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holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow inmate to participate by alternative means, noting that he had proposed several alternative means such as “appointment of an attorney ad litem or a continuance until he was released from prison” and “submitting four affidavits of his testimony”
Summary of this case from Larson v. GiesenschlagOpinion
No. 08-02-00444-CV
August 31, 2004.
Appeal from the 358th District Court of Ector County, Texas, (Tc# D-112,713).
Hon. E. Jason Leach, Odessa, TX for appellant.
Tiffany Lee Urquidez, Odessa, TX, Pro Se.
Before Panel No. 1, LARSEN, McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Juan Manuel Urquidez, an inmate, appeals from the trial court's default judgment granting divorce on the ground of insupportability and naming Tiffany Lee Urquidez sole managing conservator. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant asserts that he was given inadequate notice of the final hearing in his case. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to issue a bench warrant so he could personally appear at the hearing, and for failing to consider reasonable alternatives to allow him to present testimony. We reverse and remand
On January 30, 2002, Tiffany Lee Urquidez filed for divorce from Appellant. At the time, Appellant was incarcerated at the Swicher County Detention Center of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. Appellant was served with a Citation for Personal Service on February 7, 2002 and instructed to respond within twenty days of service. Appellant responded pro se, filing his first Original Answer with the court on February 13, 2002. On February 19, Appellant filed a second Original Answer asking the Court to deny all relief requested by Appellee. At that time, Appellant also filed a Request for Appointment of Attorney Ad Litem in which he made his first request for a bench warrant.
Also on February 19, 2002, Appellant filed a formal Motion for Issuance of a Bench Warrant, or in the alternative, a Motion for Continuance, accompanied by an affidavit of his testimony. Appellant stated in this affidavit that he loved and cared for his child, and would never expose him to dangerous influences. He wanted his child to be safe and cared for and feared that Appellee would provide an emotionally harmful environment.
On March 15, 2002, Appellant filed a second Affidavit of his testimony in which he made several accusations against his wife. First, Appellant alleged that his wife failed to inform him about the health and welfare of his child, and failed to consult with him before making decisions regarding his child. He alleged that she had suffered from mental illness in the past, that she had been previously incarcerated and had continued legal trouble, and that her thirteen-year-old daughter (not his child) also had mental issues that could negatively affect his child. Additionally, Appellant noted that Appellee was reported to Child Protective Services.
We note that on May 3, Appellant filed a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship in which he requested that his wife not be named sole managing conservator of the child, and that the Court issue a temporary injunction so that if Appellee should deepen her debts with the county, she would be forced to surrender custody of their child to Appellant's sister. The record is silent as to whether separate action was taken on this suit, though the final divorce decree filed later establishes conservatorship of the child.
On May 3, 2002, Appellant filed a Praecipe stating again that Appellee denied him of his rights as parent in failing to provide him information about the welfare of his child, and failing to allow him to participate in decisions regarding his child. Appellant took issue with her intention to remarry, asserting that she was making decisions that would affect his child solely on her own discretion.
On May 20, 2002, Appellant filed a third Original Answer and an additional Motion for Issuance of Bench Warrant with the Court. Appellant again made a general denial of each allegation in the Original Petition, and asserted that the suit could not be fairly made without his being present and allowed to testify at the hearing. Also on May 20, Appellant filed another Affidavit of his testimony. Its purpose was to state Appellant's opposition to the divorce, to request the court to order counseling, and in the event a divorce was granted, to request that he be name sole managing conservator.
On June 17, 2002, the Court heard the case. Appellee testified stating that reconciliation was impossible due to the fact that Appellant was constantly incarcerated. Appellee's attorney stated that Appellant had requested a bench warrant, and referred to several other requests he made in the motions described above. When the attorney objected to the relief requested and asked that it be denied on the record, the trial court responded "Go ahead." No further mention was made about Appellant's requests, or the testimony he had submitted through numerous affidavits. A default judgment was handed down, and the Final Decree of Divorce named Appellee sole managing conservator of their child.
Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial on July 17, 2002, asking for the default judgment to be set aside. He cited the Craddock test, asserting that his failure to appear was not intentional, and was rather the result of his bench warrant being denied. Appellant also asserted that he had a meritorious defense, and that a trial court's refusal to consider and rule on a prisoner's request to appear in a civil proceeding personally or by other means constitutes an abuse of discretion. In the affidavit accompanying the Motion for New Trial, Appellant further alleged that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering documents by which he responded to allegations, and set forth claims, denials, or defenses of his own. Appellant also stated that he received notice of the final hearing on June 11, 2002.
We note that on July 18 and July 25, Appellant filed Motions for Issuance of a Bench Warrant. It is unclear whether these were filed in relation to the divorce hearing which had already been held, or in relation to the Motion for New Trial.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2002, asserting that the trial court did not respond to or consider his requests for bench warrant or appointment of counsel, and did not consider the factors weighing in his favor. Further, Appellant asserted the record contained no evidence in opposition to Appellee. In conjunction with the Notice of Appeal, Appellant filed an Affidavit of Indigence asserting that he was an indigent parent as defined by the Texas Family Code and requesting that the court appoint an Attorney Ad Litem.
On October 3, 2002, the trial court filed an Order for Appeal which stated that Appellant's appeal was frivolous and was not a substantial question for appellate review. The court further instructed the clerk of the court not to prepare a record for transmission to the Court of Appeals. Several months later, the trial court reversed this order and instructed the court reporter to prepare a transcript of the proceeding at county expense. An attorney was also appointed to represent appellant in his appeal on March 3, 2003.
Inadequate Notice
Appellant argues in his first issue that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive the forty-five days notice of the setting of the final hearing. However, we find that Appellant did not adequately preserve this complaint for appeal.
Before presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must reflect that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the request with sufficient specificity to make the court aware of the complaint. TEX.R.APP.P. 33.1(a). In other words, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the complaining party must generally raise the issue in the trial court. Gallardo v. Ugarte, No. 08-03-00374-CV, 2004 WL 1292484 (Tex.App.-El Paso June 10, 2004, no pet.h.) (not yet published); see Sunday Canyon Property Owners Association v. Annett, 978 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.).
In the present case, Appellant did not raise the issue of inadequate notice until his appeal, and thus did not properly preserve it. We note that Appellant did not have the opportunity to object at trial since his bench warrant request was denied. However, Texas courts have held that a complaint included in a motion for new trial is sufficient to arouse a trial court's attention and preserve an issue for appeal. Aguirre v. Phillips Properties, 111 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). Appellant here did file a Motion for New Trial, but the motion did not include a complaint about inadequate notice. Rather, it requested that the default judgment be set aside on the basis of the Craddock test, and alleged that the trial court erred in denying his bench warrant by failing to weigh the integrity of the correctional system against his right of access to the courts. The only mention of notice in the record can be found in the affidavit accompanying his Motion for New Trial, which merely states that notice was received on June 11. However, it does not raise this as an issue on which the motion is based, and cannot be considered specific enough to make the trial court aware that inadequate notice was a formal complaint. We therefore conclude Appellant failed to preserve his complaint and overrule Issue One.
The Bench Warrant and Other Effective Means
We review a trial court's ruling on a bench warrant request for an abuse of discretion. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to guiding principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
Appellant makes two arguments in asserting that the trial court abused its discretion with regard to his participation at the proceeding. Appellant contends first that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appropriately consider several factors in reviewing his bench warrant request, and by failing to balance the interest of the State in protecting the integrity of the correctional system against his right of access to the courts. Appellant relies on the record, implying that it contains no evidence that the trial court considered the appropriate factors.
Appellant here refers to the Stone factors that are to be used to consider whether to grant a bench warrant. The factors include the cost of transporting the inmate to court, the security risk to the court and the public, whether the inmate's claims are substantial, and the inmate's probability of success on the merits. See Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976).
At the time the appeal was filed, this would have been a valid argument supported by holdings from several Texas courts of appeal. However, the Texas Supreme Court recently modified the appellate court holdings by shifting the responsibility of identifying and supporting these factors from the trial court to the complainant. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165. The Court in Z.L.T. held that the litigant requesting the bench warrant bears the responsibility of establishing his right to relief, and must provide factual information demonstrating why his need to appear outweighs the impact on the correctional system. See id. at 166. In short, the Court determined that a trial court has no duty to independently inquire into the necessity of an inmate's appearance beyond the contents of the bench warrant request. Id.
As a result, Appellant's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion simply by not considering the Stone factors is inadequate. In order to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the Appellant's bench warrant request would have to have contained factual information supporting the necessity of his appearance and an argument as to how that information outweighed the impact on the correctional system. Upon examination of the record, we find that Appellant did not present the trial court with any such information or argument. Rather, the motion Appellant filed requesting a bench warrant merely stated his love for his child, and his desire that his child be placed in the safest environment possible. Under the standard established by the Texas Supreme Court in Z.L.T., Appellant failed to establish his right to relief, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying the request on this basis.
However, Appellant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider allowing him to appear by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means. We agree. Z.L.T. specifically struck down the notion propagated by Texas appeals courts that trial courts must evaluate independently various factors in deciding whether to grant bench warrant requests, regardless of the content of the requests. Id. at 166. However, the Supreme Court did not address the assertion, also encouraged by appeals courts, that the trial court has an additional responsibility if the bench warrant is refused.
Several appeals courts have held that in the event a trial court finds that a pro se inmate in a civil action is not entitled to appear personally in court, the prisoner should be allowed to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means. Boulden v. Boulden, 133 S.W.3d 884, 886-87 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.h.); In the Interest of D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.h.); Lann v. LaSalle County, No. 04-02-00005, 2003 WL 141040, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio January 22, 2003, no pet.) (not yet published); Byrd v. Attorney General of State of Tex. Crimne Victims Compensation Div., 877 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, no pet.); In re B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d 812, 820 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.). We have further stated that a trial court's refusal to consider and rule on a prisoner's request to appear in a civil proceeding personally or by other means, such that the inmate has been effectively barred from presenting his case, constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d at 820.
Many circumstances can contribute to an inmate being barred from presenting his case. For example, one court found that an inmate who was a defendant in a civil action and who was proceeding pro se as had been effectively barred from presenting his case when his request to appeal and for an attorney were denied. Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied). An abuse of discretion was found in another case where the court records demonstrated repeated efforts on the part of an inmate to present a defense from prison, but no mention of his assertions or evidence was made during the proceeding. Zuniga v. Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.), disapproved in part on other grounds by In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166. Still another court found an abuse of discretion where an inmate who filed for divorce proposed alternative means of appearing and did everything possible to respond to the trial court, only to find the case dismissed without his participation. Boulden, 133 S.W.3d at 887. The Zuniga Court emphasized that the inmate in that case had a right to be heard, particularly because the suit affected his parental rights. Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d at 801. We believe the same to be true in the case at bar.
Applying the above case law to the facts before us, we find that Appellant was effectively barred from presenting his case, and agree that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow him to proceed by alternative means. Despite numerous requests, Appellant was not allowed at trial, nor was he able to have anyone represent him there. He proposed several alternative means of appearing such as appointment of an attorney ad litem or a continuance until he was released from prison. He made several attempts to present his case from prison, submitting four affidavits of his testimony in response to the petition for divorce, and an additional affidavit accompanying his motion for new trial. The brief record of the court proceedings is comprised solely of Appellee's testimony, while Appellant's affidavit testimony is entirely absent, and his multiple requests to participate in the proceeding are dismissed by the judge without any consideration of their validity. Absent from the record is any mention of the allegations Appellant made against his wife, and his testimony regarding why his wife was unfit to be named sole managing conservator. While Z.L.T. allows the trial court to implicitly deny a bench warrant request like Appellant's that does not adequately establish a right to relief, it does not grant permission to the trial court to entirely ignore an inmate's party to a lawsuit and his repeated efforts to participate. Issue Two is sustained.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.