Opinion
B332553
08-13-2024
LISA A. VAUGHN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PATRICIA V. LEWIS et al., Defendants and Respondents
Lisa A. Vaughn, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. 22STCV22542 Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa A. Vaughn, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
ASHMANN-GERST, ACTING P. J.
Plaintiff and appellant Lisa A. Vaughn appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered against her and in favor of defendants Almita Delone, Amos Delone, and Patricia V. Lewis (Lewis) following defendants' successful demurrer.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"Because this matter comes to us on demurrer, we take the facts from plaintiff's complaint, the allegations of which are deemed true for the limited purpose of determining whether [the] plaintiff has stated a viable cause of action. [Citation.]" (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885.) We decline plaintiff's request for judicial notice set forth in her opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252.)
As summarized by the trial court: "This action was initiated on July 13, 2022, and arises out of a dispute over the distribution of trust assets. The currently operative third amended complaint (the 'TAC') alleges: (1) fraud; and (2) emotional distress.
"In relevant part, the TAC alleges: On or about October 10, 2000, Dorothy M. Vaughn ('Settlor') conveyed real property located at 8806 John Avenue (the 'Property') to the Dorothy M. Vaughn Revocable Trust (the 'Trust'). [Citation.] The Trust named . . . Wayne Vaughn . . . and Lewis as the Trust's successor trustees. [Citation.] Section 3.03 of the Trust agreement provided that upon Settlor's death, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, distribute the net income and principal remaining in the Trust to the identified beneficiaries, which included [p]laintiff's 15 percent interest. [Citation.]" The Trust also required Lewis to provide plaintiff with an annual accounting.
According to the appellant's opening brief, Dorothy Vaughn is plaintiff's mother, and Wayne Vaughn and Lewis are plaintiff's siblings.
"On or about October 28, 2008, the date that she assumed her duties as co-trustee of the Trust, Lewis transferred the Property to herself and encumbered the Property with a mortgage. [Citation.] In 2012, Lewis conveyed the Property to the Delone Defendants to prevent a foreclosure sale. [Citation.] Lewis concealed these transfers from Plaintiff by failing to provide an annual accounting as required under the Trust. [Citation.] On or about March 29, 2012, when Plaintiff inquired when Trust distributions would be made, Lewis informed her that Plaintiff's interests in the Property were secured and that Lewis would return to work in order to pay Plaintiff her interest. [Citation.] At some point, Lewis filed for bankruptcy. [Citation.] In 2019, after the settlement of Lewis's bankruptcy proceedings, the Delone Defendants transferred the Property back to Lewis. [Citation.] As a result of the three conveyances of the Property, Plaintiff was defrauded of her rights to the title and benefits of the Property. [Citation.] Plaintiff became aware of these facts when she received a letter from Lewis dated September 26, 2020. [Citation.]"
Although not part of the record on appeal, defendants demurred to the TAC. Plaintiff filed a written opposition.
Defendants previously demurred to plaintiff's first and second amended complaints. The trial court sustained those demurrers with leave to amend.
According to the trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrer, defendants only challenged the first cause of action for fraud. But the notice of appeal provides that plaintiff is appealing a judgment of dismissal, leaving us to conclude that the second cause of action for emotional distress was somehow dismissed. As plaintiff does not mention the second cause of action in her appellate briefs, we do not address it.
The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, finding the fraud cause of action time-barred by the appliable three-year statute of limitations. It reasoned: "The TAC does not include allegations that clearly address the deficiencies identified in the Court's ruling on [defendants'] demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint. Nor does the TAC include allegations that clearly articulate a basis for tolling the three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims. To the contrary, the TAC alleges that Plaintiff inquired about distributions of the Trust's assets in 2012. Plaintiff did not initiate this matter until 2022, and the Court therefore finds that the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to allow her to invoke the delayed discovery rule to avoid the three-year statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiff does not present facts to show that the deficiencies in the TAC may be cured by further amendment."
Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
Judgment and appeal
Although not part of the record, it appears that a judgment of dismissal was entered, and plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that a trial court judgment is "'presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' [Citations.]" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Plaintiff has not overcome this burden. While the opening brief sets forth lengthy discussions of assorted legal principles, plaintiff has not adequately explained how these legal principles compel reversal of the trial court judgment. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellant bears the burden of supporting a point with reasoned argument]; County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 [appellant must present argument on each point made]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [appellate court is not required to make an independent, unassisted search of the appellate record].) We decline to consider the issues raised in plaintiff's opening brief that are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, and we treat them as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.) Plaintiff's election to act as her own attorney on appeal does not entitle her to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
With these principles in mind, we have attempted to address the merits of the issues raised by plaintiff.
I. Standard of review
"Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review for ruling on a demurrer dismissal as follows: 'On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed "if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]" [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043-1044.)
II. The trial court properly sustained defendants' demurrer
A. Relevant law
Fraud claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).)
"The limitations period commences when the cause of action accrues. [Citations.] 'Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at "the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements."' [Citation.] 'An exception to the general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action-indeed, the "most important" one-is the discovery rule.' [Citations.] The application of that rule is the crux of the dispute here." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1317-1318.)
"The discovery rule 'postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.' [Citations.]" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.)
"The discovery rule 'protects the plaintiff, whose cause of action is preserved when, despite diligent investigation, he is blamelessly ignorant of the cause of his injuries.'" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.) "The discovery rule 'is based on the notion that statutes of limitations are intended to run against those who fail to exercise reasonable care in the protection and enforcement of their rights; therefore, those statutes should not be interpreted so as to bar a victim of wrongful conduct from asserting a cause of action before he could reasonably be expected to discover its existence.' [Citation.] Thus, in actions where the rule applies, the limitations period does not accrue until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury. [Citation.]" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.)
"Notice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is 'express information of a fact,' while constructive notice is that 'which is imputed by law.' [Citation.]" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1318-1319.)
"For purposes of accrual of the limitations period, inquiry notice is triggered by suspicion. As the California Supreme Court explained in [Jolly v. Eli Lilly &Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111]: 'Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, [he or] she must decide whether to file suit or sit on [his or] her rights.' [Citation.] The court recently reaffirmed the suspicion rule in [Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803], saying 'under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that a reasonable investigation at that time would not have revealed a factual basis for that particular cause of action.' [Citation.]" (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.) Stated differently, a plaintiff may not be intentionally dilatory in order to invoke the delayed discovery rule in his favor, because "plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have '"'information or circumstances to put [them] on inquiry'"' or if they have '"'the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.'"' [Citation.] In other words, plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation." (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 807-808.)
"'"The defense of statute of limitations may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Van de Kamps Coalition v. Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.)
B. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Plaintiff was aware of the alleged fraud by 2012. At that time, she asked Lewis about the status of the property and when distributions would be made. No distributions were ever made. Also, for the past 14 years, Lewis failed to provide plaintiff with an annual accounting. These allegations are sufficient for plaintiff to have suspected that Lewis had engaged in some sort of wrongdoing. Despite not being given distributions and an annual accounting for years, plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until 2022. Accordingly, her action is time-barred.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that the discovery rule applies. She does not allege any reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the alleged fraud. (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 299-300 [plaintiff must allege "specific facts" to show that any delay was reasonable; where the allegations demonstrate that the plaintiff had constructive notice of allegedly undiscovered facts, any subsequent delay in filing her lawsuit is unreasonable].) While she contends that she did not discover the alleged fraud until 2020, when she received a letter from Lewis, that conclusory allegation is insufficient to withstand demurrer. (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) Cal.5th 627, 633, fn. 3.)
Urging us to reverse, plaintiff argues that Lewis actively concealed facts from her, which prevented her from reasonably discovering the facts that constitute the alleged fraud. While Lewis may have concealed her fraud from plaintiff, plaintiff should have suspected that something was awry. She knew she was entitled to distributions and annual accountings, but Lewis never gave them to her. Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot avail herself of the delayed discovery rule. (Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374 ["The courts interpret discovery in this context to mean not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but when the plaintiff suspected or should have suspected that an injury was caused by wrongdoing. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has information which would put a reasonable person on inquiry. A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish a claim since they can be developed in pretrial discovery. Wrong and wrongdoing in this context are understood in their lay and not legal senses"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: CHAVEZ, J. HOFFSTADT, J.