Opinion
Civil No. 05cv1462 (AJB).
April 12, 2006
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 18]
This case arises out of a civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 brought by the United States against Defendant vehicle, a 1998 Ford Expedition, VIN # 1FMRU17L2WLA44568, California License Number 4XIY640 ("the 1998 Ford Expedition"), and its tools and appurtenances for its alleged use to transport and/or facilitate the transportation, sale, possession or concealment of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). The matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed March 14, 2006, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Claimants Tamon Takahashi and Mariela Montoya-Acosta ("Takahashi" and "Montoya-Acosta" or collectively "Claimants"), the registered owners of the Defendant vehicle, filed an Answer to the Complaint filed by the United States, but indicated that they would not file an opposition to the United States' Summary Judgment Motion. The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction for the purposes of this motion. The hearing date set for April 12, 2006 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom A, before Judge Battaglia is hereby vacated, as this is motion is appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).
Background
In September 2002, agents with the San Diego County Narcotics Task Force conducted a consent search of Claimant Takahashi's residence in San Diego, California. There, agents discovered approximately $5,000.00 cash, detailed pay-owe sheets believed to represent records of cocaine sales, and numerous cash deposit slips totaling over $100,000.00 in cash deposits made to Mexican banks by Claimant Montoya-Acosta. Both Claimants were arrested by U.S. Immigration officials and deportation proceedings were initiated.
In May 2004, agents observed Cruz-Tapia, a known narcotics trafficking associate of Claimant Takahashi, meet with two subjects in an apparent narcotics transaction. After the transaction was completed, agents contacted the two subjects and discovered cocaine on one them. During questioning, the subjects stated that they had been buying cocaine from Takahashi for approximately four years and that Takahashi regularly used Defendant vehicle to deliver cocaine.
In November 2004, Claimant Takahashi testified in U.S. Immigration court before Hon. Judge Bartolomei concerning the Defendant vehicle. Takahashi testified that he purchased the Defendant vehicle using funds loaned from Joseph Sweis. Joseph Sweis was subsequently called before the Immigration court and testified that he did not loan Claimant Takahashi money to purchase the vehicle. Based on these testimonies, Judge Bartolomei found that Claimant Takahashi had provided false testimony regarding the Defendant vehicle in an effort to hide how he had been earning income in the United States.
In March 2006, Ms. Lisa Baker stated in a sworn Declaration that she had previously made over twenty cocaine purchases from Takahashi. Ms. Baker stated further that Takahashi made the deliveries driving the Defendant vehicle and was often accompanied by Claimant Montoya-Acosta.
Legal Standard
I. Summary JudgmentThe government has moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, which presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52(1986).
A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Materiality" is determined by the substantive law claim. U.S. v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 247-48. When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Thus a factual dispute that "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported. See, e.g., California Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Additionally, the non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party's properly supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the parties. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. These standards are applicable when deciding a summary judgment motion in a forfeiture action. U.S. v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1988).
II. Civil Forfeiture Actions A. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act and Burden of Proof
On April 25, 2000, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA"), Pub.L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, to address concerns associated with federal civil forfeitures. Since the Government commenced this action after August 23, 2000, the date on which CAFRA became effective, CAFRA applies to this case. CAFRA overhauled the procedures for civil judicial forfeiture proceedings. Significantly, the Government now has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Once the Government makes this showing, the burden shifts to the claimant. The claimant may choose to assert the "innocent owner defense." See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1). "Innocent ownership" remains an affirmative defense, as it was under all previously enacted forfeiture statutes, notwithstanding the fact that CAFRA now shifts the initial burden to the Government in its case-in-chief.
The innocent owner defense was previously codified in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1994).
The relevant statute setting forth the burden of proof, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c), provides the following:
Burden of proof — In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property —
(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture; (2) the Government may use evidence gathered after the filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that property is subject to forfeiture; and
(3) if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
The government must still establish a substantial connection between the property and the offense; however, it must now do so by a preponderance of the evidence, not merely by "probable cause." "The burden of showing something by a preponderance of the evidence, the most common standard in the civil law, simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he or she] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence." Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). For the Government to prevail on its motion for summary judgment, it must persuade the Court that the undisputed facts, while drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Claimants, establish a substantial connection by a preponderance of the evidence between the 1998 Ford Expedition and the Claimants' drug trafficking activities and that no defenses can be proven.
B. Innocent Owner Affirmative Defense
In a civil forfeiture case, the government must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a nexus existed between the property and specified illegal activity sufficient to justify forfeiture. This shifts the burden to the claimant, who must refute the government's prima facie case either (1) by demonstrating that the property was not in fact used for the specified illegal activity or (2) by proving that she (the claimant) did not know about or consent to the illicit activity. See, e.g., U.S. v. 3814 NW Thurman Street, Portland, Or., A Tract of Real Property, 164 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 1999).
C. Drug-Related Forfeitures
In drug-related forfeitures, the "guilt" issue to be determined is whether the seized property is connected with illicit drug activity. The owner-claimant is neither defendant nor plaintiff, but an intervener who seeks to defend his or her right to the property against the government's claim. Indeed, the guilt or innocence of the owner-claimant is largely irrelevant. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). The owner-claimant thus stands in an essentially civil litigation position in the civil forfeiture proceeding. See United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989) (forfeiture statute 21 U.S.C. § 881 is a civil, not a criminal, provision).
Discussion
Ultimately, in order to prevail at trial, the government would have to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant assets are traceable to drug trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit employs an "aggregate of facts" test to determine whether the defendant assets are so traceable and analyzes the relevant facts cumulatively, rather than in isolation. See United States v. U.S. Currency, $42,500.00, 283 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, in order for the United States to establish the necessary connection between such assets and drug trafficking, they must demonstrate that the assets "be `in combination with other persuasive circumstantial evidence.'" United States v. Padilla, 888 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). Padilla establishes that "[p]articularly persuasive [evidence] is the presence of drugs or drug paraphernalia." 888 F.2d at 644.
The government argues that the 1998 Ford Expedition is properly subject to forfeiture because the vehicle was used to transport and/or facilitate the transportation, sale, possession or concealment of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). A summary of the evidence the government relies upon to show that the property at issue in this case is subject to forfeiture is as follows:
1. During a consent search of Claimants' residence in September of 2002, Narcotics Task Force agents discovered $5,000.00 in cash, detailed pay/owe slips believed to represent records of cocaine sales, and numerous deposit slips for Mexican banks totaling over $100,000.00 made by Montoya-Acosta.
2. Inability of Claimant Takahashi to demonstrate any source of legitimate income during the period from approximately 1995 until 2002.
3. The Claimant Takahashi's testimony during a November 2004 Immigration proceeding before the Judge Bartolomei, where upon the Judge found Takahashi to have given false testimony regarding the funds used to purchase the vehicle in an effort to hide how he had been earning his income in the United States. Specifically, Takahashi testified that he purchase the Defendant vehicle using funds loaned to him by Joseph Sweis as well as funds received from an insurance claim. However, Mr. Sweis testified under oath that he did not loan Takahashi any money to purchase the Defendant vehicle.
4. Takahashi testified that he was employed by Joe Sweis at Mr. Sweis's gas station in San Diego starting in 1999 or 2000, however, investigating agents interviewed Mr. Sweis and he was unable to provide any documentation indicating employment of Takahashi at the gas station.
5. During the investigation conducted by the Narcotics Task Force, agents contacted subjects involved in apparent narcotics transfers who stated that they had been buying cocaine for approximately four years from Takahashi and that Takahashi made the cocaine deliveries to them in the Defendant vehicle.
6. The declaration of Lisa Baker in which she states that she purchased and received over 20 deliveries of gram quantities of cocaine from Takahashi while he was driving the Defendant vehicle. During several of the deliveries, both Claimants were present.
In this case, there is no genuine issue as to the existence of these facts, and there are clear inferences that the Defendant asset was acquired from drug trafficking. Furthermore, the Claimants have failed to produced any evidence that they acquired the Defendant asset from any other source, such that inferences favorable to them could be drawn. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"). The Court further finds that no evidence was introduced by the Claimants to refute the Government's showing and the Court is not persuaded by Claimant's contentions in their Answer that the Defendant vehicle was purchased with funds obtained from an insurance claim and funds loaned from Takahashi's alleged employer Joseph Sweis. As such, the Court finds that the United States has met its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 1998 Ford Expedition is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the United States' Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgement in favor of the United States in accord with the Complaint filed in this proceeding and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.