Opinion
# 2016-040-056 Claim No. 124012
08-09-2016
SEAN VAN ZANDT v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Sean Van Zandt, Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Court finds Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that DOCCS failed to properly calculate his sentence and that he was unlawfully imprisoned because the Court imposed a period of PRS which was in excess of the period allowed by statute.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-040-056 |
| Claimant(s): | SEAN VAN ZANDT |
| Claimant short name: | VAN ZANDT |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124012 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Sean Van Zandt, Pro Se |
|---|---|
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | August 9, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Pro se Claimant, Sean Van Zandt, failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Defendant was liable in connection with his Claim. The trial of this Claim was held on June 28, 2016 at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York. At trial, Claimant submitted three exhibits into evidence (Exs. 1-3) and Defendant submitted nine (Exs. A- I). Claimant was the only witness and testified on his own behalf.
Mr. Van Zandt alleges: (1) a cause of action for unlawful imprisonment because the period of post-release supervision (hereinafter, "PRS") imposed by Columbia County Court in 2001was in excess of the period prescribed by statute; (2) that the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter, "DOCCS") failed to properly calculate his sentence because it failed to credit him for time he served while incarcerated in the State of Texas upon conviction of an unrelated crime there; and (3) that there were improprieties in connection with several parole revocation hearings by the State Board of Parole (hereinafter, "Board") because they were tainted by the actions of certain State employees who engaged in a conspiracy against Claimant, committed perjury, and gave false statements (see Ex. 3 [Claim], ¶ 2).
On December 12, 2001, Mr. Van Zandt was sentenced by Columbia County Court to a 3 ½-year determinate term and a five-year period of PRS upon conviction of the crime of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). At the same time, he also was convicted of the crimes of grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law § 155.35 [2]) and conspiracy in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 105.10 [1]), and was sentenced to separate indeterminate terms of one to three years for each of those offenses, with all of the sentences to run concurrently with each other (see Exs. A and I [letter of Richard de Simone, Esq., dated June 3, 2014 (hereinafter, "de Simone Letter"), p. 1]). In 2004, 2006, and 2007, Claimant was released by DOCCS to PRS (see Ex. I [de Simone Letter], pp. 1-2). In each case, Mr. Van Zandt subsequently was declared delinquent and returned to DOCCS' custody (id.). The Claim also recites that Mr. Van Zandt was convicted of "possession" by a Texas court and sentenced to a term of two years (see Ex. 3 [Claim Attachment, p. 2]). At trial, Claimant agreed that he was incarcerated for 10 ½months, all of it in Texas, in connection with that conviction.
Concerning the unlawful imprisonment cause of action, Mr. Van Zandt argues that the five-year period of PRS imposed by Columbia County Court in 2001 was in excess of the period prescribed by statute. The Court disagrees. The prescribed period of PRS for a determinate sentence imposed in connection with certain class C violent felony offenses is not less than 2 ½-years and not more than 5 years (Penal Law § 70.45 [2][f]). Burglary in the second degree (as defined in Penal Law § 140.25), the offense for which Mr. Van Zandt was convicted in 2001, is one such offense (see Penal Law § 70.02 [1][b]). The sentence and commitment order issued by Columbia County Court clearly states that the judge imposed a 5-year period of PRS in connection with the class C felony conviction (burglary in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). Thus, this Court finds and concludes that the period of PRS imposed by Columbia County Court was in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Law. At trial, Mr. Van Zandt also stated that he is not challenging the 3 ½ year determinate sentence imposed by Columbia County Court, which, in any event, this Court concludes was imposed correctly in accordance with the statute (see Penal Law § 70.02 [3][b]).
Mr. Van Zandt did not clearly articulate, either at trial or in his Claim, his theory as to why the period of PRS imposed was incorrect in his case. However, he did assert that the maximum period that could be imposed upon him was 1-2 years. Exhibit 1 (a copy of Penal Law § 70.45) contains handwritten brackets around paragraphs (a) and (b) of the statute with a question mark drawn next to it. The Court notes that those paragraphs concern certain felony drug offenses which do not pertain here (see Penal Law §§ 70.45 [2][a], [b]; 70.70).
Assuming, arguendo, that Claimant had established that the period of PRS imposed was invalid as a matter of law, this prong of the Claim, nevertheless, would fail. To establish a cause of action for unlawful imprisonment, a Claimant must establish that: (1) Defendant intended to confine him; (2) Claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) Claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Middleton v State of New York, 54 AD2d 450, 451 [3d Dept 1976], affd 43 NY2d 678 [1977]). It is not disputed that Claimant was confined, was conscious of the confinement, and did not consent. Thus, the issue is whether the confinement was not otherwise privileged.
"Confinement is privileged to the extent that it is imposed 'under color of law or regulation' " (Hudson v State of New York, 35 Misc 3d 241, 248 [Ct Cl 2011], affd 115 AD3d 1020 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 907 [2014], quoting Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is clear that Mr. Van Zandt's confinement was privileged in this case because his sentence, including the period of PRS imposed, was calculated by DOCCS pursuant to the clear and unequivocal terms of the sentence and commitment order issued by Columbia County Court (see Ex. A; Ex. I [de Simone Letter]). The Court's order was facially valid and, thus, issued under color of law or regulation (see Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389, 395 [2011]; Davis v City of Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 842 [1985]). No liability would attach to the State because it relied upon such facially-valid documentation, even if the information contained therein later proved to be erroneous, because, at the time, "it was acting under a warrant of commitment valid on its face" (Middleton v State of New York, 54 AD2d 450, 451 [3d Dept 1976], affd 43 NY2d 678 [1977]).
Turning next to Claimant's Texas incarceration, the Court finds that this prong of Mr. Van Zandt's Claim is barred by the principles of collateral estoppel. "The equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel 'precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity' " (Church v New York State Thruway Auth., 16 AD3d 808, 809 [3d Dept 2005], quoting Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). "[P]reclusive effect is limited to only those 'issues that were actually litigated, squarely addressed and specifically decided' " (id. at 810, quoting Ross v Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 75 NY2d 825, 826 [1990]). Moreover, "a determination will generally not be given preclusive effect unless the resolution of the issue was 'essential' to the decision rendered in the first action or proceeding" (id.).
"The party seeking application of collateral estoppel bears the burden of showing that the decisive, identical issue was 'necessarily decided' in the prior action, while the party opposing application of the doctrine must demonstrate the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination" (id. at 809-810, see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]). "The question of whether a litigant had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination on those issues requires a case-by-case analysis of the realities of the prior litigation, 'including the context and other circumstances which … may have had the practical effect of discouraging or deterring a party from fully litigating the determination' " (id. at 810, quoting Ryan v New York Tel. Co., supra at 501).
By Order to Show Cause, dated April 28, 2014, Mr. Van Zandt brought an Article 78 proceeding against "NYS Parole" in Supreme Court, Dutchess County (see Ex. I). His verified Petition in that matter, dated May 1, 2014, asserts the same facts about his Texas sentence as he sets forth in his Claim in this proceeding, as set forth above. The 2014 Petition challenged the determination of a parole revocation hearing on May 22, 2012 (id., [Petition, ¶ 6]).
By Decision and Order, dated July 29, 2014, Supreme Court Justice James V. Brands held:
The petitioner … contends that his State of Texas sentence was to run concurrently with his New York State parole, which he alleges was not properly administered by the respondent. The petitioner's relevant convictions, sentences, and the calculation of petitioner's legal dates are set forth in the affirmed [de Simone Letter] … Such information is corroborated with the information contained in the relevant sentence, commitments, jail time certificates, and official records attached thereto, all of which are unopposed by the petitioner. According to [the de Simone Letter], Texas would have had to return the petitioner to New York if the Texas sentence was intended to be imposed to run concurrently with his New York State parole (see page 3 of [the de Simone Letter], citing Penal Law § 0.40(3)(b), (c )(iii); People ex[.] rel. Howard v. Yelich, 87 AD3d 772 [3d Dept 2011]). De Simone affirms that "Texas did not return the petitioner to New York State when the two year sentence was imposed or keep him in custody once such sentence was completed" (Id.). Accordingly, the petitioner's parole jail time credit began on March 5, 2012 pursuant to the Division of Parole's lodging of the second Absconder Warrant (Id.[,] at page 2-3). Accordingly, . . . the petition is dismissed in its entirety since the respondent has demonstrated that the petitioner's 2001 sentences have received the parole jail time credit to which petitioner is entitled.
The Court notes that, on cross-examination, Mr. Van Zandt again did not dispute or challenge the time-line contained in the de Simone Letter.
(Ex. H)
This Claim raises the same issues as were raised before Supreme Court, Dutchess County, asserting that the time computation of Mr. Van Zandt's sentence was incorrectly calculated because it fails to account for time served in connection with the Texas sentence. Justice Brands held that DOCCS correctly computed the sentence. It is clear to this Court that Mr. Van Zandt had a full and fair opportunity in Supreme Court, Dutchess County to litigate his contention that his sentence was improperly computed. The issue was clearly raised before Justice Brands, who squarely addressed and specifically and necessarily decided Mr. Van Zandt's argument in the decision he rendered. Simply put, Mr. Van Zandt's argument was not successful.
Thus, the Court finds that Claimant is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of the alleged improper computation of his prison sentence, as set forth above, in this Court against a different employee of Defendant.
Finally, Claimant's allegations of improprieties in connection with several parole revocation hearings fail for want of proof. Mr. Van Zandt provided neither testimony, nor documentation to support his assertions that the proceedings were tainted by the actions of certain State employees who engaged in a conspiracy against Claimant, committed perjury, and gave false statements. Moreover, to the extent Claimant is challenging the Board's determinations themselves, the Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, with power to hear claims against the State and certain public authorities (NY Const Art VI; Court of Claims Act § 9). This Court does not have jurisdiction to grant strictly equitable relief, such as the reversal or modification of Parole's hearing determinations and, if Claimant had wished to challenge those determinations, he should have commenced a timely proceeding in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 78. To the extent he seeks money damages in relation to Parole's actions, the Claim is untimely as the cause of action relates to actions that allegedly occurred in 2004, 2006, and 2007 (see Court of Claims Act § 10). Finally, "New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort as an independent cause of action" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Wine, 90 AD3d 1216, 1218 [3d Dept 2011]; Scott v Fields, 85 AD3d 756, 757 [2d Dept 2011]).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Claimant failed to establish his Claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence and it is hereby dismissed.
All motions made at trial upon which the Court reserved decision are now denied.
All objections upon which the Court reserved decision at trial are hereby overruled.
The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
August 9, 2016
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims