Opinion
24A-JV-1121
02-27-2025
T.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT JOSHUA C. VINCENT TALISHA R. GRIFFIN MARION COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Ryan K. Gardner, Judge The Honorable Regina Tidwell, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D10-2309-JD-7610
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT JOSHUA C. VINCENT TALISHA R. GRIFFIN MARION COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] T.W. was found to be a delinquent child after the juvenile court determined that he had committed what would otherwise be a criminal act, i.e., dangerous possession of a firearm, in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5. T.W. contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's delinquent finding. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, we affirm.
We held oral argument in this case at Ball State University on February 10, 2025. We thank the administration, faculty, students, and staff of Ball State for their warm hospitality and commend counsel for the quality of their arguments.
[¶2] On February 12, 2023, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Corey Shinn observed a vehicle commit at least two traffic infractions and initiated a traffic stop. Officer Shinn asked the driver of the vehicle to roll down the windows, and the driver complied. Officer William McInerney assisted on the passenger side of the vehicle. Inside the vehicle, sixteen-year-old T.W. was seated in the rear passenger seat, while another passenger was seated in the front passenger seat. Both the driver and front-seat passenger were adults. When Officer McInerney asked T.W. for his name and information, T.W. provided a false first name and "a couple of date of births." Tr. Vol. II p. 26.
[¶3] Officer Shinn detected the odor of raw marijuana from inside the vehicle and noticed a black "buffer tube" behind the driver's seat of the vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. Officer Shinn alerted Officer McInerney to the presence of the buffer tube, which Officer McInerney also recognized as a buffer tube, commonly associated with a rifle. Officer McInerney observed that there was a "tan backpack, that was kind of on the seat, kind of falling off the seat," that appeared to be "leaning up against what ended up being an AR pistol that ... had a buffer tube." Tr. Vol. II. p. 27. The firearm attached to the buffer tube was largely "concealed with a backpack" on top of it. Tr. Vol. II p. 43. The buffer tube was "sticking out the back end" of the firearm while the muzzle "would have been on the floorboard." Tr. Vol. II p. 26.
[¶4] As the driver was exiting the vehicle, Officer McInerney observed that T.W. "made a couple movements towards the left, um, where the gun was," so he opened the door and had T.W. step out of the vehicle until another officer arrived. Tr. Vol. II p. 27. During the subsequent search of the vehicle, the officers found marijuana in the center console, an "AR pistol" with a buffer tube behind the driver's seat, a "Draco style pistol" inside the backpack that was on top of the AR pistol, a "handgun with an extended magazine" on the front passenger floorboard, and a "little green gum wrapper that had ... a wet powder in it." Tr. Vol. II pp. 28, 29.
[¶5] On September 6, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition, in which it alleged that T.W. had committed the following acts: Level 6 felony cocaine possession, Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm, and Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession. At the delinquency hearing, the State dismissed the allegation involving cocaine possession.
[¶6] Also at the delinquency hearing, Officer Shinn testified that it would not have been difficult for T.W. to have reached the firearms behind the driver's seat and reduced them to his control from his position in the rear passenger seat of the vehicle. T.W. testified that he had initially provided Officer McInerney with a false first name but had provided his correct first name after he had stepped out of the vehicle. T.W. also testified that he is familiar with firearms.
[¶7] Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court entered a true finding only on the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm allegation. Following a disposition hearing on April 17, 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated T.W. to be a delinquent and closed the case with no services ordered.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] T.W. contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his juvenile adjudication. The standard of review for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile adjudication is the same as for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an adult criminal conviction. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001).
When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to juvenile adjudications, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. K.D. v. State, 754 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of delinquency on appeal. J.D.P. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006).D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied.
[¶9] To prove that T.W. was a delinquent for committing what would otherwise be a criminal act, dangerous possession of a firearm, the State was required to prove that T.W. was a child, i.e., a person less than eighteen years old, and that he had "knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly" possessed a firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, T.W. contends that the State failed to prove that he had possessed a firearm.
[¶10] "Possession can be actual or constructive." Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 273 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). Because T.W. did not have actual possession of any of the firearms at the time of the encounter with the police, we must determine whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove that T.W. had constructively possessed either of the firearms that were recovered from the rear of the vehicle. Id. "For the State to prove constructive possession, it must prove the defendant had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. To prove intent to maintain dominion and control, there must be additional circumstances supporting the inference of intent." Id. (internal citations omitted).
[¶11] [I]f a defendant's possession of the premises on which the contraband is found is not exclusive, then the inference of the intent to maintain dominion and control must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. The following types of evidence are among those that demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of the presence of a firearm: (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) proximity of the contraband to the defendant, (4) location of the firearm within the defendant's plain view, and (5) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant. This list of circumstances is not exhaustive, as other circumstances can just as reasonably demonstrate the requisite knowledge.Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
[¶12] T.W. contends that the State failed to prove that he had the intent to maintain dominion and control over the weapons. Examining the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the adjudication, we disagree, and as an initial matter, note that many of the factors listed above are present in this case. T.W. first provided Officer McInerney with a false first name and "a couple of date of births" when asked for his information, which are incriminating as the statements support an inference of guilt. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. See Williams, 240 N.E.3d at 1291 (providing that "[t]he giving of a false name is a form of flight and thus evidence of consciousness of guilt") (internal quotation and citations omitted). Review of the record reveals that, as Officer McInerney asked T.W. for his name and information, he heard Officer Shinn asking the driver "for his information," which Officer Shinn testified, often includes asking whether "there are any narcotics or weapons in the car[.]" Tr. Vol. II pp. 26, 35. Although T.W. offers several reasons for which he may have provided the false identifying information to police, the juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to determine whether T.W.'s act demonstrated a consciousness of guilt or was done for some other reason. See D.W., 903 N.E.2d at 968.
[¶13] T.W. was also undisputedly in close proximity to both the AR pistol and the Draco-style pistol located in the backpack behind the driver's seat, and, after the driver was removed from the vehicle, T.W. made "movements towards the left" near the weapons. Tr. Vol. II p. 27. Despite T.W.'s argument that this movement was more like an indication of nervousness than a furtive movement, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that T.W.'s movement toward the weapons nearby was, in fact, a furtive movement.
[¶14] Finally, the buffer tube, which was attached to the AR pistol underneath the driver's seat, was within the plain view of both officers on the scene, and T.W. testified at the delinquency hearing that he is familiar with firearms. This supports a reasonable inference that T.W. had also recognized the buffer tube, in plain view near him in the backseat of the vehicle, as part of a gun.
[¶15] Considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that T.W. had the intent to maintain dominion and control over the guns. It is undisputed that T.W. had the capability. The evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain T.W.'s juvenile adjudication. T.W.'s arguments to the contrary effectively amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d at 968.
[¶16] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Kenworthy, J., and Felix, J., concur.