Opinion
Criminal No. 99-1417 JP.
August 14, 2000
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISCOVERY OF MATERIALS RELATED TO SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
Dr. Lee. through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this reply memorandum in support of his motion for discovery of materials related to selective prosecution.
Dr. Lee's discovery motion set forth direct evidence that Dr. Lee was targeted for prosecution because he is "ethnic Chinese." Under United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), these admissions from officials involved in-his criminal prosecution satisfy entirely Dr. Lee's burden for obtaining discovery. Dr. Lee, therefore, need not show that similarly-situated persons who were not "ethnic-Chinese" have not been prosecuted for the crimes with which he was charged. Dr. Lee, nevertheless, has shown that no other person has ever been charged under 42 U.S.C. § § 2275 2276, which carry potential sentences of life in prison. Dr. Lee also cited several similarly-situated individuals who have not been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 793(c).
Additional instances of mishandling of classified information at LANL that did not result in the prosecution of individuals who are not ethnic-Chinese are described in the Classified Addendum to the Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion For Discovery on Issues Related to Selective Prosecution on file with the Court.
The government's Response makes the following arguments: 1) Dr. Lee's proof that the government engaged in improper racial profiling of ethnic-Chinese was deficient: 2) even if Dr. Lee has shown that the government engaged in racial profiling, such profiling is permissible: 3) even if the government's racial profiling in connection with the "Kindred Spirit" espionage investigation were improper, Dr. Lee's indictment for violations of 42 U.S.C. § § 2275 and 2276 was a separate. untainted case; and 4) even though Dr. Lee is the only person ever charged under § § 2275 2276, he has not been improperly singled out because no similarly-situated person ever violated these two statutes. This Reply will refine each of these arguments in turn. First. however, Dr. Lee will set out two additional declarations which prove that Dr. Lee was subjected to improper profiling; that this profiling led to his indictment on the charges here: and that the declarants are personally aware of similarly-situated individuals who have not been prosecuted.
A. Vrooman's Declaration And Charles Washington's Declaration Prove That Dr. Lee Has Met His Burden Under Armstrong to Obtain Discovery
The government argued that Mr. Vrooman's declaration should not be considered because it was not signed under penalty of perjury. Response at 8. Attached to this Reply is a sworn declaration from Vrooman in which he reaffirms under penalty of perjury his earlier statement, and also provides additional proof that Dr. Lee was improperly singled out for prosecution. See Ex. 1, Second Declaration of Vrooman. First Vrooman refutes FBI SA Messemer's claim that the "matrix" used to target Dr. Lee was based on travel to the PRC and access to W-88 information, rather than primarily on racial profiling. See Messemer Decl. at ¶ 3a. Vrooman rejects Messemer's false statement and declares that "hundreds of individuals who shared those characteristics were not chosen for investigation. . . It is my firm belief that the actual reason Dr. Lee was selected for investigation was because he was ethnic Chinese." See Ex. 1 at ¶ 3. Vrooman then refutes the government's claim that it was appropriate to target Chinese-Americans for espionage involving the PRC because these Chinese-Americans are more likely to be contacted by the PRC. As Vrooman states: "It was our experience that Chinese intelligence officials contacted everyone from the laboratories with a nuclear weapons background who visited China for information, regardless of ethnicity." Ex. 1 at ¶ 4.
Vrooman also notes that he has observed FBI SA Messemer "distort information" and that other FBI agents have told him that FBI SA Messemer engages in such distortion. Vrooman's observations, made under penalty of perjury, are consistent with the defense's uncovering that FBI SA Messemer provided false testimony to this Court at two bail hearings. The government has argued that this false testimony was a mistake by FBI SA Messemer.
Vrooman also rejects the government' s unsupported assertion that targeting Chinese-Americans for espionage investigations furthered some rational law enforcement purpose. Vrooman states that he is "unaware of any empirical data that would support any inference that an American citizen born in Taiwan would be more likely than any other American.
Ex. 1 at ¶ 4. Vrooman also makes clear that he was personally aware of similarly-situated individuals who were not prosecuted by DOJ, including a DOE employee working at a nuclear laboratory who committed espionage by passing nuclear-related information to the Russians, but whose prosecution was declined in exchange for a debriefing as to the nuclear secrets he had passed. Ex. 1 at ¶ 8.
The government also argued that this Court should not consider that Charles Washington. the former Acting Director of Counterintelligence at the DOE, had told the Washington Post that Dr. Lee was targeted for prosecution because he was ethnic-Chinese. Response at 8. Attached is a sworn declaration from Washington in which he concludes that Trulock "improperly targeted Dr. Lee due to Dr. Lee's race and national origin."See Ex. 2. August 10, 2000. Declaration of Charles Washington at ¶ 4.
As the attached Declaration of James Ford, a DOE official who supervised Washington and Trulock, makes clear, Washington was highly regarded by his supervisors. See Ex. 3. August 11, 2000. Declaration of James Ford.
Washington also concludes that he is personally aware of similarly-situated persons to Dr. Lee who were not prosecuted by the government. Washington states:
I am aware of Department of Energy employees who were not imprisoned or prosecuted for committing offenses that are much more serious than the "security infractions" alleged to have been committed by Dr. Lee. I am personally aware of a DOE employee who committed a most egregious case of espionage that cost our nation billions of dollars and drastically impacted our national defense. That DOE employee was not prosecuted.
Ex. 2 at ¶ 10. Washington also debunks FBI Special Agent Messemer's claim that the "second" investigation of Dr. Lee by the FBI was not tainted by the three-year investigation of Dr. Lee for espionage, which was leaked to the press throughout the United States. Washington concludes that not only would Dr. Lee likely not have been charged under the Atomic Energy Act, but also he probably would not have been charged under any criminal statute but for the initial racial profiling of Dr. Lee. Washington states:
Based upon my experience in counterintelligence and my personal experience with Notra Trulock, I have concluded that if Dr. Lee had not been initially targeted based on his race (Taiwanese-Chinese) with the resulting wide press disclosures that he had purportedly passed [SEALED BY THE COURT] and the politicizing of the situation, he may very well have been treated administratively like the others who had allegedly mishandled classified information.
The government cannot plausibly dismiss Trulock as merely a criminal investigator who played a limited role here. Trulock took extraordinary steps to actively seek Dr. Lee's prosecution, and to ensure that the DOS's policy of profiling and targeting ethnic Chinese was not altered. To that end, Trulock met personally with Attorney General Janet Reno, testified repeatedly on Capitol Hill, and appeared on national news programs.
Washington further concludes that there is no empirical data to support the singling out of American citizens born in either Taiwan or China as somehow being more likely to commit espionage for the PRC. See Ex. 2 at ¶ 9. Finally, Mr. Washington makes clear that the files being withheld from the defense do contain evidence that similarly-situated individuals have not been prosecuted by the government. See Ex. 2 at ¶ 10.
B. The Government's Response Misstates the Applicable Law and Facts
1. Dr. Lee Has Proven That The Government Engaged In Racial Profiling
The government's Response largely sidesteps Dr. Lee's contention that Trulock's profiling and targeting of him for the espionage investigation was improperly based on Dr. Lee's race. While the government claims that it "does not concede" that Trulock targeted Dr. Lee because he was ethnic-Chinese, it provides nothing to this Court to rebut Vrooman's damning evidence, nor does the Response refute or explain the uncontroverted statement of former FBI Deputy Director Moore that the FBI had a practice of targeting "ethnic-Chinese" for counterintelligence investigations involving the PRC. Response at 6.
Further, Vrooman and Washington, two government officials who are personally aware of the investigation of Dr. Lee, conclusively establish that Dr. Lee was targeted because he is "ethnic-Chinese." Dr. Lee has also shown that the racial profiling approved by Moore was used by the DOJ here. The DOJ explicitly adopted the raise premise that ethnic-Chinese Americans are more likely to commit espionage for the PRC than other Americans. When it edited, approved and filed the April 13, 1999, affidavit for the search of Dr. Lee's home. That affidavit states that "PRC intelligence operations virtually always target overseas ethnic Chinese with access to intelligence information sought by the PRC" and that "travel to China is an integral part of the Chinese intelligence collection tradecraft, particularly when it involves overseas ethnic Chinese." See Search Warrant Affidavit at ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
See Transcript of Proceedings, Motion Hearing. July 26, 2000 at 165 (Search warrant affidavit had been "reviewed by people in the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office" and by DOJ officials in Washington D.C.).
Further, the DOJ continued this race-specific profiling after the so-called "separate" investigation began in March 1999. that was supposedly untainted by the earlier racial profiling. The DOJ issued a subpoena to the University of California at Los Angeles after March, 1999, ordering the university to provide the name of every UCLA student between 1993 and 1994 who was from either the PRC or Taiwan. See Ex. 4. Letter from UCLA counsel to the FBI, June 21 1999, and attachment listing students from the PRC and Taiwan. It is simply not credible for the DOJ to file an affidavit and issue a subpoena that are premised on racial profiles after March 1999, and then claim that its investigation after March 1999, was race-neutral.
2. The Profiling of Dr. Lee Cannot Be Justified
Vrooman's and Washington's declarations prove there is no data or basis whatsoever to support singling out Chinese-Americans for investigation of espionage with the PRC. See Ex. 1 at ¶ 4; Ex. 2 at ¶ 9. Moreover, Mr. Vrooman establishes that not only are "ethnic-Chinese" not more likely to commit espionage for the PRC. but also that the PRC approaches all scientists, not just "ethnic-Chinese." See Ex. 1 at ¶ 4. These sworn declarations from two counter-intelligence experts obliterate any government claim here that the racial profiling used by the government is rational.
Further, empirical evidence also proves that this policy of singling out Chinese-Americans for counterintelligence investigations is based solely on an irrational racial profile. Attached to this Reply is the Department of Defense's summary of the 115 reported cases of espionage committed in the last 25 years. See Defense Research Center. Recent Espionage Cases 1975-1999, attached at Ex. 4. Only one of these cases involved an American citizen who was born in Taiwan. No correlation whatsoever can be found between race and the commission of espionage, other than the conclusion that American citizens of European descent are most likely to commit espionage. The DOD summary proves the opposite of what the government's racial profile falsely assumes — American citizens of Taiwanese descent are less likely than any other race to commit espionage for any country, including Taiwan's enemy the People's Republic of China.
This empirical data is a far cry from the empirical data relied on by the court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975), where 85 percent of all persons who committed alien-smuggling offenses were from Mexico. See 422 U.S. at 879. Similarly, in Armstrong, the Supreme Court relied heavily on empirical evidence that showed that over 90 percent of crack cocaine violations involved African-Americans.See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469-70. Armstrong, therefore, refused to infer a discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent from the high percentage of African-Americans prosecuted by federal prosecutors in Los Angeles. Here. the statistical evidence directly contradicts the FBI's and the DOJ's investigative policy of targeting "ethnic-Chinese."
3. Dr. Lee Has Met His Burden of Providing Some Evidence That His Indictment Was Due To the Racial Profiling
The government concedes that Dr. Lee's race was a factor when it selected him for the criminal counter-intelligence investigation. Response at 7. (According to Vrooman and Washington. race was thecritical basis). The government then seeks to justify its impermissible use of Dr. Lee's race by relying on Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87 (defendant's race may be considered as one of several factors for stop where empirical evidence proves that 85% of illegal alien smugglers are Latino) and United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481. 1484-87 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). However, in these border stop cases empirical evidence from prior convictions proved that in the border stop context, it was reasonable for the race of a suspect to be used as one of a number of factors to support a reasonable suspicion for a stop. Here, of course, the government has no empirical or statistical evidence to justify the presumption that Americans who are "ethnic-Chinese" are somehow more likely to commit espionage for the PRC. This assumption based on race is even more pernicious when it is used to lump together individuals like Dr. Lee, who were born in Taiwan, with individuals born in the PRC.
The government also asserts that the Dr. Lee is not entitled to discovery regarding selective prosecution unless he has direct admissions that the federal prosecutors who indicted him also intentionally discriminated against him. Response at 9-10. The Response relies primarily on United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1998), an inapplicable case involving an alleged vindictive prosecution. InSpears, the defendant asked the court to impute a state prosecutor's personal vindictiveness against him to federal prosecutors who later indicted him. Id. at 1087. The defendant. however. had no evidence that the federal prosecutors or agents were vindictive towards him. Here, Dr. Lee has presented specific evidence that the DOJ had a policy articulated by FBI Deputy Director Paul Moore, of racial profiling of ethnic-Chinese in criminal counterintelligence investigations involving the PRC. Evidence regarding a policy of profiling ethnic-Chinese does not turn on any personal vindictiveness of Paul Moore or other DOJ officials, andSpears is inapplicable here.
The government's arguments that specific admissions by federal prosecutors are necessary to obtain discovery is also refuted by United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1998). In Jones, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of discovery in a selective prosecution case. Jones presented evidence that the investigators had made improper racist comments to him and engaged in improper behavior. Id. at 975-76. Jones provided no evidence to the district court of any improper motivations by the prosecutors. The Court of Appeals however, ordered discovery on the grounds that the egregious misconduct of the agents could reasonably be inferred to have tainted his prosecution. Id. At 76. Here, Washington has submitted a sworn declaration that establishes far more — Dr. Lee would not have been indicted under the Atomic Energy Act but for Trulock's racial profiling and the resulting firestorm of political pressure. See Ex. 2 at ¶ 8.
In any event, Dr. Lee has evidence of admissions by the individuals at the highest levels of the DOJ who are responsible for selecting individuals for criminal counterintelligence prosecutions. Dr. Lee has already provided this Court with a transcript of former FBI Deputy Director Moore wherein he admits this fact. Just last year, a second high-level FBI official made the same damning admission. Harry Brandon, a former FBI head of counterintelligence. explained "critics say our government is racist because our government is targeting Chinese-Americans because they are Chinese. And the answer is, Yes, we a targeting them because they are targets (of Beijing)." Jeff Stein.Espionage without Evidence, Aug. 26, 1999, available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/08/26/china/index.html. Washington and Vrooman also confirm that this irrational profiling occurred here. Under existing law. even one such admission is sufficient to obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim. United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987).
Noticeably absent from the government's response is a declaration from any one associated with the DOS that it does not have a policy of profiling of ethnic-Chinese in counterintelligence investigations involving the PRC. Cf. United States v. Turner, 104 F.34 1180 (9th Cir. 1997) (discovery motion properly denied where three federal agents and a federal prosecutor submitted sworn declarations that investigation and indictment were premised on race neutral factors); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459-60 (agents and prosecutor submitted sworn affidavits stating that race played no part in the prosecution).
4. Dr. Lee Has Proven That Similarly-situated Individuals Have Not Been Prosecuted
The government makes a weak attempt to respond to Dr. Lee's showing that he is the only person who has ever been charged under either 42 U.S.C. § 2275 or 42 U.S.C. § 2276. The government first argues that 35 years ago, one other person was charged with violating the Atomic Energy Act. Response at 12. The government then concedes that in this 35 year old case. Gessner v. United States, 354 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1965), the defendant had intentionally passed U.S. nuclear secrets to the Russians, and had been charged with transferring atomic energy data in violation of a 42 U.S.C. § 4274. which is not one of the statutes under which Dr. Lee was charged. Thirteen pages into the government's brief, the government admits for the first time that Dr. Lee is the only American ever indicted under 42 U.S.C. § § 2275 and 2276 The government's admission is couched so as to camouflage its critical importance:
Although the absence of other prosecutions under these sections may suggest that the Attorney General's standard for obtaining approval to prosecute is high, it does not, by itself, prove that her policy is discriminatory.
Response at 13 (emphasis added).
Dr. Lee's motion set forth several examples of similarly-situated individuals who have not been targeted. including 38 cases the State Department referred to the DOJ last year alone. Dr. Lee also provides this Court with admissions from DOJ officials that it has a "policy" of not prosecuting egregious violations, if an agency had taken administrative action. These admissions are proof that the government does not even consider prosecuting these similarly-situated individuals.See Motion at 10-11, Ex. G. In light of this overwhelming proof. the government's claim that no person has committed a similar crime is untenable.
The critical question at this stage is whether Dr. Lee has shown that similarly-situated individuals exist — not identically situated individuals as the government argues. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d at 977 (individuals who were not African-American had not been referred for federal prosecution for generally similar drug offenses). The Vrooman and Washington declarations, the information in the Classified Addendum on file with the Court, the numerous cases cited in Dr. Lee's opening brief and the admissions by DOJ officials, all make clear that such similarly-situated individuals exist.
The government relies heavily on United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a defendant must prove that the government refused to bring cases where the facts are identical to his case. The government quotes from only a part of the court's holding when it rejected a violent, African-American, drug kingpin's claim that he was similarly-situated to non-violent white co-conspirator who played a minor role and was not charged. In Olvis, the government submitted a sworn declaration that the prosecution was race-neutral.
Further, the "work-relatedness" distinction the government attempts to draw between the other potential defendants and Dr. Lee is likewise without merit. Prior filings in this case have demonstrated that Dr. Lee worked on these codes. The government also claims that the examples of similarly-situated individuals provided by Dr. Lee are dissimilar because more material is at issue here. However, the sensitivity, not the quantity. of the material is the critical question. The government's decision not to classify the materials Dr. Lee is alleged to have mishandled as Top Secret, or even Secret, and the Agnew and Goad declarations already on file with this Court, demonstrate that the materials at issue here are not nearly as sensitive as the material the eight other similarly-situated individuals are alleged to have mishandled. One page from Deutch's top-secret files is more sensitive than the snippets of potentially classified materials that are buried in the codes here. Contrary to the government's claim, leading nuclear scientists and prominent former government leaders such as Jack Kemp, have concluded that Deutch's security violations are more serious than those allegedly committed by Dr. Lee. See Ex. 6, April 7, 2000, Kemp Editorial.
It is abundantly clear that Dr. Lee has presented substantial evidence that similarly-situated potential defendants exist and have not been prosecuted. The government is left with the never-before advanced argument that it failed to prosecute any similarly-situated person, because no such person exists.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above. Dr. Lee respectfully requests that the Court grant his motion and provide him the requested discovery.
Respectfully submitted.
O'MELVENY MYERS LLP
By: Mark Holscher Richard Myers, II 400 South Hope Street Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 430-6000 Fax: (213)430-6407
FREEDMAN BOYD DANIELS HOLLANDER GOLDBERG CLINE P.A.
By: Nancy Hollander John D. Cline 20 First Plaza., Suite 700 Albuquerque, NM 87102 Telephone: (505) 842-9960 Fax: (505) 842-0761 Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Wen Ho Lee
EXHIBIT 1 DECLARATION OF ROBERT VROOMAN
I, Robert Vrooman, do hereby declare and state:
1. I have reviewed the government's response to Wen Ho Lee's Motion for Discovery of Materials Related to Selective Prosecution, including the attached Declaration of Special Agent Robert Messemer. As set out below, Agent Messemer's declaration contains numerous false statements. Based on my experiences with Agent Messemer and the information I have received from other FBI agents, I believe that he regularly distorts information.
2. I did not tell Agent Messemer that Lee probably assisted the Chinese by helping fix Chinese hydrocodes during his travel in 1986 and 1988. His allegation that I did to is false. Our April 28, 1999 meeting focused on [SEALED BY THE COURT] [SEALED BY THE COURT] and Agent Messemer's theory that there was something inappropriate going on [SEALED BY THE COURT] I attended that interview solely as a favor to John Browne, the director of Los Alamos National Laboratory. When it was over, I told Browne that I considered the interview strange, because it had nothing to do with the Lee case. I later learned from officials that Agent Messemer was falsely informing CIA officials that I had been critical
At the time, Agent Messemer was attempting to shift blame [SEALED BY THE COURT] for possible fallout [SEALED BY THE COURT] I sought to obtain a copy of Agent Messemer's memoranda of my interview and to have it corrected. See Attachment one. The FBI refused to provide me a copy of this memorandum, which I expect contains false information.
3. Agent Messemer's statement that the individuals selected for investigation were chosen because they fit a "matrix" based on access to W-88 information and travel to the PRC is false. Dozens of individuals who share those characteristics were not chosen for investigation. As I explained in my prior declaration, it is my firm belief that the actual reason Dr. Lee was selected for investigation was because he made a call to another person who was under investigation in spite of the fact that he assisted the FBI in this case. It is my opinion that the failure to look at the rest of the population is because Lee is ethnic Chinese.
4. Mr. Moore's contention that the Chinese target ethnically Chinese individuals to the exclusion of others, therefore making it rational to focus investigations on such individuals was not borne out by our experience at Los Alamos, which was the critical context for this investigation. It was our experience that Chinese intelligence officials contacted everyone from the laboratories with a nuclear weapons background who visited China for information, regardless of their ethnicity. I am unaware of any empirical data that would support any inference that an American citizen born in Taiwan would be more likely than any other American citizen.
5. Of the twelve people ultimately chosen for the short list on which the investigation focused, some had no access at all to W-88 information, and one not have a security clearance, but this individual is ethnically Chinese. I do not believe this was a coincidence. Further, this ethnically Chinese individual did not fall within the "matrix" which Agent Messemer claims was used by the DOE and FBI. In addition, although there were other names on the AI list, Mr. Trulock made clear that Dr. Lee was his primary suspect.
6. Agent Messemer deliberately mischaracterizes the nature of my comments to him regarding my concerns about Dr. Lee's travel to the PRC. I did consider it unusual that Dr. Lee had not reported any contact by Chinese agents when I debriefed him following his return from the PRC. I did not believe then and I do not believe now that Dr Lee engaged in espionage, and I made no such intimation to Agent Messemer. Dr. Lee and his wife Sylvia were both cooperating with FBI investigations, and I considered them loyal Americans. Nonetheless, I considered Dr. Lee naive, and therefore a potential security risk. It was to keep Dr. Lee out of harm's way, not because I had any fear that he might knowingly engage in improper conduct, that I recommended against further unescorted trips out of the country for Dr. Lee.
7. My concerns about the real motivation behind the investigation were exacerbated when I received a classified intelligence briefing from Dr. Thomas Cook, an intelligence analyst at LANL, in September 1999. This briefing put to rest any concerns that I may have had that Dr. Lee helped the Chinese in any substantial manner.
8. In my capacity as a counterintelligence investigator at LANL, I was briefed on the existence of an investigation code-named [SEALED BY THE COURT] some time in the late 1980s involving a non-Chinese individual working at a DOE laboratory who transferred classified information to a foreign country. That individual was granted full immunity in return for agreeing to a full debriefing on the information that he passed.
9. The statements contained in my Declaration dated June 22, 2000 are true and correct and I to attest.
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 10, 2000, at Gallatin Gateway, Montana.
Robert Vrooman
September 17, 1999 Robert S. Vrooman P.O. Box 348 Gallazin Gateway, MT 59720
David V. Kitchen Special Agent in Charge FBI 415 Silver SW Albuquerque, NM 87102
Dear Mr. Kitchen:
I would like to have a copy of the 302 prepared by SA Robert Messemer as a result of his interview with me on April 28, 1999. Several members of the [SEALED BY THE COURT] office have read me portions Messemer's report and it is clear to me that SA Messemer attributed his opinions to me. During the interview, I told SA Messemer that I did not know [SEALED BY THE COURT] well enough to have an opinion [SEALED BY THE COURT].
He then provided me with the details and asked me to speculate on the implications. I find this interview technique objectionable.
On the other hand, SA Messemer did provide me with a lot of details regarding Dr. Lee that I did not know. This helped to solidify my opinions on the case and to have the confidence to go public. I learned during the meeting with SA Messemer that Dr. Lee [SEALED BY THE COURT]. SA Messemer was particularly helpful to us when he provided us a copy of Mr. Bruno's April 15, 1997 memorandum to Notra Trulock thus allowing us to defend our decision to keep Dr. Lee in his job. For this I am grateful to SA Messemer, but I still object to his using me to promote his opinions.
I am planning to write a book on my experiences and would like to have the 302 as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours,
Robert S. Vrooman
Federal Bureau of Investigations P.O. Box 25186 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87125-0186 September 30, 1999
Mr. Robert S. Vroornan P.O. Box 348 Gallacin Gateway, Montana 59730
Dear Mr. Vrooman:
Reference is made to your Freedom of Information Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request received by this office on September 22, 1999.
The records you have requested are being withheld in their entirety pursuant to the following subsection of Title 5, United States Code, Sections 552 and 552a:
(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.
You may submit an appeal from this denial by writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, United States Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530, within 60 days from receipt of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the name of the office to which your original request was directed to it may be easily identified.
Upon the completion of this investigation, you may again request this information.
To obtain information on yourself which may be located in FBI files it is necessary for you to provide us with your complete name, including any variations of your name which the records may be located under. We also request that you provide your date and place of birth and your current mailing address. We further request that you have your signature notarized. This is necessary to ensure that records are released only to individuals with a right of access to the information.
Sincerely yours.
David V. Kitchen Special Agent in Charge
EXHIBIT 2 DECLARATION OF CHARLES E. WASHINGTON
I, Charles E. Washington, do hereby declare and state:
1. I am the former Acting Director of Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. I have worked at the Department of Energy since 1991. Before becoming the Acting Director of Counterintelligence, I also held the positions of counterintelligence analyst, program manager and division director. I received the highest annual evaluation of "outstanding performance" as acting director and for every year preceding that since 1992. While I was acting director, I worked directly with Mr. Notra Trulock.
2. Before joining the Department of Energy, my work experience included the following: I am an honorably discharged and decorated, Viet Nam era veteran, and I was a federal criminal investigator for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) from 1978-1991. While employed at the OSI, I investigated a variety of criminal activity, and specialized in counterintelligence. From 1984-1990, I worked counterintelligence exclusively, serving as an analyst, branch chief, and division chief for the OSI regional headquarters in Ankara, Turkey. At the OSI Regional Counterintelligence Division Director, (was employed at the regional headquarters in Ankara, Turkey, and I had counterintelligence responsibility for more than 20 Army and Air Force installations in Turkey alone, and for 22 on-call countries in the Middle East and Africa.
3. I have read the Washington Post article of August 24, 1999, which was submitted by Dr. Won Ho Lee's counsel in this case. The statements attributed to me are accurate, except that my problems with Mr. Trulock were exacerbated by the Administrative Inquiry, and not due exclusively to it.
4. I have read Mr. Bob Vrooman's declaration, including the portions of his declaration regarding statements and actions of Mr. Non Trulock. As Acting Director of Couerintelligence, I worked directly with Mr. Trulock. While I was Acting Director, I read the Administrative Inquiry that was prepared concerning Dr. Lee, I also participated in discussions regarding the defects and inadequacies of the Administrative Inquiry. Based on my experience and my personal knowledge, I believe that Mr. Trulock improperly targeted Dr. Lee due to Dr. Lee's race and national origin.
5. My reaction upon reading the Administrative Inquiry was that the inquiry was wholly lacking in any support to identify Dr. Lee as a suspect. Upon reading the AI, I also concluded that the investigation was a fishing expedition. As stated in the Washington Post article, I wrote to Mr. Trulock, and I also talked with him. I recommended among other things, that the AI be closed due to a complete lack of evidence.
6. Based upon my personal experience with Mr. Trulock, I strongly believe that he acts vindictively and opportunistically that he improperly uses security issues to punish and discredit others, and that he has acts views towards minority groups. I am a black man of African-American origin, and I personally experienced his misconduct, and I know of other minorities who were victimized by Mr. Trulock. At one point I was forced to call outside police officers due to Mr. Trulock's abusive behavior, and I brought a lawsuit against the Department of Energy based on that incident, as well as other improper conduct by Mr. Trulock. That case was settled favorably to me by the Department of Energy this year with a pay raise, a cash award, restoration of leave, and other incentives.
7. I have been informed of the section of FBI Special Agent Messemer's declaration which states that a "completely new" investigation was initiated against Dr. Lee in March, 1999, after certain files were found on the open computer and certain documents in his office were found to not have appropriate markings. While I do not know the specifics of these alleged infractions, based upon my experience at the Department of Energy, I know that there west instances where DOE employees compromised classified or other sensitive information, where computers were improperly used, and where files were inappropriately marked, but criminal investigations were not opened.
8. Based upon my experience in counterintelligence and my personal experience with the AI and Notra Trulock, I have concluded that if Dr. Lee had not been initially targeted based on his race (Taiwanese-Chinese), with the resulting wide press disclosures that he had purportedly [SEALED BY THE COURT] and the politicizing of the situation, he may very well have been treated administratively like others who had allegedly mishandled classified information.
9. In the counterintelligence training I have received and in my counterintelligence experience, I am unaware of any empirical data that would support a claim that Chinese-Americans an most likely to commit espionage than other Americana. Further, I know of no analysis whatsoever that has been done as to whether American citizens born in Taiwan would be more likely to commit espionage for the Peoples Republic of China.
10. I am aware of Department of Energy employees who were not imprisoned or prosecuted for committing offfenses that are much more serious than the "security infractions" alleged to have been committed by Dr. Lee. I am personally aware of a DOE employee who committed a most egregious case of espionage that cost our nation billions of dollars and drastically impacted our national defense. That DOE employee was not prosecuted.
11. I was informed of the governments claim that no other individuals have committed similar offenses to Dr. Lee and avoided prosecution. Although I do not currently have access to Department of Energy and FBI files regarding investigations of other DOE employees, I am certain that DOE files contain information that would prove that this claim is false. There is a big difference between a security infraction and espionage; security infractions are less serious. Security infractions within DOE are not unusual, and as long as one is in good favor, security infraction generally do not result in harsh discipline, much less criminal prosecution and pre-trial confinement. Many security infractions involving classified information simply result in a form being completed that indicates the violator was verbally counseled, even though these counselings frequently did not occur. I do not believe that prior to the AI involving Dr. Lee, that other DOE employees who were in good favor underwent this type of extreme scrutiny and criminal prosecution, when they committed security infractions.
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 11, 2000 in Greenfelt, Maryland.
Charles Washington
EXHIBIT 3 DECLARATION OF JAMES L. FORD
I, JAMES L. FORD, do hereby declare and state:
1. I am the former Director of Office of Intelligence at the United States Department of Energy, and was succeeded by Notra Trulock in that position in 1994. I was transferred from that position to serve as Associate Deputy Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. In the Department of Energy hierarchy, the Office of Intelligence was a subdivision of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.
2. I have known Charles Washington professionally for eight years, and I am personally familiar with his qualifications and his work in counterintelligence for the Department of Energy, including his work as Acting Director of Counterintelligence.
3. It is my professional opinion that Mr. Washington was eminently qualified for his position, based on his background and training. Mr. Washington is a seasoned professional and a man of personal integrity, who performed his counterintelligence duties admirably. Mr. Washington also had a reputation within the Department of Energy as a skilled manager of people. In January 1995, Mr. Washington received a Distinguished Career Service Award for his "superior and sustained contributions to the total quality management of the Departments critical national security threat analysis program" and for his "devotion to duty in creating, implementing and monitoring the NN (Office of Nonproliferation and National Security) Diversity Council."
4. I am also aware of Notra Trulock's qualifications and his professional reputation. It is my opinion that Mr. Trulock lacked the training and experience necessary to be considered qualified to oversee the Office of Counterintelligence. Specifically, he lacked training in human intelligence and had minimal experience in management, both of which are essential aspects of the position. It is my opinion that Mr. Trulock was not competent in this position and sometimes acted unprofessionally in his execution of his duties. I am also aware that in one instance Mr. Trulock intended to give Mr. Washington a negative evaluation, which was reversed by more senior Department of Energy officials who were aware of their relative capacities.
5. I therefore offer no opinions on that subject.
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is time and correct Executed on August 11, 2000 in Fairfax, Virginia.
James L. Ford
EXHIBIT 4
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA June 21, 1999
Special Agent David Oldham Federal Bureau of Investigation P.O. Box 25186 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87125
Re: Grand Jury Subpoena
Dear Mr. Oldham:
I enclose in a separate, sealed envelope those records complied by the UCLA campus in response to the Federal Grand Jury Subpoena served upon me as UCLA Campus Counsel. The information provided has been compiled from records on the campus, and provides name, student identification number, major, country of citizenship, visa status, last term registered, whether undergraduate or graduate student, degrees already received, and the institutions from which degrees have already been granted.
Once you have had a chance to review the information, please feel free to call me should you have any questions or require additional assistance.
Sincerely,
Patricia M. Jasper Campus Counselor
EXHIBIT 5 RECENT ESPIONAGE CASES-1975-1999
Security Research Center Defense Security Service Monterey, California
Recent Espionage Cases: 1975-1999 Summaries and Sources
Since its first publication in 1985, Recent Espionage Cases has offered the security educator easy-to-find factual information about cases for use in briefings, newsletters, and other educational media. Our goal is the enhancement of security awareness among cleared employees and military service members by showing that espionage involves real people in workplace situations like their own. These case summaries bear little resemblance to the glamorized fictional accounts of spy novels; rather, they tell a mundane tale of human folly resulting in tragic personal consequences.
Many of the disasters described in these summaries might have been avoided if concerned co-workers, recognizing danger signs, had been willing to intervene. Other lessons that can be shared with employee audiences are that most offenders are trusted insiders, not foreign agents; even "friendly" countries have been the recipients of stolen US classified information; and these damaging betrayals can occur in either government or contractor organizations.
In addition to serving the needs of the security educator, Recent Espionage Cases has consistently been in high demand as a reference source for security managers and policymakers and has been used in the training of counterintelligence and security professionals in government and industry.
The year 1975 was selected as the starting point for these case summaries as it marked the end of a 10-year period of relative quiet in the active prosecution of espionage cases. According to news reports, the government decided to resume an aggressive prosecution of arrested spies in the mid-70s. Within 10 years, the number of cases brought to court each year had risen to nearly a dozen. Recent Espionage Cases now includes 105 case summaries. New events are added each year as they come to light in the public media.
All cases summarized here were reported in the public news media or appeared in other open-source literature. Each summary identifies one or more offenders who were implicated in an effort to illegally provide US classified or other sensitive national defense information to a foreign interest. Each case is identified by the year of arrest (or public disclosure of the case) and by the name of a person who was officially named or indicted on at least one count of espionage. The authors offer selected citations at the end of case summaries should a reader wish to refer to original sources for more information.
Consistent with our interest in developing innovative products to support security education, the Security Research Center will continue to update and publish Recent Espionage Cases in electronic format to allow for easy downloading and printing should hard copy be desired. Please forward your comments and questions to lynn.fischer@mail.dss.mil The public media articles on which many of these case summaries an based do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, nor does this publication constitute endorsement or confirmation of these facts by the Department of Defense or the Defense Security Service.
Table of Contents
Page Espionage Case Name Page Espionage Case Name 40. Herman, Rudolph Albert 26. Allen, Michael H. 39. Horton, Brian P. 8. Ames, Aldrich Hazen 29. Howard, Edward L. 8. Ames, Maria Del Roario Casas 42. Humphrey, Ronald 13. Anzalone, Charles Lee Francis 29. Irene, Dale 41. Baba, Stephen 25. Ismaylov, Vladimir M. 41. Barnett, David H. 12. Baynes, Virginia Jean 30. Jeffries, Randy Miles 40. Bell, William H. 10. Jones, Geneva 1. Boone, David 44. Boyce, Christopher J. 10. Kao, Yen Men Kao 12. Brown, Joseph Garfield 42. Kampiles, William 15. Brown, Russell Paul 43. Karpov, Yevegeny P. 31. Buchanan, Edward Owen 23. Kaikov, Mikhail 32. Kearn, Bruce Leland 13. Carney, Jeffrey M. 21. Kerscik, Sandor 35. Cavanagh, Thomas Patrick 21. Kercsik, Imre 7. Charlton, John Douglas 6. Kim, Robert C. 43. Chernyayev, Rudolf 17. King, Donald Wayne 29. Chin, Larry-Wu-Tai 34. Koecher, Karl F. 3. Clark, James 38. Kosadinov, Penyu B. 21. Conrad, Clyde Lee 8. Kota, Subrahmanyam 40. Cooke, Christopher M. 15. Kunkle, Craig Dee 34. Cordrey, Robert E. 9. Lalas, Steven J. 24. Davies, Allas John 44. Lee, Andrew Daulton 44. Dedeyen, Sadag K. 2. Lee, Peter 23. Desheng, Hou 35. Leono, Yuriy P. 22. Dolce, Thomas Joseph 4. Lessenthien, Kurt G. 35. Dubberstein, Waldo H. 4. Lipka, Robert Stephan 26. Lonetree, Clayton J. 37. Ellis, Robert Wade 43. Enger, Valdik 42. Maksen, Lee Eugene 37. Maynard, John Raymond 21. Fleming, David 33. Michelson, Alice 32. Forbrich, Ernst 33. Miller, Richard 19. Garcia, Wilfredo 36. Mira, Francisco de Assis 39. Gilbert, Otto Attila 44. Moore, Edwin G. II 17. Graf, Ronald Dean 34. Morison, Samuel L. 14. Mortati, Tommaso 11. Gregory, Jeffry E. 41. Murphy, Michael R. 1. Groat, Douglas 18. Neabitt, Frank Arnold 17. Haeger, John Joseph 5. Nicholson, Harold J. 25. Haguewood, Robert Dean 10. Ntube, Dominic 22. Hall, James III 11. Hamilton, Frederick C. 33. Ogorodnikov, Nikolas 37. Harper, James Durward 33. Ogorodnikova, Svetlana. 41. Helmich, Joseph G. 25. Ott, Bruce D. 3. Squillacote, Therese 16. Pakhtsuov, Yuri N. 3. Stand, Kurt Allen 44. Paskalian, Sarkis O. 21. Szabo, Zoltan 31. Pelton, Ronald William 18. Peri, Michael A. 28. Tobias, Michael 38. Pickering, Jeffery 28. Tobias, Bruce 6. Pitts, Earl Edwin 32. Treholt, Arne 28. Pizzo, Francis X. 42. Truong, David 30. Pollard, Jonathan J. 23. Tsou, Douglas 30. Pollard, Anne Henderson 8. Prasad, Alura J. 27. Walker, Arthur James 27. Walker, John Anthony 19. Ratkai, Stephen Joseph 27. Walker, Michael Lance 14. Ramsay, Roderick James 2. Warren, Kelly Therese 18. Richardson, Daniel Walter 23. Weichu, Zang 43. Rogalsky, Ivan 28. Whitworth, Jerry Alfred 12. Rondeau, Jeffrey S. 15. Wilmoth, James R. 36. Wold, Hans Palmer 17. Schoof, Charles Edward 16. Wolf, Ronald Craig 37. Schuler, Ruby Louise 34. Wolff, Jay Clyde 28. Scranage, Sharon M. 4. Seldon, Phillip Tyler 10. Yen Men Kao 39. Slavens, Brian E. 22. Yildrim, Huseyin 33. Smith, Richard Craig 13. Sombolay, Albert T. 40. Zacharski, Marian 28. Soussoudis, Michael 24. Zakharov, Gennadiy F. 20. Souther, Glenn Michael 37. Zeche, Alfred 19. Spade, Henry Otto 43. Zinyakin, Vladimir 7. Schwartz, Michael Stephen 1998-DAVID SHELDON BOONE, a former Army signals analyst for the National Security Agency. was arrested 10 October and charged with selling Top Secret documents to agents of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991, including a 600-page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia. Boone was arrested at a suburban Virginia hotel after being lured from his home in Germany to the United States in a FBI sting operation. tic had worked for the NSA for three years before being reassigned to Augsburg, Germany, in 1988, and retired from the Army in 1991. In October 1988, the same month that he separated from his wife and children. Boone walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offend his services. According to a FBI counterintelligence agent's affidavit, Boone was under "severe financial and personal difficulties" when he began spying. His former wife had garnished his Army sergeant's pay, leaving him with only $250 a month. According to the federal complaint. Boone met with his handler about four times a year from late 1988 until June 1990, when his access to classified information was suspended because of "his lack of personal and professional responsibility." He held a Top Secret clearance from 1971 and gained access to SCI information in 1976. He is alleged to have received payments totaling more than $60,000 from the KGB. Boone was indicted on three counts: one for conspiracy to commit espionage and the other two related to his alleged passing of two Top Secret documents to his Soviet handler. On 18 December, Boon pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and on 26 February 1999 he was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison. Under a plea agreement Boone was also required to forfeit $52,000 and a hand-held scanner he used to copy documents.Washington Post, 6 November 1991, "Ex-NSA Indicted for Spying" 9 November 1993, "Trial Set for Ex-NSA Analyst" 27 February 1999, "Ex-NSA Worker Gets 24 Years for Spying"
1998-DOUGLAS F. GROAT, former CIA officer, was arrested on 3 April and charged with passing sensitive intelligence information to two foreign governments and attempting to extort over $500,000 from the CIA in return for not disclosing additional secrets. Groat had been placed on a three-year paid administrative leave in the spring of 1993 after the agency felt he posed a securiry risk, reportedly involving a discipline or job performance issue. Apparently Groat first attempted to extort money from the CIA in May 1996 and was fired the following October. During a 16-year career at the CIA, Groat participated in intelligence operations aimed at penetrating the secret codes and communication systems employed by foreign governments, Groat, a cryptographic expert, was reported to have revealed classified information to two undisclosed governments regarding the targeting and compromise of their cryptographic systems in March and April 1997. For Groat, it was "very much a case of pure revenge, " said a federal official, explaining that the former intelligence officer had long felt slighted and abused by the CIA because he had never been given the assignments he thought he deserved. Groat is reported to have not received any money from the foreign governments for the information passed. The former CIA employee pleaded guilty to one count of attempted extortion 27 July, and was sentenced 27 September to five years confinement followed by three years probation. According to news reports, the sharp reduction from the original four-count espionage charge and the limited penalties reflected the government's desire to avoid a trial in which damaging classified information might have been disclosed.
Washington Times, 4 April 1998, "Former CIA officer charged with spying; Pleads not guilty in extortion codes case"
Washington Post, 23 Jul 1998, "Ex-CIA Operative Pleads Guilty to Blackmail Attempt at Agency"
Washington Post, 26 Sep 1998, "Ex-CIA Agents Given 5 Years in Extortion Case; Former Operative Admitted Demanding $1 Million in Return for Not Disclosing Secrets"
1997-PETER K. LEE, a nuclear physicist who worked as key research facilities for more than 30 years, turned himself in to authorities and pleaded guilty on 8 December 1997 to two felony counts, one for passing-national defense information and the other for providing false statements to the government. Dr. Lee admitted that in 1985, while working as a research physicist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, he traveled to the People's Republic of China. During this visit Lee discussed with a group of approximately 30 Chinese scientists the construction of hohlraums, diagnostic devices used on conjunction with tastes to create microscopic nuclear detonations. Prosecutors stated Lee acknowledged that he knew the information was classified. The second charge against Lee concerned disclosures he failed to make in 1997 while he was working on classified research projects for TRW. Before he traveled to China on vacation, Lee was required to fill out a security form in which he stated he would not be giving lectures on his work. Upon his return, he had to fill out a second form in which he confirmed that he did not give any lectures of a technical nature. However, as Lee later confessed to the FBI, he lied on both forms because he intended to and did, in fact, deliver lectures to Chinese scientists that discussed his work on microwave backscattering from the sea surface. Dr. Lee told the FBI that he disclosed the information because he wanted to help his Chinese counterparts and he wanted to enhance his reputation in China. According to US Government sources, Lee did receive compensation for the information he provided to the Chinese in the form of travel and hotel accommodations. The case resulted from an investigation by agents from the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence Squad. On 26 March 1998, Dr. Lee was sentenced to one year in a community corrections facility, three years of probation, and ordered to perform 3,000 hours of community service and pay S20,000 in fines.
Counterintelligence News Digest, March 1998, "US Physicist Pleads Guilty" Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1997, "Taiwan Born Scientist Passes Defense Information" Los Angeles Times, 9 Dec. 1997, "Physicist admits passing laser secrets to Chinese scientist"
1997-KELLY THERESE WARREN, a former US Army clerk was arrested 10 Jun 1997 and named in a three-count indictment alleging her involvement in the passing of sensitive information to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the mid-80's, as a part of the CLYDE LEE CONRAD spy ring. Warren was charged with conspiracy to aid a foreign government and gathering or delivering classified national defense information. From 1986 to 1988 she had been assigned as an administrative assistant in the section that handled war plans for the Army's 8th Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. In 1987 she was recruited into due Conrad ring by then co-worker RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY. Among documents Warren gave to Conrad to pass to Hungarian and Czech agents were seats US and NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe in the evens of a Soviet bloc attack. The indictment said that Warren, met with Conrad on base, as a bowling alley and in a church in Bad Kreuznach, to trade cash for secrets. She earned only $7,000 for her efforts with which she claimed to have paid off debts. Federal agents had suspected her involvement for almost to years. According to a plea agreement, Warren pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage on 6 Nov. 1998 and on 12 Feb she was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Warren is the seventh US service member to be charged with taking part in the Conrad spy ring since 1988.
The Raleigh News and Observer, 29 July 1997, "Federal agents still tracking members of 80s Army spy ring" The Florida Times-Union, 11 June 1997, "Former soldier arrested Warner Robins woman charged in espionage case"
1997-KURT ALAN STAND, a regional labor union representative along with has wife. THERESE MARIE SQUILLACOTE, a former senior staff lawyer in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and friend JAMES MICHAEL CLARK a private Investigator, were arrested 4 Oct 1997 on charges of spying for East Germany and Russia. Stand reportedly began his spying activities in 1972 after being recruited by East Germany to cultivate other spies in the Washington, DC. area. He was introduced to East German intelligence officers (the Stasi) through his father, Maxmillian Stand, a chemical engineer who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Clark, Squillacote, and Stand attended the University of Wisconsin in the 1970s where they were affiliated with leftist groups, specifically the Progressive Student Forum and the Young Workers Liberation League, the youth arm of the Communist Party USA. Stand recruited Clark in 1976 and Squillacose about the time the couple was married in 1980. Before obtaining a position as the Pentagon, Therese Squillacote was employed by the National Labor Relations Board and, later, the House Armed Services Committee. She sent numerous photographs to her German handlers. Squillacote reportedly told an undercover FBI agent that she turned to spying to support the progressive anti-imperialist movement. She first came to the attention of the FBI in 1995 when she offered to be a spy in a letter to a South African government official who was a leader of his country's Communist Party. Stand and Squillacote frequently traveled to Mexico, Germany, and Canada during which time Stand would meet with their East German handlers. When the two Germany. united in 1990, his controllers tried to recruit him to spy for the Soviet Union and then for the Russian Federation. Although he never gained access to classified material, his role in the operation was to recruit agents and to provide information about the non-governmental groups with which he worked. Stand allegedly received $24,650 for his recruiting and coordinating efforts. On 23 Oct 1998, he and Squillacote were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage, attempted espionage, and illegally obtaining national defense documents. On 22 Jan 1999, a US District Judge sentenced Squillacote to 21 years and ten months in prison and Stand to a sentence of 17 years and six months.
The Washington Post, 2 Nov. 1997, "Cloak and Blabber; A Story of Espionage, And Very Loose Lips" The Washington Post, 24 Oct. 1998, "Jury Rejects Entrapment Defense, Convicts DC Couple of Spying" The New York Times, 7 Oct 1997, "Three Onetime Radicals Held in Spy Case"
1997-JAMES MICHAEL CLARK, a private investigator, was arrested 4 October along with KURT ALLEN STAND and THERESE MARIE SQUILLACOTE, and charged with spying for East Germany. Clark was recruited by his friend Kurt Stand in 1976 when both were members of the Young Workers Liberation League while attending the University of Wisconsin. Media sources state that a 1975 FBI report describing Clark's participation in due youth arm of the communist party was the basis on which his subsequent application to the CIA for employment was denied. However, in 1986 Clark received a Secret clearance for his work fees private firm doing contract work for the government. And in 1992, according to media reports, the Army renewed his access after hiring him as a civilian analyst. According to news reports, as a defense contractor at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Boulder, Colorado, in the 1970s, Clark had access to classified information on chemical warfare. He was also accused of giving East Germany classified State and Commerce Department documents about the Soviet leadership, the Soviet's strategic nuclear doctrine, and problems in the military of Soviet bloc countries. He reportedly told an undercover ages that, under the guise of needing help with a research report, he obtained these classified documents — including as least one classified as Top Secret — from two State Department employees. Clark admittedly passed information to his German handlers in the form of microfiche. Law enforcement officials and court documents describe Clark as a radical who fell into spying from 1979 to 1989 as an extension of his Marxist ideology. He received as total of $17,500 from East Germany and suspects much of it travelling to meet his handler in Germany, Mexico and Canada. Clark was convicted on 3 June 1998 on a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage and on 4 December was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in prison. This reduced sentence was a result of has testimony at the trial of Stand and Squillacote that sided in their conviction.
The Washington Post, 4 Jun. 1998, "Falls Church Man Pleads Guilty to Passing Secrets to East Germany" The Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1997, "Three Former Campus Leftists Held in VA on Espionage Charges" The New York Times, 5 Dec. 1998, "Spy, in Plea Agreement, Is Given 12-Year Sentence"
1996-KURT G. LESSENTHIEN, a Navy petty officer, arrested in Orlando, Florida, on 3 April, was charged with attempted espionage after offering information about nuclear submarine technology to a Russian government representative. Lessenthien was subsequently contacted by undercover agents of the FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service posing as Russian agents. As the time Lessenthien was an instructor as the Navy Nuclear Power School in Orlando and was very knowledgeable about the design and operation of submarine motors. It was reported that the petty officer, in a phone call to the Russian Embassy, offered Top Secret information about the movement of US submarines an exchange for thousands of dollars. According to one media source, Lessenthien accumulated nearly $25,000 in credit card debt on a "relentless pursuit of women" that he intended to marry. A Navy psychiatrist testified that he suffered personality flaws that drove him to ruin an excellent military record. However, a Navy prosecutor stated that Lessenthien decided to become a spy for money and excitement, not love, and that the petty officer had been storing classified materials since 1991. On 28 October, Lessenthien was sentenced by a military court to life imprisonment, but will serve 27 years under a plea agreement. He was also given a dishonorable discharge and ordered to forfeit all pay and benefits.
Washington Post, 4 Apr. 1996, "Petty Officer Arrested on Spy Charge" Orlando Sentinel, 24 Apr. 1996, "Orlando Sailor In Spy Arrest" Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk), 29 Oct. 1996, "Lessenthien Gets 27 Years In Espionage Case"
1996-PHILLIP TYLER SELDON, a former Pentagon civilian employee, pleaded guilty on 7 August in Alexandria, Virginia, to passing classified documents to a Salvadoran air force officer while on active military duty in El Salvador as a US Army captain. After leaving the Army, Seldon took a civilian job with the Department of Defense. According to court documents, Seldon gave the Salvadoran three packets of documents between November 1992 and July 1993. None of the material was reported to have exceeded the Secret level. Seldon claimed that he had met the Salvadoran officer while working as an intelligence advisor, and he believed that the officer had the appropriate, clearance. This information came to light in the course of a polygraph examination as Seldon was applying for a position with the CIA. On 8 November, Seldon was sentenced by a US District court to two years in prison.
Washington Post, 9 Nov. 1996, "Ex-Pentagon Worker Given 2 Years For Passing Secrets"
1996-ROBERT STEPHAN LIPKA, former National Security Agency staff member, was taken into custody on February 23 at his home in Millersville, Pennsylvania, and charged with commuting espionage while workings as a communications clerk from 1964 to 1967. An Army enlisted man between the ages of 19 and 22, Lipka worked in the NSA central communications room and reportedly provided the KGB with a constant stream of highly classified reports. He is believed to have caused extensive damage to US intelligence collection activities. According to James Sanford of the Los Angeles Times, since Lipka provided Top Secret information to the KGB during the war in Vietnam, he may have been responsible for the loss of American lives. He is said to have used dead drops along the CO Canal near the Potomac River was paid between $500 and $1000 per delivery. Lipka left the NSA in 1967 and stopped meeting with his KGB handlers in 1974. He became a suspect in 1993 as a result of information believed to have been provided to the FBI by his ex-wife. His role in espionage was confirmed by FBI agents posing as Russian contacts. According to an FBI spokesman, while the government was aware of a major security breach in the 1960s, it had not been able to identify Lipka as a suspect until it had received the additional information. It is believed that Lipka is the young soldier described in the autobiography of former KGB major general Kalugin who tells of a walk-in in the mid-1960s who was interested in money. According to Kalugin, the documents which the soldier passed included Top Secret NSA reports to the White House and copies of communications on US troop movements around the world. The price reportedly paid by the Soviets during the period of his betrayal was $27,000. On 23 May 1997, Robert Lipka pleaded guilty to one count of espionage in exchange form jail term of no more than 18 years. On 24 Sepsember, he was sentenced to serve a term of 18 years in Federal prison.
Washington Post, 24 Feb. 1996, "FBI Arrest Ex-Soldier As Mysterious KGB Spy In Supersecret NSA" Los Angeles Times, 3 Mar. 1996, "Has A 30-year Mystery Unraveled?" Wall Street Journal, 21 Nov. 1996, "How the FBI Broke Spy Case That Baffled Agency For 30 Years" Baltimore Sun, 24 May 1997, "Ex-clerk at NSA Is Guilty of Spying: Former Soldier Sold secret Documents To Soviets In Mid-1960s"
1996-HAROLD J. NICHOLSON, was arrested on 16 November at Dulles International Airport as he was about to board a flight to Switzerland. On his person were found rolls of film bearing images of Top Secret documents. Nicholson is the highest ranking Central Intelligence Agency officer (GS-15) charged with espionage to date. Counterintelligence officials believe that he began spying for Russian intelligence in June 1994 as he was completing a tour of duty as deputy station chief in Malaysia. He joined the agency in 1980 after serving as a captain in the US Army. Nicholson was charged with passing a wide range of highly classified information to Moscow, including biographic information on every CIA case officer trained between 1994 and 1996. He is also suspected of having compromised the identities of US and foreign business people who have provided information to the CIA. According to investigators, for two and a half years he had been hacking into the agency's computer system and providing the Russians with every secret he could steal. It is alleged that Nicholson received approximately $120,000 from the Russians over a two-year period. He came under suspicion in late 1993 when he failed a series of polygraph examinations. Further investigation revealed a pattern of extravagant spending, and an unusual pastern of foreign travel followed by large, unexplained bank deposits. Nicholson, who as the time was in the middle of a divorce and child custody battle, claimed that he did it for his children and to pay his bills. On 21 November he was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. On 3 March 1997, Nicholson pleaded guilty under a plea agreement in which he admitted that he had been a Russian spy. On 6 June he was sentenced by a Federal judge to 23 years and seven months in prison. This reduced sentence reflected his extensive cooperation with government investigators.
Los Angeles Times, 19 Nov. 1996, "Career CIA Officer is Charged With Spying For Russia" 21. Nov. 1996, "Alleged Mole To Plead Not Guilty" Washington Post, 6 June 1997, "Convicted Spy Says He Did It For His Family" New York Times, 4 Mar. 1997, "C.I.A. Officer Admits Spying For Russians"
1996-EARL EDWIN PITTS, a senior FBI agent, was arrested on 18 December at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and charged with providing classified information to the Russian intelligence services from 1987 until 1992. He is believed to have received $224,000 from Russian intelligence services for his activities. Pitts allegedly turned over Top Secret documents to the KGB (and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the SVRR) including a list of FBI assess who were providing intelligence on Russia. Pitts' betrayal of trust began in July 1987 when, as a newly assigned agent to the New York City field office, he wrote to a Soviet representative assigned to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations and asked to meet a KGB officer. From 1988 to 1992 Pitts allegedly, on nine occasions, provided documents to his handler, KGB officer Aleksandr Karpov. Each meeting was followed by an unexplained deposit in one of several bank accounts in the Washington area. After 1992 Pitts became inactive as a foreign agent. He was identified as a mole when Karpov himself became a double agent (or the FBI. At this time the FBI set up a sting operation against Pitts and, using agents posing as Russians. easily gained his agreement to renew his espionage activities. Over a period of 15 months, Pitts made 22 drops of classified documents to undercover FBI agents and was paid $65,000. The Bureau was also informed of Pitts' involvement by his wife, Mary Colombaro Pitts, who confided her suspicions about her husband's activities to another FBI agent. Earl Edwin Pitts pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage in February 1997 following the discovery of a computer disk with a letter to his supposed Russian handier. On 23 June, he was sentenced to 27 years in prison by a Federal judge who stated that the former agent was guilty of "the most egregious abuse of trust." When asked why he spied, Pitts cited a number of grievances he had against the FBI and stated that he "wanted to pay them back."
Washington Post, 19 Dec. 1996, "Senior FBI Agents Charged With Spying for Russians" and 19 Dec. 1996, "Espionage Suspect Depicted As Eager To Sell His Loyalty" Washington Post, 2 Mar. 1997, "Spy Case Sealed By 1990 Letter: Computer Disk Held Agent's Memo to KGB" Washington Post, 24 Jun. 1997, "Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years For Passing Secrets To Moscow"
1996-ROBERT C. KIM, a Navy civilian computer specialist, working as the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland, was charged on 25 September with passing classified information to a foreign country. He was arrested outside a diplomatic reception at Ft. Myer, Virginia, on 24 September as he stood beside Capt. Baek Dong-II, a Korean Embassy Naval attache and the alleged recipient of the classified materials. Kim, a native of Korea, became a US citizen in 1974 and has lived in the United Stases for 30 years. He had access to classified information since 1979. According to investigators, over a five-month period, he passed dozens of classified documents (including some that were Top Secret) out of loyalty to his country of birth. An FBI affidavit states that Kim searched naval computer systems, made copies of sensitive classified intelligence reports, removed classified markings, printed them off and mailed or passed them in manila envelopes to Baek. The documents included military assessments about North Korea and China and US intelligence assessments of South Korean government officials. In his official capacity, Kim operated a computer program that tracked global shipping movements. However, he had access to highly classified documents from other intelligence agencies. Kim came under surveillance by the Naval Investigative Service when is learned of his contact with Baek. A court-approved search of Kim's office produced a list of classified documents he had illegally passed to the naval attache. More than 40 documents sent to Baek were intercepted in the mail. Capt. Baek Dong-II, who enjoyed diplomatic immunity, was subsequently recalled by has government. While there is no evidence that Kim received any payment for his illegal activities, according to one news source, he had requested assistance from the South Koreans in his efforts to find employment with a South Korean intelligence or customs agency after his retirement from his US Navy job. It is also reported that Kim had accumulated a credit card debt of approximately $100,000. On 7 May 1997, Robert C. Kim pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. On 11 July he was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Washington Post, 26 Sep. 1996, "Navy Worker Is Accused of Passing Secret: Papers Allegedly Went To S. Korean Officer" Washington Post, 2 Oct. 1996, "Kim Allegedly Sought Job With S. Korea" Los Angeles Times, 8 May 1997, "Ex-Analyst Admits Spying For S. Korea In Plea Bargain"
1995-MICHAEL STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, US Navy Lieutenant Commander, was charged with passing Department of Defense classified documents and computer diskettes to Saudi naval officers between November 1992, and September 1994 while assigned to a US military training mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Schwartz, a naval surface warfare officer who served in the Gulf War, was charged with four counts of espionage on 23 May. He is also charged with five counts of violating federal regulations for allegedly removing classified material to his residence. The charges result from a Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigation which began in September, 1994. The documents allegedly included classified messages to foreign countries, military intelligence digests, intelligence advisories, and tactical intelligence summaries classified up to the Secret (Noforn) level. There is no indication that Schwartz received any money for the materials: according to a media report, Schwartz was attempting to be helpful to the Saudis because of US-Saudi cooperation during the Gulf War. On 14 October, Schwartz agreed to a plea bargain that allowed him to avoid a court-martial and possible imprisonment. According to the agreement in November 1995, Schwartz received an "other than honorable" discharge and lost all retirement benefits and other military privileges.
The Virginia-Pilot (Norfolk VA), 25 May 1995, "Officer Spied for Saudis, Navy says" Washington Jewish Week, 1 Jun. 1995, "Navy Officer Arrested On Charges of Espionage" Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1995,"Norfolk Naval Officer Faces Court-Martial in Espionage Case" The Virginian-Pilot, 14 Oct. 1995, "Navy Officer Accused of Spying Gives Up Retirement Benefits"
1995-JOHN DOUGLAS CHARLTON, retired Lockheed Corporation engineer, was attested on 25 May for attempting to sell secret documents removed from the company at the time of his retirement. According to an Assistant US Attorney, the plans concerned the Sea Shadow, a Navy stealth project and the Captor Project related to mines which release anti-submarine torpedoes. According to the 10-point espionage indictment, Charlton tried to sell the information to an FBI agent posing as a foreign government representative. Five times between July and September 1993, Charlton attempted to sell the secrets for $100,000 to the undercover agent. Charlton joined Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California, in 1980 as a research specialist and left the company under an early retirement program in 1989, but apparently was disgruntled about the circumstances of his departure. At the time of his retirement he took with him several classified documents outlining US defense projects. A search of his Lancaster, California, residence tarried up a cache of illegal guns and the classified documents. Followings plea agreement on 17 October, Charlton pleaded guilty to selling two classified schematic drawings related to the anti-submarine program. He admitted knowing that the Captor Project information that the former engineer attempted to sell to what he believed to be a French official was highly classified. According to the prosecuting attorney, "The documents would have enabled any nation to discover some of the workings of the program." On 8 April 1996, Charlton was sentenced to two years in federal prison and fined $50,000 for his guilty plea to two counts of attempted transfer of defense information. He will be placed on five year probation after his release. He is not eligible for parole.
Los Angeles Times, 26 May 1995, "Ex-Acrospace Worker Indicted In Spy Case" Antelope Valley Press (California), 18 Oct. 1995, "Valley Man Pleads Guilty To Attempted Espionage" Los Angeles Times, 10 Apr. 1996, "Retired Engineer Gets 2 years in Defense Espionage Case"
1995-ALURU J. PRASAD and SUBRAHMANYAM KOTA: On 8 October, Indian businessman, Aluru J. Prasad, and ten days later, software engineer Subrabmanyan Kota, were messed and detained for their involvement in a spy ring that sold highly sensitive defense technology to the KGB between 1985 and 1990. Prasad, a wealthy Indian national who frequently visited the United States, was alleged to have been an agent of the KGB. Kota, a naturalized US citizen, was president of the Boston Group computer consulting firm. According to an FBI affidavit, the pair met Russian agents in Bermuda, Ponugal, Switzerland, and other foreign locations and at these meetings passed classified defense information. At the time of their indictment, it was revealed that Kota and another conspirator, Vernun Reddy, had been arrested the previous December by FBI agents, who were posing as Russian intelligence agents, to whom they had attempted to sell (for $300,000) micro-organisms used in the production of a high-tech drug. Beginning in 1989, Prasad plotted with Kota of Northborough, Massachusetts, and other unnamed persons to obtain classified technology front a network defense contractor employee. Prasad and Kota specifically sought information about mercury cadmium telluride missile detectors, radar-absorbing coating used on stealth fighters and bombers, and semiconductor components used in infrared missile-tracking systems. According to their indictment, the two received $100,000 for information about each project. On 29 October 1996, former KGB intelligence officer Vladimir Galkin was arrested as he attempted to enter the United States at Kennedy Airport in New York. Galkin was alleged to have been Kota and Prasad's contact with the KGB and met with Kota in Cyprus beginning in late 1990. Although Galkin had not committed espionage on American soil, he was charged for his involvement in the conspiracy. In June 1996, under a plea agreement, Kota pleaded guilty to selling stolen biotech material and evasion of income taxes and agreed to testify against Prasad. He admitted that he was paid a total of $95,000 by Prasad and his alleged KGB colleagues. Prasad's first trial ended in a mistrial: however, in a second trial in December 1996 he was convicted of espionage charges. Under a plea agreement Prasad was sentenced to the 15 months he had served awaiting his trial and agreed to return to India. On 13 November, accused KGB intelligence agent Vladimir Galkin was released.
Boston Globe, 19 Oct. 1995, "Northborough Man Charged With Espionage" Boston Globe, 12 Jun. 1996, "A Post-Cold War Spy Story Comes To Life" Washington Post, 5 Nov. 1996, "Computer Check of Visa at Airport IDs Spy Suspect"
1994-ALDRICH HAZEN AMES, CIA intelligence officer and his Colombian-born wife MARIA DEL ROSARIO CASAS AMES, were arrested 21 February after a 10-month investigation, on charges of providing highly classified information to the Soviet KGB and later, to its successor, the Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation (MBRF) over a nine-year period. From 1983 to 1985, Ames was assigned to the CIA's counterintelligence branch in the agency's European Division and was responsible for directing the analysis of Soviet intelligence operations. In this capacity he would have known about any penetration we had of the Soviet military or the KGB. According an press repasts, the trial that led to the arrest of Ames and his wife began in 1987 alter the unexplained disappearance or deaths of US intelligence sources overseas. According to court documents. Ames' information allowed the Russians to close down at less 100 intelligence operations and at least 10 US and allied agents were executed. Ames reportedly received up to $2.5 million from his Russian handlers over this period of time. Reports of the couples high-rolling life style included the cash purchase of a half-million dollar home, credit card bills of $455,000, and a new Jaguar sports car. A search of Ames' office uncovered 144 classified intelligence reports not related to his current assignment in CIA's Counternarcotics Center. On 28 April, Aldrich Ames and his wife pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit espionage and to evading taxes. Ames was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Under the plea agreement Maria Rosario Ames was sentenced to five years and three months in prison for conspiring to commit espionage and evading taxes on $2.5 million obtained by her husband for his illegal activities.
New York Times, 22 Feb. 1994, "Ex-Branch Leader of C.I.A. is Charged as a Russian Agent" Washington Post, 23 Feb. 1994, "CIA Officer Charged With Selling Secrets" 25 Feb. 1994, "Accused Couple came from Different Worlds" 27 Dec. 1994, "Ames says CIA does not believe be has told all" Los Angeles Times, 22 Oct. 1994, "Wife of CIA double agent sentenced to 5 years in prison" Security Awareness Bulletin, 4-94. "An Assessment of th Aldrich Ames Espionage Case"
1993-STEVEN J. LALAS, a former State Department communications officer stationed with the embassy in Athens, was arrested in Northern Virginia on 3 May and charged with passing sensitive military information to Greek officials. Although Lalas originally claimed that he had been recruited by a Greek military official in 1991 and feared for the welfare of relatives living in Greece were he not to cooperate, authorities later stated that he began spying for the Greek government in 1977 when he was with the US Army. It is estimated that he passed 700 highly classified documents. including papers dealing with plans and readiness for US military strategy in the Balkans and a US assessment of Greece's intentions toward the former Yugoslavia. Athens was Lalas' fourth communications posting with the State Department. He had previously served in Belgrade, Istanbul, and in Taiwan. During his espionage career he earned a steady income stealing, then selling, DIA reports about troop strength, political analyses and military discussions contained in cables between the US Embassy in Athens and the White House, FBI communications about counter-terrorism efforts, and the names and job descriptions of CIA agents stationed overseas. Greek handlers allegedly paid him $20,000 to provide about 240 documents from 1991 to 1993. The government first learned of the espionage activities in February 1993, when an official of the Greek Embassy here made a statement to a State Department officer indicating that he knew the consents of a Secret communication from the US Embassy in Athena to the State Department. Lalas was later identified (through a video monitoring system) stealing documents intended for destruction. In June 1993 Lalas pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage and on 16 September was sentenced to 14 years in federal prison without possibility of parole. Prosecutors had recommended the 14-year sentence in return for Lalas' promise to reveal what documents he turned over and to whom. The full extent of his espionage activity was revealed prior to sentencing only after he failed two FBI polygraph examinations. Lalas is of Greek descent, but was born in the US.
Washington Post, 4 May 1993, "Va. Arrest Made in a Spy Case From Greece" New York Times, 4 May 1993, "Am. Employee at Embassy in Athens Arrested as Possible Spy" New York Times, 6 May 1993, "US Embassy Employee Sold Secrets to Greeks, F.B.I. Says" Washington Post, 16 Sep. 1993, "A 14-Year Sentence for Selling Secrets"
1993-GENEVA JONES, a secretary with a Top-Secret clearance in the Stare Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, was arrested 3 August and indicted 31 August for theft of government property and transmission of defense information to unauthorized persons. FBI agents say the smuggled classified documents for two years to West African journalist DOMINIC NTUBE, indicted at the same time. Jones was carrying classified government documents with her at the time of arrest. Agents who searched Ntube's Washington, DC, apartment after his arrest on 4 August found thousands of classified cables and 39 CIA documents marked Secret, including documents relating to US military operations in Somalia and Iraq. Some of the material apparently made its way to West African magazines, which had been publishing classified State Department cables for several months. Agents indicted they wire-tapped Jones' phone after several classified US documents were found 10 months earlier in the West African command post of Charles Taylor, leader of a violent movement to overthrow the Liberian government. Ntube reportedly faxed 24 documents he received from Jones to the Liberian rebels. The former State Department employee told the FBI she had been giving Ntube classified cables for about 18 months. In a preliminary hearing, the FBI testified that agents watched her on 16 occasions take documents from the department and hide them in newspapers or a grocery bag. During the month she was under surveillance, she allegedly took more than 130 classified documents from her office. On 31 August, Ntube was indicted with Jones for receiving stolen property and for transmitting national defense information to unauthorized persons. In June 1994, Jones pleaded guilty to 21 counts of theft and two counts relating to the unlawful communication of national defense information. In delivering a sentence of 37 months in prison (longer than what the prosecution had asked), US District Judge Harold H. Greene stated, "Somebody would have to be a complete moron not to know that when you work for the State Department you can't take documents out and give them to anybody."
Washington Post, 5 Aug. 1993, "FBI Arrests Two in Theft of State Dept. Documents" Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1993, "Two Indicted in Theft of State Department Documents"
1993-YEN MEN KAO, a Chinese national, residing in Charlotte, North Carolina, was arrested on 3 December 1993, after a six-year investigation into a spy ring that sought secrets on advanced naval weapons and technology. According to an official statement, Kao "and several other Chinese nationals" conspired to illegally procure and export classified and embargoed high-technology military items. Kao was also charged with violating US immigration laws. Targeted for illegal export were the Navy's MK 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) Torpedo, two F 404-400 General Electric jet engines used to power the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet fighter, and fire-control radar for the F-16 Falcon jet. Although these systems were not delivered to China, Kao was able to transfer embargoed oscillators used in satellites for which Kao paid an FBI informant $24,000 as part of a sting operation. On 22 December, an immigration judge ordered Yen Men Kao's deportation to Hong Kong for overstaying his visa and for "committing acts of espionage against the United States." A decision was made not to prosecute to avoid offending the Chinese government and to protect counterintelligence sources and methods that might have been disclosed in court. Kao, who reportedly owned two Chinese restaurants in Charlotte, had been under FBI surveillance for several years. During this time he met and received instructions from Chinese intelligence agents who offered him $2 million to obtain US weapons technology. According to one federal official, Kao had a gambling problem and lost money supplied by his Chinese handlers. Fearing reprisal from the Chinese as well as the US, he requested deportation to Hong Kong rasher than mainland China. Kao left behind his wife, a naturalized US citizen, and two children.
Washington Post, 22 Dec. 1993, "Spy Sting Gets Chinese Man Deported" Los Angeles Times, 5 Dec. 1993, "FBI Arrests Chinese National in Spy Ring Investigation"
1993-FREDERICK CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official, pleaded guilty on 5 February 1993 to the charge of passing to Ecuadorian officials classified US intelligence repass evaluating the military readiness of Peruvian security forces. At the time, Hamilton was a DIA research technician in the defense attache's office in Lima, Peru, a post which be held from 1989 to 1991. He apparently believed that the disclosures could help avert a possible conflict between the two countries, Peru and Ecuador have been disputing territory (sometimes violently) along their mutual border for the past 50 years. Hamilton holds advanced degrees in Spanish and Portuguese. At the time of his arrest, he was employed as a language instructor at a military academy in Virginia. His activities were uncovered by US intelligence agencies after they received information from a confidential source indicating secrets were being leaked. Hamilton, who held a Top Secret security clearance while with the DIA, met Ecuadorian representatives in their embassy in Lima on 13 February and 20 May of 1991. He passed extremely sensitive information which disclosed US intelligence operations and the identity of US sources in the region. "He didn't get any money" said a US official "He was a very naive individual who was flattered by the [Ecuadorian]." Hamilton's attorney stated that, "What he thought he was trying to do was prevent a war. . . The purpose of disclosing the documents that he did was to show the country that was concerned about being attacked that the other country had neither the intent nor the ability to attack." Hamilton reportedly passed five Secret intelligence reports and orally disclosed the contents of four other classified reports. Under a court agreement, the former DIA employee pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully communicating classified information to a foreign country. The agreement specifies Hamilton may not appeal the sentence and the Justice Department will not prosecute him for espionage-related crimes. On 16 April, he was sentenced to 37 months in prison.
The Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1993, "Va. Man Pleads Guilty to Leaking US Secrets" The Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1993, "Ex-DIA Official Pleads Guilty in Document Leak"
1993-JEFFERY E. GREGORY, a US Army Staff Sergeant, was arrested 29 April 1993 at Fort Richardson, Alaska, resulting from a joint investigation between the FBI and the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Gregory was one of several members of a spy ring operating out of the 8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in the mid-1980s that sold US and NATO military secrets to Hungary and Czechoslovakia when those countries were in the Soviet Bloc. German authorities convicted the ring leader, former US Army sergeant CLYDE LEE CONRAD, of high treason in 1990 and sentenced him to life in prison. In 1991, another ring member RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY, also a former Army sergeant stationed in Bad Kreuznach, was sentenced to 36 years in prison by an American court for his involvement in the network. Clyde Conrad recruited Ramsay who is believed to have then recruited others, including Gregory. According to the federal complaint against Gregory, while assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Germany from March 1984 to October 1986, "he helped procure extremely sensitive, classified documents relating to national defense, for transmittal to one or more foreign powers." At that time, Gregory was a staff driver at Bad Kreuznach, West Germany, and helped maintain the commanding general's mobile command center. He was also in charge of updating maps showing military maneuvers and had access to classified messages and correspondence. According to an FBI official. Gregory once took a military flight bag stuffed with 20 pounds of classified documents. The documents included "war plans" for the US and NATO. On 28 March 1994, Gregory pleaded guilty to espionage charges. In June, 1994, Gregory, along with Sgt. JEFFREY STEPHEN RONDEAU, another member of the espionage ring, was sentenced by a military court to 18 years in prison.
New York Times, 2 May 1993, "Fourth Army Sergeam Held in Espionage Case" Huntsville Times, 2 May 1993, "4th Army Sgt Arrested in Alleged Espionage Ring in Germany"
1992-JOSEPH GARFIELD BROWN, former US airman and martial arts instructor, was arrested by FBI agents on 27 Decembee 1992, and charged with spying for the Philippine government. Brown allegedly provided an official there with illegally obtained secret CIA documents on Iraqi terrorist activities during the Persian Gulf War and assassination plans by a Philippine insurgent group. The former US airman was arrested at Dulles International Airport after being lured to the US from the Philippines by undercover FBI agents with the promise of a job teaching self-defense tactics to CIA agents. On the following day he was indicted on three counts of espionage in federal court in Alexandra. Virginia. Brown enlisted in the US Air Force in 1966 and served until 1968 He continued to reside in the Philippines, working as a martial arts instructor for the Department of Tourism until the time of his arrest. He is accused of obtaining classified documents in l990 and 1991 in Manila from CIA secretary, VIRGINIA JEAN BAYNES, and passing them to a Philippine government official. An FBI spokesman stated that Baynes pleaded guilty to espionage in federal court on 22 May 1992, and served a 41-month prison term. The FBI began its investigation in April 1991 after an internal CIA inquiry determined that Baynes, who joined the agency in 1987 and who was assigned two years later to the embassy in Manila. had passed two or three classified documents to Brown. Baynes had met Brown when she enrolled in a karate class which he taught at an embassy annex. According to Baynes, as the friendship between her and Brown grew in the late summer of 1990, he asked her to obtain CIA information on assasinations planned by an insurgent group that were to be carried out in the Philippines. Baynes who held a Top Secret clearance complied with his request by removing secret documents from the embassy. Brown pleaded guilty in April 1993 to a charge of conspiring to commit espionage by delivering secret CIA documents to a Philippine government official. He was sentenced to nearly six years in prison.
Los Angeles Times, 29 Dec. 1992, "Ex-US Airman Charged With Espianage" Washington Post, 6 Jan. 1993, "Spy Charge Played Down by Official"
1992-JEFFREY STEPHEN RONDEAU, a US Army sergeant stationed at Bangor, Maine, was arrested in Tampa, Florida, on 22 October 1992, and charged with espionage for providing Army and NATO defense secrets, including tactical nuclear weapons plans, to intelligence agents of Hungary and Czechoslovakia from 1985 through 1988. Rondeau was allegedly part of the Conrad spy ring which operated out of the 8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in the mid-1980s. A German court convicted former US Army sergeant CLYDE LEE CONRAD of high treason in 1990 and sentenced him to life in prison. The inquiry into Rondeau's involvement was aided by the cooperation of RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY. In 1991, Ramsey, also a former Army sergeant stationed in Germany. was sentenced to 36 years in prison by an American court for his involvement in the ring. As a recognition signal, Ramsay reportedly gave Rondeau a torn dollar bill to use when dealing with others in the plot. The US Attorney for the Middle District of Florida said, "The espionage charge in this case is especially serious because it related to the allied defense of Central Europe including the use of tactical nuclear weapons and military communications." The three-count indictment of Rondeau charged that he conspired with Conrad, Ramsay, and others to "copy, steal, photograph, and videotape" documents and sell them to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The indictment did not specify what amount of money he may have received. On 28 Mach 1994, Rondeau pleaded guilty to espionage. In June, 1994, Rondeau, along with Sgt. JEFFERY EUGENE GREGORY, another member of the espionage ring. was sentenced by a military court to 18 years in prison.
Houston Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1992, "US Soldier Is Charged With Spying" Atlanta Constitution, 23 Oct. 1992, "Soldier Accused of Stealing NATO Plans to Communists"
1991-CHARLES LEE FRANCIS ANZALONE, a 23-year old Marine corporal stationed in Yurna, Arizona, was arrested 13 February after a four-month investigation and charged with suspicion of attempted espionage. In November 1990, Anzalone, a telephone lineman, called the Soviet Embassy in Washington to offer his services as a spy (under the pretext of asking about a college scholarship). An FBI agent posing as a KGB intelligence officer contacted Anzalone who passed him two technical manuals about cryptographic equipment, a security badge, and guard schedules. Anzalone, who is part Mohawk, told the agent that he hated capitalism, the American government, and held a grudge against the nation's treatment of native Americans. Anzalone testified that his offering to spy was a ruse to get money from the Soviets. On 3 May 1991, Anzalone was found guilty of attempted espionage. He was also convicted of adultery with the wife of another Marine stationed in the Persian Gulf, and of possession and use of marijuana. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
San Diego Union, 2 May 1991, "Tape Shows Marine and Soviet Spy" Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1991, "Marine Guilty in Spying Case"
1991-JEFFREY M. CARNEY, former intelligence specialist with the Air Force, was sentenced at a general court-martial December, 1991, to 38 years. He pleaded guilty to charges of espionage, conspiracy, and desertion. Carney entered the Air Force in December 1980. From April 1982 to April 1984 he was stationed at Templehof Central Airport in Berlin when he was a linguist. While at Tempelhof, he began copying classified documents which he then provided to the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi). In 1984 he was transferred to Goodfellow AFB in Texas where he worked as an instructor while continuing to spy for East Germany. After defecting to East Germany in 1985 he continued to aid the Communists by intercepting and translating official telephone communications of US military commanders and embassy officials in Berlin. Carney apparently became disillusioned with the Air Force. He originally intended to defect to East Germany, but allowed himself to be drawn into espionage by East German agents who expertly manipulated him and claimed his complete loyalty. He was apprehended in Berlin in April 1991 by Air Force OSI agents.
Cincinnati Post, 21 Dec. 1991, "US Spy Gets 38 Years" Air Force Times, 6 Jan. 1992, "Ex-Intelligence Specialist Guilty of Spying"
1991-ALBERT T. SOMBOLAY, a specialist 4th class with the Army artillery, pleaded guilty in July 1991 to espionage and aiding the enemy. He was tried by military judge in Baumholder, Germany, and sentenced to confinement as hard labor for 34 years, reduction to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and dishonorable discharge. Sombolay was born in Zaire, Africa. He became a US citizen in 1978 and entered the Army in 1985 as a cannon crewman. In December 1990, assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Baumholder, Germany, he contacted the Iraqi and Jordanian embassies to volunteer his services in support of the "Arab cause." To the Jordanian Embassy in Brussels he passed information on US troop readiness said promised more information to include videotapes of US equipment and positions in Saudi Arabia. He told the Jordanians that he would be deployed to Saudi Arabia and could provide them useful information. To the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn, Germany, he offered the same services, but the embassy did respond. On 29 December, Sombolay's unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia, as part of Desert Shield, without him. Still in Germany, Sombolay continued to contact the Iraqis and provided a Jordanian representative several items of chemical warfare equipment (chemical suit, boots, gloves, and decontamination gear). His activity was discovered by US Army Military Intelligence. After Sombolay's arrest in March 1991, he admitted to providing DESERT SHIELD deployment information, military identification cards, and chemical protection equipment to Jordanian officials. his motivation was money.
Cincinnati Post, 7 Dec. 1991, "Anatomy of a Spy" Huntsville Times, 4 Dec. 1991, "Army Spy Sentenced to 34 Years"
1990-RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY, a former US Army sergeant, was arrested in Tampa, Florida, on 7 June and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. Ramsay joined the Army in 1981 and was transferred to West Germany in June 1983 where he was recruited by then-Army Sgt. Clyde Lee Conrad. (Conrad was sentenced to life imprisonment in May 1990 for treason.) Ramsay received $20,000 for selling military secrets that could have caused the collapse of NATO — Top Secret plans for the defense of Central Europe, location and use of NATO tactical nuclear weapon and the ability of NATO's military communications — that were passed to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. An FBI official said, "It's one of the most serious breaches ever — it's unprecedented what went over to the other side. The ability to defend ourselves is neutralized because they have all our plans." Ramsay initially used a 35-millimeter camera to photograph classified documents, but then switched to more effective videotape. He reportedly recorded a total of about 45 hours of videotape. Ramsay is said to have a high IQ, is multilingual, and has the "ability to recall minute details, facts and figures from hundreds of volumes of documents." The FBI described him as "brilliant, but erratic." In West Germany he worked as a clerk-typist in the 8th Infantry Division. When arrested he was unemployed, living sometimes at his mother's house and sometimes in his car. In September 1991 he pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. On 28 August 1992 he was sentenced to 36 years in prison. The sentence reflects his cooperation with investigators. According to the FBI, this case was the most extensive espionage investigation in the history of the FBI and considered to be the largest US espionage conspiracy case in modern history.
Los Angeles Times, 9 Jun. 1990, "Alleged Spy Called Brilliant, Erratic" Washington Times, 29 Aug. 1992, "Spying Sergeant Gets 36 Years" Security Awareness Bulletin I-97, "Profile of A Spy"
1989-TOMMASO MORTATI, former US Army paratrooper was arrested in Vincenza by Italian authorities on charges of having passed top-secret documents to Hungarian military intelligence services. According to European news reports, the former Army sergeant who was born in Italy, confessed to disclosing secrets about American and NATO bases in Italy and claimed he belonged to a still-active espionage network. He is presumed to have been a member of the same network that included the Conrad spy ring in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Conrad was arrested in August 1988 and has since been sentenced by a German court to life imprisonment. Mortati was born in Italy but later emigrated to the United States where he obtained US citizenship. He left the army in 1987 but remained in Italy at his American wife continued to work for the US Army base in Vincenza. Mortati's arrest followed that of Hungarian-born naturalized America ZOLTON SZABO who recruited Mortarti in 1981, sent him for two weeks of training in Budapest, and continued to be his contact. Mortati is said to have confessed to Italian authorities that he attempted to bribe several Italian officers in 1984 and 1985, offering money for information. Press reports state that Italy's military secret service was informed about Mortati's activities by German and Austria counterintelligence authorities. A search of Mortati's home revealed a hidden two-way radio used to transmit his reports in code. Up until the time of his arrest, he had received $500 a month from the Hungarian Intelligence Service plus a payment for every report filed, based on its importance. Mortati was convicted in an Italian court and after a period of incarceration was released.
This summary is based on European media items and an ABC Television News report.
1989-CRAIG DEE KUNKLE, former Chief Petty Officer who specialized in anti-submarine warfare, was arrested on 10 January as he attempted to sell classified information for $5,000 to FBI agents posing as Soviet diplomats. The arrest took place at a Williamsburg, Virginia, motel. On 9 December Kunkle mailed a packet of diagrams, photographs and information related to anti-submarine warfare tactics to an Alexandria, Virginia, post office box he believed to be a Soviet drop point. The material was collected by Federal agents who had been in communication with Kunkle on six previous occasions. An investigation by the Naval Investigative Service and FBI began in early December 1982 when Kunkle's attempt to contact the Soviet Embassy in Washington was intercepted. Kunkle had served for 12 years in the Navy in anti-submarine squadrons in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and was discharged in 1985 under less than honorable conditions, reportedly for multiple incidents including indecent exposure. Kunkle also had a history of alcohol and drug abuse in addition to marital and financial problems. During his period of active duty, he held a Secret clearance. The former Chief Petty Officer had since been employed at a security guard at a local hospital. At the time of arrest Kunkle stated that he offered to sell classified information because he was short of cash and angry with the Navy. Kunkle was indicted on one count of attempted espionage and ordered held without bond. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. On 4 May 1989 Kunkle changed his plea to guilty because, he said, he did not want to subject his family to a trial. He had faced a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. The judge imposed a 12-year sentence (agreed upon by prosecutors and Kunkle's attorneys) and, noting Kunkle's money problems, fined him $550. He will not be eligible for parole and was placed on three years probation in addition to the sentence.
New York Times, 11 Jan. 1989, "Former Navy Man Is Charged As A Spy" 19 Jan. 1989, "Ex-Navyman Denies Trying to Sell Secrets"
1989-JAMES R. WILMOTH, US Navy Airman Recruit, was a food service worker aboard the carrier USS Midway. He was arrested by Naval Investigative Service agents in Yokosuka in July for attempting to sell classified information to a Soviet agent in Japan, where the Midway is based. He was tried and convicted as a general military court-martial 24 September. In addition to attempted espionage, Wilmoth was convicted of failure to report a contact with a citizen of the Soviet Union, conspiracy to unlawfully transfer classified material, and possession, use and distribution of hashish. He was sentenced to 35 years at hard labor however, since he cooperated in the investigation, his sentence was reduced to 15 years. He also received a dishonorable discharge, and was ordered to forfeit all his pay. He had been in the Navy for over two years and had a history of disciplinary problems including unauthorized leave of absence. Wilmoth did not have a security clearance. Classified information was procured by Petty Officer Third Class RUSSELL PAUL BROWN also stationed aboard the Midway. Brown held a Secret security clearance and took classified documents obtained from the burn bag in the electronic warfare center of the Midway. He passed the documents to Wilmoth, who planned to exchange the documents for cash in an arrangement with a KGB operative in Japan. Brown was convicted in October of conspiracy to commit espionage and lying to Navy investigators. A military judge sentenced him to 10 years in prison, a dishonorable discharge, reduction in rank from E-3 to E-1, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Motivation for the attempted sale to the Soviets was "money and greed."
Los Angeles Times, 5 Oct. 1989, "Sailor Sentenced to 35 Years After Attempted Espionage." Washington Times, 5 Oct. 1989, "Navy Convicts Spy, Stalks Another" 25 Oct. 1989, "2nd Midway Sailor Gets Jail Term for Spying"
1989-YURI N. PAKHTUSOV, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet army, arrived in the US in June 1988. as assistant military attache with the Soviet Military Mission. Two months later he began approaching an American employee of a defense contractor to obtain documents dealing with how the US government protects classified and other sensitive information contained in its computer systems. What he didn't know was that the American reported the approaches to US authorities. Pakhtusov, 35, was caught as part of a sting operation after he received classified documents from the American employee working under FBI control. On 9 March 1989, he was ordered out of the country and declared persona non grata for engaging in activities incompatible with his diplomatic status."
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 Mar 1989. "Soviet Diplomat Ousted As Spy"
1989-MICHAEL A. PERI, 22, an electronic warfare signals specialist for the Army, fled to East Germany with a laptop computer and military secrets 20 February and voluntarily returned 4 March to plead guilty to espionage. He was sentenced to 30 years in a military prison. Even after his court-martial authorities were at a loss to explain what happened. Peri said he made an impulsive mistake, that he felt overworked and unappreciated in his job for the 12th Armored Cavalry Regimens in Fulda, West Germany. His work involved operating equipment that detects enemy radar and other signals. Peri had been described as "a good, clean-cut soldier with a "perfect record." During his tour of duty in Germany he had been promoted and twice was nominated for a soldier of the month award.
Los Angeles Times, 29 June 1989, "From Soldier to Spy; A Baffling About-Face" St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25 Jun. 1989, "US Soldier Given 30 Years"
1989-RONALD CRAIG WOLF, a former pilot in the Air Force from 1974 to 1981, was arrested 5 May 1989 in Dallas, Texas, for selling classified information to an FBI undercover officer posing as a Soviet agent. During his career in the Air Force, Wolf was trained as a Russian voice-processing specialist and flew intelligence missions on reconnaissance aircraft in the Far East. He held a Top Secret clearance. Discharged from the military in 1981 because of his unsuitability for service "due to financial irresponsibility," he worked as an automobile salesman for a while, but was unemployed at the time of his arrest. The FBI's investigation began in March, 1989, when information was obtained indicating Wolf's desire to sell sensitive information to the Soviet Union. Wolf talked with FBI undercover agent "Sergei Kitin"on a number of occasions thinking he was a representitive of the Soviet Union assigned to the Soviet Embassy. During these conversations Wolf talked about his military experience, and his desire to defect and provide Air Force secrets "for monetary gain and to get revenge for his treatment by the United States government. He was directed to mail letters to a post office box in Maryland detailing the type of information he was capable of providing. Wolf passed along classified documents concerning Top Secret signals intelligence. The FBI says they are "confident there was no exchange of information (with foreign agents) in this case." On 28 February 1990 Wolf pleaded guilty in federal court. In return for his guilty plea, the government reduced the severity of the charges from life imprisonment to up to 10 years in prison. In June, Wolf was sentenced to 10 years without parole.
Dallas Times Herald, 1 Mar. 90, "Ex-Air Force Pilot Pleads Guilty to Espionage" Washington Post, 16 Jun. 90, "Ex-Airman Gets 10 Years"
1989-DONALD WAYNE KING, Navy Airman and RONALD DEAN GRAF, Navy Airman Apprentice, both assigned to the Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse, LA, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and larceny of government property following their apprehension by Special Agents of the Naval Investigative Service. The pair was apprehended by the NIS at a motel in New Orleans after they delivered $150,000 worth of sensitive and classified aircraft parts and technical manuals to an undercover NIS agent they believed was a foreign government representative. The stolen government property and manuals (about 30 items in total) dealt with technology pertaining to the Navy's P-3 anti-submarine aircraft. The investigation was initiated in January, 1989, after an informant notified the New Orleans NIS office that King and Graf were trying to sell aircraft parts they had stolen from the Naval Station as Belle Chasse. The airmen were also charged with the sale of cocaine. King was sentenced to ten years, reduction in rank to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and a dishonorable discharge. Graf was sentenced to five years, reduction in rank to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and a dishonorable discharge. Their motivation for espionage is not known: however, Graf is quoted as claiming that he did it to pay off debts amounting to $1,000.
New Orleand Times-Picayune, 5 March 1989, "2 Navy Clerks Accused of Spying" New Orleans Times-Picayune. 7 July 1919, "Jail Terms Given in Spy Case" Case summary provided by Albert E. DiFerderico, US Naval Criminal Investigative Service
1989-CHARLES EDWARD SCHOOF, 20, and JOHN JOSEPH HAEGER, 19, both Navy Petty Officers 3rd Class, were arrested aboard ship on 1 December on charges they conspired to commit espionage. The two sailors were stationed aboard the tank landing ship USS Fairfax County assigned to the Norfolk area. Both were operations specialists, trained in radar communications, electronic countermeasures, and navigational plotting. Although Schoof was reported to be the instigator, it was Haeger who had the combination to the document safe. Schoof called the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, to ask if someone would come down to pick up the classified material, but Norfolk is beyond the embassy's allowed travel radius. He then visited several bars looking for a ride to the embassy. A shipmate reported Schoof's activities to the ship's commanding officer. It is believed that no information was passed to the Soviets and that all documents were received. On 24 April 1990, Schoof was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, stripped of all rank, forfeited all pay and allowances, and received a dishonorable discharge. Haeger was sentenced to 19 years, also forfeited pay and allowances and received a dishonorable discharge. Under a 1987 regulation that revised parole guidelines, the two are expected to serve virtually all of their sentences.
Northern Virginia Sun, 11 Dec. 1989, "Two Radar Operators From Landing Ship Charged in Spying Conspiracy" Free Lance Star, 26 Apr. 1990, "Navy Men Get Prison Terms for Attempted Espionage"
1989-FRANK ARNOLD NESBITT, The former Marine and Air Force communications officer was arrested by the FBI on 14 October and charged with delivering unauthorized information to the Soviet government. Nesbitt, a Memphis resident, left behind family and bewildered colleagues in June, appending a terse nose to his weed trimmer ("I'm gone. Don't look for me."), and flew to Belize in Central America. Plans to settle there did not work out, to he moved on to Guatemala City where he enrolled in Spanish classes. In August while sightseeing in Sucre, Bolivia, he happened to board a bus full of Russian ballet dancers. He attended the ballet that evening and the next day bumped into a Soviet official traveling with the group. This meeting set in motion his trip to Moscow. From Sucre he went to La Paz where a Soviet Embassy official arranged for his flight to Moscow. Nesbitt claims he stayed 11 days in Moscow in a safe house, wrote from memory 32 pages detailing US defense communications, was polygraphed, toured the city, and met important KGB personnel. However, he grew upset over the Soviets' failure to grant him citizenship and provide him with an apartment and job. He returned in a circuitous route, to Guatemala where he contacted US authorities who then accompanied him to Washington, DC. He was met by the FBI and arrested 11 days later. He offered his services as a double agent to the FBI claiming he did not give the Soviets any useful information. The National Security Agency, however, determined that information Nesbitt said he provided is still classified. The former communications officer served in the military between 1963 and 1966, and 1969 to 1979. On 8 November he was indicted on a charge of conspiring with a Soviet agent to pass sensitive national defense information to the Soviet Union. Nesbitt initially pleaded innocent to espionage and conspiracy charges. If convicted, he faced a possible life sentence and fines up to $500,000. According to his lawyer, Nesbitt "wanted to have some excitement in his life." A Soviet foreign ministry spokesman has said that Nesbitt was denied Soviet citizenship because a check of the autobiography he gave the Soviet parliament "led to suspicion of his possible connections with the criminal underworld." On 1 February 1990 Nesbitt changed his plea to guilty in order to receive a substantially reduced sentence. On 27 April he was sentenced in US District Court to 10 years in a psychiatric treatment facility at a federal prison. His psychiatric evaluation states that he suffers from severe personality disorders.
Washington Post, 15 Oct. 1989, "Odyssey of a Suspected Spy; FBI Arrests Man in Va. After Moscow Trip." 17 Oct. 1989, "No Bail for Alleged Spy" 20 Oct. 1989, "Suspected Spy Sought to Defect, FBI Says" 2 Feb. 1990, "Guilty Plea Entered in Secrets Case" 27 Apr. 1990, "Ex-Officer Given 10 Years in Mental Hospital for Spying"
1988-DANIEL WALTER RICHARDSON, a US Army sergeant stationed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, was arrested on 7 January and charged with attempting to spy for the Soviet Union. Richardson reportedly intended to offer unspecified national defense information to Soviet representatives in exchange for money. No information is believed to have been compromised. Officials stated that Richardson was apprehended after electronic surveillance picked up his efforts to contact Soviet representatives. This led to his negotiation with an undercover government agent posing as a Soviet. He was arrested at the Holiday Inn in Aberdeen (with an unclassified military manual and circuitry front the M-I tank in his possession) as he attempted to meet with the undercover agent. An Army spokesman stated that Richardson had a Secret clearance but "no ready access to classified materials." Although trained as an instructor, his job was to issue tools to students at the Ordinance Center School at Aberdeen. "Money and revenge against the military" have been identified by an administration official as Richardson's chief motivations for espionage. Described as a mediocre soldier, Richardson was demoted in August 1987 for repeated tardiness. He was charged at the time of arrest with espionage, failure to report contacts with a foreign government, theft, and unauthorized disposition of government property. On 26 August 1988 Richardson was sentenced by a military jury to ten years in prison, fined $36,000, and discharged with a bad conduct record.
New York Times, 15 Jan. 1988, "Army Sergeant is Arrested on Espionage Charges" Washington Post, 16 Jan. 1988, "Soldier Had No Access to Army Secrets"
1988-HENRY OTTO SPADE, a former Navy radio operator, was arrested in Mountain Home, Arkansas, on 17 November for the unauthorized possession of two Top Secret documents. One of the documents was a cryptographic key card. Spade, who was discharged from the Navy in April, 1988, stole the items while on active duty, but had reportedly made no attempt to sell them to any person or foreign government. While in the Navy, Spade served aboard the USS Midway and the USS Bristol County. Charged with one count of espionage, Spade pleaded innocent and was released on $25,000 bond. Spade faced up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine when convicted, but on 14 March 1989 was sentenced to three months probation.
Washington Post, 18 Nov. 1988, "Ex-sailor charged in secrets case"
1988-WILFREDO GARCIA, Navy Master-at-Arms 1st Class, was found guilty of espionage on 22 January following a two-year investigation by agents of the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI. In last 1985, NIS and FBI officials received information that a civilian businessman in Vallejo, California, was attempting to sell classified Navy documents to representatives of a foreign government. A cooperating witness identified Garcia, who was then stationed at Mare Island Naval Shipyard, as the source. Confidential documents stolen by Garcia dealing with submarine activities were sold to the civilian for $800,000, with a promise of more money when they were resold to a foreign government. Evidence indicated that the final destination could have been an East-Bloc country. The espionage scheme resulted in a number of classified documents being taken to the Philippines for sale to a foreign power there. Participants in the conspiracy couriered the documents on commercial aircraft and had gathered the material in a residence in Manila. Naval Investigative Service agents in Manila entered the home with a search warrant and recovered the documents before the planned sale. At a general court-martial convened in January 1988, Garcia was found guilty of espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny, sale of government property, and violations of military regulations. He was sentenced to 12 years confinement, reduced in rank to E-1, forfeited all pay and allowances, and received a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. Garcia had served in the Navy for 15 years.
Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage3, 1989 Sentry, Spring/Summer 1988. "MAI Convicted of Espionage"
1988-STEPHEN JOSEPH RATKAI, was arrested by Canadian authorities on 11 June and charged with attempting to obtain US classified military documents related to the operation of a US Navy installation at Argentina, Newfoundland. Although born in Canada, Ratkai was brought up in Hungary, his father's native country, after the death of his Canadian mother. As an adult he returned to Canada to work as a short-order cook, but made frequent trips back to Hungary. Ratkai was seized as a result of a double agent operation begun two years earlier by the US Naval Investigative Service and Canadian intelligence: On 2 December 1986 Donna Geiger walked on board a Soviet scientific research vessel, the Akademik Boris Petrov, which was temporarily docked in the harbor of St. John's, Newfoundland, Geiger, a Navy lieutenant, was a double agent who had been recruited by the Naval Investigative Service. She was stationed at the US Naval Facility in Argentia, Newfoundland. On board the Soviet ship, she portrayed herself as a "disgruntled female naval officer . . . working in a world dominated by men assigned to an isolated duty station." She brought classified material to prove her intentions. Two months Later she received a letter indicating someone would meet with her. Finally in May 1987, acting on directions she received by mail, she met her contact, "Michael," in the parking lot of the Hotel Newfoundland in St. John's. She was given money and some tasking to collect information. A week later Lt. Geiger met Michael in a restaurant. Classified information was exchanged for money. During this meeting she was asked to provide information on the highly classified Sound Underwater Surveillance System and the Naval Facility Argentia's area of responsibility. After several more meetings, Michael was identified as Ratkai. At their last meeting in June 1981, Geiger steered Ratkai to a room at the Hotel Newfoundland which was outfitted with surveillance equipment. More money and classified information was exchanged. When Ratkai left the room, he was arrested. No damage is reported to have occurred. On 6 February 1989 Ratkai pleaded guilty to one general charge of spying on behalf of the Soviet Union from May 1987 to June 1988 and one charge of attempted espionage. On 9 March 1989 the Newfoundland Supreme Court sentenced Ratkai to two concurrent nine-year prison terms.
New York Times, 16 Jun. 1988, "Canada Holds Suspect in Spying on US Navy" St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 Mar. 1989, "Spy Gets 9 Years" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1988-GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, On 11 July, Soviet newspaper Izvestia announced that Souther, a former navy photographic specialist who disappeared in May 1986, had been granted political asylum in the Soviet Union. Just before his disappearance, Souther, a recent graduate with a major in Russian Studies from Old Dominion University, was questioned by FBI counterintelligence agents. According to one source, investigators were acting "on more than suspicions, but didn't catch him in the act of espionage, and thus couldn't hold Souther at the time he was questioned." While attending college, Souther had been assigned as an active reservist to the Navy Intelligence Center in Norfolk where he had access to classified information. Souther's sudden disappearance was of considerable concern to FBI and Navy officials since the former Navy enlisted man had held special security clearances while on active duty with the Sixth Fleet in the early 1980s. During that time he had access to highly classified photo-intelligence materials. Souther joined the Navy in 1975 and left active duty in 1982 with the position of photographers mate. According to the Soviets, the former Navy specialist had asked for asylum because "he had to hide from the US special services which were pursuing him groundlessly." Described as a bright but undisciplined young man by former teachers and acquaintances. Souther reportedly had wanted to become a US Naval officer, but had been turned down as a Navy officer candidate. On 22 June 1989, at the age of 32, he reportedly committed suicide by asphyxiation after shutting himself in has garage and staring his car. Russian newspapers suggested he had been disappointed by aspects or Soviet life after defecting in 1986 and was prone to depression.
Washington Post, 18 Jul. 1988, "Ex-Sailor Defects to Soviets"
1988-CLYDE LEE CONRAD, retired Army Sergeant First Class, was arrested on 23 August in West Germany and charged with copying and transmitting classified documents to the Hungarian intelligence service for nearly a decade. He was recruited in 1974 by a Hungarian-born immigrant, ZOLTAN SZABO, a veteran of Vietnam who served as an Army Captain in Germany. Szabo began working for Hungarian intelligence in 1967. (He was convicted of espionage by an Austrian court in 1989, but served no jail time because of his cooperation with authorities in the prosecution of Conrad.) Two Hungarian-born doctors arrested at the same time in Sweden are said to have acted as couriers in the espionage operation and Conrad is believed to have hired at least a dozen people in the US Army to supply classified information — one of the biggest spy rings since World War II. Conrad's recruits continued to work for him after returning to the US, illegally exporting hundreds of thousands of advanced computer chips to the East Bloc through a phony company in Canada. In June 1990, former Army sergeant RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY, 28, was arrested in Tampa, Florida, following a two-year investigation. Ramsay worked in West Germany from 1983 to 1985 directly under Conrad. He provided Conrad with sensitive documents on the use of tactical nuclear weapons by US forces and NATO allies and plans for the defense of Europe, and manuals on military communication technology. Conrad was granted a Top Secret security clearance in 1978 when assigned to the U.S. 8th Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Despite his administrative specialists job which gave him access to extensive classified materials, Conrad had not been subject to a periodic reinvestigation before his retirement in 1985. Documents provided to Hungarian agents concerned NATO's plans for fighting a war against the Warsaw Pact: detailed descriptions of nuclear weapons and plans for movement of troops, tanks and aircraft. Conrad, in charge of a vault where all the 8th Infantry Division's secret documents were kept, took suitcases stuffed with classified papers out of the base. The former sergeant is reported to have received more than $1 million for selling secrets. The two Hungarian couriers, SANDOR and IMRE KERCSIK were sentenced by a Swedish court on 18 October to 18 months in prison. In 1989 Conrad was charged with treason under West German law. It took more than a year to charge him formally due to the complexity of the case which initially was declared one of espionage and then broadened to include the more serious charge of treason. Tried in a West German court, Conrad was sentenced to life imprisonment on 6 June 1990. In January 1998, Conrad died in a German prison, of heart failure.
Washington Post, 27 Aug. 1988, "US Ex-Sergeant Accused in Spy Case Not Given Mandatory Security Check" St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 Sep. 1989, "Former US Sergeant Accused of Treason" Richmond Times-Dispatch, 7 Jun. 1990, "Former GI Given Life for Spying" Los Angeles Times, 9 Jun. 1990, "Alleged Spy Called Brilliant, Erratic"
1988-DAVID FLEMING, Navy Chief Petty Officer, was convicted by a six-member military court on 4 October for the theft of 16 Secret photographs and four classified training manuals which he had at his home. At the time of his arrest in October 1987, Fleming was chief photographer aboard the submarine La Jolla, based at San Diego, California. At that time Federal agents found classified material in Fleming's apartment. Fleming contended that cramped quarters aboard the ship led him to develop photographs at home. Concluding that he knew that the materials, if kept at home, could result in damage to national security, the court convicted Fleming under statutes which apply to acts of espionage. However, no evidence was presented to the court that the Chief Petty Officer had intended to provide classified materials to representatives of another country. Fleming was sentenced to four years confinement and was given a bad conduct discharge from the Navy. In April 1989 a Navy parole board in San Diego recommended that the remainder of the four-year sentence be commuted. He was released on parole in 1990.
Los Angela Times, 5 Oct. 1988, "Sailor Gets Prison in Classified Data Case" San Diego Union, 15 Apr. 1989, "Early Release Backed for Sailor Convicted on Security Charges"
1988-THOMAS JOSEPH DOLCE, civilian research analyst at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, admitted in Federal court on 11 October that he had supplied scores of Secret documents related to Soviet military equipment to the Republic of South Africa between 1979 and 1983. Dolce, who had been under investigation by the FBI since April, resigned from his position on 30 September "for personal reasons." Dolce had held a Secret clearance at the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity at Aberdeen where he had been employed since 1973. In pleading guilty to a single count of espionage, he acknowledged passing documents on 40 or more occasions by mail or in person to military attaches at the South African Embassy in Washington and at South African Missions in London and Los Angeles. According to Dolce, he was motivated by ideological rather than financial reasons and had a long-term interest in the Republic of South Africa. He had in fact moved to South Africa in 1971, but later returned to the US because of better employment opportunities. Prior to 1971 Dolce had been a US Army clandestine warfare specialist. His contacts with South African representatives began when he sent them an unclassified paper on clandestine warfare which he had written. There is no evidence that Dolce received money in exchange for documents. On 20 April 1989, the former analyst was sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined $5,000.
Washington Post, 12 Oct. 1988, "Md. Man Admits to Espionage for South Africa" 13 Oct. 1988, "Spy for S. Africa Called Reserved"
1988-JAMES HALL III, Army Warrant Officer, was arrested on 21 December in Savannah, Georgia, after bragging to an undercover FBI agent that over a period of six years he had sold Top Secret intelligence data to East Germany and the Soviet Union. At the time, Hall believed that he was speaking to a Soviet contact. During this conversation he claimed that he had been motivated only by money. He told the FBI agent posing as a Soviet intelligence officer, "I wasn't terribly short of money. I just decided I didn't ever want to worry where my next dollar was coming front. I'm not anti-American. I wave the flag as much as anybody else." Also arrested in Belleair, Florida, was HUSEYIN YILDIRIM (nicknamed "the Meister"), a Turkish national who served as a conduit between Hall and East German agents. He was working as a civilian mechanic at an Army auto shop in Germany at the time. According to FBI sources, Hall started passing documents to East German agents in 1982 while serving in West Berlin as a communications analyst monitoring Eastern-bloc cable traffic. Later, Hall was transferred to Frankfurt where he continued to pass "massive amounts" of highly classified data on communications intelligence. Hall is believed to have received over $100,000 from agents of two countries during this period of time. In July 1987 he was reassigned to Ft. Stewart, near Savannah, Georgia. Hall had been under investigation by FBI and Army counter-intelligence agents for several months before his arrest and had been observed meeting Yildirim three times in November and December. Hall's detection as an espionage source may have resulted from reports that Hall was living in a style far above what his pay scale would allow. According to US officials, the operation appears to have inflicted serious damage on US electronic intelligence collection activities in Europe. On 9 March 1989 Hall was sentenced to 40 years in prison, fined $50,000 and given a dishonorable discharge. Yildirim was convicted 20 July 1989 of scheming with Hall and sentenced to life. Prosecutors contended that from 1982 to 1988 Yildirim carried classified military intelligence from Hall to East Bloc agents and returned with money.
New York Times, 22 Dec. 1988, "Army Technician and a Civilian are Held as Spies for Soviet Bloc" 19 Jul. 1989, "Jury Hears Tale of Spy Who Did It Out of Greed" Washington Post, 23 Dec. 1988, "Spy Suspect Said to Act Prosperous" Newsweek, 2 Jan. 1989, "Top Secrets for Sale?"
1988-DOUGLAS TSOU, a Chinese-born former FBI employee, was indicted in 1988 on one count of espionage following his admission that in 1986 he had written a letter to a representative of the government of Taiwan in which he revealed the identity of an intelligence officer of the People's Republic of China. According to testimony at the trial (which was delayed until October 1991), the unidentified agent operating in Taiwan had unsuccessfully approached the FBI with an offer to work as a double agent. Although the information Tsou passed to a Taiwanese representative in Houston was classified as Secret, Tsou, claimed that he considered the information to be declassified since the offer was not accepted. Tsou fled to Taiwan when the communists rose to power on the mainland in 1949 and moved to the U.S. 20 years later where he became a naturalized US citizen. He worked for the FBI from 1980 to 1986, first in San Francisco and later in Houston. On 4 October 1991, Tsou was found guilty as charged. However, prosecutors claimed that this represented only the tip of the iceberg of what Tsou gave to Taiwanese officials during his six years with the FBI. On 2 January 1992, Tsou was sentenced to a ten-year federal prison term.
Houston Chronicle, 22 Jan. 1992, "Ex-FBI Translator Sentenced for Passing Secrets to Taiwan"
1987-HOU DESHENG, a military attache of the People's Republic of China, was detained by FBI agents on 21 December while attempting to obtain Secret National Security Agency documents from a federal employee. Desheng was taken into custody at a restaurant in Washington's Chinatown after accepting what he believed to be classified NSA documents. The federal employee, a US citizen, had been working under FBI direction. Arrested at the same time was ZANG WEICHU, a PRC consular official in Chicago. Both diplomats were asked to leave the country as a result of "activities incompatible with their diplomatic status" — the first Chinese diplomats expelled since formal relations were established with the PRC in 1979.
New York Times, 31 Dec. 1987, "2 Chinese Depart in Espionage Case" Washington Post, 31 Dec. 1987, "US Expels Two Chinese Diplomats as Spies"
1987-MIKHAIL KATKOV, a second secretary assigned to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations was detained in New York City on 17 December as he was attempting to acquire defense-related technology. He was ordered to leave the country on the following day. Although few details about the case have been released, officials acknowledged that Katkov had been under surveillance for "some time" and that his activities amounted to "not a huge deal, but nonetheless serious espionage." According to a State Department source, Katkov is the 42nd Soviet representative to have been expelled from the United States for espionage since 1950.
Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1987, "Soviet Aide Detained by FBI, To be Expelled for Espionage" New York Times, 19 Dec. 1987, "US is Expelling Soviet Diplomat at U.N. as a Spy"
1986-ALLEN JOHN DAVIES, former Air Force sergeant and, at the time of his arrest, a lab technician at a Silicon Valley defense consuctor, was formally charged on 27 October with trying to pass classified information to the agents of the Soviet Union. Davies, a ten-year veteran who was separated from active service for poor job performance in 1984, had held a Secret clearance during his military service and worked as an avionic sensors system technician. According to the FBI, on 22 September Davies met with an FBI undercover agent posing as a Soviet official in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park. During the meeting Davies provided detailed verbal information and a hand drawing concerning US reconnaissance technology. At a second meeting in October he provided additional classified information. According to Davies's recorded statement, he was motivated "out of revenge because of the unfair way he was treated while in the Air Force." He is also quoted as saying that he wanted to do something to embarrass the United States and to interfere with the effectiveness of its reconnaissance activities. Asked why he waited two years before providing the information, Davies said he waited "just to make sure they couldn't link me with it if I told anybody, just sort of . . . hide my trail." Davies, born in Eastleigh, England in 1953, became a naturalized US citizen at the age of eleven. Since October 1984, he had been employed by Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation in Palo Alto. Federal officials stated that the former airman did not currently hold a clearance and that no information from the contractor facility was involved in the case. Davies was released on $200,000 bail with the condition that he undergo psychological evaluation. But on 27 May 1987 he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempting to communicate secrets to an unauthorized person. Davies was sentenced on 27 August 1987 to five years in prison.
Washington Post, 28 Oct. 1986, "FBI Arrests Ex-Airman on Espionage Charges" Los Angeles Time, 28 Oct. 1986, "San Jose Man Angry at AF Is Arrested as Would-be Spy"
1986-GENNADIY F. ZAKHAROV, Soviet physicist employed at the United Nations Secretariat was arrested on 23 August on a Queens, New York, subway platform as he gave $1000 to an employee of a US Defense contractor for three classified documents. Zakharov, who did not have diplomatic immunity, had attempted to recruit the employee over a period of three years. At the time of Zakharov's first approach, the individual, a Guyanese national and resident alien of the US, was in his junior year at Queens College, New York. Zakharov met with the student on numerous occasions and paid several thousand dollars for a wide range of technical but unclassified information about robotics, computers, and artificial intelligence. At the time of Zakharov's first approach in April 1983, the recruitment target, identified only by the code name "Birg," informed the FBI and agreed to work under FBI control in order to apprehend the Soviet agent. Following his graduation in 1985, Birg obtained a position with a high-technology firm. Under FBI direction, he agreed to sign a ten-year written contract with Zakharov to provide classified information. Money to be paid by the Soviets was to be determined by the quantity and quality of the information. On 30 September, Zakharov pleaded no contest to espionage charges and was ordered to leave the country within 24 hours. Zakharov's expulsion came less than 24 hours after the release of American correspondent Nicholas Daniloff who had been arrested in the Soviet Union for alleged espionage activities.
New York Times, 24 Aug. 1986, "A Soviet Official Assigned to U.N. is Seized as a Spy" 25 Aug. 1986, "Russian's Arrest Called Example of Spy Threat" 26 Avg. 1986, "US Investigating Further Spy Cases in New York Area"
1986-BRUCE D. OTT, Airman 1st Class, assigned duties as an administrative clerk at Beale Air Force Base, was arrested 23 January by FBI and Air Foree Security agents at a Davis, California, motel as he attempted to sell classified information to undercover agents posing as Soviet representatives. One of the documents cited is "The SAC Tactical Doctrine for SR-71 Crews." At that time, Beale AFB was the home base of SR-71 "blackbird" reconnaissance aircraft. It is reported that Ott tried to contact representatives at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco during the month of January. His communication was intercepted and no classified information actually changed hands. Military prosecutors contended that Ott hoped to be paid up to $160,000 for his information. Following an eight-day court martial proceeding, Ott was found guilty and on 7 August was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
New York Times, 29 Jan. 1986, "Airman in California Charged in New Spy Case" 1 Feb. 1986, "Details are given on Spying Charge"
1986-ROBERT DEAN HAGUEWOOD, Petty Officer 3rd Class, was arrested 4 March by agents of the Naval investigative Service after allegedly selling part of a Confidential aviation ordinance manual to an undercover police officer. Haguewood, who was stationed at the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Mugu Naval Air Station near Oxnard, California, reportedly asked around town for someone who would pay for secret information about Naval ordinance. He was placed under surveillance by agents of the Naval Investigative Service who with the FBI and local police officials made the arrest on 4 March after Haguewood received a payment of $360 for the classified document at a beach location. No contact was made with foreign representatives and no information is known to have been compromised. Haguewood was reported to have had serious financial problems. On 20 June, Haguewood pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain agreement and receive a sentence of two years from a military court.
Washington Post, 20 Jun. 1986, "Sale of `Secrets' To Put Sailor Behing Bars" New York Times, 11 Mar. 1986, "Navy Man Arrested in Spy Case" Washington Post, 1 Mar. 1986, "Sailor Allegedly Tried to Sell Manual"
1986-VLADIMIR M. ISMAYLOV, senior Soviet military attache, was arrested on 19 June at a remote site in Prince George's County, Maryland, after retrieving Secret documents left by a US Air Force officer who was working undercover with counterespionage agents of the AFOSI and the FBI. Until his expulsion for activities incompatible with his diplomatic role. Col. Ismaylov was the highest ranking air force officer at the Soviet Embassy. Ismaylov, apprehended as he buried a milk carton with $41,100 for the US officer, scuffled briefly with FBI agents. According to an FBI spokesman, the Soviet attache was alter information about the Strategic Defense Initiative research program, and data on the cruise missile. stealth bomber, and a hypersonic passenger jet known as the Trans-Atmospheric Vehicle. The operation was run by the GRU. According to the US officer, the Soviets evaluated the USAF officer for nearly a year before asking him to photograph classified documents. All transactions and communications were to be carried out by the use of dead drops at remote locations.
Washington Post, 21 Jun. 1986, "Soviet Attache Arrested, Expelled for Receiving Document"
1986-MICHAEL H. ALLEN, a retired Navy Senior Chief Radioman employed at the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines, was arrested on suspicion of espionage by Navy security agents on 4 December. Allen, who had been working as a civilian clerk, retired from the Navy in 1972. The employee confessed to passing classified US counterintelligence reports to Philippine intelligence officers after seeing a videotape of himself hiding documents in his pockets. When apprehended he had a photocopy of a Secret page on his person; six other classified documents were seized at his residence. The charges covered the period between July and December 1986 during which time he was accused of photocopying and removing classified material from the communication center. According to the Naval Investigative Service, Allen's activities may have resulted in the compromising of important Filipino intelligence sources. Prosecutors argued that Allen's main reason for providing secrets to the Filipinos was to promote his local business interests which included a used car dealership, a bar, and a cockfighting ring. On 14 August 1987, a court martial in San Diego found Allen guilty of 10 counts of espionage and sentenced him to eight years in prison. The six-officer panel also imposed a $10,000 fine on the former radioman.
New York Times, 12 Dec. 1986, "Navy Employee Held in Espionage Related Case" Los Angeles Times, 15 Aug. 1987, "Linked to Filipinos; Ex-Navy Man Found Guilty"
1986-CLAYTON J. LONETREE, Marine Corps security guard at the US Embassy in Moscow from September 1984 to March 1986, and later in Vienna, was placed under detention on 31 December 1986 after he acknowledged his involvement with a female KGB officer, Violette Seina, who had previously been a telephone operator and translator at the US Embassy in Moscow. Soon after their relationship began, Seina introduced Lonetree to her "Uncle Sasha" who was later identified by US intelligence as being a KGB agent. It was alleged at the time that Sgt. Lonetree had a sexual liaison with Seina, and had in fact allowed Soviet agents after-hours access to the US Embassy. In December 1986, Lonetree turned himself in to authorities at the US Embassy in Vienna, Austria, where he was stationed. Also arrested and charged with collaboration with Lonetree was Corporal Arnold Bracy who was also alleged to have been romantically involved with Soviet women. As the investigation proceeded, five other Marine guards were detained on suspicion of espionage, lying to investigators, or for improper fraternization with foreign nationals. Lonetree was tried on 13 counts including espionage. Among these counts were charges that he conspired with Soviet agents to gather names and photographs of American intelligence agents, to provide personality data on American intelligence agents, and to provide information concerning the floor plans of the US Embassies in Moscow and Vienna. On 21 August 1987 Lonetree was convicted of espionage and 12 related counts by a military court. Three days later he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, fined $5,000, loss of all pay and allowances, reduced to the rank of private, and given a dishonorable discharge. Espionage charges against Bracy and all of the other Marines have since been dropped. According to reports in last 1987. intensive investigations have led to the conclusion that the former guards did not, as earlier believed, allow Soviet agents to penetrate the US Embassy in Moscow. in May, 1988, Lonetree's sentence was reduced to 25 years, in 1992 to 20 years, and later to 15 years. In February 1996 he was released.
Washington Post, 10 Feb. 1987, "Success Story Marine May Face Trial for His Life" 30 Jul. 1987, "Envoy Blamed for Lax Security" 17 Jan. 1988, "Spy Scandal Snowballed, Melted Away" Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25 February 1996, "Lonetree May Find Stigma Lives On" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1985-JOHN ANTHONY WALKER and his son, MICHAEL LANCE WALKER were indicted 28 May by a Federal grand jury in Baltimore on six counts of espionage. The elder Walker, a retired Navy warrant officer who had held a Top Secret Crypto clearance, was charged with having sold classified material to Soviet agents for the past 18 years. During his military career, Walker made some investments in which he lost money. To makeup for his losses, in late 1968 at the age of 30, Walker went to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, and offered his services for purposes of espionage. He compromised key cards used for enciphering messages and also provided information on the encryption devices themselves. At least a million classified messages of the military services and US intelligence agencies were compromised. A Soviet defector said the KGB considered this the most important operation in its history. Michael Walker, a petty officer assigned to the USS Nimitz, was accused of providing classified Navy documents to his father for sale to the Soviets. Fifteen pounds of classified material were in his possession at the time of arrest on the Nimitz. John Walkers arrest resulted from a tip to the FBI from his former wife. He was apprehended at a Maryland motel after depositing a number of documents at a roadside drop. Soviet Embassy official, Alexei Tkachenko, who was spotted in the area, returned to Moscow within days of Walker's arrest. It is also alleged that John Walker recruited his brother, Arthur James Walker, and former Navy friend, Jerry Alfred Whitworth, as sources of classified information for Soviet intelligence (see summaries which follow). On 28 October, both John and Michael Walker pleaded guilty to espionage charges under a plea agreement by which the senior Walker agreed to testify in the trial of Jerry Whitworth and to provide full information on what was given to the Soviets in exchange for a lesser sentence for his son. On 6 November 1986, John Walker was sentenced to two life terms plus ten years to be served concurrently. Michael was sentenced to 25 years. A federal grand jury has been convened to pursue some of the unresolved questions including the location of up to $1 million possibly hidden by John Walker, and the involvement of minor players in the espionage ring.
New York Times, 21 May 1985, "Ex-Navy Officer Is Charged With Espionage" Washington Post, 22 May 1985, "Spy Suspect's Son Queried" 16 Aug. 1985, "Lawyers Admit Walker Left Bag" 29 Oct. 1985, "2 Walkers Plead Guilty to Spying" 7 Nov. 1986, "Walker Gets Life Term: Judge to Oppose Parole" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1985-ARTHUR JAMES WALKER, a retired Navy Lieutenant Commander, was arrested on 29 May for providing classified material to his brother in 1981 and 1982. Arthur Walker was employed with a Defense contractor in Chesapeake, Virginia, where he reportedly sought work in early 1980 at the urging of his brother, John A. Walker, to gain access to classified documents. During the period of his employment, Arthur Walker provided his brother with several Confidential documents which related to ship construction and design. These were photocopied and returned to the firm's classified container. In all Arthur Walker received $12,000 for his collaboration, much of which he returned to his brother to repay a debt. On 9 August, he was found guilty of seven counts of espionage by a US Districts Court judge. On 12 November, Arthur Walker was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined $250,000. At the time of sentencing it was revealed that polygraph tests indicated Walker may have been involved in espionage while on active duty with the Navy.
Washington Post, 7 Aug. 1985, "Two Portraits of Arthur Walker; Subversive Plotter" 10 Aug. 1985, "Walker Guilty of Espionage On 7 Counts" Time, 19 Aug. 1985, "A Spy Ring Goes to Court" New York Times, 13 Nov. 1985, "Arthur Walker Sentenced to Life; Wider Spying Role"
1985-JERRY ALFRED WHITWORTH, collaborator with John A. Walker, surrendered to FBI agents on 3 June following the issue of a complaint charging him with conspiracy to commit espionage. Whitworth, a retired Naval communications specialist who had held a Top Secret clearance, is alleged to have received $332,000 through Walker for highly classified information related to naval communications between 1975 and 1982. FBI sources state that Whitworth had attempted to arrange a meeting with than in 1984 in order to bargain for immunity from prosecution. According to one news item, of all the alleged participants in the "Walker Spy Ring" the damage attributed to Whitworth is thought to be the worst since he is reported to have provided the Soviets with "key lists," which would have enabled them to decode US Naval communications, and classified information about the design of cryptographic equipment. Whitworth pleaded innocent to a 13-count indictment, but during his subsequent trial, defense lawyers admitted that he had passed classified materials to John Walker. However, the argument that he did not know these highly classified cryptographic materials were ending up in Soviet hands was not accepted by the Federal jury. Following a highly publicized three-month trial, Whitworth was convicted on 12 counts of espionage and tax evasion. The former communications specialist received a sentence of 365 years and a fine of $410,000 on 28 August 1986.
Washington Post, 4 Jun. 1985, "4th Arrested in Spy Case" 8 Jun. 1985, "Agent Believes Sailor Said He Passed Data" 14 Jun. 1985, "Accused Spy `A Quiet Man'"
1985-SHARON M. SCRANAGE, operations support assistant for the CIA stationed in Ghana and her Ghanaian boyfriend, MICHAEL SOUSSOUDIS, were charged on 11 July with turning over classified information, including the identities of CIA agents and informants, to Ghanaian intelligence officials. It is reported that a routine polygraph test given to Scranage on her return to the US aroused CIA suspicions. Following an internal investigation, Scranage agreed to cooperate with the FBI in order to arrest Soussoudis, a business consultant and permanent residents of the United States. According to one report, damaging information on CIA intelligence collection activities is likely to have been passed on by pro-Marxist Kojo Tsikata, head of Ghanaian intelligence, to Cuba, Libya, East Germany and other Soviet Bloc nations. Indicted on 18 counts of providing classified information to a foreign country, Scranage subsequently pleaded guilty to one count under the espionage code and two counts of violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act Fifteen remaining charges were dropped. On 26 November Scranage was sentenced to five years in prison. (This was later reduced to two years.) At the same time Soussoudis who had been charged with eight counts of espionage pleaded nola contendere and was sentenced to 20 years. His sentence was suspended on the condition that he leave the United States within 24 hours.
Washington Post, 12 Jul. 1985, "CIA Aide, Ghanaian Face Spy Counts" 14 Jul. 1985, "Routine Polygraph Opened Ghanuian Espionage Probe" 20 Jul. 1985, "FBI Says Spying Occurred After CIA Order on Ghanain"
1985-MICHAEL TOBIAS, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class, along with his nephew, FRANCIS X. PIZZO were arrested on 13 August and charged with stealing Top Secret cryptographic key cards from the USS Peoria, berthed at San Diego. The pair were also accused of attempting to sell the material to representatives of the Soviet Union for $100,000: Tobias and Pizzo drove to the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, bus arrived during the early morning before regular business hours. Having failed in their initial attempt to contact a "foreign power," and obviously having second thoughts about committing espionage, the pair drove back to San Diego and called the US Secret Service offering to sell the cards back to the Government for amnesty and money by claiming that they were prepared to sell the key material to the Soviets. Several calls were placed to the Secret Service by Pizzo, one of which was traced by the FBI. Also arrested in connection with the case were Tobias's brother, BRUCE TOBIAS, and DALE IRENE of San Diego. According to government prosecutors, Tobias took the classified cards from the ship instead of shredding them, as was his assignment. Pizzo pleaded guilty to five federal charges and on 7 October was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Bruce Tobias and Dale Irene pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property. During the four-day trial of Michael Tobias, an NSA official testified that the cards would have provided sensitive information about the location and movement of US and foreign vessels. Two of the 12 pilfered cards have not been recovered. On 14 August Michael Tobias was found guilty of four counts of conspiracy and three counts of theft of government property. The US Attorney stated that Tobias had attempted to leave the country and that he and Pizzo had been seen near the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco before their arrests. On 12 November 1995, Michael Tobias was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in January 1996, Bruce Tobias was sentenced to the prison time he served up to that date (159 days), and Dale Irene was sentenced to a two-year confinement.
New York Times, 15 Aug. 1985, "Sailor is Guilty of Conspiring to Sell Secret Data from Ship" 13 Nov. 1985, "Sailor Sentenced 10 20 Years for Trying to Sell 11 Navy Codes" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1985-EDWARD L. HOWARD, former CIA agent, was reportedly forced to resign in June 1983 after failing a polygraph examination which indicated his involvement in petty theft and drug use. According to news reports, Howard was one of two former CIA employees (identified by Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko) who sold classified information to the KGB. Although placed under surveillance by the FBI at his Albuquerque home, Howard (who had been trained in surveillance and evasion tactics) eluded spotters and fled the country. Howard allegedly had met with Soviet agents in Austria in September 1984 and received payment for classified information. He is reported to have revealed to the KGB the identity of a valuable US intelligence source in Moscow, now presumed dead or under sentence of execution. It is also reported that five American diplomats were expelled from the Soviet Union as persona non grata as a result of information provided by Howard. On 7 August 1986, the Soviet news agency TASS announced that Howard had been granted political asylum in the USSR.
Washington Post, 3 Oct. 1985, "2 Ex-CIA Agents Sought by FBI as Possible Spies" 5 Oct. 1985, "Affidavit Says Ex-CIA Agent Met High-Level KGB Officers" 20 May 1986, "The CIA Agenet who Sold Out" 11 Jul. 1986, "5 American Diplomats Caught by KGB" Newsweek, 22 May 1988, "The Spy Who Got Away"
1985-LARRY WU-TAI CHIN, retired CIA employee, was arrested 22 November and accused of having carried out a 33-year career of espionage on behalf of the People's Republic of China. According to media reports, Chin, who retired at 1981 at 63, had been an intelligence officer in the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. During his career, he held a Top Secret clearance and had access to a wide range of intelligence information. Born in Peking, Chin was recruited by communist intelligence agents while a college student in the early 1940s. Later he became a naturalized US citizen, worked for the US Army Liaison Office in China in 1943, and joined the CIA in 1952. It is believed that he provided the PRC with many of the CIA's Top Secret reports on the Far East written over the past 20 years. Chin reportedly smuggled classified documents from his office and between 1976 and 1982, gave photographs of these materials to Chinese couriers at frequent meetings in Toronto, Hong Kong and London. He met with Chinese agents in the Far East as recently as March 1985. Chin may have received as much as $1 million for his complicity. He was indicted on 17 counts of espionage-related and income tax violations. At his trial which began on 4 February 1986, Chin admitted providing the Chinese with information over a period of 11 years, but for the purpose of reconciliation between China and the United States. On 8 February, Chin was convicted by a Federal jury on all counts. Sentencing had been set for 17 March: however, on 21 February the former CIA employee committed suicide in his cell.
Washington Post, 24 Nov. 1985, "Ex-CIA Employee Held as 33-Year China Spy" New York Times, 30 Nov. 1985, "Huge Data Loss from China is Seen from Espionage" Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1985, "Chin Believed Planted in US as Spy"
1985-JONATHAN J. POLLARD, intelligence analyst with the Naval Investigative Service and his wife, ANNE HENDERSON-POLLARD, were apprehended on 21 November outside of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC as they vainly sought asylum with hope of fleeing the country. Both were charged under the espionage code for selling classified documents to an Israeli intelligence unit for $50,000. It is reported that Pollard's detection resulted from tips from fellow employees that the accused was seeking and copying more classified documents than his job required. Confronted with evidence of his activities by the NIS and the FBI on 15 November, Pollard admitted delivering classified documents to a foreign government agent. He was originally ideologically motivated to pass classified information, but that motivation was later clouded by monetary considerations. At Stanford University in 1976, Pollard is reported to have boasted of working for the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency. Anne Henderson-Pollard is accused of having intended to sell to representatives of the Peoples Republic of China documents related to the US analysis of China's intelligence operations in this country. Seized at the Pollard residence was a suitcase full of classified materials including many marked Top Secret and relating to military capabilities of foreign countries. On 4 June 1986, Pollard and his wife pleaded guilty so espionage and related charges under a plea agreement with Federal officials. Four Israeli nationals were later named as unindicted co-conspirators. On 4 March 1987 Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment. Anne Henderson-Pollard received a five-year term.
New York Times, 21 Nov. 1985, "F.B.I. Man Says Naval Analyst Told of Spying" Washington Post, 4 Dec. 1985, "FBI Seeking Pollard Contact Identity" 5 Jun. 1986, "Ex-Analyst Pollard Pleads Guilty to Spying" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1985-RANDY MILES JEFFRIES, messenger for a private stenographic firm in Washington, DC., was arrested on 14 December and charged with attempting to deliver national defense secrets to the Soviet Union. The firm, a cleared contractor facility, had transcribed closed hearings of the House Armed Services Committee. Jeffries allegedly provided Soviet military officials with at least 40 "sample pages" of Secret and Top Secret transcripts from congressional hearings, offering to hand over a complete package of three documents for $5,000. The investigation of Jeffries began after he was observed by US agents entering the Soviet Military Office its Washington. An FBI undercover agent posing as a Soviet representative contacted the messenger at his residence and arranged a meeting later in the day at a local hotel. Jeffries was arrested as he left the meeting. From 1978 to 1980, he was a support employee for the FBI and reportedly held an agency security clearance. In March 1983 he was convicted of possession of heroin and completed a program for rehabilitation from drug abuse in July 1985. Jeffries entered a plea of guilty on 23 January 1986. On 13 March, Jeffries was sentenced by a Federal judge to from three to nine years imprisonment. As stated by the court at the time of sentencing, it was obvious that poor security practices at the cleared facility were major contributing factors leading to the loss of classified information.
Wahington Post, 22 Dec. 1985, "FBI Agent Says Suspected Spy Offered to Sell Him Document" 24 Dec. 1985, "Transcripts Tied to Jeffries Had Strategic Data" DoD Security Institute, Security Awareness Bulletin 2-90
1985-RONALD WILLIAM PELTON, former communication specialist with the National Security Agency for 14 years, was identified as a spy for the Soviet Union based on facts provided by defector Vitaly Yurchenko. Arrested in Annapolis on 25 November, Pelton admitted making contacts with the Soviets in 1980, a year after he left NSA. At the time he was faced with serious financial difficulties. Pelton reportedly visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington where he agreed to sell classified information and subsequently made several trips to Vienna, Austria, where he was debriefed at length by the KGB. During his employment in NSA, Pelton had access to a wide range of highly sensitive information. He allegedly received $35,000 from the Soviets between 1980 and 1983 for information about highly classified US intelligence collection projects targeted at the Soviet Union. Pelton was indicted 20 December on six counts related to espionage. Despite his statement at the time of arrest. Pelton pleaded not guilty. Following highly publicized trial, Pelton was convicted (5 June 1986) on one count of conspiracy and two counts of espionage. On 6 December 1986, he was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences.
Washington Post, 26 Nov. 1985, "FBI Says Spy Suspect Admits Selling Data" 7 Dec. 1985, "Accused Spy Ronald Pelson Was Preoccupied with Money" New York Times, 28 Nov. 1985, "Ex-Security Agency Employee Said to Have Admitted Spying"
1985-EDWARD OWEN BUCHANAN, In early May 1985, an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) human source provided information that Airman Edward O. Buchanan, in training at Lowry AFB, Colorado, had been phoning the East German Embassy in Washington, DC. He reportedly wanted to know if Embassy officials had received a letter he had sent in April 1985. According to the source, the letter contained an offer by Buchanan to commit espionage for the East German Government. Unsuccessful at making an East German contact, Buchanan then mailed a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, fully identifying himself and stating that he had information of a scientific and technological nature that he wanted to sell to the Russian Government. He indicated he would continue to conduct business with the Soviets if they liked his material. At this point AFOSI agents, posing as Soviet representatives, contacted Buchanan. Believing that he was doing business with Soviet Intelligence Officers, the Airman offered to commit espionage and sell classified documents. He then provided documents to the undercover AFOSI/FBI agents which he claimed were classified Secret and was paid $1,000. Buchanan was apprehended immediately. A later examination of the documents disclosed that they were copies of unclassified articles from an electronics magazine. During an interview following his arrest, Buchanan admitted contacting the East German Embassy and the Soviet Embassy for the purpose of committing espionage. Buchanan also admitted that, although he did not have access to classified information at that time (because of his student status), he planned to sell classified information once his clearance had been granted and he was assigned to a base in Germany. At the time he was being processed for a Top Secret-Special Compartmented Information clearance. His stated intention was to establish a business relationship with the Soviets by selling bogus material to "get my foot in the door" and then later sell classified information. He would then "sell as much classified material as he could until he made enough money to live comfortably." Buchanan was court-martialed on 26 August 1985, and sentenced to 30 months confinement, reduction to Airman Basic, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.
1984-ERNST FORBRICH, a West German automobile mechanic, was arrested 19 March in Clearwater Beach, Florida, after paying $550 for a classified military document supplied by an undercover agent posing as an Army intelligence officer. Forbrich was described as a conduit who passed US military secrets to East German Intelligence and by his own admission had been selling documents to East German intelligence for a period of 17 years. Forbrich traveled frequently to the United States, contacting former US military personnel who had served in West Germany. Convicted in June on two counts of espionage, Forbrich was sentenced to 15 years.
Washington Post, 21 Mar. 1984, "West German Accused of Spying for East" New York Post, 21 Mar. 1984, "German is Arrested on Spying Charge"
1984-BRUCE LELAND KEARN, a Navy operations specialist assigned at command Secret control officer on board the USS Tuscaloosa, was arrested in March 1984 and convicted at a general court-martial far dereliction of duty, and willfully delivering, transmitting or communicating classified documents to unauthorized persons. No nation was named as having received any of the classified materials. While absent without leave, Kearn left behind a briefcase which was found to contain 147 classified microfiche (copies of nearly 15,000 pages of Secret documents), seven Confidential crypto publications, and child pornographic photographs and literature. He was sentenced to 18 months based on a plea bargain.
1984-ARNE TREHOLT, head of the press section of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was arrested 20 January by Norwegian authorities while boarding a plane for Vienna. He reportedly had a suitcase of classified documents in his possession. A search of his residence uncovered a collection of 6,000 pages of classified material. Treholt, charged with supplying Secret NATO documents to the KGB, had come under suspicion as early as 1980 while he was serving as a member of the Norwegian delegation to the U.N. in New York. At that time he was placed under surveillance by the FBI. Pre-trial statements and testimony revealed that he received over $7,000 from Soviet agents and that he had been subject to blackmail. It was also believed that Treholt was motivated by pro-Soviet ideological beliefs. Treholt pleaded innocent to charges and underwent an 11-week trial by jury. On 20 June 1985 the Norwegian court found Treholt guilty of seven counts of espionage. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
New York Times, 29 Jan. 1984, "Portraits of Spy as Golden Young Man" Newsweek, 6 Feb. 1984, "The Spy Who Wore Jogging Shoes"
1984-ALICE MICHELSON, an East German national, was apprehended 1 October as she was boarding a flight in New York to Czechoslovakia with tape recordings hidden in a cigarette pack. Michelson, apparently acting as courier for Soviet Intelligence, had been given the classified material by a US Army sergeant who was posing as a KGB collaborator. Michelson was indicted and held without bail; however, before coming to trial she was exchanged (June 1985), along with three other Soviet Bloc agents, for 25 persons who had "been helpful" to the United States. The FBI has described the case as "a classic spy operation."
Washington Post, 3 Oct. 1984, "East Games Women Charged with Spying" and 3 Oct. 1984, "FBI Agent, German, analyses an Intelligence Cases" New York Time, 11 Oct. 1984, "East German Indicted in Spy Plot"
1984-RICHARD CRAIG SMITH, former Army counterintelligence agent, was arrested on 4 April and indicted for selling information to Soviet agents regarding the identities of six double-agents in the US. Having failed in business after leaving government service and faced with severe financial difficulties, Smith reportedly met on three occasions with KGB officers in Tokyo and received $11,000 for classified information. Smith himself initiated contact with the FBI in the summer of 1983, claiming he had "conned" the Soviets out of $11,000. Later, Smith claimed that he had been working under the direction of CIA operatives in Honolulu. After months of pre-trial litigation over the admissibility of evidence, Smith was acquitted by a Federal jury on 11 April 1986.
Washington Post, 9 Apr. 1984, "Unlikely Character for a Spy Story" 11 Apr. 1984, "Spy Case Suspect. . . ." 13 Apr. 1986, "Smith Celebrates His Freedom"
1984-RICHARD MILLER, first member of the FBI to be indicted for espionage, was arrested with two accomplices, SVETLANA and NIKOLAI OGORODNIKOV on 3 October. According to news reports, Miller provided classified documents to the Ogorodnikon, two pro-Soviet Russian emigres and demanded $50,000 in gold and $15,000 cash in return. Miller, who was faced with financial difficulties, is alleged to have been sexually involved with Svetlana Ogorodnikov and was preparing to travel with her to Vienna at the time of his arrest. A search of Miller's residence uncovered several classified documents. At the time of their trial the Ogorodnikovs were accused of having been "utility agents" for the KGB since 1980. After a ten-week trial, and in an agreement with federal prosecutors, each pleaded guilty to me count of conspiracy. Nikolai Ogorodnikov was immediately sentenced to eight years imprisonment. His wife later received a sentence of 18 years. Richard Miller pleaded innocent and after 11 weeks of testimony, a mistrial was declared. Following a second trial which ended on 19 June 1986. Miller was found guilty of espionage and bribery. His claim that he was trying to infiltrate the KGB as a double agent was rejected by the jury. On 14 July 1986, Richard Miller was sentenced to two consecutive life terms and 50 years on other charges. This conviction following his second trial was overturned in 1989 on the grounds that US District Judge David Kenyon erred in admitting polygraph evidence. He was granted bail in October 1989 while awaiting a new trial on charges that he passed Top Secret FBI data to the Soviet woman who was his lover. Miller was forbidden to leave the Los Angeles area without special permission and underwent therapy as ordered by the Probation Department. On October 9, 1990, he was convicted on all counts of espionage for the second time and, on 4 February 1991, was sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison. On 28 January 1993, a federal appeals court upheld his conviction. On 6 May 1994, Miller was released from prison following the reduction of his sentence to 13 years by a Federal judge.
Time Magazine, 15 Oct. 1984, "Spy vs. Spy Saga" Washingson Post, 4 Oct. 1984, "FBI Agent Charged in Espionage" 5 Oct. 1984, "Accused Spies Portrayed as Incompetents" Los Angeles Times, 5 Feb. 1991, "Miller Gets 20-Year Term For Spying"
1984-ROBERT E. CORDREY, a Marine private, was convicted 13 August by court-martial of 18 counts of attempting to contact representatives of communist countries for the purpose of selling classified information about nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Cordrey had been an instructor at the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The charges were not contested and the case was not disclosed to the public until January 1985 due to the extremely sensitive nature of the investigation. Apparently Cordrey attempted to contact Soviet, Czech., East German, and Polish agents. He was sentenced to 12 years as hard labor by the military court; however, his pre-trial agreement with prosecutors limited his jail term to two years.
New York Times, 10 Jan. 1985, "Marine Gets 12 Years At Spy Court-Martial"
1984-SAMUEL L. MORISON, a civilian analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence, was arrested 1 October for supplying Jane's Publications with classified photography showing a Soviet nuclear powered carrier under construction. The photographs were subsequently published in Jane's Defense Weekly (July 1984). Morison, described as a heavy spender and unhappy with his Navy Department job, had been employed by Jane's as a part-time contributor. A search of his apartment turned up two portions of Navy documents marked Secret. On 17 October 1985, after a seven-day trial, Morison became the first individual convicted under the 1917 Espionage Code for unauthorized disclosure to the press. Also convicted of theft of government property, Morison was sentenced to two years imprisonment on 4 December 1985. The decision was appealed and in April 1988 the conviction was upheld by the 4th US Circuit Court of Appeals. In October 1988 the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, thus endorsing the use of the espionage code for prosecuting cases of unauthorized disclosure.
Washington Post, 3 Oct. 1984, "Navy Analyst Arrested in Photo Sale" 29 Oct. 1984, "Unlikeyl Espionage Suspect" 18 Oct. 1985, "Morison Guilty of Spying, Stealing Documents" New York Times, 8 Oct. 1984, "Disclosing Secrets to the Press. . . ."
1984-JAY CLYDE WOLFF, 24-year old auto painter and former Navy enlisted man, was arrested on 17 December in Gallup, New Mexico, for offering to sell classified documents dealing with US weapons systems aboard a US Navy vessel. Wolff who was discharged from the Navy in 1983 met with an undercover agent and offered to sell classified material for $5,000 to $6,000. According to the FBI, a tip led to the meeting with Wolff at a convenience store where he was apprehended. Wolff pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to sell classified documents and on 28 June 1985 the former service member was sentenced to five years in prison.
1984-KARL F. KOECHER, a former CIA employee, and his wife, were arrested 27 November as they were preparing to fly to Switzerland. At the time, he was believed to be the first foreign agent to have penetrated the CIA having operated successfully as an "illegal" for Czech intelligence for 19 years. In 1962 Koecher was trained as a foreign agent by Czech intelligence, he and his wife staged a phony defection to the US in 1965 and soon became known as an outspoken anti-Communist member of the academic community in New York City. Both became naturalized citizens in 1971 and Koecher obtained a translator job with the CIA two years later where he translated Top Secret materials until 1975. Koecher, who claimed that he was a double-agent, was arrested alter being observed making frequent contact with KGB operatives. According to Federal prosecutors, Mrs. Koecher operated as a paid courier for Czech intelligence until 1983. An FBI agent testified that from February 1973 to August 1953, Karl Koecher passed on to Czech agents highly classified materials including names of CIA personnel. However the case never came to trial. On 11 February 1985, Koecher was exchanged in Berlin for Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky.
New York Times, 23 Nov. 1984, "Man Charged with Passing State Secrets" 5 Dec. 1984, "Wife is Held in Contempt of Court for Refusing to Testify" 13 Jan. 1985, "Intrigue and Countercharges Mark Case of Purported Spies" Washington Post, 17 Apr. 1988, "Moscow Mole in the CIA"
1984-THOMAS PATRICK CAVANAGH, an engineering specialist for Northrop Corporation holding a secret clearance, was arrested on IS December and charged with attempting to sell classified documents on Stealth aircraft technology to the Soviets. It is reported that Cavanagh's attempts to contact the Soviet Consulate were intercepted. A meeting was proposed at a Los Angeles motel by FBI undercover agents posing as USSR representatives when a deal could be negotiated. During a subsequent meeting, agents provided the $25,000 demanded for classified documents and made the arrest. Cavanagh, recently separated from his wife, faced mounting financial difficulties and feared that he was being denied a Top Secret clearance because of indebtedness. Is is reported that no serious compromise occurred. Cavanagh pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage and on 23 May 1985 was sentenced to two concurrent life terms in prison.
New York Times, 19 Dec. 1984, "Engineer is Held in Scheme to Sell Secrets" Washington Post, 22 Dec. 1984, "Engineer in Secrets Case is Held Without Bail" DoD Security Awareness Bulletin, Dec. 1985, Number 1-86
1983-WALDO H. DUBBERSTEIN, retired DIA employee and associate of convicted arms smuggler Edwin P. Wilson, was indicted on 28 April on charges of selling US military secrets to Libya. The following day Dubberstein was found dead: his death was later ruled a suicide. Had he been convicted of espionage and of other charges against him, including conspiracy and bribery, Dubberstein would have faced a possible sentence of 57 years and $50,000 in fines. Dubberstein had apparently begun his cooperation with Libya as an outgrowth of his meetings with Edwin P. Wilson who acted as a middleman for passage of information to Libya and receipt of payments to Dubberstein.
Washington Post, 8 May 1983, "The Last Battle of an Old War Horse" Times, 9 May 1983, "Beyond Justice; an Accused Spy is Dead"
1983-YURIY P. LEONOV, a lieutenant colonel in Soviet military intelligence (GRU), fronting as a Soviet air force attache, was apprehended on 18 August after receiving 60 pounds of government documents from an editor working under FBI control. The following day Leonov, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. This ended a two-year recruitment attempt by Leonov against Armand B. Weiss, an editor of technical publications and former government consultant. Weiss had previously held a Top Secret clearance. In all, Leonov paid Weiss $1,800 for sensitive but unclassified publications on weapon systems. Ultimately, Leonov demanded a classified document. Under FBI direction Weiss provided the item with a large number of highly technical publications for $500 cash. Leonov was arrested by agents waiting outside the office.
Washington Post, 16 Sep. 1983, "Soviet Military Spy Caught in FBI Trap"
1983-FRANCISCO DE ASSIS MIRA, an Air Force computer specialist stationed in Germany. was charged in April with providing classified defense information to East Germany. Mira, a naturalized American born in Spain, and two West German accomplices sold information on American codes and radar to the East German State Security Service. In August 1982, while assigned to duties as a US air base at Birkenfeld, West Germany, Mira photographed the cover and random pages of code books and maintenance schedules of air defense radar installations. He processed the photos, with the help of his girlfriend, and asked two local minor drug dealers to carry the material to East Germany and attempt to make contact with the KGB. They made several trips between September 1982 and March 1983, each time passing information provided by Mira, and were paid between $1,136 and $1,515 per visit. Realizing he was in over his head and feeling used by his accomplices, Mira sought to extricate himself from a bad situation. In March 1983, Mira went to the AFOSI and related what he had done, not realizing how thorough the investigative process would be. Under questioning, Mira claimed that he wanted to become a double agent and that he "wanted to show the Air Force I could do more with my intelligence." But in subsequent interviews he admitted he had originated the idea to commit espionage to make some money, and enlisted the two West Germans to assist him. He was disgruntled because he had not gotten the assignment he had wanted. In August 1984 Mira was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to 10 years confinement. Under a plea bargain he served only seven years of the sentence.
Stars and Stripes, 29 Aug. 1984, "Airman is Sentenced for Spy Activities"
1983-HANS PALMER WOLD, was an Intelligence Specialist Third Class assigned to the USS Ranger when he asked for and was given leave from 13 June through 2 July 1983. The leave was granted with the understanding that Wold would stay in the local San Diego area, but around 2 July Wold's command received a message from the American Red Cross, Subic Bay, Philippines, in which Wold requested an extension of leave. Wold's request was granted for five additional days of leave. But he failed to report for duty on 7 July and was listed as an unauthorized absentee. Wold's command then asked the Naval Investigative Service to locate him and turn him over to US Naval Forces in the Philippines at Subic Bay for appropriate debriefing. On 19 July Wold was picked up by NIS Special Agents at his fiancee's residence in Olongapo City, in the Philippines, for being absent without leave. During Wold's apprehension, an undeveloped roll of film was seized. During his debriefing Wold told an intelligence specialist that the roil of film had photographs front a Top Secret publication. Wold admitted he had covertly photographed the publication, "Navy Application of National Reconnaissance Systems (U)" while onboard the USS Ranger during June, 1983, and intended to contact the Soviets. On 5 October 1983, Wold pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to unauthorized absence, using marijuana onboard the USS Ranger, false swearing, and "making photographs with intent or reason to believe information was to be used to the injury of the US or the advantage of a foreign nation." Wold was sentenced to four years at hard labor a dishonorable discharge; forfeiture of all pay and allowances: and reduction in rate. to E-1.
Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989
1983-JOHN RAYMOND MAYNARD, Navy Seaman, while on unauthorized absence, was found to have 51 Top Secret documents in his personal locker. Until the time of his arrest in August, Maynard was assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet in Hawaii as an intelligence specialist. He was convicted at a general court-martialed for wrongfully removing classified material and was sentenced so ten years confinement. Maynard's sentence was later reduced to three years.
1983-ROBERT WADE ELLIS, Navy Petty Officer, stationed at the Naval Air Station, Moffets Field, California, reportedly contacted the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, with an offer to sell classified documents for $2,000. Ellis was arrested in February while attempting to sell documents to an undercover FBI age. He was convicted at a general court-martial for unauthorized disclosure of classified information and was sentenced to three years confinement
1983-JAMES DURWARD HARPER, a Silicon Valley free-lance engineer, was arrested 15 October for selling large quantities of classified documents to Polish intelligence for a reported amount of $250,000. Harper, who did not hold a clearance, acquired classified material through his wife, RUBY SCHULER. Schuler was employed by Systems Control, Inc. of Palo Alto, a Defense contractor engaged in research on ballistic missiles. Between July 1979 and November 1981, Harper conducted a total of a dozen meetings with Polish agents in Europe and Mexico at which times he turned over documents related to the Minuteman ICBM and ballistic missile research. In September 1981 Harper attempted to bargain for immunity from prosecution by anonymously contacting the CIA through a lawyer. Schuler died in June 1983 of complications related to alcoholism. Harper, who eventually pleaded guilty to six counts of espionage, received a life sentence on 14 May.
DoD Security Institute, Security Awareness Bullettin, August 1984, Number 4-84 Time Magazine, 31 Oct. 1983, "For Love of Money and Adventure" Washington Post, 18 Oct. 1983, "KGB Intelligence Windfall"
1983-ALFRED ZEHE, an East German physicist and operative for Last German intelligence was arrested on 3 November 1963, the result of a successful sting operation. On 21 December 1981, Bill Tanner, a civilian engineer employed at the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center an Charleston. S.C., walked into the East German Embassy in Washington, DC, and offered to exchange classified information for money. Tanner was actually a double agent working under the control of the Naval Investigative Service and FBI. The FBI's target was the East German intelligence service, the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS): how it worked and what type of information it was looking for. Zehe was Tanner's primary contact. Zehe is reported to be the first East German operative apprehended in this country. In July 1984, Zehe was freed on $500,000 bail to await trial. He subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 4 April to eight years imprisonment with a fine of $5000. In June 1985, Zehe was traded with three other Eastern Bloc agents for 25 persons who had "been helpful" to the United States.
New York Times, 4 Nov. 1983, "East German Held in Espionage Case" 5 Nov. 1983, "East German is Denied Bail" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989.
1983-PENYU B. KOSTADINOV, a commercial counselor at the Bulgarian Commercial Office in New York, was arrested in December at a New York restaurant as he exchanged a sum of money for classified material. Kostadinov had attempted to recruit a graduate student who had access to documents related to nuclear energy. The unnamed American agreed to work under FBI control to apprehend the agent. One of Kostadinov's official functions was to arrange for exchange students between Bulgaria and the US. Although Kostadinov claimed diplomatic immunity at the time of his arrest, this was later dented by a Federal court. In June 1985, Kostadinov was "swapped" along with three other Soviet Bloc agents for 25 persons who had "been helpful" to the United States.
Washington Post, 25 Sep. 1983, "Bulgarian Man Arraigned" New York Times, 24 Sep. 1983, "Bulgarian Charged as Spy"
1983-JEFFERY LORING PICKERING, On 7 June 1983, an individual using the name Christopher Eric Loring entered the Naval Regional Medical Center, Seattle, Washington, acting very erratic and stating that he possessed a large quantity of secret documents vital to the security of our country." The individual was in possession of one plastic addressograph card imprinted with the address of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC. During permissive searches of his car and residence by Naval Investigative Service agents, four Government muted envelopes containing classified microfiche and 147 microfiche cards containing a variety of classified defense publications were located. Through investigation. the individual was identified as Jeffrey Loring Pickering who had previously served in the US Marine Corps. Diving his Marine enlistment, he was described as a thief, thrill seeker, and a perpetual liar. Pickering left the Marines in August 1973, but became dissatisfied with civilian life and began efforts to re-enlist in the military. Pickering assumed an alias, Christopher Eric Loring hid the facts of his prior USMC affiliation, and enlisted in the US Navy on 23 January 1979. During interrogation, Pickering admitted stealing the classified material torn the ship's office of the USS Fanning between July and October 1982. Pickering likewise expressed an interest in the KGB, and said he fantasized about espionage. He ultimately admitted mailing a five page Secret document to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC. along with a typed letter offering additional classified material to the Soviet Union. Or, 3 October 1983, Pickering pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to several violations including espionage. Pickering was convicted and sentenced to five yea: as hard labor, forfeiture of $400 per month for 60 months, reduction to E-1, and a bad conduct discharge.
Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989.
1982-BRIAN E. SLAVENS, Marine Corps PFC, reportedly deserted his sentry post at the Marines Modified Advanced Undersea Weapons Command, Adak, Alaska. He advised his sister that he did not intend to return to the Marine Corps and that he had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC. during late August/early September 1982. Slavens father alerted the Marine Corps of his son's intent to desert, and abruptly Stevens was arrested by Naval Investigative Service Special Agents on 4 September 1982. During interrogation, Stevens admitted entering the Soviet embassy in Washington. DC, and offering to provide information concerning the military installation where he worked in Adak. Slavens denied transferring any classified material to the Soviets, but explained that his intent was to set) US military information for $500 to $1,000. According to Slavens, he was actually inside the Soviet Embassy less than 30 minutes, during which time he was asked to provide an autobiographical sketch and to reconsider his action. . . . Stevens subsequently requested legal counsel, and his lawyer later asked for Slavens to undergo a polygraph examination. Stevens was administered a polygraph exam on 5 September 1982, the results of which indicated that he did not disclose any classified information to the Soviets. On 24 November 1982, Slavens pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted espionage at a general court-martial held at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He was sentenced to two years confinement and forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and given a dishonorable discharge.
Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989.
1982-OTTO ATIILA GILBERT, Hungarian-born US citizen, was arrested 17 April after paying $4,000 for classified documents provided by an Army officer who was working as a US Army double agent under Army control. The officer, CWO Janos Szmolka, had been approached in 1977 by agents of Hungarian military intelligence while on a visit to his mother in Hungary and had reported the contact to Army Intelligence. While stationed in Europe, Szmolka agreed to work as a double agent. In 1981 he received $3,000 for 16 rolls of film of unclassified documents and was offered $100,000 for classified material on weapon and cryptographic systems. Szmolka was reassigned to Fort Gordon, Georgia, in 1980, but maintained his contacts with Hungarian intelligence which led to the meeting with Gilbert. Gilbert was convicted if espionage and sentenced to 15 years in prison. This case is considered to be a classic example of recruitment based on a hostage situation since implied threats were made against the Hungarian relations of the US service member.
Washington Post, 20 Apr. 1982, "Spying is Charged to New Yorker of Hungarian Origin" New York Times, 20 Apr. 1982, "Native of Hungary is Jailed in South on Spying Charges"
1982-BRIAN P. HORTON, was a US Navy Intelligence Specialist Second Class, assigned to the Nuclear Strike Planning Branch at the Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe and Atlantic, located in Norfolk. Virginia. Between April and October; 1982, Horton wrote one letter and made four telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy, offering to provide information on the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Based upon evidence accumulated during the investigation, Horton chose to plead guilty under a pretrial agreement which included a post trial grant of immunity. This allowed the Naval Investigative Service to question Horton after his conviction and sentencing for a period of up to six months to determine any damage to national security caused by his actions. (This technique of post-trial grant-of-immunity encourages the suspect to cooperate in an effort to reduce his sentence.) He was sentenced by a general court-martial on 12 January 1983 to six years confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, a dishonorable discharge, and reduction in pay grade to E-1 for failing to report contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, and for attempting to sell classified information to the USSR. No classified information was actually exchanged and no money was received by Horton. His defense attorney argued that Horton was working on a novel and approached the Soviets to learn their modus operandi. The prosecution stated that he had attempted to get between $1,000 and $3,000 for classified information.
Washington Post, 14 Jan. 1983, "Sailor Sentenced after Bid to Sell Plans to Soviets" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989.
1981-CHRISTOPHER M. COOKE, deputy commander of an Air Force Titan missile crew, was arrested on 21 May and charged with passing classified information to the Soviets which seriously compromised US strategic missile capabilities during the 1980-81 time frame. On own volition. Cooke began to phone and visit the Soviet Embassy in late 1980 with offers to provide classified information. Cooke's motives were never (tally established, but it is reported that he was attempting to establish his credentials with the Soviets for the purpose of academic research. It is also known that he sought employment with the CIA on at least two occasions. Believing that Cooke was part of a larger spy ring, Air Force prosecutors offered him immunity from prosecution for a full disclosure. After being given immunity, Cooke admitted to providing classified defense information to the Soviets. The US Court of Military Appeals ordered his release in February 1982 and Cooke resigned his commission.
Washington Post Magazine, 4 Dec. 1983, "Spy Rings of One"
1981-WILLIAM H. BELL, process manager of the Radar Systems Group at Hughes Aircraft in El Segundo, California, and MARIAN ZACHARSKI, president of the Polish American Machinery Corporation (POLAMCO), were arraigned in June on espionage charges. Bell had been faced with financial difficulties Zacharski in reality was an officer of the Polish intelligence service. Under the guise of business activities, and over a period of several months, Zacharski developed a relationship with Bell which resulted in the transfer of Secret documents for more than $150,000. As a result, the "quiet radar" and other sophisticated systems developed at Hughes Aircraft were seriously compromised. On 24 June, Bell was confronted by FBI agents with the fact of his involvement in espionage which had been independently established. He confessed and agreed to cooperate with the FBI in the effort to apprehend Zacharski. On 14 December, Zacharski was convicted of espionage and received a life sentence. Bell, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced to eight years. In June 1985 Zacharski was exchanged, along with three other Soviet Bloc spies, for 25 persons held in Eastern Europe. This case is seen as a classic example of recruitment of cleared US personnel for espionage by hostile intelligence operatives.
DoD Security Institue, Awareness Bulletin, No. 3-83 June 1983 John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand; Readers Digest Press 1983 Chicago Tribune, 20 May 1984, "Real-life Spy Tale Robbed of an Ending"
1981-MICHAEL R. MURPHY, a Navy Seaman assigned to the USS James K. Polk reportedly made several calls to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in June 1981 offering to make a deal which he said "would benefit both the Soviets and himself." He was offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for cooperation. A polygraph examination indicated that he had contacted the Soviets three times, but had not passed any information. In August, 1981 Murphy was discharged from the Navy.
1981-JOSEPH G. HELMICH, a former US Army Warrant Officer, was arrested on 15 July at his residence in Jacksonville, Florida, for the sale of US cryptography to the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1966. Helmich served as a Crypto custodian in France and at Ft. Bragg, N.C. He initiated contact with USSR Embassy officials in Paris after being faced with severe financial problems. In return for extremely sensitive information related to the KL-7 cryptographic system widely used by the US military, Helmich received approximately $131,000. After being transferred to Ft. Bragg. Helmich continued to provide the Soviets with KL-7 key lists and traveled to both France and Mexico City to rendezvous with his handlers. Helmich came under suspicion in 1964 and was questioned because of his unexplained affluence. He was interviewed again in August 1980 and although admitting he had received $20,000 from Soviet agents, denied he had compromised classified information. In early 1981 he was spotted with Soviet agents in Canada. Eventually Helmich recounted full details of his espionage involvement. On 16 October he was sentenced to life imprisonment
Washington Post, 16 Jul. 1981, "Ex-Army Cryptographer Indicted on Spy Charges" New York Times, 16 Jul. 1981, "Ex-Army Warrant Officer Accused of Being Soviet Spy" New York Times, 24 Sep. 1981, "Generals Testify in Espionage Case"
1981-STEPHEN BABA, an ensign in the US Navy, was arrested on 1 October for sending a classified electronic warfare document and two microfilm indices of key code words to the South African Embassy in Washington, DC. He reportedly asked for an initial payment of $50,000 for the material. Other charges against Baba at the time included armed robbery, extortion, and assault. Dabs mailed the documents from his frigate, the USS Lang, in September 1981, while stationed at San Diego. The South African Embassy returned the unsolicited materials to US officials. In court testimony it was asserted that Baba had attempted to sell documents to raise money for his fiancee in the Philippines to that she could attend college. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced 20 January 1982 by court-martial to eight years of hard labor.
New York Times, 4 Dec. 1981, "Ensign is Accused in Navy Spy Case" Washington Post, 21 Jan. 1982, "Ensign Sentenced to Hard Labor for Sending Data to S. Africa"
1980-DAVID H. BARNETT, a CIA officer, was indicted 24 October for having sold to the Soviet Union details of one of the CIA's most successful undercover operations code-named "Habrink." Following stow of duty in Indonesia between 1967 and 1970, Barnett resigned from the CIA to enter private business. In late 1976, faced with failure and debts of $100,000, he offered to sell classified information to the KGB. Earnest handed over full details of Habrink to the KGB, including CIA information on the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the Whiskey class diesel-powered submarine. He also revealed the names of 30 CIA intelligence officers as well as the identities of informants recruited by the CIA. In all Barnett was paid approximately $92,000 by the KGB for information supplied between 1976 and 1977. US agents reportedly spotted Barnett meeting the KGB in Vienna in April 1980; he was questioned by the FBI upon his return to the US. Barnett entered a plea of guilty and received an 18-year sentence. He was paroled in 1990.
New York Times, 23 Oct. 1980, "Alleged Spy Sought 2nd Post, Aides Say" 30 Oct. 1980, "Ex-Agent of C.I.A. Pleads Guilty" Washington Post, 30 Oct. 1980, "Ex-CIA Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying"
1980-RUDOLPH ALBERT HERRMANN, KGB career officer, entered the US illegally with his family from Canada in 1968 and operated as a Soviet agent within the US under the guise of a free-lance photographer. His primary assignment was political information. While Herrmann claimed not to have recruited Americans for espionage, he admitted to having transmitted sensitive information collected by other spies and to acting as a courier for the KGB. Apprehended by the FBI in 1977, he agreed to operate as a double agent until the operation was terminated in 1980. Herrmann and his family were granted asylum in the United States and have been resettled under a new identity.
New York Times, 4 Mar. 1980, "Double Agent Revealed by FBI" Washington Post, 4 Mar. 1980, "Soviet Spy Became a Double Agent" John Barron, The Inheritor: A Tale of KGB Espionage in America, 1982.
1979-LEE EUGENE MADSEN, a Navy Yeoman assigned to the Strategic Warning Staff at The Pentagon, was arrested 14 August for selling classified material to an FBI undercover agent for $700. None of 22 highly classified documents taken by Madsen is known to have fallen into the hands of foreign agents: however, it is believed that he had intended to sell them to organized crime figures dealing in narcotics. Madsen, a homosexual, is quoted as flying that he stole Top Secret documents to prove . . . I could be a man and still be gay." On 26 October 1979 he was sentenced to eight years in prison.
Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1979, "Sailor Receives 8 Years in Jail"
1978-RONALD HUMPHREY, an employee of the US Information Agency, and DAVID TRUONG, a Vietnamese immigrant, were indicted in early 1973. A search of Truong's apartment at the time of his arrest in January uncovered two Top Secret State Department documents. Humphrey had turned over classified cables and documents to Truong who in turn sent them to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris visa woman who was a Vietnamese double agent working for the FBI. Testimony indicated that Humphrey supplied documents to Truong in order to obtain the release of his common-law wife and her four children from communist Vietnam. Both Humphrey and Truong were convicted on six counts of espionage on 20 May, and on 15 July each received a 15-year sentence.
Washington Post, 21 May 1978, "FBI Continues Spy Case Investigation" 24 May 1978, "Cables in Spy Case Larded with Gossip"
1978-WILLIAM KAMPILES, a lower echelon CIA employee from March to November 1977, was arrested in August 1978 on charges he stole a Top Secret technical manual on an intelligence surveillance system and later sold it to a Soviet agent in Athens, Greece, for $3,000. Kampiles had resigned from the CIA after being told that he was not qualified for work as a field agent. He then proceeded to Greece where he contacted Soviet representatives. His detection followed receipt of a lesser by a CIA employee from Kampiles in which he mentioned frequent meetings with a Soviet official in Athens. On returning to the US. Kampiles was contacted by FBI special agents and confessed to an act of espionage. Kampiles maintained that his objective was to become a double agent for the CIA. He was sentenced on 22 December to 40 years in prison.
Washington Post, 23 Aug. 1978, "CIA `Big Bird' Satellite Manual Allegedly Sold to Soviets" New York Times, 12 Nov. 1978, "Spy Trial Focusing on Security in C.I.A." Washington Post Magazine, 4 Dec. 1983, "Spy Rings of One"
1978-VALDIK ENGER and RUDOLF CHERNYAYEV, both Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat, were stressed by the FBI in New Jersey in May 1978 for accepting classified information on anti-submarine warfare passed by a US Naval officer acting on instructions of the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI. The officer. Navy Lieutenant Commander Art Lindberg, acted as a double agent in 3 counterintelligence operations called Operation Lemonaid. In August 1977, LCDR Lindberg took a trip on the Soviet cruise ship Kazakhstan. Upon the ship's return to New York, he passed a note to one of the Soviet officers containing an offer to sell information. He was later contacted by telephone by a Soviet agent. During subsequent telephone calls LCDR Lindberg was given contact instructions on the type of information to get and the locations of drop sates where that information could be left and payment money could be found. Naval Investigative Service and FBI agents kept the drop zones under surveillance and later identified the Soviet agents. On 20 May 1978, FBI agents moved into the drop zone and apprehended three Soviets, Enger, Chernyayev and another man, VLADIMIR ZINYAKIN, third secretary at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Zinyakin avoided arrest due to diplomatic immunity. Enger and Chemyayev, the first Soviet officials ever to stand trial for espionage in the United States, were convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Altogether they paid the Navy officer $16,000 for materials he provided. Enger and Chemysyev were later exchanged for the release of five Soviet dissidents.
New York Times, 21 May 1978, "2 Russians Arrested by F.B.I. for Spying" Washington Post, 24 Dec. 1978, "The Spy Who Came Into It Cold" Los Angeles Times, 24 May 1979, "Navy Officer `Drafted' as Counterspy" Naval Investigative Service Command, Espionage, 1989.
1977-IVAN ROGALSKY, a former Soviet merchant seaman admitted to the US as a political refugee. was arrested in New Jersey on 7 January after receiving a classified document from a cleared employee of RCA Research Center. The employee, who worked on communications satellite and defense projects. agreed to work under FBI control after first being approached by Rogalsky. The ex-seaman had earlier asked the RCA employee for unclassified information about the space shuttle program. A second secretary of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, YEVEGENY P. KARPOV, was named as a co-conspirator. Karpov had been suspected of being a KGB officer by the FBI. According to later press reports, Rogalsky was not tried due to questions regarding his sanity. He claimed to receive instructions from disembodied voices.
New York Times, 8 Jan. 1977, "Soviet Alien Arrested in Jersey on Spy Charges" 9 Jan. 1977, "Accused Soviet Spy Known as a Drifter" 16 Jan. 1977, "Spy Case Clouds a Russian Holiday"
1977-CHRISTOPHER J. BOYCE, an employee of TRW Inc., a California-based Defense contractor, and his friend, ANDREW DAULTON LEE, were arrested in January 1977 for selling classified information to the Soviets. Over a period of several months, Boyce, employed in a vaulted communications center, removed classified code material which was passed on to KGB agents in Mexico City by Lee. The scheme, which nested the pair $70,000, was discovered only after Lee's arrest by Mexican police as he attempted to deliver classified material as the Soviet Embassy. Film snips marked Secret found on Lee by Mexican authorities were turned over to the American officials. Under questioning by Mexican security police and FBI representatives, Lee implicated Boyce. who was arrested on 16 January in California. The pair are reported to have seriously compromised the Ryolite surveillance satellite system developed as TRW. Lee was sentenced to life in prison, Boyce to 40 years. In 1980 Boyce escaped from prison and spent 19 months as a fugitive. Following Boyce's second apprehension, his sentence was increased by 28 years.
New York Times, 13 Apr. 1977, "Alleged Spy for Soviets Linked to C.I.A" 27 Apr. 1977, "Man Said to Admit Spying for Soviets" 22 May 1977, "To be Young, Rich — and a Spy" Lindsey, Robert, The Falcon and the Snowman, Simon and Schuster, 1996 Testimony of Christopher J. Boyce before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, April 1985.
1976-EDWIN G. MOORE II, a retired CIA employee, was arrested by the FBI in 1976 and charged with espionage after attempting to sell classified documents to Soviet officials. A day earlier, an employee at a residence for Soviet personnel in Washington, DC, had discovered a package on the grounds and turned it over to police, fearing it was a bomb. The package was found to contain classified CIA documents and a note requesting that $3,000 be dropped at a specified location. The note offered more documents in exchange for $197,000. Moore was arrested after picking up what he thought to be tthe payment at a drop site near his home. A search of his residence yielded ten boxes of classified CIA documents. Moore retired from the CIA in 1973. and although financial gain was a strong motivational factor leading to espionage, is is known that he was disgruntled with his former employer due to lack of promotion. Moore pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, but was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was granted parole in 1979.
Washington Post, 13 Apr. 1977, "Thought He was on Assignment for CIA" 25 Apr. 1977, "Trial of Ex-Agent. . . ." 6 May. 1977, "Moore Guilty of Trying to Sell CIA Files"
1975-SADAG K. DEDEYAN, an employee of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory who was cleared for access to classified information, and a relative, SARKIS O. PASKALIAN, were arrested in 1975. Disregarding regulations, Dedeyan brought home a Top Secret document on NATO defenses to work on. Paskalian, who had been recruited and trained by the KGB in 1962, surreptitiously photographed the document and allegedly sold the film to Soviet agents for a reported sum of $1,500. Dedeyan was charged with failing to report the illegal photographing of national defense information. Paskalian was charged with conspiring with Soviet agents to gather and transmit national defense information. Dedeyan was convicted and sentenced to three years. Paskalian pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to 22 years.
Washington Post, 28 Jun. 1975, "2 Arrested by FBI On Spying Charges" "Relative Duped Him on Spy Photographs, Accused Man Says" "Paskalian Choreographer, Merchant" New York Times, 28 Jun. 1975, "2 Held in Plot to Spy for Soviets on NATO."
EXHIBIT 6
Is this discretion or discrimination? Jack Kemp COPLEY NEWS SERVICE
April 7, 2000
I recently received an e-mail from a physicist colleague. Gordon Prather, that raises some disturbing questions about the disparity between the Clinton administration's handling of two highly publicized cases involving the alleged mishandling of national security secrets.
Prather has long experience in the development of nuclear weapons and is intimately familiar with procedures used for protecting our vital security secrets. He became interested in these cases because both of them are related to this administration's failure to vigorously carry out congressional mandates to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In the aftermath of the hysteria generated by the selective leaking last spring of the Cox Committee Report on suspected espionage by the People's Republic of China, the Justice Department made the decision so vigorously prosecute Los Alamos nuclear weapons scientist Wen Ho Lee for "massive" mishandling of sensitive classified information while deciding at the same time not to prosecute former CIA Director John Deutch for having done what appears to have been exactly the same kind of mishandling, or worse:
"Dear Jack, I just read an article in The Washington Post that states, `An aide to Attorney General Janet Reno said she (Reno) was deeply concerned about the appearance of inequity in the handling of Deutch and Wen Ho Lee, a former scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory who faces trial and a possible life sentence for transferring nuclear secrets so an unsecure computer and portable tapes, seven of which are missing.'
"What Lee is alleged to have done is make his own copy on those missing tapes of hundreds of files that reside on a classified computer system at Los Alamos. I say `alleged' because apparently all the countersnoops know is that there are records on the Los Alamos classified computer system of his having downloaded those files onto some computer storage media, and since the downloaded files were not found on the hard disk of the unsecure computer itself, the countersnoops assume that Lee downloaded them directly onto the missing tapes. despite a thorough search, the countersnoops have been unable to find any such tapes.
"Nevertheless, the basis for the most serious charge against Lee is that since the unsecure computer was connected from time to time to the Internet via modem, those missing tapes could somehow have been been accessed over the Internet by a computer hacker. But if Lee had sent the downloaded files as e-mail to an accomplice, there would have been a record., and there is none. And if the missing tapes had not been accessible by the unsecure computer while it was connected via modem to the Internet, the tapes would not have been accessible to a hacker, either.
"In contrast, Justice doesn't have to speculate about what Deutch did because they found the files he had mishandled on the hard disks of the CIA-supplied, unsecure computers at his two homes and on removable data cards that could be used with all of his computers. Furthermore. Deutch has admitted to having sent some of these files outside of official secure channels over the unsecure Internet as e-mail to the president and others in the White House.
"From an evidentiary point of view, Reno has good reason to be `deeply concerned.' No charges are contemplated against Deutch, while Lee is currently imprisoned without bail in solitary confinement and faces spending the rest of his life there, according to federal prosecutors.
"If anyone ought to be facing a long jail term, it's Deutch. Justice has hard evidence that Deutch mishandled classified information at home and disclosed it to unauthorized third parties, but to this day can only speculate about what Lee did in his office inside the security fence at Los Alamos and whether any unauthorized third party gained access to classified information. All the best, Gordon."
The prosecution of Lee appears to have been the "sop" thrown to Congress by the Clinton administration in the wake of the Cox report's assertion that "The People's Republic of China's penetration of our national weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades, and almost certainly continues today."
That assertion, Prather concluded in a white paper he authored last year, was not warranted by the evidence and "is almost certainly not true." Prather concluded that while espionage by the PRC may have occurred, there is no evidence that our labs have been penetrated by PRC "moles."
I asked him what could account for Deutch's behavior at DCI, which based on the evidence gives, if not the appearance of illegality, at least is certainly indefensible when compared to Wen Ho Lee. And, more importantly, why did Clinton, knowing all about Deutch's indefensible behavior at DCI in 1995 and 1996, then appoint Deutch in 1997 to be co-chairman of the Weapons of Mass. Destruction Commission?
His answers are disturbing. I will report on his response in a future column.
Kemp is co-direcror of Empower America and Distinguished Fellow of the Competitive Enterprise Institute.