Opinion
1215N, 380626/12.
05-19-2016
McCallion & Associates LLP, New York (Kenneth F. McCallion of counsel), for appellant. Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, Syracuse (John A. Cirando of counsel), for respondent.
McCallion & Associates LLP, New York (Kenneth F. McCallion of counsel), for appellant.
Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, Syracuse (John A. Cirando of counsel), for respondent.
TOM, J.P., SAXE, RICHTER, GISCHE, and WEBBER, JJ.
Opinion Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered January 28, 2015, which denied defendant Wanys Martinez's motion to vacate her default in answering the complaint and for leave to extend her time to file an answer to the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The motion court properly found that jurisdiction, in this mortgage foreclosure action, had been obtained over defendant Wanys Martinez and thus she had not established entitlement to vacatur pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4). Defendant's conclusory denial of service failed to rebut the presumption of service created by the process server's properly executed affidavit (see Matter of de Sanchez, 57 A.D.3d 452, 454, 870 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept.2008] ), which reflects that service was effectuated by delivering the summons and complaint “to a person of suitable age and discretion at [defendant's] actual ... dwelling place or usual place of abode,” followed by the requisite mailing (CPLR 308[2] ). Defendant admitted that, at the time of service, the subject property was still her “legal address” and that she had only “taken up temporary residence elsewhere,” at an unspecified location, which claim was not substantiated with any documentary evidence. As defendant “never established a permanent alternative ‘actual dwelling’ or ‘usual place of abode’ ” and admitted that she still received mail at the property, service was properly made thereat (CC Home Lenders v. Cioffi, 294 A.D.2d 325, 742 N.Y.S.2d 101 [2d Dept.2002] ). Indeed, defendant identified no other address at which she could have been served.
Defendant's belief that her then estranged husband would not have accepted service of process on her behalf is insufficient to rebut the presumption of service created by the process server's claim as to what her husband actually did (see Granite Mgt. & Disposition v. Sun, 221 A.D.2d 186, 634 N.Y.S.2d 48 [1st Dept.1995] ).
The motion court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in finding that defendant did not establish a reasonable excuse for delay and meritorious defense to this action (see CPLR 5015(a)(1) ; Carroll v. Nostra Realty Corp., 54 A.D.3d 623, 864 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1st Dept.2008] [citation omitted], lv. dismissed 12 N.Y.3d 792, 879 N.Y.S.2d 38, 906 N.E.2d 1072 [2009] ). Defendant's unsuccessful claim that she was not properly served with process and conclusory denial of receipt of certain mailings are insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery created by the affidavits of service reflecting such mailings and do not constitute a reasonable excuse for delay or a meritorious defense (see 60 E. 9th St. Owners Corp. v. Zihenni, 111 A.D.3d 511, 512, 975 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept. 2013] ; Burr v. Eveready Ins. Co., 253 A.D.2d 650, 651, 677 N.Y.S.2d 547 [1st Dept.1998], appeal dismissed 92 N.Y.2d 1041, 685 N.Y.S.2d 416, 708 N.E.2d 172 [1999] ; Citimortgage, Inc. v. Bustamante, 107 A.D.3d 752, 753, 968 N.Y.S.2d 513 [2d Dept.2013] ).
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.