Opinion
20-73409
03-21-2022
JOSE LUIS REYES VASQUEZ, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted March 11, 2022 [**] Phoenix, Arizona
On Petition for Review of an Order of an Immigration Judge Agency No. A098-658-367
Before: HAWKINS, PAEZ, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Petitioner Jose Luis Reyes Vasquez ("Petitioner") seeks review of the Immigration Judge's ("IJ") concurrence with the finding of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") that Petitioner did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture following the reinstatement of the prior removal order. We deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ's determination that Petitioner did not establish a protected ground, a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground, or government action to support a claim under the Convention Against Torture. In the hearing before the IJ, Petitioner admitted that he had been threatened by a gang "because we were charging rent in, in that neighborhood without [the gang's] permission." Petitioner thus failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the harm he fears and a protected ground, because "individual retaliation" does not constitute persecution on account of membership in a distinct social group. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[M]istreatment motivated purely by personal retribution will not give rise to a valid asylum claim . . . ."). Nor did the evidence demonstrate that Petitioner was likely to be targeted for harm by the government or that the government would acquiesce to his torture. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).
To the extent Petitioner claims he was denied due process, he received a fair hearing before an immigration judge, which is all the process that is required in a reinstatement of removal case. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(f)-(g); see Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 813‒14 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Reasonable fear review hearings [] are not full evidentiary hearings. Like reinstatement orders, reasonable fear review proceedings are intended to be expedited and efficient.").
Finally, Petitioner attempts to claim he received a defective notice to appear in his original 2008 removal proceeding. However, Petitioner may not collaterally attack that order in this petition for review, see Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and is "foreclosed from challenging reinstatement of [his] prior removal order due to defective service." Nolasco-Amaya v. Garland, 14 F.4th 1007, 1011 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021).
Petitioner's Motion for Stay (Dkt. Entry No. 1) is denied as moot.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).