Opinion
19-70032
10-21-2022
MARTINA URIOSTEGUI-APARICIO, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted [**] October 19, 2022 San Francisco, California
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A098-805-978
Before: S.R. THOMAS, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Martina Uriostegui-Aparicio ("Petitioner"), a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the denial by an immigration judge ("IJ") of Petitioner's applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Petitioner argues that the determination that she is not eligible for CAT protection is not supported by substantial evidence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
Petitioner does not challenge the denial of withholding of removal.
Because the BIA adopted the decision of the IJ, cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. &N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A. 1994), and provided its own analysis, we review both the BIA and IJ decisions. See Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 2021). Our review is deferential: "The agency's fact finding is conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2021).
Petitioner's application for CAT protection was denied for two reasons. Each reason is independently dispositive. First, the BIA found that Petitioner failed to show it was more likely than not that she would be tortured if she returned to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Second, the BIA concluded that Petitioner had not demonstrated that future torture would be "inflicted . . . with the consent or acquiescence of[] a public official . . . or other person acting in an official capacity." Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). Petitioner claims that the following compels a contrary conclusion: (1) her own experiences of abuse by Cleto, the father of one of her children, and two violent rapes by Alvarez, a fellow merchant at the marketplace where Petitioner worked in Mexico; and (2) a State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Mexico.
We conclude that the BIA's decision is supported by substantial evidence. First, taking into consideration the aggregate risk posed by Cleto and Alvarez, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner is more likely than not to be tortured if she returns to Mexico. See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that CAT determination must consider "aggregate risk" of torture from "all possible sources"). Petitioner testified that she has had no contact with Cleto since she left Mexico in 1989, and she introduced no evidence that he attempted to contact her in the United States or on any of her three return trips to Mexico in 1990, 2002, and 2005. Similarly, though Petitioner was raped by Alvarez in Mexico in 1989 and again on a return trip to Mexico in 2005, she testified that she has had no contact with him since then. Moreover, although Petitioner testified that Alvarez would find her wherever she went and that his affiliation with the Zetas cartel made her especially fearful, both rapes took place in a circumscribed area in Guerrero, and Petitioner offered no evidence that Alvarez would seek her out in other parts of the country. Thus, the BIA correctly considered, as an additional factor in its determination, that Petitioner could relocate within Mexico to avoid the risk of future torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii); Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Second, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that a public official would consent or acquiesce to the torture of Petitioner if she returns to Mexico. Petitioner did not report her abuse by Cleto or either of her rapes by Alvarez to any public officials, nor did she provide specific evidence of local police corruption or indifference to acts of violence. There was, therefore, no evidence that public officials were aware of or would have acquiesced in torture of the type she claims she is most likely to face upon her return. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 844 (9th Cir. 2022) ("Evidence of future acquiescence by public officials should be sufficiently related to petitioner's likely torture."). Instead, Petitioner relied on generalized evidence in a single country report to show the Mexican government's inadequate response to violence against women and inability to combat cartels. But the lone report in the record offers a mixed assessment: it suggests serious shortcomings in efforts by the Mexican government to combat domestic violence and rape, as well as to control cartels, but it also indicates some efforts to punish perpetrators and improve access to justice. Read as a whole, it does not compel the conclusion that the government is "willfully blind to attacks on women" or that a public official would consent or acquiesce if Petitioner faced torture in the future. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014).
Finally, given our conclusions above, there is no indication that the BIA failed to consider any of the relevant evidence. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771-72.
PETITION DENIED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).