Opinion
Civil No. 05cv1683 WQH (WMc).
April 10, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Cecilia Valdez ("Plaintiff") brings her motion under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) and § 1383(c), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's ("Commissioner") final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. Plaintiff asks the Court to find that she is disabled, to reverse the Commissioner's decision, and to order initiation of benefits on the grounds the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests the Court to remand the case for a new administration hearing. The Commissioner concurrently seeks summary judgment to affirm the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision.
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . brought in the district court of the United States. . . . The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The fidnigns of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).
After a thorough review of the pleadings filed by the parties and the entire record submitted in this matter, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion be DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 26, 2003, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("SSDI") claiming a disability. (Tr. 12.) On November 18, 2003, Plaintiff's application was denied. (Tr. 67-68.) Plaintiff timely filed a request for a reconsideration hearing and on July 13, 2004, Plaintiff appeared to testify before of an ALJ. (Tr. 12.) On January 28, 2005, an ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits. (Tr. 20.) Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's decision, but it was denied by the Appeals Council on June 23, 2005. (Tr. 3-5.) The decision became final when the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant action in Federal Court.STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff was born February 1, 1947, and was 58 years old on her application filing date. (Tr. 46.) Plaintiff has completed some college. (Tr. 65.) In the past, Plaintiff worked as a laundry and dry cleaner clerk, and as a booth cashier in a gas station. (Tr. 80.) Plaintiff has not worked since April 8, 2002, when she left work due to neck and shoulder pain. (Tr. 190.)
On April 8, 2002, while working as a laundry and dry cleaner clerk, Plaintiff was hanging cloth on a conveyer belt when she experienced a sudden sharp pain in her right shoulder that radiated down into her arm. Plaintiff visited the emergency room at Sharp Coronado Hospital where a physical examination revealed right shoulder tenderness extending down to the right biceps and right deltoid area. (Tr. 88.) The attending physician diagnosed the injury as being an acute moderate trapezius muscle strain with muscle spasm and a sternocleidomastoid muscle strain. ( Id.)
The sternocleidomastoid muscles are muscles in the neck that rotate and flex the head. (Last visited on March 6, 2006),http://www.answers.com/topic/sternocleidomastoid-muscle-1.
On May 3, 2002, Dr. Mark T. Selecky examined Plaintiff and diagnosed her injury as being right shoulder impingement syndrome with rotator cuff tenderness and associated biceps tendinitis with possible rotator cuff tear; and, mild cervical strain and right paracervical spinal muscle irritation likely secondary to the right shoulder pathology with a possible contribution of her pain from possible cervical radiculopathy. (Tr. 127.) Dr. Selecky ordered an MRI to rule out possible rotator cuff tear or biceps tendon detachment. ( Id.) The doctor recommended Plaintiff keep her work activities limited to her left arm and not to use her right hand for any work activities. (Tr. 128.)
The MRI results were read by Dr. Saeed Yadegar, a radiologist. (Tr. 118.) Dr. Yadegar found a focal area of full thickness tear in the anterior portion of the supraspinatus tendon. ( Id.) He also found moderate amounts of subdeltoid, subacromial effusion and focal areas of subchondral erosion in the superolateral aspect of the right humeral head. ( Id.) Additionally, there was moderate narrowing of the neuroforamina, and moderate narrowing of the left neuroforamina and central disc protrusions at T1 and T2. ( Id.)
On May 30, 2002, Dr. Selecky reviewed the MRI results and noted that the film revealed fluid in the subacromial space, which is generally indicative of a small full thickness rotator cuff tear. (Tr. 118.) The MRI also showed a mild degree of central stenosis in the cervical spine. ( Id.) After some discussion of Plaintiff's options, the doctor administered a corticosteroid injection and recommended that Plaintiff receive physical therapy. (Tr. 119.) Within minutes of the injection, Plaintiff notice substantial relief. ( Id.) The doctor also recommended that Plaintiff continue to limit her work activity to the use of her left hand only. (Tr. 120.)
At the recommendation of her attorney, Plaintiff went to see Dr. Thomas W. Harris, who assumed treatment of Plaintiff's case. (Tr. 109.) However, on July 18, 2002, Plaintiff re-visited Dr. Selecky and reported that her symptoms increased after Dr. Harris took her out of physical therapy and placed her on ibuprofen. (Tr. 110.) Dr. Selecky administered another steroid injection and recommended that Plaintiff continue therapy and discontinue using ibuprofen. (Tr. 111.)
On August 15, 2002, Dr. Harris examined Plaintiff and recommend she continue using the Naprosyn anti-inflammatory and therapy. (Tr. 107.) Plaintiff noted she had seen a 50-60% improvement as a result of the previous steroid injection and the continuing physical therapy. ( Id.) However, Dr. Harris performed arthroscopic surgery to repair Plaintiff's rotator cuff tear on November 12, 2002. (Tr. 155-157.)
On December 5, 2002, Dr. Michael R. Lenihan examined Plaintiff for a re-evaluation of her shoulder and noted Plaintiff was still exhibiting pain and weakness in her arm. (Tr. 100-101.) Dr. Lenihan warned that Plaintiff was exaggerating her condition. (Tr. 102.) Dr. Lenihan found Plaintiff made less than a full effort in her motor test and found that she misrepresented her actual capacity with regard to strength ability in her hands and writs. ( Id.) The doctor recommended Plaintiff undergo a comprehensive rehabilitation program for her right shoulder. (Tr. 104.)
In the follow up appointment on December 17, 2002, Dr. Harris noted that Plaintiff had not started physical therapy and strongly recommended that she do so. (Tr. 151-152.) Dr. Harris found that the Plaintiff had a decreased range of motion and was exhibiting some mild tenderness in her right shoulder. ( Id.) On January 21, 2003, Dr. Harris reexamined Plaintiff and found that she had some improvement in her shoulder. (Tr. 149.) The doctor also noted that Plaintiff was still having upper back and right thumb pain and that there was some evidence of de Quervains tenosynovitis. ( Id.) The Plaintiff was ordered to use a thumb spica splint, to continue stretching her right shoulder, to use heat and cold therapy and to start therapy for her right hand. ( Id.)
De Quervain's tenosynovitis is inflammation of the tendon on the side of the wrist at the base of the thumb. It is usually associated with pain when the thumb is folded across the palm and the fingers are flexed over the thumb as the hand is pulled away from the involved wrist area. (This is referred to as the Finklestein maneuver). William C. Shiel, Jr., MD, FACP, FACR, De Quervain's Tenosynovitis (Last visited on March 6, 2006),http://www.medicinenet.com/de quervains tenosynovitis/article.htm.
On March 11, 2003, Dr. Harris re-evaluated Plaintiff and found she was still exhibiting signs of pain and stiffness in her right shoulder. (Tr. 146.) The doctor also found that Plaintiff had a reduced range of motion and strength in her right shoulder. ( Id.) Dr. Harris complained that even though he had prescribed a right thumb spica splint and physical therapy for the right hand, it was denied by the insurance carrier. (Tr. 146-147.) Dr. Harris stated that he "believe[s] if the treatment would have been authorized four weeks ago the patient [sic] symptoms would have improved and not increased." ( Id.) Once again, Dr. Harris ordered that Plaintiff be authorized for the use of the right thumb spica splint and physical therapy on her right hand. ( Id.)
Dr. Lenihan also re-evaluated Plaintiff in March 2003, and found that physical therapy had steadily improved her right shoulder. (Tr. 91-93.) The doctor also found Plaintiff tested positive for the Finklestein test and recommended Plaintiff occasionally use a wrist brace. (Tr. 93-94.) However, the doctor again warned that Plaintiff continued to display some signs of "amplification behavior with some grimacing and withdrawal during testing, as well as some mild collapsible weakness." (Tr. 92.) Dr. Lenihan noted that these signs were less prominent than on Plaintiff's previous visit in December 2002. ( Id.) Dr. Lenihan opined that Plaintiff could return to light duty work with no forceful pushing, pulling or grasping with her arm and weight restrictions of 1-2 pounds. (Tr. 94.)
From April 2003 through October 2003, Dr. Harris continued to monitor Plaintiff's progress and found that even though she had some improvement in her right shoulder, she continued to show signs of pain and weakness in her wrist and arm. (Tr. 131-145.) Specifically, on April 8, 2003, Dr. Harris reported Plaintiff continued to have considerable pain in her wrist and elbow. (Tr. 144.) On May 6, 2003, the doctor noted that Plaintiff had regained 80-90% of the range of motion in her right shoulder. (Tr. 141.) Dr. Harris also noted that Plaintiff again tested positive for Finkelstein's test, but that her range of motion was within normal limits. (Tr. 142.) In June 2003, Dr. Harris reported that Plaintiff had been unable to regain the strength in her right shoulder and thus fitted her with an interferential muscle stimulator in an attempt to improve her muscle tone. (Tr. 139-140.) Dr. Harris also stated that he believed Plaintiff's right hand and wrist symptoms were caused secondary to her physical therapy. ( Id.) In August 2003, Dr. Harris found that Plaintiff had reached a plateau in regards to improvements to her right shoulder and back symptoms. (Tr. 136.) On September 2, 2003, an examination by Dr. Harris revealed that Plaintiff's reflexes neurological examination and motor strength were normal. (Tr. 133.) Dr. Harris also found that Plaintiff continued to have tenderness in the right wrist and continued test positive for Finkelstein's. ( Id.)
In January 2004, Dr. David M. Kupfer examined Plaintiff and found that her motor and sensory examinations were normal with no signs of right shoulder impingement. (Tr. 186.) The doctor also found Plaintiff had some tenderness in her wrist and that even though she tested positive for Finkelstein's, her de Quervain's tenosynovitis had improved with medications and splinting. (Tr. 186.) Dr. Kupfer recommended that Plaintiff continue her medications and therapy as Dr. Harris prescribed. ( Id.)
In February 2004, Dr. Kupfer re-examined Plaintiff and found her condition had improved. (Tr. 185.) Dr. Kupfer noted that Plaintiff showed no signs of swelling and that she tested negative for Finkelstein's. ( Id.) Dr. Kupfer recommended that Plaintiff (1) discontinue using a splint and (2) follow-up with Dr. Harris. ( Id.)
On July 1, 2004, Dr. Harris examined Plaintiff and preformed a physical capacities evaluation. (Tr. 170.) Dr. Harris opined that Plaintiff could not perform work above her right shoulder or perform any activities requiring pushing, pulling, gripping or grasping. ( Id.) The doctor also opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to five pounds, but that she could not crawl, climb or reach. ( Id.) Dr. Harris opined that Plaintiff's diagnoses included right shoulder rotator cuff tear and impingement; right lateral epicondylitis; cervical degenerative disease; and right de Quervain's tenosynovitis. The doctor further opined that Plaintiff was unable to do overhead work, fine manipulative activities, gross manipulative activities, and/or pushing/pulling activities with her right upper extremity. (Tr. 171.)
On August 12, 2004, Plaintiff underwent a consultative orthopedic evaluation with Dr. Thomas J. Sabourin. (Tr. 172-176.) After an examination, Dr. Sabourin opined that Plaintiff had good strength in her right shoulder with normal range of motion. (Tr. 174-176.) The doctor opined that Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. (Tr. 176.) However, the doctor stated Plaintiff was limited in manipulative functions of the right upper extremity. ( Id.) Dr. Sabourin also found that Plaintiff tested positive for de Quervain's tenosynovitis, even though the range of motion in her hands and fingers were normal.
On July 13, 2004, Dr. Walter W. Doren, a medical expert, testified to his review of the evidence of record at the reconsideration hearing. (Tr. 218-245.) Dr. Doren opined that Plaintiff retained residual functional capacity in her right upper extremity to lift five pounds, and to use it from 1/3 to 2/3 (20-39 minutes in an hour) based on an eight hour workday. (Tr. 238-243.) Dr. Doren also testified that there were no restrictions on the use of Plaintiff's left upper extremity, and no limitations in her ability to sit, stand, and/or walk. (Tr. 223-225.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner's denial of disability benefits may be set aside if the ALJ's findings are (1) not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or (2) based on legal error. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ's decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the court "may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (citations omitted). "Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detract from the [Commissioner's] conclusion." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
LEGAL STANDARD
To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must establish a medically determinable impairment that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving that the disabling condition prevented him, during the relevant period, from engaging in any of his previous occupations. Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Srvs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work available in the national economy. Gonzales v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1986). If the plaintiff is able to perform a number of other jobs existing in the national economy consistent with the claimant's medically determinable impairment, functional limitations, age, education, and work, then the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining eligibility under the Act. The five steps are as follows: (1) Is the claimant working in any substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Does the impairment "meet or equal" a specific impairment described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant's impairment neither meets nor equals one of the listed impairments, the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Is the claimant able to do any work that he has done in the past? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant can do other work, the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
In the instant case, the ALJ stated that even though Plaintiff has de Quervain's disease and status-post right rotator cuff surgery with residual right shoulder pain, her alleged disabling impairments are not "severe" and do not meet or equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 14-17.) The ALJ stated that the alleged impairments were excessive, not credible and inconsistent with the evidence of record. The ALJ noted that he found Dr. Doren's testimony persuasive and stated that he gave Dr. Harris' assessment less weight in light of the evidence as a whole. ( Id.) In support of the decision, the ALJ listed five reasons for denying the disability insurance. First, the ALJ stated Plaintiff's alleged level of disabling pain and limitations were inconsistent with her testimony that she could perform daily activities of cooking, driving, grocery shopping, walking, gardening and light laundry. (Tr. 17.) Second, the ALJ stressed the fact that Dr. Lenihan warned that Plaintiff displayed signs of amplification behavior. ( Id.) Third, the ALJ cited to Dr. Kupfer's findings on March 4, 2003, that Plaintiff's pain had decreased and that there was no soft tissue swelling nor focal tenderness over the first dorsal compartment. ( Id.) Fourth, the ALJ cited to Dr. Sabourin's neurological examination which found that Plaintiff had normal motor strength in her upper and lower extremities. ( Id.) Fifth, the ALJ stressed that even though Plaintiff had some shoulder pain, her range of motion was within normal limits. ( Id.)
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was capable of performing a significant number of jobs that Plaintiff could do. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ relied on a vocational expert's testimony which stated that based on a hypothetical individual with similar residual functional limitations as those of Plaintiff's, that individual would have the capacity to perform the job duties of gas station booth cashier. ( Id.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is able to perform the job duties of her past relevant work as a gas station booth cashier. ( Id.)
A. Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of the treating physician because conclusions of an attending physician must be given substantial weight and cannot be disregarded unless clear and convincing reasons for doing so are set forth in proper detail. (Pl.'s Mot. at 12.) Plaintiff contends that in order for the ALJ to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record. ( Id. at 13.) Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's "sole reason for accepting the opinion of Dr. Doren [is based on] his belief that it is consistent with the opinions of Drs. Saborin and Kupfer." ( Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this reason is insufficient to constitute substantial evidence. ( Id. at 14.)
The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). As a general rule, more weight is given to the opinion of treating physicians than to that of nontreating physicians. Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). Similarly, the opinion of examining physicians is generally given more weight than that of nonexamining physicians. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1987). However, a treating or examining physician's findings and conclusions are not necessarily dispositive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Regennitter v. Commissioner of the Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999). An ALJ may discredit a physician's opinion if it is conclusory, brief and unsupported by the record as a whole. Batson v. Commissioner of the Social Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Where an expert physician's opinion contradicts the treating or examining physician's opinion, the ALJ may only reject the treating or examining physician's opinion by stating specific and legitimate reasons for doing so that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506. "The ALJ may meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1999). The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot, by itself, constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining or treating physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-831 (citing Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506 n. 4). However, reports by consultative physicians may serve as substantial evidence. Andrew v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Where "the opinion of a nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from those of the treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict." Id.
In the present case, the ALJ relied on the record as a whole in deciding not to accept the treating physicians conclusions about Plaintiff's disability. (Tr. 17.) The record included the expert testimony of Dr. Doren, the opinions of Dr. Sabourin, the State Agency examining physician and the examining opinions of Dr. Kupfer and Dr. Lenihan. ( Id.) The ALJ specifically stated five reasons for giving less weight to Dr. Harris' assessment and rejecting Plaintiff's claim. ( Id.)
First, the ALJ stated Plaintiff's testimony that she was able to perform daily activities of cooking, driving, grocery shopping, walking, gardening and light laundry was inconsistent with the alleged level of disability. (Tr. 17.) Dr. Harris opined that Plaintiff could not perform any activities that required pushing, pulling, gripping, or grasping. (Tr. 170.) However, many of the activities Plaintiff testified to being able to perform involved some pushing, pulling, gripping or grasping. (Tr. 197-205.)
Second, the ALJ noted the conflicting evidence from Dr. Lenihan, who was the orthopedic consulting physician that warned Plaintiff was exaggerating her condition. (Tr. 17.) Dr. Lenihan found Plaintiff was making less than a full effort in her motor test and that she was misrepresenting the strength ability in her hands and wrists. (Tr. 102.) It is reasonable to question the findings of a physician that are based on a patient's false or exaggerated responses. See Brawner v. Secretary of Health Human Servs, 839 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1988).
Third, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Kupfer's report, stating that Plaintiff's condition had improved. Dr. Kupfer noted that Plaintiff showed a progressive decrease in right wrist pain and noted that she showed no signs of swelling or focal tenderness in the wrist. (Tr. 185.) The Plaintiff alleges that it was error to rely on Dr. Kupfer's results because he examined Plaintiff solely for her thumb and wrist symptoms and never gave an opinion regarding her "functioning." (Pl.'s Mot. at 13.) However, the Court finds the ALJ was reasonable in considering Dr. Kupfer's assessment because Dr. Harris' opinion relates to Plaintiff's ability in her wrist.
Fourth, the ALJ relied on Dr. Sabourin's neurological examination, which found that Plaintiff had normal motor strength in her upper and lower extremities. Since Dr. Sabourin was a consulting physician and his results conflicted with that of Dr. Harris', it was within the ALJ's discretion to resolve the conflict and to rely on Dr. Sabourin's assessment. See Andrew, 53 F.3d at 1041.
Finally, the ALJ stated that he found Dr. Doren's testimony persuasive. (Tr. 17.) Dr. Doren testified that in his thirty years of practicing he had never seen a case where it was necessary to totally restrict a patient who had been diagnosed with de Quervain's disease from simple grasping. (Tr. 232.) Dr. Doren opined that there was no basis for a total abstention from simple grasping, pushing or pulling or fine manipulation. (Tr. 224.) Dr. Doren's opinion cannot, by itself, constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of Dr. Harris' opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. However, Dr. Doren's assessment can be a factor for the ALJ to consider in deciding to reject Dr. Harris' conclusions about Plaintiff's disability.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately specified his reasons for rejecting the attending physicians conclusions about Plaintiff's disabilities. The ALJ's evaluation of the evidence was reasonable and was supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the record and the papers submitted and based on the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the ALJ's denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 1, 2006 any party to this action may filed a written objection with the Court and server a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 15, 2006. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED