Opinion
2:23-cr-00423-DSF
06-04-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GABRIEL GONZALES, Defendant.
JOSEPH S. GUZMAN ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
JOSEPH S. GUZMAN ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
ORDER GRANTING GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT
HONORABLE DALE S. FISCHER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Court has read and considered the Government's Motion to Hold in Abeyance Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, filed on May 24, 2024. The Government's Motion is GRANTED. The Court hereby finds as follows:
(1) Defendant's motion to dismiss will be held in abeyance until a decision on the government's petition for rehearing en banc in United States v. Duarte, 2024 WL 2068016 (9th Cir. 2024), or for 60 days, whichever is earlier.
(2) The Court further finds that this period of time is excludable in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(ii).
(3) The Government's Motion also provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
(4) Once the petition for rehearing en banc in Duarte is resolved, the Court will set a hearing at which time it will consider defendant's motion to dismiss. Until then, defendant's motion to dismiss is not “under advisement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H) because the disposition of the government's en banc petition by the Ninth Circuit is necessary to the Court's disposition of the motion to dismiss.
(5) Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.