Opinion
2:20-cv-00403-JAM-DMC
10-25-2022
CINDY WAGNER, Plaintiff, v. SHASTA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REINSTATE MONELL CLAIMS AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
JOHN A. MENDEZ, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See Mot. for Reconsideration (“Mot.”), ECF No. 98. Plaintiff asks the Court to reinstate Plaintiff's Monell claims and to reconsider its order denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Def.'s Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 25; see also Order Denying Pl.'s Mot. to Amend, ECF No 35. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion. See Opp'n, ECF No. 101. Plaintiff replied. See Reply, ECF No. 102. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to reinstate claims and motion for reconsideration.
The Court declines to entertain Plaintiff's unsubstantiated request that the Court refrain from ruling on this matter and instead remand this case back to state court. Mot. at 10. Further, this motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for November 1, 2023.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April of 2019, Plaintiff and her husband were arrested and placed into custody at the Shasta County Jail for an alleged verbal dispute. Compl. ¶ 10, Exh. A to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to excessive force during the booking process, when a deputy, while handcuffing her, pulled her left hand behind her back, shoved her face-first into a wall, threw her on the ground, and then got on top of her. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges several other officers got on top of her as well, although she weighed only 113 pounds and was 5'5” tall. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
As a result of this unnamed deputy's actions, Plaintiff sustained serious injuries, including a large contusion and hematoma to her forehead, a broken C-3 vertebra in her neck, a broken nose, a concussion, and lacerations to her face and lip. Id. 22. Plaintiff was taken to the jail's infirmary, where she was treated for bleeding, and then escorted to a cell. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Plaintiff requested further medical aid. Id. ¶ 25. She was transported to Mercy Medical Center's Emergency Department, treated, and returned to the jail where she spent the night in custody. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. Plaintiff was released from custody the following day. Id. ¶ 28.
II. OPINION
A. Motion to Reinstate Monell Claims
Plaintiff moves for an order reinstating her Monell claims, which the Court previously dismissed without prejudice. Mot. at 5. In support of her motion, Plaintiff refers the Court to her opposition to Defendants' pending motion for summary judgment. Id. There being no legal authority directing the Court to do so, the Court declines to consider arguments not properly raised in the moving papers. Plaintiff had ample space under the Court's page limit to properly brief this matter.
“Although plaintiffs style their motion as a motion to reinstate their dismissed claims it is more appropriately treated as a motion to file an amended complaint.” Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 120 F.Supp.2d 880, 881 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 19, 2000). A party seeking amendment after the Court has filed a pretrial scheduling order must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)'s “good cause” requirement. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). This “good cause” requirement looks to the “diligence of the party seeking amendment” and “the existence of degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. If the moving party was not diligent, the Court's inquiry ends. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not been diligent in pursuing amendment. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's Monell claims nearly two years ago on November 3, 2020. See ECF No. 25. Although the Court's dismissal was without prejudice, Plaintiff did not replead her Monell claims. Rather, when Plaintiff did move for leave to amend, her request was cabined to adding a new defendant to the action. Mot. to Amend. at 2, ECF No. 28-1. In that same motion, Plaintiff clearly stated her intent to “delete[] allegations that relate to possible Monell liability . . . consistent with the court's [sic] ruling on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a prior stipulation between parties.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff presents no persuasive reason why, after the close of factual discovery and the dispositive motion deadline, she now wishes to reinstate claims she had previously indicated she would relinquish. Plaintiff implies that new facts were uncovered during discovery but fails to specify what they are.
As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to diligently pursue her proposed amendment. Lacking “good cause” under Rule 16(b), the Court declines to permit amendment. Also, though the Court need not reach parties' Rule 15 arguments in light of this finding, the Court notes that Plaintiff's undue delay in seeking to reinstate her Monell claims is unlikely to satisfy even the “liberal amendment policy” under Rule 15.
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to reinstate her Monell claims.
B. Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Amend
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of her motion to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 and Local Rule 230.
As a threshold matter, Rule 60 is inapplicable here, because Rule 60 only governs reconsideration of a “final judgement, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court's order denying leave to amend is not a final order, as it is neither a final judgment nor a directly appealable interlocutory order. See Corn v. Guam Coral Co., 318 F.2d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1963) (discussing the scope of Rule 60). “Such orders, as a class, contemplate further proceedings in the district court, and [thus] fail to qualify under Cohen as a ‘final disposition of a claimed right' [permitting an appeal].” Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. Of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Court thus declines to consider Plaintiff's Rule 60 arguments as grounds for reconsideration.
However, where reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, the Court does have “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). As Plaintiff notes, the Eastern District Local Rules permit motions for reconsideration under Local Rule 230. Local Rule 230(j) requires counsel to identify “the material facts and circumstances surrounding each motion for which reconsideration is sought, including: (1) when and to what Judge or Magistrate the prior motion was made; (2) what ruling, decision, or order was made thereon; (3) what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion; and (4) why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(j). As other Eastern District courts have explained, “a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or present evidence which should have been raised before.” United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the Court's previous findings in support of its order denying leave to amend were “clearly erroneous,” but she does not present a shred of new evidence to support this contention. Mot. at 8. Plaintiff insists that her delay in bringing her original motion to amend was due to the actions of a former associate attorney at her firm, concluding that “Plaintiff should be relieved of the mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect of her original attorney.” Id. This, however, is the same argument she presented to the Court in 2021.
The inquiry under the local rule is whether “new facts or circumstances . . . which did not exist at the time of the prior motion” are present. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(j) (emphasis added). They are not. Plaintiff's motion amounts to little more “than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision.” Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d at 1131.
As such, finding that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden as the moving party, the Court denies her motion for reconsideration.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Monell Claims and Motion for Reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.