Opinion
2:18-cr-000256-JAM
10-13-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANTONIO LONG ANDREWS, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND RENEWED MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
JOHN A. MENDEZ, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Antonio Long Andrews's Motion for New Trial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 33 and Motion for Acquittal under Rule 29. See Motion for New Trial and Renewed Motion for Acquittal (“Mot.”), ECF No. 252. Defendant was found guilty of sex trafficking by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, at the conclusion of a jury trial on July 12, 2022. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and raises several evidentiary concerns. Id. The United States of America (the “Government”) opposes Defendant's motions. See Opp'n, ECF No. 264. Defendant filed a reply. See Reply, ECF No. 272. For the following reasons, Defendant's motions are DENIED.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).
I. OPINION
A. Motion for New Trial
Defendant moves for a new trial under the FRCP Rule 33. Rule 33 provides that “upon the defendant's motion, a court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). When a party moves for a new trial based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will grant the motion only if it “concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.1980)). Defendant presents five arguments for why a new trial is warranted. The Court considers each in turn.
1. Failure to Prove Intent
Defendant argues the Court should grant a new trial under Rule 33, because the Government failed to put forth sufficient evidence of intent to sex traffic under § 1591. Mot. At 2. Defendant contends that the intent element necessary for a conviction under § 1591 must be proven by evidence of a prior pattern of sex trafficking. Id. at 3-4. In support of his argument, Defendant cites United States v. Todd, involving testimony from the victims as well as evidence that the defendant had a prior pattern of sex trafficking. Id. at 5 (citing 627 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 2010)). Defendant argues that the Government failed to meet its burden to prove intent, because the Government failed to present victim testimony or put forth evidence that Defendant had a history of sex trafficking before his interactions with Victim #1. Id. at 4. Thus, Defendant concludes, sex trafficking under § 1591 cannot be proved on the evidence submitted and a new trial is proper. Id. at 5-6.
The Government responds that Defendant misstated the holding in Todd and that the intent element required for a § 1591 violation does not require proof of prior acts. Opp'n at 7. The Government contends the Ninth Circuit in Todd stated that intent may be proven by evidence that the defendant had knowledge “in the sense of being aware of an established modus operandi that will in the future coerce a prostitute to engage in prostitution.” Id. at 7 (citing Todd, 627 F.3d at 334). The Government argues that a “modus operandi” can be established through more than just prior acts of sex trafficking and that to hold otherwise would mean that a person cannot violate § 1591 the first time they traffic a victim through force, threats of force, or coercion; that is not what § 1591 states and it is not a requirement imposed by Todd. Id. at 8.
The Government further asserts it presented sufficient evidence for a conviction because the Defendant, like the defendant in Todd, had an “established practice of living off the earnings of a prostitute [through] rules controlling her work and payment of the proceeds to him” through his conduct and words. Id. (citing Todd, 627 F.3d at 334). The Government points to substantial evidence considered by the jury to prove intent, including but not limited to: (1) Defendant's recorded calls from the Sacramento County Jail to “Sean” and Victim #1 about Victim #1's prostitution work; (2) Defendant's wiretapped conversations with Jaquorey Carter; (3) Defendant's text messages to Victim #1 threatening to use force against her because her prostitution work was unsatisfactory and monitoring her prostitution work; and (4) Defendant's violence towards Victim #1 in the parking lot of the Villa Park Motel on September 28, 2018. Id. at 2-8.
In light of this evidence and the fact that a motion for new trial should be granted only in “exceptional cases” where the evidence heavily preponderates against the verdict, the Court agrees with the Government that Defendant has failed to show that a new trial is warranted. United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538, 545 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court also agrees with the Government that the Defendant has misinterpreted the holding in Todd and improperly narrowed the statutory language of § 1591 to the illogical conclusion that sex trafficking can only be proven through evidence of the sex trafficking of a prior victim. This interpretation is not supported by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Todd nor is there any language in § 1591 to support such a limitation. Further, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to sufficiently contest the substantial evidence with which the jury found him guilty of violating § 1591. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a new trial on grounds of insufficient evidence.
2. Prejudicial Evidence of Prior Domestic Violence Against Victim #2
Defendant next argues that the Government improperly introduced evidence of a domestic violence incident between Defendant and Victim #2. Mot. at 6-7. Defendant claims that the Court's curative efforts were not effective because the evidence was both “incredibly prejudicial” against Defendant and “incredibly probative” to the Government's case in proving Defendant's intent. Id. at 8. Defendant points to the fact that the jury, while deliberating, requested to relisten to a phone call in which Victim #2 was mentioned. Id. at 8-9. Defendant also argues that the Government's decision not to have Victim #1 testify at trial should be considered by the Court in granting a new trial. Id. at 9-10.
The Government refutes Defendant's assertion that it relied on or referred to evidence relating to Defendant's history of domestic violence against Victim #2. Opp'n at 9-10. As for the stricken testimony and exhibits, the Government asserts that they were not prejudicial because the evidence was minimal, had little connection to Defendant, and the Court properly instructed the jury not to consider it. Id. at 10 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)). The Court agrees.
Discussing how to cure the admission of inadmissible evidence, the Supreme Court in Miller has stated that there is a presumption that a jury will follow a court's instruction to disregard the evidence unless there is an “overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.” Miller, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption described in Miller because Defendant has (1) not shown that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury in this case was unable to follow the Court's instructions and (2) not shown that the that the evidence related to the alleged domestic violence incident between Defendant and Victim #2 was devastating to Defendant's case.
As to the phone call that jurors listened to during their deliberations, the Government asserts that the phone call primarily covered topics related to Defendant and Victim #1 and that it only mentioned Victim #2 three times. Id. at 10-11. As such, the phone call by itself is insufficient to show that the jury disregarded the Court's instructions or that a new trial is warranted. Id. The jury's request to hear the phone call is not inconsistent with the Court's instructions, because the phone call primarily contained evidence not contested by Defendant. Further, it is unclear how this phone call might be devastating to Defendant's case when there is substantial other evidence that speaks to the element of Defendant's intent.
Lastly, as to Defendant's contention that a victim of sex trafficking must testify at trial for a jury to find a defendant guilty, the Court finds Defendant's argument to be meritless. Id. at 11-12. A sex trafficking victim's testimony is not required to sustain a sex trafficking conviction. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient and is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence.” Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, the Court declines to grant a new trial on this ground.
3. Prejudice Against Defendant's Opening Statement
Defendant argues that the Government's delay in objecting to the testimony of defense expert Armand King prejudiced Defendant because defense counsel could not, in her opening statement, confirm whether the expert testimony would be admitted during the trial. Mot. at 10-11. In support of this claim, Defendant cites to Rudin v. Myles, where the court stressed the importance of opening statements in criminal cases to the success of a defendant's case. No. 211CV00643RFBEJY, 2022 WL 1556168, at *30 n. 53 (D. Nev. May 15, 2022). Defendant claims that his counsel's inability to reference the expert in her opening statement denied the jury the knowledge that a defense expert would come to rebut the Government's evidence. Mot. at 11-12. Without that opportunity, the defense could not fully lay out the evidence it planned to show and was therefore prejudiced. Id. at 12.
The Court finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive. As the Government observed, the Court was within its power to reserve its decision on whether to admit expert testimony and, to the extent that any prejudice was experienced, the Defendant has not proven a need for a new trial. Opp'n at 15. Opening statements are not evidence and are “intended to do no more than to inform the jury in a general way of the nature of the action and defense so that they may better be prepared to understand the evidence.” Best v. D.C., 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934). Further, Defendant's case is distinguishable from Rudin, which involved an ineffective assistance of counsel argument. There, the defendant asserted that his counsel gave an “incohesive, lacking opening statement” that “negatively shaped the jury's impression of the defense case”; the defendant also highlighted several other alleged deficiencies by counsel at trial to support his claim. Rudin, WL 1556168 at *31-32. Rudin, therefore, does not support Defendant's argument that a deficient opening statement constitutes grounds for a new trial. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a new trial on this ground.
4. Limitations on Defense Expert Armand King's Testimony
Defendant argues that the Court improperly excluded certain Youtube videos from evidence that defense expert Armand King relied on in forming his conclusions about pimping culture and consensual prostitution. Mot. at 12. Defendant contends that these videos should have been admitted under FRE Rule 703. Id. Defendant claims that these videos would have refuted the Government's contention that the expert was not familiar with this subject matter. Id. at 14.
The Court disagrees. Rule 703 allows experts to formulate opinions based on facts or data reasonably relied upon by experts in that field. Fed.R.Evid. 703. In assessing admissibility, the Court must determine (1) whether the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field and (2) whether the probative value of the underlying data substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003).
As the Government contends, the videos were neither peer reviewed nor based on any discernable methodology. Opp'n at 16. These deficiencies bar the entry of these videos into evidence under Rule 703. Id. The Court found that the expert's videos failed to meet Rule 703's requirements and failed on relevance and hearsay grounds. Defendant's argument under this claim rehashes his argument at trial without alleging any new facts, case law, or statutory authority that would support the Court reconsidering its prior ruling on the admissibility of the YouTube videos at issue. The Court finds it properly excluded the videos as unreliable and inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a new trial on this ground.
5. Admissibility of Jail Calls Between Defendant and Victim #1
The Defendant argues that the Court improperly excluded portions of jail calls between Defendant and Victim #1 that would have demonstrated that Defendant did not use force, fraud, or coercion in the past against Victim #1 to force her to commit a commercial sex act. Mot. at 15. Defendant contends that these recordings should have been allowed either as non-hearsay-to show the interaction between Defendant and Victim #1 and Victim #1's lack of fear-or as an exception to hearsay under FRE Rule 803(3) to show Victim #1's then existing mental or emotional state. Id. Defendant argues that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Wagner v. County of Maricopa, 747 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013), supports his claim that jail calls are admissible to establish a declarant's state of mind. Id. at 16.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that courts determining the admissibility of statements under FRE Rule 803(3) must consider three factors: (1) contemporaneousness, (2) the chance for reflection by the declarant, and (3) relevance. United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 585 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1980)). The chance for reflection weighs against admission because, for example, there is greater chance for misrepresentation when a defendant is aware that they are under investigation and that their statements can be used against them. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 992.
The Government argues that the jail calls were properly excluded as irrelevant and hearsay. Opp'n at 18. The Court agrees. The Court finds that Defendant has failed to submit case law or statutory authority to support his contention that the jail calls he sought to admit qualify as non-hearsay. Even if the jail calls qualified as non-hearsay, they would still fail to meet the relevancy requirements of FRE Rule 401 because their purported purposes have no tendency to make any fact in the case more or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Further, Defendant's factual allegations and reference to Wagner do not support a finding that Victim #1's state of mind is relevant to the requisite elements of § 1591. Defendant's argument also fails to rebut the inclination against admissibility of evidence when Defendant had a chance for reflection before making the statements in the calls at issue. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant a new trial on this ground.
B. Renewed Motion for Acquittal
Defendant renews his motion for acquittal under Rule 29 on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Mot. at 18. The Government opposes the motion. Opp'n at 20.
When considering a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, the evidence adduced at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and an acquittal should not be ordered where “any rational trier of fact could find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Mosley, 465 F.3d 412, 415 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and consistent with the Court's findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence under Defendant's Rule 33 motion, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could find each element of § 1591 beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court denies Defendant's renewed motion for acquittal.
II. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for new trial and DENIES Defendant's renewed motion for acquittal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.