Opinion
No. 13-98-172-CV
August 31, 1999
Appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Justices DORSEY, YAÑEZ and CHAVEZ.
OPINION
Appellee Irma Venegas was seriously injured in an automobile accident and incurred extensive medical expenses at the appellant hospital, Valley Baptist Medical Center. While being treated at Valley Baptist, Venegas signed a document assigning to Valley Baptist and its physicians payment of "benefits otherwise payable to me." Venegas had health insurance through Guardian Life Insurance Company, which paid much, but not all, of Venegas's medical bills. The other driver in the accident was covered by auto liability insurance, with an applicable policy limit of $35,000. Venegas was also covered by an uninsured/underinsured automobile policy with State and County Mutual Insurance Company (State and County) that provided $100,001 in coverage. Venegas demanded the full $100,001 from State and County, but rather than pay the money directly to Venegas, State and County interpleaded the $100,001, naming Venegas and Valley Baptist as defendants. Valley Baptist asserted a hospital lien and made a claim in the interpleader proceeding for an outstanding balance of $28,325.35 on Venegas's treatment. The trial court awarded the full $100,001 to Venegas, including interest accruing on that amount while it remained in the registry of the court, ordered Valley Baptist to pay State and County's attorney's fees in the amount of $6,300, ordered Valley Baptist to pay prejudgment interest to Venegas in the amount of $11,425.80, and postjudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum, compounded annually, on the sum of $11,425.80.
Valley Baptist first entered the case via a plea in intervention. State and County later filed an amended interpleader petition naming Valley Baptist as a defendant.
On appeal, Valley Baptist contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it take nothing on its claim for a portion of the interpleaded funds, erred in ordering it to pay State and County's attorney's fees, erred in assessing prejudgment and postjudgment interest against it, and should have applied a 6% annual interest rate rather than 10%.
After the trial court rendered the underlying judgment, a settlement was reached between Venegas, Valley Baptist, and the carriers of the auto liability policy with the policy limit of $35,000. In accordance with that agreement, Valley Baptist executed the following document:
RELEASE OF HOSPITAL LIEN
THE STATE OF TEXAS IN THE MATTER OF COUNTY OF CAMERON IRMA VENEGAS
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT:
VALLEY BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, an association, individual, corporation or other institution maintaining a hospital or clinic known as VALLEY BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, whose address is P.O. Drawer 2588, Harlingen, Texas 78551, the legal owner and holder of a lien under the terms and provisions of Article 5506(a) of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, as amended, on any and all rights of actions, suits, counterclaims, demands and any and all verdicts reports, decisions, decrees, judgments or final orders made or entered in any action or proceeding in any court of the State of Texas accruing to IRMA VENEGAS, whose address is 313-1 Avenida Bolivar, Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575, for treatment, care and maintenance in said hospital in the amount of $8,543.32.(sic)
The first "sentence" of this document begins with a proper noun and then proceeds through several adjective clauses and phrases. The "sentence" is incomplete because its subject is not followed by a verb.
Said treatment, care, and maintenance resulted from an accident caused by the negligence of Antonio Ruiz and Oscar Ruiz.
Said accident occurred on the 26th day of March, 1996 in Cameron County, Texas.
The name of the persons, firms or corporations alleged to be liable to pay the damages to the above named injured party because of the injuries arising out of the above mentioned accident are PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, whose address is 1906 Winchester Dr., Temple, Texas 76502; DAIRYLAND COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, whose address is P.O. Box 29460, Phoenix, AZ 85038-9460; and IRMA VENEGAS, whose address is 313-1 Avenida Bolivar, Rancho Viejo, Texas 78575.
The above named hospital acknowledges payment in full of the above mentioned amount and account due for treatment, care, and maintenance, and the hospital hereby releases the claim and lien heretofore filed with the County Clerk of Cameron County, Texas, and authorizes said Clerk to discharge said lien.
A "corporation acknowledgment" signed by Valley Baptist's attorney recites that the instrument is the act of Valley Baptist.
Venegas argues that this instrument releases any claim Valley Baptist might have had to the funds interpleaded by State and County. We agree. State and County is not listed among the "persons, firms, or corporations alleged to be liable to pay the damages to said above named injured party arising out of the above mentioned accident." The hospital also "acknowledges payment in full of the above mentioned amount and account due for treatment, care, and maintenance." While the "above mentioned amount" might be interpreted to refer to the $8,543.32 mentioned in the document, nothing in the document indicates that the "account due for the treatment, care, and maintenance" refers to anything less than the full account due on Venegas's treatment. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is undisputed that the only "claim and lien heretofore filed with the County Clerk of Cameron County, Texas" this document could "release" was the claim and lien for $28,000 which Valley Baptist asserted in the underlying interpleader proceeding. We conclude that the language of this document waived any claim of Valley Baptist to the funds interpleaded by State and County.
Valley Baptist argues that, even though they released their lien, they were still entitled to seek satisfaction of the remaining balance due. While this might have been true had the terms of the document been different, under the terms specified, Valley Baptist accepted $8,543.32 as "payment in full" on the "account due for the treatment, care, and maintenance" of Venegas, and released not just their lien, but also their "claim" for payment. Because we hold that Valley Baptist settled their claim to the interpleaded funds, we dismiss the portion of their appeal dealing with the trial court's disposition of the interpleaded funds and the interest charges assessed on those funds.
Valley Baptist next contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to pay attorney's fees to State and County. Both Valley Baptist and Venegas agree that State and County is entitled to attorney's fees. However, Valley Baptist contends that the attorney's fees should have been paid out of the interpleaded funds. When the interpleading party is entitled to attorney's fees, the trial court has discretion to order those fees to be paid either out of the interpleaded funds or that they be taxed against the losing party. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Trinity Nat'l Bank, 763 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Foreman v. Graham, 693 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Monarch Title Sales v. Frost Bank of San Antonio, 496 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ) Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of Am., 480 S.W.2d 421, 429-430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh'g.); Halloran v. Abilene State Bank, 15 S.W.2d 1056, 1059-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, no writ).
Valley Baptist argues that Olmos v. Pecan Grove Municipal Utility District, 857 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) "clearly holds that payment of the attorney's fees are to paid from the proceeds in the registry of the court." Olmos does not support this position. The issue in Olmos was whether the interpleading party was entitled to attorney's fees at all. In dicta, Olmos cites Beneficial Standard for the proposition that, although the trial court chose to order the fees to be paid out of the interpleaded funds, the trial court could have assessed the attorney's fees as costs to the losing parties. Olmos, 857 S.W.2d at 742. We find no error in the trial court's assessment of attorney's fees against Valley Baptist.
We affirm the trial court's judgment with regard to the award of attorney's fees on the interpleader action and dismiss the remainder of the appeal.