Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION No. 04-CR-402.
October 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Dwayne Dollson has submitted a Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence obtained from the search of an Express Mail package and of his residence pursuant to warrants issued in June 2004. A hearing was conducted before this Court on September 15, 2004. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
I. Background
On or about June 14, 2004, a package was mailed via Express Mail from Los Angeles, California to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The package was a 15" × 12" × 10" box addressed to "Kevin Higgs, 9701 Mill Creek Rd., #2905, Levittown, PA, 19054." On June 16, 2004, Inspector Dominick J. Casciotta, a U.S. Postal Inspector assigned to the Philadelphia/Camden High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force ("HIDTA"), intercepted the package at the Philadelphia Air Mail Center. After identifying several suspicious characteristics of the package, Inspector Casciotta contacted Officer Sandy Deveney and his drug detection canine "Haday," to conduct a sniff test. Haday signaled that a controlled substance was present. Based on this information, Inspector Casciotta sought a search warrant for the package, which was issued by the Honorable Jacob P. Hart on June 16, 2004. Upon opening the package, officers discovered approximately three pounds (1.02 kilograms) of cocaine.
Also on June 16, the government conducted further investigation regarding the sender and intended recipient of the package. Inspector Casciotta testified at the suppression hearing that he contacted Levittown Postal Officers and learned that the address on the package was an apartment within the Village of Pennbrook, and that a woman named "Sample" received mail there. Accordingly, police officers were sent to canvass apartment #2905 within the Pennbrook complex. Further investigation revealed that Defendant Dwayne Dollson, an individual suspected by local police of being involved in the drug trade, was residing with his girlfriend (Ms. Sample) at that address. During their surveillance of the apartment, officers reportedly observed Defendant entering and leaving several times. In addition, Inspector Casciotta testified that he observed Defendant speak to letter carrier Jess Toner on June 17, and that Inspector Casciotta later learned that Defendant had been inquiring about a package to be delivered to the apartment. Finally, the government alleges that the regular Mill Creek Road postal carrier informed postal inspectors that a male fitting Defendant's description had inquired about the package, reciting the tracking number from memory.
In fact, the information that Inspector Casciotta obtained pertained to 9071 Mill Creek Road, not 9701 Mill Creek Road (the actual address on the package).
Based on his investigation, Inspector Casciotta obtained an anticipatory warrant for the search of 9701 Mill Creek Rd., Apt. #2905 and officers planned a controlled delivery of the package. The warrant, issued by the Honorable Jacob P. Hart on June 17, 2004, specified that the area to be searched was "[t]he premises located at 9701 Mill Creek Rd, #2905, Levittown, PA 19054, which is more particularly described as a two story beige wood siding attached townhouse style apartment within the Village of Pennbrook Apartment Complex. The apartment has a green front wood door with two glass panes and green shutters with white trim. The address 2905 is displayed to the right of the front door above a black mailbox." In fact, this is a description of Defendant's residence and the apartment that police had been monitoring (#2905 at 9071 Mill Creek Road), not 9701 Mill Creek Road. There is no dispute that the warrant accurately describes the actual apartment searched. The warrant also granted authorization to place a transponder, or "beeper," in the package to monitor its whereabouts and enable the police to determine when the package was opened. The execution of the warrant was made contingent on the acceptance of the package into the residence.
On June 17, 2004, officers replaced the cocaine in the package with a sham substance and the tracking device, and conducted a controlled delivery of the package pursuant to the search warrant. At approximately 1:55 p.m., a postal inspector, disguised as a letter carrier, delivered the package to 9071 Mill Creek Rd., apartment #2905. The package was accepted and signed for by a juvenile who was later identified as Defendant's son, Jerall Dollson. At approximately 2:18 p.m., Defendant returned to the address to which the package was delivered and, within about two minutes, the transponder activated, indicating that the package had been opened. Agents immediately executed the warrant.
Upon entry, officers observed an adult male throw several items out the second floor window of the apartment (Defendant was the only adult male inside the apartment at this time). A search of the apartment and surrounding area where materials had been dropped yielded several pieces of evidence, including (among other things) the opened Express Mail package and sham substance, a ticket in Defendant's name between Los Angeles and Philadelphia, a receipt for a Los Angeles hotel, and a Western Union money order in the amount of $2,500, sent to Los Angeles. Based on this evidence, Defendant was arrested. Defendant now brings this Motion to Suppress all physical evidence obtained as a result of the search, which he alleges was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
II. Legal Standard
In a motion to suppress, the burden is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a search was invalid and that his rights were violated. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1257 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n. 14 (1974). The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence are matters to be determined by the trial judge. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 572, 576 (D.N.J. 2001).
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that both the initial detention and search of the package, and the subsequent search of the apartment at 9071 Mill Creek Road were invalid. First, Defendant contends that postal inspectors did not have probable cause to detain the package initially and to obtain a warrant to open and search it. Second, Defendant argues that the search of the apartment was invalid because it was based on a warrant and affidavit that contained incorrect information, which Defendant alleges was intentionally or recklessly included.
A. Defendant Lacks Standing to Object to the Seizure of the Package
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that Defendant does not have standing to object to the seizure and search of the Express Mail package. In order to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, a defendant must have some reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing searched. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). This involves a two part inquiry for the Court: (1) Did the defendant manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the thing searched; and, (2) was that expectation reasonable and legitimate under the circumstances? See United States v. Zavala, 2003 WL 431636, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2003).
The Court recognizes that this is not technically a question of standing, but rather of the reasonable expectation of privacy that an individual has in an object or area. Nonetheless, the term "standing" is a useful shorthand employed in many cases, and will likewise be used here. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 338 n. 16 (3rd Cir. 2002).
In this case, Defendant has not claimed ownership of the package or asserted any proprietary interest in it. Indeed, he has denied any such interest. Defendant's name was not on the package, either as the sender or the recipient. In addition, Defendant's suppression motion rests on an assertion that the package was not actually intended for his residence, but was instead addressed to a different location. Finally, Defendant denies any knowledge of a man named "Kevin Higgs," the addressee of the package. If Defendant had no proprietary interest in the package, as he contends, then under Rakas he cannot possibly have an expectation of privacy in the package, or the related right to object to its search. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140-41;see also United States v. Curcio, 705 F. Supp. 237, 240-41 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting standing where Defendant could not establish any right to possession, custody, or control over package searched).
Moreover, courts have repeatedly held that defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in mailed packages with no apparent connection to themselves. See Zavala, 2003 WL 431636 at *1 (no expectation of privacy where Defendant sent package under an alias); see also United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1993) (no expectation of privacy in package addressed to someone else); United States v. Hupp, 89 F.3d 836, *2 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 459 (7th Cir. 2003).
Finally, courts have consistently rejected defendants' standing to bring Fourth Amendment claims based merely on the fact that the search uncovers evidence that is later used against them.See Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 134 ("A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.").
Because Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the package, his Fourth Amendment claim as to the initial seizure and search of the package must be denied.
B. Search of Defendant's Residence was Valid
Defendant next challenges the search of his residence (9071 Mill Creek Road, #2905) based on the June 17, 2004 warrant authorizing police to search 9701 Mill Creek Road, #2905, contending that the warrant did not state with sufficient particularity the place to be searched and that it was issued based on an affidavit with incorrect information, which had been intentionally or recklessly included. For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that the search was valid.
First, the warrant clearly described with sufficient particularity the place to be searched. The description is sufficient if one can determine the intended search location with reasonable effort and the requirement of particularity has been described as a question of practical, rather than technical, accuracy. Id.; see also Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). Under this standard, courts have authorized warrants listing the name of an apartment's occupant or describing its physical characteristics, even if an address is incorrect or unavailable. See Bedford, 519 F.2d at 654-55; see also United States v. Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 2003) (ruling warrant valid despite improper address, where a sufficient description of place to be searched was provided and there was no concern that an improper location might mistakenly be searched).
The Fourth Amendment requires that all warrants specify search locations with particularity. See, e.g., United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654-55 (3rd Cir. 1975).
In this case, while it is true that the warrant did specify the wrong address, it nonetheless included an accurate description of Defendant's residence, the intended target of the warrant. The warrant described the place to be searched as apartment #2905, "a two story beige wood siding attached townhouse style apartment within the Village of Pennbrook Apartment Complex . . . [with] a green front wood door with two glass panes and green shutters with white trim." This description is plainly sufficient to determine the intended search location. In addition, because 9701 Mill Creek Road apparently does not exist, there was no possibility that the wrong location might mistakenly be searched.
Second, this Court is satisfied that the confusion regarding the address, which resulted in improper information being placed on the search warrant, was neither intentional nor reckless. Inspector Casciotta testified that he accidentally transposed the numbers in the address when first investigating the package and that this mistake was perpetuated throughout the investigation. Defendant has presented no evidence to show that Inspector Casciotta "must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported," as required to meet the recklessness standard of Franks v. Delaware. See Cummings v. City of Philadelphia, 2004 WL 906259, at *6 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2004) (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, Defendant's claim on this basis must be denied.
Finally, the search is valid based on the Leon good faith exception. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). The good faith exception provides that suppression of evidence "is inappropriate when an officer executes a search in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant's authority."United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1993). As detailed in Leon, the test for whether the good faith exception applies is "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23. In this case, the warrant affidavit was not recklessly or intentionally false, it indicated a sound basis of probable cause, it was not facially deficient, and there is no evidence that the magistrate failed to act in a neutral or detached manner in issuing the warrant. Cf. id. at 923; Williams, 3 F.3d at 74 n. 4. Accordingly, the officers that searched Defendant's residence were entitled to rely in good faith on the warrant that they obtained, and the evidence resulting from the search will not be suppressed.