Opinion
90-CR-1019-11 (RJD)
2023-06-20
UNITED STATES of America, v. Chiang T. CHENG, Defendant.
Andrew Patrick Wenzel, Government Attorney, Gilbert Rein, John O'Donnell Enright, DOJ-USAO, Brooklyn, NY, Chand Warren Edwards-Balfour, Douglas M. Pravda, Government Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, Antoinette N. Rangel, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for United States of America.
Andrew Patrick Wenzel, Government Attorney, Gilbert Rein, John O'Donnell Enright, DOJ-USAO, Brooklyn, NY, Chand Warren Edwards-Balfour, Douglas M. Pravda, Government Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, Antoinette N. Rangel, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for United States of America.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DEARIE, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion of defendant Chiang T. Cheng under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for compassionate release or a reduction in the five concurrent life terms imposed upon him in 1992 for three murders and related crimes he committed when he was 21 and 22 years old. ECF Nos. 567, 571.
For the reasons to be discussed the motion is granted, Cheng's life sentence is vacated, and he is re-sentenced to time-served effective December 15, 2023.
DISCUSSION
The Court assumes the parties' general familiarity with the underlying facts of this fifteen-defendant prosecution, including the nature of the Green Dragon gang and the racketeering, murders, and other violent crimes its members perpetrated upon the Asian community in Queens, as detailed in this Court's and the Second Circuit's decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1355 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming convictions and sentence), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Ed.2d 127 (1995); United States v. Brian Chan, 645 F.Supp.3d 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), ECF No. 553.
The distinct features of the gang relevant here, as highlighted in Chan and the Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"), were its recruitment and communal-living practices. As Chan summarizes:
The gang's work began at the level of the schools and playgrounds in Queens, where senior members lured susceptible Asian teenagers, like Chan, into the gang's cult-like fold. Supplanting other influences in the recruits' lives, the gang arranged for most new recruits to move out of their families' homes and into apartments or 'safe houses' maintained by the gang, where they lived with other members under the supervision of more senior members, and were supplied with food, shelter, community, material possessions, and even pocket money.Chan, 645 F.Supp.3d at 73, ECF No. 553 at 3 (cleaned up) (citing, inter alia, PSR ¶17).
Cheng, product of an unsettled upbringing, was another highly recruitable Asian teen. Born on July 11, 1967, in Taiwan, he immigrated to the United States in 1981 at age 14. Once here, he experienced a difficult adolescence, dealing with poverty, absent parents, and physical abuse at the hands of his stepfather. Cheng dropped out of school after eighth grade, and by his late teens, he was effectively on his own, living in the homes of various friends in Flushing. By age 20, still young and impressionable, Chen landed in a Green Dragon safe house. The combined influence of leadership and peers—i. e., obedience, survival, and reputation—undoubtedly encouraged Cheng's commission of his crimes.
The Court here relies on Cheng's own account in his motion papers, see ECF 567, 571, which is generally consistent in portions with the PSR and the Circuit's factual summary, see Wong, 40 F.3d at 1356, and which the government has not disputed.
The seriousness of those crimes, committed in a several-month span during which Cheng turned 22 years of age, speaks for itself: albeit at the orders of gang leadership, Cheng drove fellow gang members to and from three brutal planned murders; he committed two armed robberies; he raped one of the robbery victims; and he participated in the gang's extortion activities. See PSR ¶¶ 22-28, 38-39, 41, 49. For this conduct Cheng was convicted, at trial, of nine felonies, including two counts of conspiracy to commit murder to maintain or increase his position in a RICO enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); three counts of murder to maintain or increase his position in a RICO enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 2; one count of conspiracy to use extortionate means to collect a debt in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894; and one count of using extortionate means to collect a debt in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 894 and 2.
Since the imposition of Cheng's Guidelines-required five life sentences in October 1992, several extraordinary and compelling changes have occurred in sentencing law and in this case. First, the guidelines that bound then-District Judge Reena Raggi to impose life are now advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Second, Congress, through the First Step Act of 2018, amended the compassionate release statute to allow Cheng to bring this motion and to liberate him from the former gatekeeping function of the Bureau of Prisons as final arbiter of available grounds for relief. See, e.g., United States v. Kevin Haynes, 456 F.Supp.3d 496, 506 et seq., (E.D.N.Y. 2020). Third, the fullest breadth of this Court's sentencing discretion is available when it entertains such motions. See United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 374 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (courts are "free to consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them") (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235-37 (2d Cir. 2020)); Chan, 645 F.Supp.3d at 81, ECF 553 at 17 (describing Brooker's "full slate" standard as a "clarion call to rethink sentence reduction").
See also Concepcion v. United States 597 U.S. 481, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2403, 2402, 213 L.Ed.2d 731 (2022) ("the First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act," including, inter alia, "post-sentencing rehabilitation" and "unrelated" Guideline amendments). Indeed, the Court recognized that subsequently updated laws are "evidence of society's judgment of the seriousness of an offense." Id. at 2400 (cleaned up).
Fourth, youth has been accorded overdue recognition as a potent mitigating factor in culpability and rightful ground for reducing harsh sentences imposed by courts that could not or did not adequately account for it. See, e.g., Chan, 645 F.Supp.3d at 77-78, 81-83, ECF 553 at 10-11, 17-21 (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and the relevant pre- and post-Miller cases on the role of youth in sentencing). Cheng committed all of his crimes in a several-month span during which he turned 22. Although Cheng was several years older than Chan when Chan committed his offenses, many, if not all, of the mitigating factors of youth recognized in the Miller jurisprudence discussed in Chan apply to Cheng. As noted, the turning point in the lives of the many young defendants in this case was recruitment. Although not quite as young as some of his codefendants, Cheng, at age 20, was still young, impressionable, with little in the way of education, stability, or positive role models when he landed in a Green Dragon safe house, enticed by the promises of acceptance, purpose, and financial opportunity, and ensnared into its criminal designs.
Fifth, due to some or all of these changes, the life sentences imposed on four of Cheng's comparably culpable codefendants were reduced to between 33 and 37 years, and each has since been released from federal custody. As Chan details, Miller required vacatur of the life sentences imposed on codefendants Roger Kwok, Alex Wong, and Joseph Wang because each committed his crimes while not yet 18 years of age. Kwok, the actual shooter of murder victims Tina Sham and Tommy Mach, was resentenced to 37 years; Wong, convicted of one murder, was resentenced to 35 years; and Wang, convicted of two murders, was resentenced to 30 years. Chan was ineligible for Miller relief because he committed two murders 50 and 54 days after turning 18, but this Court reduced his sentence to 33 years, finding that his youth at the time he committed his offenses, along with his rehabilitation, exceptional remorse, and the disparity between his and his codefendants' sentences were extraordinary and compelling circumstances. The resulting disproportionality of Cheng's sentence speaks for itself.
In addition to the foregoing as grounds for sentencing reduction, Cheng further advances the separate theme of relative culpability, suggesting that the sentencing disparity is rendered even more compelling by the fact that he was exclusively a driver, whereas each of the four freed codefendants was an actual shooter of one or more of the homicide victims. His motion papers seize on certain remarks of then-District Judge Reena Raggi during his October 1992 sentencing. According to Cheng, Judge Raggi stated that he "was almost universally the driver rather than the shooter in these homicides" and that she "really wondered whether there ought to be an adjustment for his role in the offense." ECF 567 at 3. But Judge Raggi went on to observe that even the resulting proposed adjustment based on his "lesser role" would also "recognize that it occurred on so many occasions that to treat him as less culpable of homicide to [sic] those who actually shot, when he drove on so many different homicides, is to ignore the severity of the crime when committed over and over again." Id. (emphasis added). The recurrence of Cheng's criminal actions likewise informed the Second Circuit's assessment of his overall culpability. See Wong, 40 F.3d at 1374 (recognizing that while Cheng was "lower in the gang's hierarchy" and a driver rather than a shooter, he nevertheless had an "intensive and continuing involvement in the operations of the Green Dragons" over an "extensive period") (emphases added). On balance, independent of considerations of youth and sentencing disparity already addressed, the Court rejects the discrete claim of relative culpability as a compelling circumstance for Section 3582(c) purposes.
This Court's outreach for a copy of the transcript from which Cheng says he is quoting has proved fruitless; notably, however, the government, who has also been asked about the transcript, has not disputed Cheng's account.
The relative culpability argument based solely on the murders fails for the separate reasons that it ignores the fact that Cheng, unlike the four freed codefendants, also committed a rape.
But that finding is not fatal to Cheng's motion. In addition to the changes in sentencing law, Cheng's youth, and the sentencing disparities reviewed above—all of which fall well within the "full slate" of circumstances that qualify as extraordinary and compelling—Cheng also "accepts full responsibility" for his crimes, which he recognizes were "serious," ECF 567 at 6, and offers genuine remorse. Cheng says that it was "wrong" to have joined the gang and to have caused the "horrific deaths" of the victims; he calls himself "the worse[sic]" of criminals and feels "shamefully about himself." Id. at 17. He sees that his "loss of liberty . . . cannot stand next to the murder victims and the sufferings of their families." Id. He continues: "Cheng's past deeds were nothing short of heinous, atrocious, and cruel . . . For every wrongdoing he cannot turn his back on, Cheng is deeply remorseful, repented [sic] of what he has done . . . and he understands the need to condemn him in the strongest of terms." Id. at 17-18. Of note, Cheng also now admits that, in a prior submission to this Court, he had disputed his involvement in the rape. See ECF 567 at 22 ("Cheng was involved in rape during the course of a crime. In his previous motion under section 3582(c) in 2018 before this Court, Cheng denied his involvement. Cheng was wrong. Instead, he should accept and meet his wrongdoing. The words he had wrote in the motion were improper, Cheng apologizes to the Court").
Additionally, Cheng presents a fair record of rehabilitation. He appears to have been a dedicated student, having earned his GED and immersed himself in a wide-ranging curriculum. On the disciplinary side, he arrives with more than 20 infractions; only two, however—both for fighting with inmates—occurred since 2008, with none occurring since 2017. While not a spotless record, the Court views positively the pattern of decreasing transgressions over time.
Having found that extraordinary and compelling reasons are present, I must also satisfy myself that a sentence reduction is consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Jones, 17 F.4th at 374 (explaining that "extraordinary and compelling reasons are necessary—but not sufficient—for a defendant to obtain relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)" because the "district court must also consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a) before granting relief"). I so find, with little additional discussion, as the applicable section 3553(a) factors largely overlap with the circumstances already discussed as extraordinary and compelling. The keynote of the conversation here, of course, is the seriousness of Cheng's crimes, which warrant a sentence that justly punishes him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (the purposes of a sentence are, inter alia, "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense"). But bookending seriousness with § 3553's parsimony clause, I readily determine that a sentence of life—increasingly rare in today's post-Booker, post-Brooker federal penal system—is far greater than necessary to achieve the statutory sentencing objectives. In settling on the appropriate sentence, I, of course, find instructive the reduced terms imposed upon Kwok, Wang, Wong, and Chan and the seriousness of their offense and conduct relative to Cheng's. Considering all of the circumstances deemed extraordinary and compelling and the applicable § 3553(a) factors, I vacate Cheng's life sentence and impose a term of time-served effective December 15, 2023.
To be sure, only three years ago I remarked substantially to the contrary when I denied Cheng's COVID-era motion for compassionate release based on his age and health status. See ECF 507 (Order dated May 26, 2020). Finding then that neither Cheng's physical condition, his age, nor the COVID rate at his facility was an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, my order also remarked: "Lastly, an examination of the statutory sentencing factors and Sentencing Commission policy statements, in light of Mr. Cheng's well-documented history of violent criminal conduct, compels his continued incarceration." Id. That remark is not binding here for obvious reasons: that earlier motion did not even advance the grounds presented and accepted here as compelling and extraordinary (changes in sentencing law, Cheng's youth, and codefendant sentencing disparity), and Brooker's announcement that the Court could consider such matters would not be issued for another six months.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Chiang T. Cheng's motion for sentence reduction (ECF 567, 571) is granted, his concurrent life sentences are vacated, and he is resentenced to time-served effective December 15, 2023. His motion for appointment of counsel (ECF 589) is denied. An amended judgment shall issue. SO ORDERED.