Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-0034.
April 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Currently before the Court are Defendants City of Philadelphia and Detective Theodore Ryan's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 10 11), Plaintiffs' Response thereto (Docket Nos. 12 13), Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response (Docket No. 17), Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 16), Defendants' Response thereto (Docket No. 18), and Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To the extent the facts are in dispute, they are presented in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).
This case arises out of the allegedly wrongful arrests of Plaintiffs Gregory Cummings ("Cummings") and his mother, Shirley Baker ("Baker") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). On January 2, 2001, Cummings was arrested by Philadelphia police officers on warrant #254785. On May 15, 2001, Baker was arrested on warrant #254786. The arrest warrants were signed by a bail commissioner of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to Criminal Complaints from the Office of the District Attorney that were based on affidavits of probable cause filled out by Defendant Detective Theodore Ryan. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of these warrants arguing, inter alia, that Detective Ryan did not have probable cause to obtain them and that Defendant City of Philadelphia ("City") failed to adequately train its investigating officers.
Warrants #254785 and #254786 are based on the story of Tiffany Robinson, the daughter of Cummings' ex-girlfriend, Defendant Katherine Sessions. Cummings and Sessions had been in an ongoing custody battle over Cummings' son Jabree, who was then in Sessions' custody. On November 27, 2000, Robinson, who was 15 years old at the time, reported to police that Baker pulled alongside her in a car and yelled, "Listen you little bitch, tell your mother to give me my grandson back, or I'll kill her." Robinson also reported that before the car drove off, Baker fired three gun shots at her. Robinson was uninjured. Cummings was allegedly in the passenger seat during the incident.
After the incident, Robinson was taken to a police station where she met with Detective Ryan and recited the above story. Robinson also told him that she had no doubt that she saw her "stepbrother" Jabree's grandmother Baker and his father Cummings in the car. See Investigation Interview Record, Nov. 27, 2000, Docket No. 11, Ex. C. The next day, November 28, 2000, Detective Ryan visited the scene of the alleged shooting. While there, he did not find any bullet casings to evidence the alleged shooting. See Ryan Dep. at 47, Docket No. 13, Ex. B. He interviewed Karo Sharpe, a school crossing guard on duty at the time of the shooting, who reported that she did not hear or see anything out of the ordinary. See Investigation Report of Det. Ryan, Docket No. 11, Ex. G.
Detective Ryan filed two Affidavits of Probable Cause in support of arrest warrants for Plaintiffs Gregory Cummings and Shirley Cummings, a.k.a. Shirley Baker. In the Affidavits, Detective Ryan recounted Tiffany Robinson's story and stated that there was a custody battle between Sessions and Cummings and that there was a Protection from Abuse Order on Cummings. Detective Ryan also stated that he had an approved arrest warrant for Cummings for an incident on November 13, 2000 when Cummings allegedly threatened Sessions. The details of the incident were not included in the affidavit. Ryan also did not include the report of the crossing guard or the fact that he had visited the scene of the alleged shooting and did not find bullet casings. See Affidavits of Probable Cause for Arrest Warrants, Docket No. 11, Exs. H I.
Katherine Sessions alleges that on November 13, 2000, Cummings threw a brick into a window of her house with a threatening note on it. Detective Ryan investigated the brick throwing incident on November 15, 2000, when he also learned of the custody dispute and the Protection from Abuse Order. See Ryan Dep. at 21, Docket No. 13, Ex. B.
Detective Ryan submitted the Affidavits to the Office of the District Attorney for approval. Both Affidavits were approved and Detective Ryan then applied for the arrest warrants with a Philadelphia bail commissioner. The bail commissioner determined there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs and issued Arrest Warrants #254785 and #254786.
On January 2, 2001, Cummings was arrested on Warrant #254785. Cummings explains that he was at a courthouse on January 2 for a custody hearing at which he expected to regain custody of his son Jabree. Before the hearing took place, however, Sessions identified Cummings to the police, telling them there was a warrant out for Cummings' arrest. See Cummings Dep. at 40, Docket No. 13, Ex. B-1. Cummings was arrested and subsequently incarcerated for 17 months, until May 17, 2002, when a jury found him not guilty of all charges against him arising out of the allegations of Sessions and her daughter Tiffany Robinson.
Cummings was also arrested on Warrant #254514, issued for the alleged November 13, 2000 brick throwing incident. The specifics of this warrant are discussed below in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend.
Shirley Baker was arrested on May 15, 2001, on Warrant #254786. She was held for nine days before her release. She, too, was found not guilty of the alleged November 27, 2000 shooting.
Baker alleges her arrest took place on May 15, 2001. The Arrest Report, however, indicates she was arrested on May 31, 2001. See Arrest Report, Docket No. 11, Ex. M.
The Amended Complaint states claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Ryan, alleging Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Ryan made false statements and misleading omissions in the Affidavits of Probable Cause for warrants #254785 and #254786. Plaintiffs also bring § 1983 malicious prosecution claims against Detective Ryan. Lastly, Plaintiffs bring § 1983 claims against the City for failure to adequately train its investigating officers.
The Amended Complaint also states claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Katherine Sessions. Sessions has not moved for summary judgment and has not filed a motion in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to amend.
II. LEAVE TO AMEND
In the first motion before the Court, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the first Amended Complaint to allege a constitutional violation arising out of arrest warrant #254514. This third warrant was issued for the alleged brick throwing incident of November 13, 2000.A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows a plaintiff to seek leave of court to amend a complaint even after the defendant has filed an answer:
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The United States Supreme Court has noted that leave should be freely granted because a plaintiff ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave can be denied, however, where allowing the amendment would cause undue prejudice to the defendant or where the amendment is futile. See id.;Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997);Hairston-Lash v. R.J.E. Telecom, Inc., No. 00-2070, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15697 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000). Prejudice and futility are the bases of Defendants' arguments in opposition to the instant motion.
B. Discussion
This case involves the validity of the two arrest warrants used to arrest Plaintiffs on January 2, 2001 and May 15, 2001. Those warrants were based on the story of Tiffany Robinson. Plaintiffs seek leave to include allegations regarding the validity of another warrant pursuant to which Cummings was arrested on January 2, 2001. This third warrant, #254514, is mentioned only once in the Amended Complaint and the Defendants did not have notice that Plaintiffs would challenge the validity of the warrant until the motion to amend was filed.
The proposed amendment would allege that warrant #254514 was based on the story of Katherine Sessions, who reported to police that "she discovered someone had thrown a rock through her window and that there was a threatening note. She told police investigating the incident that she recognized the handwriting on the note to be that of Cummings." See Pl.'s Proposed Second Amended Complaint, para. 11, Docket No. 16, Ex. A. The proposed amendments would also allege that Detective Ryan failed to conduct an investigation of Sessions' story and made an application for an arrest warrant against Cummings in which he recklessly made misleading statements and material omissions. Id. at para. 12, 17.
Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to leave to amend because the proposed amendment merely adds facts to the pleading that came to Plaintiffs' counsel's attention during discovery. Defendants oppose the motion arguing that the amendment does not just add facts, but a new legal claim. Specifically, Defendants claim (1) that they will be unduly prejudiced if leave is granted at this late juncture and (2) that the amendment asserts a time-barred claim and is, thus, futile.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment. See Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1993); Hairston-Lash, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15697, at *5. Prejudice is more than mere delay or passage of time; it involves showing that the non-moving party "was unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the [moving party's] amendments been timely." Heyl Patterson Int'l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing of the Virgin Is., Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999); Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1413-14. Prejudice means "undue difficulty in prosecuting [or defending] a law suit as a result of a change in tactics or theories on the part of the other party." Deakyne v. Comm'rs of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 1969).
Courts in this Circuit have traditionally allowed amendments where the amendment clarified the plaintiff's legal theory or provided specific facts concerning the claims already asserted.See Johnston v. City of Phila., 158 F.R.D. 352, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Downey v. Coalition Against Rape Abuse, 143 F. Supp.2d 423, 436-37 (D.N.J. 2001) (allowing amendment because it did not present new causes of action and would require very little new briefing by non-moving party); Cuffy v. Getty Ref. Mktg., 648 F. Supp. 802 (D. Del. 1986).
Courts have found undue prejudice to the non-moving party and denied leave to amend where the amendment would have asserted new claims, where new discovery would have been necessary, where the motion for leave was filed months after the factual basis of the amendment was discovered by the moving party, and where the motion for leave was brought after summary judgment motions were filed. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 924 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing all factors listed in upholding trial court's denial of leave); Johnston, 158 F.R.D. at 354 (denying leave to amend to add a gender discrimination claim to the previously claimed racial discrimination); Ellwood City v. Pa. Power Co., 570 F. Supp. 553, 556 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (denying leave to amend because it would require new discovery and discovery period had already expired).
In this case, Defendants Ryan and the City will be unduly prejudiced if leave to amend is granted. First, Plaintiffs filed the motion for leave to amend after the close of discovery, after summary judgment motions were filed, after pre-trial memoranda were filed, and after the case was put in the trial pool. Second, Plaintiffs discovered information about the third warrant no later than September 29, 2003, prior to the discovery deadline and over two months prior to filing the instant motion. Third, as noted above, since the inception of this litigation against Detective Ryan and the City, the case has concerned the conduct of Detective Ryan with regards to arrest warrants #254785 and #254786. Granting leave to amend at this juncture would introduce a new claim based on warrant #254514. Fourth, additional discovery would be needed for the third warrant so that Detective Ryan and the City could adequately defend themselves. The fact that Defendants were aware of the third warrant, as Plaintiffs point out in their brief, is of no consequence. Although Defendants knew the warrant existed, they did not know that Plaintiffs were challenging its validity and, in fact, were expecting that Plaintiffs would not challenge its validity. See Ryan Dep. at 26, Docket No. 13, Ex. B.
In sum, the totality of circumstances indicates that Detective Ryan and the City would suffer undue prejudice in defending this case if the Court were to grant Plaintiffs' motion. Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII of the Amended Complaint against the instant Defendants is denied.
The Court need not reach the Defendants' futility argument.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The next motion before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The City and Detective Ryan move for summary judgment on all counts against them.A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant adequately supports its motion pursuant to Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the mere pleadings and present evidence through affidavits, depositions, or admissions on file showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See id. at 324. The substantive law determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then there is a genuine issue of fact. See id.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). Moreover, a court may not consider the credibility or weight of the evidence in deciding a motion for summary judgment, even if the quantity of the moving party's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. See id. Nonetheless, a party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. See Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992).
B. Counts I VI: Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claims against Detective Ryan
Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. To prevail under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendants were "state actors," and (2) that they deprived the plaintiffs of a right protected by the Constitution. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). Because Detective Ryan has raised a qualified immunity defense, Plaintiffs have a further burden. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs must first show that Detective Ryan's alleged conduct violated a federal statute or constitutional right. If step one is met, Plaintiffs must show that the right violated was clearly established at the time of the defendant's conduct. Summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiffs' clearly established right was violated. See id. (citing Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Section 1983 states:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004); see also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 289 (1999); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000).
In Counts I and VI Cummings and Baker claim, respectively, that they were arrested without probable cause in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Plaintiffs acknowledge the warrants, but argue that the warrants were not supported by probable cause because they were obtained through Detective Ryan's false affidavits.
The standard for challenging the validity of the underlying affidavit of an arrest warrant was established by the United States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997). A plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;" and (2) that "such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause."Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87 (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399). 1. Reckless Disregard for the Truth
In step one of the Franks analysis, the Court must determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Detective Ryan made statements or omissions that he either knew or should have known were false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). The Third Circuit has noted that a reckless disregard for the truth means different things when dealing with omissions and assertions. See id. Omissions are made with reckless disregard "if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that `[a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)). "Unlike omissions, assertions can be made with reckless disregard for the truth even if they involve minor details — recklessness is measured not by the relevance of the information, but by the demonstration of willingness to affirmatively distort the truth." Id. at 788. "An assertion is made with reckless disregard when `viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Cummings and Baker claim that Detective Ryan made omissions and false assertions in the affidavits of probable cause for arrest warrants #254785 and #254786. The affidavits are identical in substance. They explain Tiffany Robinson's story about the shooting, the existence of a protection from abuse order on Cummings, and the custody dispute between Cummings and Sessions over Sessions' stepson Jabree. Detective Ryan states that Robinson positively identified Cummings from a police photograph and that there was an approved affidavit from Cummings' arrest for the incident on November 13, 2000.
Cummings also raises an issue concerning the Criminal Complaint filed against him by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Docket No. 13, Ex. C-2. The District Attorney's Office prepares and issues the Criminal Complaint, not Detective Ryan. Thus, Detective Ryan's potential liability lies only in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, the document he prepared.
Plaintiffs claim that Detective Ryan misstated the following assertions with reckless disregard for the truth: (1) Tiffany Robinson is not the stepsister of Cummings' son Jabree, and (2) Jabree is not Katherine Sessions' stepson because Sessions and Cummings were never married. As set forth above, the appropriate inquiry is whether Detective Ryan made the assertions with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788. Detective Ryan did have some background knowledge of the familial relationships of Cummings, Sessions, Robinson, and Jabree. He did not know, however, the precise relationships among the parties involved. The Court finds that Detective Ryan did not have a high degree of awareness of these facts sufficient to conclude that he acted with reckless disregard for the truth with respect to his assertions of the family relationships in the affidavit.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs could prove reckless disregard, the allegedly false assertions are not material underFranks because probable cause to arrest still exists when the challenged assertions are removed from the affidavit.
Plaintiffs next claim that Detective Ryan omitted from the affidavit the following information: (1) Karo Sharpe, the school crossing guard on duty at the time of the shooting, reported to Detective Ryan that she did not hear or see anything out of the ordinary on the morning of the alleged shooting; (2) Detective Ryan searched the alleged crime scene and did not find bullet casings or any other evidence to corroborate Tiffany Robinson's story; and (3) Detective Ryan never questioned Plaintiffs regarding their whereabouts at the time of the alleged shooting.
To prove reckless disregard with respect to the omissions, Plaintiffs must show that any reasonable person would have known that the omissions were highly relevant and that a judge would want to know about them to make the probable cause determination.See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (citing Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1234). In Wilson, the Third Circuit instructed that, while we cannot demand that police officers relate the entire history of events leading up to a warrant application, a police officer cannot make unilateral decisions about the materiality of information and merely inform the magistrate of inculpatory evidence. Id. at 787. For example, in Jacobs the court found reckless disregard where the officer omitted from his affidavit the fact that a drug sniffing dog failed to alert on the defendant's bag that was searched pursuant to the search warrant the officer obtained. See Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1234.
Here, the Court finds that any reasonable person would recognize that a judge would want to know about the lack of corroborating evidence at a crime scene, including a bystander who did not see or hear anything out of the ordinary and the absence of bullet casings at an alleged shooting scene. On the other hand, Detective Ryan had no responsibility to report the fact that he never questioned Cummings or Baker about their whereabouts. Thus, Detective Ryan acted with reckless disregard of the truth by omitting exculpatory facts about the crossing-guard and the bullet casings from the affidavit of probable cause.
2. Materiality
Under the next step in the Franks analysis, the Court must determine whether Detective Ryan's omissions made with reckless disregard of the truth were "material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause." Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399. To determine materiality, we insert the facts recklessly omitted and ask whether the "corrected" warrant establishes probable cause.See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789 (citing Sherwood). If probable cause still exists, the inquiry stops there and summary judgment may be granted in favor of the police officer.
To assess whether or not probable cause exists, a court must weigh the inculpatory evidence against any exculpatory evidence to determine whether a reasonable person would believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 791; Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the strongest inculpatory evidence is the positive identification of Plaintiffs by the victim Tiffany Robinson. There is also evidence of the custody dispute and the protection from abuse order issued against Cummings. The exculpatory facts recklessly omitted by Detective Ryan concern the lack of evidence from the crime scene, including the crossing guard's statement and the lack of bullet shells.
The Third Circuit has rejected the argument that positive identification by a victim is absolute proof of probable cause.See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790. "Independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness's own unreliability that is known by the officer could outweigh the identification such that probable cause would not exist." Id. Nonetheless, weighing the exculpatory evidence against the positive identification of Plaintiffs by Robinson, the exculpatory facts are not sufficient to undermine a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., id. (holding positive identification by victim outweighs exculpatory evidence on specific facts of case); Roberts v. Toal, No. 94-0608, 1997 WL 83748 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1997) (same); Thomas v. Piree, No. 95-956, 1995 WL 709938 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995) (same). The Court concludes, therefore, that no reasonable jury could find that Detective Ryan's affidavit, after inserting the omissions, lacked probable cause to arrest Cummings and Baker for allegedly firing shots at Robinson. Summary judgment on Counts I and VI is granted in favor of Detective Ryan. C. Counts III VIII: Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims against Detective Ryan
Because the Court holds that Detective Ryan did not knowingly or recklessly omit facts that could negate probable cause, the Court also holds that Detective Ryan did not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights and that Detective Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 402; Thomas, 1995 WL 709938 at *6 n. 12.
To prove a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, Plaintiffs must establish a deprivation of liberty consistent with the Fourth Amendment concept of seizure and the common law elements of the tort. See Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Backof v. New Jersey State Police, No. 02-4131, 2004 WL 260779 (3d Cir. Feb. 13, 2004) (unpublished);Colbert v. Angstadt, 169 F. Supp.2d 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Under the common law of Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs must show: (1) Detective Ryan initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding ended in Plaintiffs' favor; (3) Detective Ryan initiated the proceeding without probable cause to arrest; and (4) Detective Ryan acted with actual malicious purpose. See Patterson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-4792, 2000 WL 1020332, *5 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2000).
Plaintiffs meet the constitutional element of their malicious prosecution claims. Cummings was arrested and incarcerated for 17 months before trial and Baker was arrested and allegedly incarcerated for nine days, constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. However, Plaintiffs fail at least the third prong of the common law inquiry. As discussed above, Plaintiffs were arrested with probable cause, even after correcting for Detective Ryan's reckless omissions. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot prove their § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Detective Ryan on Counts III and VIII.
D. Counts II VII: Section 1983 Claims against the City
In Counts II and VII, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against the City of Philadelphia claiming that it fails to adequately train its investigating police officers. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a municipality is a "person" under federal civil rights statutes and that it can be found liable under § 1983. To establish a claim, a plaintiff must predicate recovery on the existence of a particular municipal policy or established custom. See id.; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829 (1985) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., concurring). Further, a plaintiff must prove that this policy or custom caused the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 829-30; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Here, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to substantiate theirMonell claim beyond the facts of this case. Summary judgment is granted in favor of the City on Counts II and VII.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants City of Philadelphia and Detective Theodore Ryan's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 10 11), Plaintiffs' Response thereto (Docket Nos. 12 13), Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response (Docket No. 17), Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 16), Defendants' Response thereto (Docket No. 18), and Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED; and
(2) Defendants City of Philadelphia and Detective Ryan's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.