Opinion
No. 08-3223.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 21, 2009.
Filed on June 4, 2009.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, (D.C. No. 03-cr-246), District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo.
William A. Behe, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellee.
Frederick W. Ulrich, Esq., Office of Federal Public Defender, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.
Before FUENTES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Dennis Spriggs appeals the denial by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because the District Court correctly determined that it did not have authority to reduce Spriggs's sentence, we will affirm.
I. Background
Spriggs pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court determined that Spriggs was a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, set his offense level based on the career offender table at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and sentenced him to ninety-six months in prison. Spriggs filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to have his sentence reduced based on the recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that retroactively lowered the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. The District Court denied his motion, stating simply that "[d]ue to defendant's status as a career offender, the guideline range remains the same." (App.3.) Spriggs filed a timely notice of appeal and contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, the District Court had jurisdiction to consider the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines amendments on Spriggs's sentence. See United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154-55 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of Spriggs's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
When a defendant files a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the district court conducts a two-step analysis. First, it determines whether the defendant "has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). If the defendant's sentencing range has not been lowered, the district court is not authorized to reduce the sentence and must deny the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2) ("A reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if . . . (B) an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range."). If the defendant's sentencing range has been lowered, the district court is to consider the § 3553(a) factors and the applicable policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant's sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Because the first step required the District Court to interpret the Sentencing Guidelines, we review de novo its decision at that step of the analysis. See United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 377 (3d Cir. 2003). As the second step involved the exercise of the District Court's discretion, we review that portion of the analysis for abuse of discretion. See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154 n. 2.
As we recently explained in United States v. Mateo, the crack cocaine amendments did not lower the sentencing ranges of defendants who were sentenced on the basis of their status as career offenders. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155. (The amendment to the crack cocaine guidelines "simply 'provides no benefit to career offenders'") (quoting United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2009)). Because Spriggs's sentence range was based on his status as a career offender, it was not lowered by the crack cocaine amendments, and the District Court was not authorized to reduce his sentence. The District Court properly denied Spriggs's motion at step one and did not need to continue to the second part of the analysis.
III. Conclusion
Because the District Court correctly determined that it did not have authority to reduce Spriggs's sentence, we will affirm.