a duty to protect the lien, appeal the New Mexico court's judgment, etc.

To defeat a no-evidence summary judgment motion, the nonmovant is required to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). The nonmovant raises a genuine issue of material fact by producing more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the challenged element's existence. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 99.

The Mortgage Lien which Robin alleges gave rise to the various contractual duties consists of two paragraphs. In the first paragraph, the document states that Robin "hereby grants a mortgage lien in the amount of $54,133.00" to Gloria and William on the property for which a legal description was provided. In the second paragraph, the document states, "This mortgage lien represents a 30 year mortgage loan at 6% interest made by Mr. and Mrs. W.R. Wakeland to Robin Wakeland in the following amounts on the following dates: 4/22/86-$24,133.00; 10/13/86-$10,000.00; 1/3/86-$15,000.00; and 1/9/87-$5,000.00." After examining the mortgage lien, we conclude that Gloria and William contracted to undertake no duty other than to lend Robin the money the mortgage lien was intended to secure. Accordingly, Robin failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the no-evidence motion.

Robin also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to compel discovery. A trial court has great latitude in ordering or denying discovery and its action cannot be set aside unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Tucker v. Gayle, 709 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Martinez v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "Subjecting federal income tax returns of our citizens to discovery is sustainable only because the pursuit of justice between litigants outweighs protection of their privacy." Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 683 (Tex. 1996). "But sacrifice of the latter should be kept at a minimum, and this requires scrupulous limitation of discovery to information furthering justice between the parties which, in turn, can only be information of relevancy and materiality to the matters in controversy." Id.

In this case, Gloria and William objected to the discovery of their tax returns on the basis of relevancy. Robin then had the burden to show that the tax returns were relevant and material to issues in the case. El Centro del Barrio, Inc. v. Barlow, 894 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, orig. proceeding). Robin argues that the tax returns were relevant in determining whether Gloria and William could have appealed the New Mexico judgment and whether they were paid for agreeing not to appeal. However, in order for the tax returns to be relevant for the reasons asserted by Robin, the mortgage lien would have to give rise to a contractual duty that required Gloria and William to protect their lien interest, including the contractual obligation to appeal the New Mexico judgment finding the judgment creditor's lien superior. Because we have concluded that the mortgage lien did not give rise to the contractual duties alleged by Robin, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robin's motion to compel.

We note that the record contains evidence that Gloria and William were not paid for agreeing not to appeal the New Mexico court's judgment; however, since they were not contractually obligated to appeal, the evidence is not relevant to our resolution of the issue before us on appeal.

Finally, Robin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to extend the discovery deadline. We consider the following nonexclusive factors when deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance seeking additional time to conduct discovery: the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). In this case, the case had been on file for over two years and none of the discovery described by Robin could have raised a fact issue in response to the no-evidence motion because Gloria and William did not owe Robin any contractual duty under the mortgage lien other than the duty to loan her money. See id. (court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance because none of the discovery described could have raised a fact issue in response to motion for summary judgment). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robin's motion to extend the discovery schedule.

Conclusion

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

Wakeland v. Wakeland

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Jan 4, 2006
No. 04-05-00239-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 4, 2006)
Case details for

Wakeland v. Wakeland

Case Details

Full title:ROBIN G. WAKELAND, Appellant, v. GLORIA S. WAKELAND AND WILLIAM R…

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

Date published: Jan 4, 2006

Citations

No. 04-05-00239-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 4, 2006)