U.S. v. Lewis

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. VICTORIA DUNN LEWIS, a/k/a…

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division

Date published: Dec 5, 2005

Civil Action No. SA-05-CA-0557-XR (W.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No. SA-05-CA-0557-XR.

December 5, 2005

ORDER

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ, District Judge

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2005 (docket no. 6). Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on its claims that Defendant defaulted on numerous student loans. On August 5, 2005, Defendant filed an answer indicating her intention to represent herself on a pro se basis. See Docket no. 2. Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's summary judgment motion within the time period prescribed by Local Rule CV-7(d) (11 days). On November 8, 2005, the Court extended to Defendant a final opportunity to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Defendant was ordered to file a response on or before November 22, 2005 and warned that the failure to respond would result in the granting of the motion. Defendant again did not respond. Accordingly, the Court would be within its discretion to grant Plaintiff's motion without further inquiry. However, as Defendant has chosen to represent herself, the Court will critically analyze Plaintiff's motion. After careful consideration of the motion, as well as the pleadings on file, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's motion should be GRANTED (docket no. 6).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves the alleged default of numerous student loans that Defendant applied for and was granted during three different time periods: July 11, 1977 through April 29, 1980, October 24, 1980 though February 23, 1984, and August 27, 1987.

On or about July 11, 1977 through April 29, 1980, Defendant applied for and was granted four student loans by The University of Texas at Arlington. Defendant allegedly executed a promissory note securing payment of the loan under the following terms:

Date Lender Principal Amount Interest Rate (per annum) July 11, 1977 The University of Texas at Arlington $200.00 3% August 22, 1979 The University of Texas at Arlington $136.00 3% December 14, The University of Texas at Arlington $300.00 3% 1979 April 29, 1980 The University of Texas at Arlington $770.00 3% Mot., at Ex. 12. The University of Texas at Arlington made the loans to Defendant under the Federally-funded National Direct Student Loan¹ program authorized under Title IV-E of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Mot., at Ex. 13. "[The University of Texas at Arlington] demanded payment according to the terms of the notes, and [Defendant] defaulted on the obligation on 3/31/85. Due to this default, [The University of Texas at Arlington] assigned all rights and title to the Department of Education." Id. According to a Certificate of Indebtedness attached to Plaintiff's motion, as of March 22, 2005, the total debt (principal plus interest) owed by Defendant on these loans was $2,229.55. Id.

On or about October 24, 1980 through February 23, 1984, Defendant applied for and was granted an additional ten student loans. Defendant allegedly executed promissory notes securing payment of the loans under the following terms:

Date Lender Principal Amount Interest Rate (per annum) October 24, 1980 The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,625.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund January 13, 1981 The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,625.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund August 24, 1981 The Hinson-Hazelwo od College $925.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund July 6, 1982 The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,331.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund October 6, 1982 The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,600.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund November 29, The Hinson-Hazelwood College $300.00 7% 1982 Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund December 22, The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,900.00 7% 1982 Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund March 18, 1983 The Hinson-Hazelwood College $1,200.00 7% Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund December 28, The Hinson-Hazelwood College $2,478.00 7% 1983 Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund February 23, The Hinson-Hazelwood College $2,450.00 7% 1984 Student Loan Program a/k/a The Texas Opportunity Fund Mot., at Exs. 1-10. These loans were allegedly made to Defendant under the loan guaranty programs authorized by Title IV-B of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Mot., at Ex. 11. "[The Hinson-Hazelwood College Student Loan Program] demanded payment according to the terms of the note(s), and credited $0.00 to the outstanding principal owed on the loan(s). [Defendant] defaulted on the obligation on 3/21/85, and [The Hinson-Hazelwood College Student Loan Program] filed a claim on the guarantee." Id. According to a Certificate of Indebtedness attached to Plaintiff's motion, as of March 22, 2005, the total debt (principal plus interest) owed by Defendant on these loans was $39,671.95. Id.

On or about August 27, 1987, Defendant applied for and was granted a student loan by Trans World. Defendant allegedly executed a promissory note securing payment of the loan under the following terms:

Date Lender Principal Amount Interest Rate (per annum) August 27, 1987 Trans World $2,625.00 8% Mot., at Ex. 14. Defendant's "loan obligation was guaranteed by the Higher Education Assistance Foundation and then reinsured by the Department of Education under loan guaranty programs authorized under Title IV-B of the Higher Education Act of 1965." Mot., at Ex. 15. "[Trans World] demanded payment according to the terms of the note(s), and credited $0.00 to the outstanding principal owed on the loan(s). [Defendant] defaulted on the obligation on 8/29/89, and [Trans World] filed a claim on the guarantee." Id. The Higher Education Assistance Foundation paid Trans World the full amount of the debt. Id. After an unsuccessful attempt to collect the debt from Defendant, the Higher Education Assistance Foundation allegedly assigned its right and title to the loans to the Department of Education on September 6, 1992. Id. According to a Certificate of Indebtedness attached to Plaintiff's motion, as of March 22, 2005, the total debt (principal plus interest) owed by Defendant on this loan was $3,713.84. Id.

Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment to establish Defendant's default on the above-described student loans and recover $45,615.34 ($23,202.33 principal and $22,413.01 interest through March 22, 2005) in student loan debt. Plaintiff also seeks attorney's fees and court costs.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court will review the evidence in the record and disregard the evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In order for a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 4 (1986). If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is proper.

III. Analysis

To recover on a promissory note, the United States must establish that (1) Defendant signed the note; (2) the government is the current owner or holder of the note; and (3) the note is in default. United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5^th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has produced sufficient summary judgment evidence to satisfy all three prongs.

First, Plaintiff has produced a promissory note signed by Defendant for each student loan it seeks to recover. Mot., at Exs. 1-10, 12, 14. Second, Plaintiff has produced three sworn United States Department of Education Certificates of Indebtedness evidencing Plaintiff's ownership of the promissory notes in question. Mot., at Exs. 11, 13, 15. Finally, the Certificates of Indebtedness also establish Defendant defaulted on each of the promissory notes. Id. The promissory notes together with the Certificates of Indebtedness demonstrate that as of March 22, 2005, the student loan debt (principal plus interest) Defendant owed to Plaintiff totaled $45,615.34. Mot., at Exs. 1-15.

Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to satisfy its summary judgment burden, and shift the burden to Defendant to "`set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,' [and] not just . . . `rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading.'" Lawrence, 276 F.3d at 197 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Camp, 965 F.2d 25, 29 (5^th Cir. 1992)). As previously noted, Defendant failed to file a response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment despite being ordered by the Court to do so. See Order dated November 8, 2005. Defendant's unsworn answer asserts the affirmative defense of payment. However, there is no evidence that Defendant did not sign the promissory notes, Plaintiff is not the current holder of the notes, or the notes are not in default. Because Defendant's answer is not competent summary judgment evidence and she has failed to produce any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the student loan debt at issue is due and owing, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff has alleged Defendant defaulted on numerous federally guaranteed student loans. Plaintiff produced competent summary judgment evidence establishing Defendant signed the promissory notes, the government is the current holder of the notes, and the notes are in default. Defendant asserted the affirmative defense of payment in her answer, but did not file a response to Plaintiff's motion. Accordingly, she failed to come forward with any evidence that supports her payment defense. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED (docket no. 6). Plaintiff is awarded court costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The parties shall bear their own attorney's fees.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment against Defendant Victoria Dunn Lewis, also known as Victoria Lewis-Dunn, and formerly known as Vickie D. Lewis, in the sum of $45,615.34 plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.30 percent per annum until paid in full, to be compounded annually pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and all costs of court.