Opinion
CASE NO. 926 CRD-1-89-10
APRIL 17, 1990
The claimant appeared pro se. In addition to waiving oral argument neither party appeared on appeal but by agreement the parties waived oral argument. The claimant waived his right to file a brief and instead filed a reply to respondents' brief.
The respondents were represented by Brian Prindle, Esq.
This Petition for Review from the October 2, 1989 Ruling on Motion to Re-open and Modification of the Commissioner at Large acting for the First District was decided pursuant to papers submitted for the February 2, 1990 hearing before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli, and George Waldron.
OPINION
Claimant contends it was error to deny his Motion to Re-Open. Motions to Re-Open are governed by Sec. 31-315 C.G.S. which provides that a prior award may be opened and modified whenever "the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award. . . . The commissioner shall also have the same power to open and modify an, award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment, of such court."
Sec. 31-315 provides: Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to modification, upon the request of either party and in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, whenever it appears to the compensation, commissioner, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. The commissioner shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The compensation commissioner shall retain jurisdiction, over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.
Although appearing here pro se claimant is no stranger to the forum nor to the multiple means of legal redress available. He had a previous appeal, Velilla v. UTC/Hamilton Standard Div., 3 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 35, 416 CRD-1-85 (1986) aff'd 9 Conn. App. 803 (1986) (per curiam) cert. denied 201 Conn. 815 (1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 948 (1987) (docket #86-6323) [hereinafter Velilla I]. In that decision we reviewed his appeal from the July 12, 1985 Finding and Dismissal of Claim. We affirmed the trial commissioner's July 12, 1985 Finding and Dismissal.
In that appeal he also sought to re-open and modify an earlier award. As part of that proceeding claimant alleged a change of circumstances as required by Sec. 31-315. However, the trial commissioner was unimpressed by the evidence offered. We noted in Velilla I, supra at 36, that we could not "substitute our conclusions for the commissioner's unless he had found facts without evidence or could not reasonably reach the conclusions he stated. Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143 (1915), Battey v. Osborne, 96 Conn. 633 (1921), Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979)". Our inability to substitute our findings for those of the trial commissioner has not changed in the intervening years since we decided Velilla I.
Subsequent to Velilla I, Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988) reiterated the limits of our review. Id. at 539. In the instant matter it appears the only new evidence proffered was the August 9, 1988 decision of a Social Security Administrative Law Judge, awarding Supplemental Security Income benefits. However, a finding and conclusion of disability reached under federal Social Security Laws and Regulations differs significantly from a finding and conclusion under our Workers' Compensation Act. The Social Security finding of benefits entitlement is in no way conclusive of proceedings under our act. Such findings and conclusions may serve as evidence in our forum but not as res judicata. See e.g., Bjelka v. Norwalk Hospital, 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 21, 370 CRD-7-84 (1988). But it is for the trial commissioner to determine what significance, if any, attaches to the Social Security findings.
We are unable to review the record entirely as claimant did not provide us with either an oral or written record to the proceedings at issue in this appeal.
We conclude that the trier's denial of claimant's Motion to Re-Open was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore dismiss claimant's appeal.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and George Waldron concur.