Opinion
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2002.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Frank R. Zapata, J., of illegal reentry, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) post- Miranda confession of defendant was not tainted by involuntary pre- Miranda statements to border patrol agents, and (2) identify of defendant was established by testimony and documentary evidence of border patrol agent.
Affirmed.
Page 785.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Frank R. Zapata, District Judge, Presiding.
Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, FISHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Defendant appeals his conviction for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the district court erred by finding that his post- Miranda confession was admissible at trial. He asserts that border patrol agents initially processed him for voluntary return to Mexico when they found him in Nogales, Arizona near the United States/Mexico border. He contends that his subsequent confession, after he was read his Miranda rights, was the result of the agents' improper promise that he would be returned to Mexico.
We disagree. When Defendant filled out the I-213 form, he requested voluntary return to Mexico. He was never promised voluntary return to Mexico. Thus, his statements were voluntary. See United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.1993). Accordingly, his post- Miranda confession was not tainted by involuntary pre- Miranda statements. See United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).
We also reject Defendant's contention that Agent Manning's testimony was used to establish Defendant's identity. Although Agent Manning testified that one of the individuals for whom he completed an I-213 form was named Luis Luquez-Acedo and that he recognized Defendant in the courtroom as Luquez-Acedo, Manning then explained that he remembered Defendant from the suppression hearing, and not from the day of the arrest. The government established Defendant's identity with Agent Rubinoff's testimony and with documentary evidence (Defendant's fingerprints and photograph, and his INS alien file). Under these circumstances, the district court did not err by admitting Agent Manning's testimony.
AFFIRMED.