Opinion
1:23-cv-00003-SHL-HCA
2024-02-26
Rene VALDIVIA and Alexis Free, Plaintiffs, v. Derek PORSCH; Gabriel Christensen; Derick Seaton; Coby Gust; and Todd Johnson, all Individually and in Their Official Capacities; City of Audubon, Iowa; and Audubon County, Iowa, Defendants.
Matthew Mark Boles, Adam Clifford Witosky, Gribble, Boles, Stewart & Witosky, LLC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs. Douglas L. Phillips, Klass Law Firm LLP, Sioux City, IA, for Defendants Derek Porsch, Coby Gust, City of Audubon, Iowa. Kristopher K. Madsen, Robert M. Livingston, Stuart Tinley Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants Gabriel Christensen, Derick Seaton, Todd Johnson, Audubon County, Iowa.
Matthew Mark Boles, Adam Clifford Witosky, Gribble, Boles, Stewart & Witosky, LLC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.
Douglas L. Phillips, Klass Law Firm LLP, Sioux City, IA, for Defendants Derek Porsch, Coby Gust, City of Audubon, Iowa.
Kristopher K. Madsen, Robert M. Livingston, Stuart Tinley Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants Gabriel Christensen, Derick Seaton, Todd Johnson, Audubon County, Iowa.
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MOST CLAIMS AND DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
STEPHEN H. LOCHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Shortly after he began following a vehicle in the City of Audubon, Iowa, Officer Derek Porsch saw a woman jump out of vehicle's passenger seat and begin running away into a yard. When the vehicle's driver, Plaintiff Rene Valdivia, gave a vague and suspicious explanation for what the woman was doing, Porsch decided to detain Valdivia pending further investigation. The Court concludes that Porsch had at least arguable reasonable suspicion for the investigatory detention, which evolved quickly into probable cause as Porsch learned additional information. Porsch and the other Defendants therefore did not violate anyone's Fourth Amendment rights, and thus the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment on all federal law claims, as well as on Plaintiffs' state law constitutional claims.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims for false arrest, negligent training and supervision, and respondeat superior. Those claims are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on February 23, 2023, alleging twelve counts: Count I: federal law unreasonable seizure (extension of traffic stop) under section 1983 against Derek Porsch; Count II: state law unreasonable seizure (extension of traffic stop) against Porsch; Count III: federal law unreasonable warrantless search under section 1983 against Porsch and Derick Seaton; Count IV: state law unreasonable warrantless search against Porsch and Seaton; Count V: federal law unreasonable seizure (arrest without probable cause) under section 1983 against Porsch and Seaton; Count VI: state law unreasonable seizure (arrest without probable cause) against Porsch and Seaton; Count VII: federal Monell claims for unreasonable seizure (arrest without probable) against Coby Gust, Todd Johnson, the City of Audubon, Iowa, and Audubon County, Iowa; Count VIII: federal Monell claims for unreasonable seizure (extension of traffic stop) against Gust and the City of Audubon; Count IX: federal Monell claims for unreasonable warrantless search against Gust, Johnson, the City of Audubon, and Audubon County; Count X: state law false arrest claims against Porsch and Seaton; Count XI: state law negligent supervision and training claims against Gust, Johnson, the City of Audubon, and Audubon County; and Count XII: state law respondeat superior claims against the City of Audubon and Audubon County. (ECF 1.) All twelve claims arise out of a traffic stop on October 8, 2022. Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims, with separate motions filed by Porsch, Gust, and the City of Audubon (the "City Defendants") and Seaton, Christensen, Johnson, and Audubon County (the "County Defendants"). (ECF 25; ECF 32.)
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS.
The following material facts are either undisputed or, where genuinely disputed, interpreted in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-moving parties. Webster v. Westlake, 41 F.4th 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2022).
In the nighttime hours of October 8, 2022, Porsch, a police officer for the City of Audubon, was working patrol. (ECF 25-1, ¶¶ 1, 3; ECF 35-2, ¶¶ 1, 3.) He began to follow a vehicle that purportedly did not have operational license plate illumination lights. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 4; ECF 35-2, ¶ 4.) Porsch followed the vehicle as it turned onto South Street and then onto Washington Street. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 5; ECF 35-2, ¶ 5.) When Porsch turned onto Washington Street, he saw the vehicle had stopped and a female was running away to the west, into a yard. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 6; ECF 35-2, ¶ 6.) Porsch claims that seeing this made him concerned there was a "rolling domestic" situation—i.e., a potential domestic assault or disturbance in the vehicle—although Plaintiffs deny he had this belief. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 7; ECF 35-2, ¶ 7.) Regardless, it is undisputed that Porsch pulled up next to the vehicle and rolled down his window to talk to the driver, later identified as Plaintiff Rene Valdivia. (ECF 25-1, ¶¶ 8-9; ECF 35-2, ¶¶ 8-9.)
Porsch asked Valdivia why the passenger left the car and began running away. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 9; ECF 35-2, ¶ 9.) Valdivia said the woman wanted to see her sick
aunt. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 9; ECF 35-2, ¶ 9.) This turned out to be untrue, although Plaintiffs dispute that Porsch would have known this at the time. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 9; ECF 35-2, ¶ 9.) In any event, Porsch began driving around the area to look for the woman. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 11; ECF 35-2, ¶ 11.) Eventually, he returned to the area where he spoke to Valdivia and approached a nearby house to see if the passenger had gone there. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 12; ECF 35-2, ¶ 12.) A man in the house said no one was there. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 12; ECF 35-2, ¶ 12.) Shortly thereafter, Porsch spoke to Valdivia again and asked him for identification. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 13; ECF 35-2, ¶ 13.) Valdivia claimed he had not been driving the car and said he did not know which house the woman went into. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 13; ECF 35-2, ¶ 13.) Porsch decided to detain Valdivia while he continued to investigate why the woman fled. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 14; ECF 35-2, ¶ 14.)
At some point either before or immediately after he had been detained, Valdivia admitted his driver's license was suspended. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 13; ECF 35-2, ¶ 13.) Porsch explained he knew Valdivia had been driving the car, asked to see the registration and insurance information, and asked if there was anything illegal in the vehicle. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 15; ECF 35-2, ¶ 15.) Valdivia said the car was not his and there was nothing illegal inside. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 15; ECF 35-2, ¶ 15.) It turns out that Valdivia was the joint owner of the car, although Plaintiffs deny that Porsch would have known this at the time. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 15; ECF 35-2, ¶ 15.) Regardless, Porsch approached the car, shined his flashlight into the passenger side windows, and saw marijuana in plain view. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 16; ECF 35-2, ¶ 16.) Porsch and Valdivia continued to discuss where the woman had gone, with Valdivia reiterating that she went to visit her aunt or mom "or something like that," while also insisting he did not know which house she was in. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 17; ECF 35-2, ¶ 17.) Porsch patted Valdivia down and placed him into handcuffs due to Porsch's uncertainty about what had happened to the passenger. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 18; ECF 35-2, ¶ 18.) Valdivia again said the woman was in "that" house. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 19; ECF 35-2, ¶ 19.)
Deputy Audubon County Sheriff Derick Seaton arrived on the scene and immediately helped Porsch place Valdivia into handcuffs. (ECF 42-3, ¶ 13.) Porsch explained to Seaton that he could not figure out what was going on and found it "weird." (ECF 42-3, ¶ 13.) Seaton then began to help Porsch look for the woman. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 20; ECF 35-2, ¶ 20.) Eventually, Valdivia offered to call out to her and tell her to return due to his concerns that the inexperienced officers might panic and shoot her. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 20; ECF 35-2, ¶ 20.) Before the woman returned, Porsch told Valdivia he was under arrest for possessing marijuana and driving while revoked. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 21; ECF 35-2, ¶ 21.) The woman—later identified as Plaintiff Alexis Free—finally returned to the vehicle a short time later and was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 22; ECF 35-2, ¶ 22.) She was placed in Deputy Seaton's vehicle. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 23; ECF 35-2, ¶ 23.)
Deputy Audubon County Sheriff Gabriel Christensen also arrived on the scene during the encounter. (ECF 42-3, ¶ 5.) He walked past Valdivia's and Free's vehicle and did not say anything to suggest he smelled marijuana, although he later testified that he indeed smelled marijuana and that the smell grew stronger as he approached the vehicle's open window. (ECF 42-3, ¶¶ 5, 12-13; 15-17; ECF 43, ¶ 12.) Christensen's body camera video does not definitively show whether marijuana was in plain view in the vehicle, although the audio captures him saying, "plain view
right here ... in the backseat, in the purse" in reference to something in the backseat. (ECF 43, ¶ 11; Christensen BWC 4:55-5:09.)
"Christensen BWC" refer to video footage from Christensen's body worn camera. There is no time stamp on the video itself, so the minute/second references are to the time counter on the Windows Media Player used by the Court to review the footage.
Plaintiffs contend that the only reason known to Christensen for why Valdivia was being detained was that Porsch wanted to figure out why Free ran from the vehicle. (ECF 42-3, ¶ 7.) Body camera video footage establishes, however, that Christensen was present when Porsch told Valdivia he was driving while suspended. (ECF 43, ¶ 7; Christensen BWC 0:18-0:35.) In any event, Christensen was responsible for watching Valdivia while Porsch left to look into Valdivia's and Free's vehicle. (ECF 42-3, ¶ 8.) Christensen also participated in some of the questioning of Valdivia. (ECF 42-3, ¶ 9.) Porsch gave Miranda warnings to Valdivia and interviewed him. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 23; ECF 35-2, ¶ 23.) Valdivia initially said there was no stolen property in the vehicle but later admitted he sometimes steals things to buy drugs. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 24; ECF 35-2, ¶ 24.) When Porsch asked Valdivia if Free ran because there were drugs in the vehicle, Valdivia said, "yeah, probably." (ECF 25-1, ¶ 25; ECF 35-2, ¶ 25.) Valdivia and Free were both taken to the Audubon County Jail and booked for various crimes, including, as to Free, the charge of possession of contraband based on officers' discovery of a methamphetamine pipe in her bra. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 26; ECF 35-2, ¶ 26.)
Valdivia and Free filed motions to suppress in their criminal cases in the Iowa District Court for Audubon County. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 27; ECF 35-2, ¶ 27.) Both motions were granted based on the inability of the arresting officers to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion for the initial detention of Valdivia. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 29; ECF 35-2, ¶ 29.) The criminal cases were then dismissed. (ECF 25-1, ¶ 30; ECF 35-2, ¶ 30.)
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Smith v. Ashland, Inc., 250 F.3d 1167, 1171 (8th Cir. 2001). "A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit.'" Dick v. Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "An issue of fact is genuine when 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party" on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS.
The Court will start with the easiest issue: the viability of Plaintiffs' state law constitutional claims. When Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, the existing state of Iowa law was that an aggrieved party could bring direct tort claims under the Iowa Constitution for money damages against government officials. See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled by Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). Plaintiffs therefore included three state law claims for unlawful search and seizure under Iowa Constitution article I, section 8. (ECF 1, Counts II, IV, VI.) In
May 2023, however, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled Godfrey and concluded there is no longer a "standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of a provision of the Iowa Constitution." Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 307. It follows that Counts II, IV, and VI are no longer viable. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims for, inter alia, unreasonable seizure under Iowa Constitution article I, section 8).
Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold otherwise based on two interrelated arguments: (i) Burnett is not necessarily retroactive; and (ii) treating Burnett as retroactive would violate their due process rights by taking away a vested cause of action. The first argument fails because it is impossible to read Burnett as anything other than retroactive given that the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a post-Godfrey claim under the Iowa Constitution. See 990 N.W.2d at 307. If the Iowa Supreme Court intended for Burnett not to have retroactive effect, it should have overruled Godfrey but also allowed the plaintiff's claim to move forward. The fact that it did not do so makes it self-evident that Burnett applies retroactively. See also Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800, 812 (Iowa 2023) (affirming dismissal of pre-Burnett constitutional tort claim). As stated by the Iowa Court of Appeals, "Iowa no longer recognizes Godfrey constitutional tort claims, whether on file before Burnett or not." Dishman v. State, No. 22-1491, 2023 WL 8068563, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023).
Plaintiffs second argument also fails. Although they appear to be raising due process arguments under both state and federal law, they rely almost entirely on Iowa Supreme Court precedent, including, especially, Thorp v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., which held that the Iowa Legislature could not give retroactive application to a statute narrowing dramshop liability. 446 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1989). Plaintiffs correctly note that Thorp believed the retroactive amendment was "in violation of due process under both the federal and state constitutions." Id. at 463. As it relates to the federal constitution, however, Thorp's analysis was incomplete and unpersuasive. Thorp cited only two United States Supreme Court cases that struck down retroactive legislation on due process grounds, Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428, 57 L.Ed. 773 (1913) and Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921). See Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 462-63. The Eighth Circuit has subsequently recognized that Ettor was a vestige of the Supreme Court's now-widely-discredited "Lochner era," so named for the "pivotal case of judicial activism, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905)." Honeywell, Inc. v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 110 F.3d 547, 554 (8th Cir. 1997). Although Ettor was never overruled, the Eighth Circuit explained that the approach it used for analyzing the constitutionality of a statute "has long since been discarded." See id. (quoting United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 34, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994)). In other words, Ettor is not persuasive authority. Nor is Truax, which emanates from the same discredited era of judicial activism. It is unclear why Thorp attached significance to those cases, but Eighth Circuit precedent prohibits this Court from following suit. See Honeywell, 110 F.3d at 554.
Moreover, and in any event, even the Lochner era cases never went so far as to hold that a change to the common law, if applied retroactively, would violate federal due process. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that "[a]
person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327 (1912)). It follows that the Iowa Supreme Court did not create a federal due process problem when it chose to give retroactive effect to Burnett. Cf. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 461, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) ("In the context of common law doctrines ... there often arises a need to clarify or even to reevaluate prior opinions as new circumstances and fact patterns present themselves.")..
As for Plaintiffs' due process rights under the Iowa Constitution, it is for the Iowa Supreme Court to decide in the first instance whether giving retroactive effect to Burnett impermissibly impairs a vested right. See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2010) ("This court is bound by decisions of the highest state court when interpreting state law."). The Iowa Supreme Court obviously concluded in Burnett, however, that the answer is "no," as it would not otherwise have affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's constitutional claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to show that it would violate the Iowa Constitution to give retroactive effect to Burnett. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on Counts II, IV, and VI.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS: FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.
A. Qualified Immunity.
1. Qualified Immunity for Individuals.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on any person who, acting under color of law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Government officials are protected against section 1983 claims by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which frees them from liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "Qualified immunity 'is an immunity from suit rather than merely a defense to liability.'" Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808. Qualified immunity "is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806.
Law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity "unless: (1) [they] violated a constitutional right, and (2) that constitutional right was clearly established so that a reasonable officer would know of the right at the time of the alleged violation.'" Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 925 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2019). Courts may address these issues in either order, and a plaintiff must satisfy both prongs before a claim may proceed to trial. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241, 129 S.Ct. 808. "Under either prong of the inquiry, the district court 'may not resolve genuine disputes of fact' relevant to the
issue of qualified immunity." Wealot v. Brooks, 865 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam)). Moreover, all disputed facts must be interpreted in the plaintiff's favor when defendants move for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861.
2. Qualified Immunity for Supervisors and Entities.
"Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Instead, plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a local government entity must "prove that their constitutional rights were violated by an action pursuant to official municipal policy or misconduct so pervasive among non-policymaking employees of the municipality as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Edwards v. City of Florissant, 58 F.4th 372, 376 (8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998)). "[A]bsent a constitutional violation by a city employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the City." Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018).
"Policy and custom are not the same thing." Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2016). "[A] 'policy" is an official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters." Id. at 700 (alteration in original) (quoting Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999)). By contrast, to establish municipal liability through an official "custom," a plaintiff must show:
(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014).
In addition, "[i]n limited circumstances, a local government may be liable for its 'decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights.'" Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011)). "The failure to train must rise to 'deliberate indifference' to be actionable." Id. "A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to show deliberate indifference." Id. "It may be, however, that 'evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal liability.'" Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). "'[D]eliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Brown, 520 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. "A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train." Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350.
Relatedly, "a supervisor may... be liable under § 1983 if either his direct action or his 'failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee'
caused the constitutional violation at issue." Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001)). "Even if a supervisor is not involved in day-to-day operations, his personal involvement may be found if he is involved in 'creating, applying, or interpreting a policy' that gives rise to unconstitutional conditions." Id. (quoting Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2009)). When pursuing supervisor liability on a failure to supervise theory, the plaintiff must show the supervisor "(1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by a subordinate, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts." S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). Likewise, for failure to train, the plaintiff must prove that the supervisor's actions or omissions amounted to deliberate indifference to the likelihood that subordinate officers would violate constitutional rights, and the "alleged failure to train actually caused the constitutional deprivation." McGuire v. Cooper, 952 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
B. Porsch Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Section 1983 Claims Because He Had Arguable Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Valdivia in the First Instance and Arguable Probable Cause to Arrest Both Plaintiffs and Search their Vehicle.
1. Porsch Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Unreasonable Seizure Claims.
The threshold question for all of Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims is whether Porsch had lawful authority to detain Valdivia while Porsch investigated what happened to the woman—later identified as Free—who was seen running away from Valdivia's vehicle. Both sides agree, correctly, that Porsch's initial detention of Valdivia was an investigatory stop—i.e., a Terry stop—for which the governing standard is reasonable suspicion. "Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause, requiring at least some minimal level of objective justification— something more than unparticularized suspicion or hunch—for the belief that a suspect has committed a crime." Sturgeon v. Faughn, 36 F.4th 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). In a section 1983 case, the question for qualified immunity purposes is if the officer "had arguable reasonable suspicion—that is, if a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed she had reasonable suspicion." Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 736 (8th Cir. 2019).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The Court concludes that Porsch had arguable reasonable suspicion when he initially detained Valdivia. By that point, a reasonable officer in Porsch's position would have known, at minimum, the following: (i) Porsch made a U-turn and began to follow Valdivia's vehicle through Audubon in the nighttime hours of October 8, 2022; (ii) Valdivia's vehicle turned onto two different streets before pulling over, at which point the passenger jumped out and ran away while Valdivia remained in the driver's seat; (iii) when Porsch approached the vehicle to ask what happened, Valdivia
The parties dispute whether Valdivia had already been detained when he admitted to having a suspended driver's license. The Court doubts he was already detained at that time, but this dispute is not outcome determinative. The Court therefore will assume Valdivia had already been detained when he made this admission, and thus that the admission cannot be used as part of the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
claimed the woman had run out to see her"sick aunt"; (iv) Porsch searched the neighborhood, including speaking to the occupant of a nearby house, but was unable to find the woman; and (v) when Porsch returned, Valdivia was still outside but declined to provide identification and claimed he was not driving the vehicle. Taken together, these facts are sufficiently suspicious to cause a reasonable officer in Porsch's position to develop reasonable suspicion that something criminal was afoot. For example, it is difficult to understand why a person would run from a car if she was merely visiting a sick relative. It is similarly difficult to understand why Valdivia was still standing outside several minutes later (after Porsch had driven around the neighborhood to look for the passenger) rather than going into the same home to see the same relative. A reasonable officer in Porsch's position could have concluded that Valdivia was not telling the truth about the passenger's whereabouts or reason for running. This conclusion would have been reinforced moments later when Valdivia told an even more obvious lie about not driving the vehicle despite Porsch having seen him in the driver's seat just minutes earlier. In these circumstances, Porsch had at least arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Valdivia for additional questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 416 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed based, in part, on "the seeming implausibilities and inconsistencies in the responses to [the officer's] routine questions"); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed based on a furtive driving maneuver and other "peculiar behavior," as well as inconsistent answers to questions).
In urging the Court to conclude otherwise, Plaintiffs argue that Porsch was unable to identify any specific crime that Valdivia might have committed. This argument fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of the reasonable suspicion standard. "Direct evidence of a specific, particular crime is unnecessary." United States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). Instead, it is enough for an officer to have reasonable suspicion that some sort of criminal activity is afoot, regardless of whether the officer can "articulate particularized facts that support a finding that a particular specific crime is afoot." United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 356 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010). Here, the passenger's flight combined with Valdivia's strange statement about the "sick aunt" and false statement about not driving the vehicle was enough to give a reasonable officer in Porsch's position reasonable suspicion that Valdivia had done something to cause the passenger to run (i.e., the "rolling domestic" situation) or that Valdivia was helping the passenger try to evade the police (which turned out to be the case). Either way, Porsch had arguable reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory detention.
Porsch's additional questioning of Valdivia quickly resulted in probable cause for arrest. Either immediately before or after being detained for Terry purposes, Valdivia admitted to having a suspended driver's license. Because Porsch had seen him in the driver's seat of the vehicle a short time earlier, this admission alone was enough to give Porsch probable cause to arrest Valdivia for driving with a suspended license. See United States v. Jones, 479 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2007) ("If an officer determines that a person is driving on a suspended license, then the officer has probable cause to arrest."). Porsch then developed even more probable cause when he looked inside Valdivia's vehicle
and saw marijuana in plain view. See United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2007) (probable cause for arrest existed based on presence of drugs in vehicle). In other words, by the time Porsch officially placed Valdivia under arrest, he had probable cause for at least two separate crimes. Porsch did not violate Valdivia's Fourth Amendment rights in these circumstances and thus is entitled to qualified immunity on Valdivia's section 1983 claims for unreasonable seizure.
Porsch also did not violate Free's Fourth Amendment rights. After Valdivia was placed under arrest, he began helping search for Free, thus effectively admitting she was not visiting a "sick relative" but rather was hiding somewhere in the neighborhood to avoid the police. When this admission is combined with the presence of marijuana in the purse in the vehicle and Free's decision to flee in the first place, Porsch had probable cause to arrest her. See Cummins, 920 F.2d at 502 (officer had probable cause to arrest both driver and passenger based on presence of marijuana in vehicle). The Court therefore GRANTS Porsch's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and V.
2. Porsch Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Unreasonable Search Claims.
Porsch is also entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims arising out of the warrantless search of the vehicle. "[O]fficers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest—even after the arrestee is restrained in the back of a patrol vehicle— when officers have a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains evidence related to the crime of arrest." United States v. Stegall, 850 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2017). The presence of marijuana in plain view was enough to give Porsch probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest. See United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that officers did not violate Fourth Amendment when they conducted warrantless search of vehicle after seeing drug paraphernalia in plain view); see also United States v. Williams, 955 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2020) ("We have repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana provides probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle under the automobile exception."). The Court therefore GRANTS Porsch's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III.
C. Defendants Christensen and Seaton Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Section 1983 Claims.
The Court's conclusion that Porsch had arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Valdivia for additional questioning is outcome determinative as to Plaintiffs' claims against Christensen and Seaton. Those two Defendants participated in the detention of Valdivia and Free and therefore are entitled to qualified immunity from the unreasonable seizure claims for the same reasons as Porsch. See Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1010 (8th Cir. 2017) ("Generally, an assisting officer is entitled to rely on the probable cause determination of the arresting officer and may receive qualified immunity as long as the reliance is reasonable.").
Christensen and Seaton are likewise entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' unreasonable search claims. Plaintiffs argue that Christensen's body camera footage does not definitively show the presence of marijuana inside the vehicle when Christensen shined his flashlight through the window. This is true, but only in the sense that the surrounding darkness and glare of the flashlight off the window-pane make it impossible to tell from the
vantagepoint of the camera what Christensen could or could not see. His eyes, however, were at a different vantagepoint, and the audio captures him saying "plain view right here ... inside the purse" as he looked in the backseat area of the vehicle. This is exactly where officers indeed located and seized marijuana. Moreover, and in any event, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Porsch saw marijuana when he looked through the window, and Valdivia did not deny the presence of marijuana when alerted to that fact by Porsch; instead, he simply denied it was his (Christensen BWC 1:00-1:12). Finally, it is significant that Plaintiffs do not claim the marijuana was not in plain view, but rather simply challenge whether Christensen in fact saw it. In these circumstances, Plaintiffs have not done enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact on whether officers saw marijuana in plain view. It follows that Christensen and Seaton had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle and did not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by assisting with the search of the vehicle. See, e.g., Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1010. The Court therefore GRANTS Christensen's and Seaton's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, III, and V.
D. The Supervisor and Entity Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims.
In their remaining section 1983 claims, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Audubon, Audubon Police Chief Coby Gust, Audubon County, and Audubon County Sheriff Todd Johnson (collectively, the "Supervisor/Entity Defendants") are liable under failure to train or supervise theories—i.e., under Monell v. Department of Social Services. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Where underlying officers are entitled to qualified immunity, however, the supervisors and governmental entities cannot be held liable under section 1983 for failure to train or supervise. See Rogers v. King, 885 F.3d 1118, 1122 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018) ("[A]bsent a constitutional violation by a city employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the City."). The Court therefore GRANTS the Supervisor/Entity Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts VII, VIII, and IX.
VI. REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS.
When a federal court dismisses section 1983 claims, it must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See Moore-Jones v. Quick, 909 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 2018). "In exercising its discretion, the district court should consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." See Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 738 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2013). With those factors in mind, the undersigned is sometimes reluctant to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when, as here, the case was filed in federal court in the first place and extensive litigation has taken place in this forum. Here, however, two important factors cause the Court to conclude that it should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.
First, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that when a district court has dismissed every federal claim, "the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004)). As this
ruling leaves no federal claims, this precedent squarely applies.
Second, the Court's ruling on the Fourth Amendment aspects of Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims is at odds with rulings from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County granting motions to suppress in each of Valdivia's and Free's underlying criminal cases. In other words, this Court has diverged from its state court counterpart in evaluating the legitimacy of the Porsch's actions. To the extent the divergent rulings are reconcilable (which they might not be), one potential explanation is that there is a difference between federal and state law standards for reasonable suspicion under the unique facts of this case. Resolution of this question hinges on interpretations of state law that a state court is better equipped to handle. The Court therefore will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' claims for state law false arrest (Count X), negligent supervision and training (Count XI), and respondeat superior (Count XII).
The Audubon County rulings do not have preclusive effect here, which is why the Court undertook its own independent analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues. See McMurtrey v. Cleveringa, No. C20-4048, 2022 WL 67471, at *4-6 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 6, 2022) (holding that issue preclusion doctrine did not prevent law enforcement officer from relitigating constitutionality of allegedly improper search).
VII. CONCLUSION.
The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF 25; ECF 32) as to Counts I through IX. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants on those claims.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts X through XII and therefore DISMISSES those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.