Opinion
Case No. 2015-CV-0343
08-11-2017
Deion L. Turner, Plaintiff, v. S.A. Godinez, et al, Defendants.
Motion For Relief From Fraud And Void Orders and Judgment
NOW COMES The Plaintiff, , Pro Se (herein "Turner"), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rules 60(b)(3) & (4), Relief from Judgment or Order and respectfully moves this Honorable Court for Relief from fraud and its void orders and judgment of May 3rd, 2016. Thereof said in support, Turner states as follows:
Pro Se litigants' court submission are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. Holding Pro Se petition can not be held in same standards as pleading drafted by attorneys. The courts provide Pro Se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers. When interpreting Pro Se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what relief the Pro Se party desires. Courts have special obligation to construe Pro Se litigants' pleadings liberally.
This Court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the reasons of fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party and/or judgment is void. S.H.A. FRCP Rules 60(b)(3) & (4).
This Court, May 3rd, 2016, renders orders and judgment based on, void State Court orders and judgments, The Captioned Defendants' active steps of conspiracy, deception, selective enforcement, fraud and misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, denying Turner equal protection required and prescribed by, The August 7th, 2002 in effect, Illinois Statute 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) &150/3, through judicial interpretation of laws to purport innocent acts criminal, reviewed, changed and rejected the October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment rendered by said 97CR29533 State Court, finding and ordering: October 21st, 1998 said 97CR29533 State Court could not and did not convict Turner of nor for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) and did not acquitted Turner of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), does not and did not prescribes nor describes the offense, "(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he...(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration...and (2) The person knows he...is related to the other person as ...(iii) Stepfather...when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed... Class 3 Felony." (West 1997); and this court found that in facts, said 97CR29533 State Court, convicted Turner of and for committing the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 prescribes and describes the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; sexual relations within family is a criminal offense prescribed and described by The Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 and Criminal Code of 1961; upon Turner's release from IDOC, August 7th, 2002, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) does not and could not prescribes and describes the offense sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), nor defines nor prescribes nor describes "Duty to register, Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register.... any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997. (West 2002)." not a sex offense; The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) as amended, altered by legislative enactment, that took effect August 22nd, 2002, prescribes and describes, August 7th, 2002, the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offense; Turner being convicted by said 97CR29533 State Court for committing the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offender subjected to and required to register under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, upon Turner's release on August 7th, 2002; and Turner sought to over turn his conviction by said 97CR29533 State Court of and for the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11.
Applicable Legal Facts & Rights:
1. The U.S. Code Title 42 Section 1983, requires and prescribes, " Civil action for deprivation of rights-Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...."
2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decision; only the Supreme Court has the authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284; Rooker v. Fidelity Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16; GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F. 2d 726, 728. Precisely stated, the doctrine bars "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgment rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" Exxon Mobile Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
3. Obstruction of justice occurrence when two or more persons conspire to impeded, hindered, obstructed and defeated the due course of justice. U.S. Code Title 42 Sections: 1985(2) 'Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights' "....(2) Obstructing Justice;...or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing and defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of law, The rights of access to the courts is not limited to protecting rights of access to justice of only those individuals who will ultimately prevail in judicial process but it reaches conspiracy, misconduct and unjustified acts and actions which impedes the due course of justice with the intent to deny the individual equal protection of the law. This assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights, rights to seek judicial redress is granted not only in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, but also in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and acts of deception, obstruction and intimidation in connection with judicial proceedings are violations of the due process and equal protection clauses and give raise to legal actions under U.S. Code 42 Section 1985. First Amendment, U.S.C., See Bell, 746 F.2d 1205; Also See McTigue, 60 F.3d 381, 382. Conduct which interrupts or delay or hinders prison's to pursue their legal claims and/or litigations before the courts denies access to the courts and obstructs justice. Murillo v. Page, 294 Ill. App. 3d 860; Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289; Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388; Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351.
4. The 14th Amendments secures and guarantees rights of due process of and equal protection under the law, Due Process Clause provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty nor property without due process of law. U.S. Constitution Amendment Fourteen Section One, has a substantive and a procedural component which are defined by law as follows: (1) Procedural Due Process limitation does not require that the government refrain from making a substantive choice to infringe upon a person's life, liberty or property interest, it simple requires that the government provide Due Process before making such a decision. The goals is to minimize the risk of substantive error, to assure fairness in the decision making process and to assure that the individual affected has a participatory role in the process, many procedural due process claims are grounded on violations of State-Created Rights (See Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487.) and (2) Substantive Due Process, serves the goal of preventing government power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used and Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws", empowering the judiciary to enforce that principle against the states. See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665; Also See Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343. The Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".The Equal Protection Clause can be seen as an attempt to secure the promise of the United States' professed commitment to the proposition that "all men are created equal" by empowering the judiciary to enforce that principle against the states. Portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that prohibits discrimination by state government institutions. The clause grants all people "equal protection of the laws," which means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another. Jackson, 646 N.E.2d 1299. To sufficiently show one person was treated unequally than another similarly saturated person states a constitutional right violation, to establish the violation, discrimination against one person in favor of another with no rational basis for the differentiation in treatment must be shown. Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F.Supp. 1252; Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771; Oyler v. Boles, 82 S.Ct. 501, 505-06; Whren, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774.
5. It is settled that a void judgment is one which has no legal force nor effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected, any time and during any proceedings, directly or collaterally. Judgment is void judgment when the court rendering the judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law or exceed its power to render the particular judgment and may be challenged through direct review or in collateral proceedings. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149; People v. Appellate Court, 48 Ill. 2d 195, 197; Thaver v. Village of Downer Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339; C.J.S. Criminal Law Section 150; H. Black, The Law of Judgments, Section 258; Armstrong v. Obucino , 300 Ill. 140, 143-33. It is well settled that a void judgment may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally without any showing of diligence nor a meritorious defense offense. R.W. Sawant & Co., v. Allied Programs Corp.,111 Ill.2d. 304, 309; City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill.2d 108, 112; Franciso v. Franciso , 39 Ill.Dec. 153. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can never be presumed, never be waived and cannot be constructed even by mutual consent of the parties. Smith v. Jones , 113 Ill.2d 126. The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. [Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine, Inc., 254 U.S. 348]. Any order or judgment based on a void order or judgment is void. English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736; Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343. Any attempt by officer of the court to deceive is considered fraud, when the attempt to deceive occurs in a judicial proceeding, it is fraud upon the court, denies that court subject matter jurisdiction, (In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393), and violations of due process, and any resulting judgment to be void. Sterling,337 Ill. 354; Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill.2d at 245. A void order or judgment has no legal force or effect, there can be no time limit within which to challenge the order or judgment. Further since the order or judgment has no legal force or effect, it can be repeatedly challenged, since no judge has the lawful authority to make a void order or judgment valid. Bates v. Board of Education, 136 Ill. D 260, 267. Res Judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment, Allcock v. Allcock , 62 Ill.Dec. 865, 437 N.E.2d 392.
6. The District Court usurps its power when the District Court renders orders and judgments over matters beyond the scope of authority granted to the District Court by law and Constitution. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F. 3d 1311, 1331; Ben Sager Chemicals International, Inc., 560 F. 2d 805. District Court orders and judgments rendered based upon misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, by an official of the court, during court proceedings is fraud upon the court, Fraud upon the court denies due process of the law with the intent to deny equal protection under the law, fraud upon the court is directed to the judicial machinery itself, to embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, and is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication. Kenner, 387 F.2d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, Section 60.23. Essence a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, never becomes final and void. Orders and judgments Based on void orders and judgments are void. Austin, 312 F. 2d 337, 343.
7. Selective enforcement is the ability that executors of the law have to arbitrarily select choice individuals as being outside of the law. The use of enforcement discretion in an arbitrary way is referred to as selective enforcement or selective prosecution. Selective enforcement is recognized as sign of tyranny, and an abuse of power, because it violates rule of law, allowing men to apply justice only when they chose. Aside from this being inherently unjust, it almost inevitably must lead to favoritism and extortion. See Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562; Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F. 3d 767; U.S. v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480; Oyler v. Boles, 82 S. Ct. 501.
8. Conspiracy is when two or more persons or entities in concert, agreement or combination commit unlawful acts or commit lawful acts by unlawful means or continue the offense where overt acts are performed in the furtherance of the conspiracy. The principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong or injury upon another and an overt act that results in damages, it is not needed that all co-conspirers know each other, in cases of conspiracy, the period of statutes of limitations begin to run upon the final overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F. 2d 600; Rotermund v. United States, 474 F. 2d 1139; Adickes v. Kress & Co., 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608-18; Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F. 2d 872, 875. In order to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy, plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence of the agreement between conspirators, circumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy, absent the testimony of a co-conspirator, it is unlikely that direct evidence of conspiratorial agreement will exist. Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can infer from the circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had a meeting of the mind and thus reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objective and the period. Adickes, 90 S. Ct. At 1609; Hoffman-LaRoche, 447 F. 2d at 875; See Also United States v. Varelli, 407 F. 2d 735, 741-42.
9. Under the 8th amendment, a person is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when said person is penalized through consecutive sentence for a crime not specified by statute as requiring consecutive sentence for that said crime. S.H.A. 8th Amendment, U.S.C. Illinois Statute, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, states in relevant part,
"(a) ...The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was...a violation of Section 12-13 or 12-14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, [i.e., criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault,] in which the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively."A criminal sentence that is in conflict with statutory guidelines is void. See Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1206; Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 427; Steinbrecher, 759 N.E.2d 509, 531. To establish and substantiate consecutive sentence was in violation of 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, where a trial court imposes a sentence not authorized by statute, the sentence is void and may be attacked at any time. See Williams, 263 Ill.App.3d 1098, 1108, 638 N.E.2d 207, 214. Turner was convicted of two counts of sexual relations within families, in violations of Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), by 97CR29533 State Court, October 21st, 1998, committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, the offenses for which Turner was convicted are not violations of Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/12-13 nor 5/12-14 nor offenses of sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault, said 97CR29533 State Court, October 21st, 1998, may not impose consecutive sentences for the two convictions for sexual relations within families, in violations of Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), in conflict with statutory, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, guidelines. In denials of due process of Illinois Statute, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, said 97CR29533 State Court, October 21st, 1998, consecutive sentence Turner for his convictions for sexual relations within families, in violations of Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) and denied equal protection under Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 and 8th Amendment, U.S.C. Thereafter, said 97CR29533 State Court, October 21st, 1998, ordered consecutive sentences were in violation of 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, consecutive sentences not authorized by statute, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4, issued in conflict with statutory guidelines of Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 and 8th Amendment, U.S.C., and void. A void order or judgment is void even before reversal. [Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine, Inc., 254 U.S. 348]. Any order or judgment based on a void order or judgment is void. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736; Austin, 312 F.2d 337, 343. Orders and judgments rendered, between October 21st, 1998 and May 3rd, 2016, by Illinois Circuit Court, Cases Nos. 05CR25895, 10CR5017, 11CR18762, under any other cases, based on the orders and judgment rendered, October 21st, 1998, by said 97CR29533 State Court, are void.
10. Clearly established standards of Illinois law, requires and prescribes: Any attempt by officer of the court to deceive is considered fraud, when the attempt to deceive occurs in a judicial proceeding, it is fraud upon the court, denies that court subject matter jurisdiction and violations of due process, and any resulting judgment to be void. See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393; Sterling,337 Ill. 354; Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill.2d at 245. A void order or judgment is void even before reversal. [Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine, Inc., 254 U.S. 348]. Res Judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment, Allcock v. Allcock, 62 Ill.Dec. 865, 437 N.E.2d 392. A criminal sentence that is in conflict with statutory guidelines is void. See Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1206; Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 427; Steinbrecher, 759 N.E.2d 509, 531; Any order or judgment based on a void order or judgment is void. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736; Austin, 312 F.2d 337, 343. Law enforcement authorities have no descretion to determine which offender would be an offender prescribed by, subject to nor sex offender under The Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act ("The Act"), 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/3 (See Lanni, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854; Logan, 705 N.E, 2d 152.); Amendments to The Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., are not retroactive nor punitive and does not apply to the offender to whom was subjected to the section before it was amended. (See United States v. Barberg, 311 F. 3d 862; People v. Craig, 374 Ill. App. 3d 375.); Illinois statutes 720 ILCS 5/3-4 states in relevant part, "Effect of former prosecution. A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if that former prosecution: (1) resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction; (2) was terminated by a final orderor judgment, even if entered before trial, that required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or (3) was terminated improperly after the jury was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court." Former jeopardy is not limited to Double Jeopardy claims, but includes statutorily prescribe situation in which former prosecution is asserted as bar to subsequent prosecution. S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/3-3; See People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516; People v. Franklin, 159 Ill. App. 3d 56. Applicability of common law. No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code (Criminal Code of 1961) or in another statute of this State. However, this provision does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or civil judgment. S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/1-3. Illinois Law has found a Registrant has not failed to register under The Act, when Registrant reported at a registration unit and made a good-faith effort to register and was turned away due to the officer's refusal to complete the registration, for reasons other than any voluntary act by the Registrant. Clearly established standards of Illinois law, establishes and substantiates there is NO Offense defining nor prescribing nor describing an offense of sexual relations with in family, sexual relations with in family is not defined nor prescribed nor described in nor by Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 nor The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 nor The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq. The offense of sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age is an offense defined, prescribed and described under and by Illinois, Criminal Code of 1961, Statutes, 720 ILCS 5/12-13, 5/12-13, 5/12-14, 5/12-15 and The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq.
11. Clearly established standards of Federal law requires and prescribes: 5th Amendment, U.S. Constitution, prohibits persons from being retried and placed in jeopardy twice for convicted and acquitted offenses, The Eight amendment, U.S.C., prohibits, a person from being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment of penalized through consecutive sentence for a crime not specified requiring consecutive sentence by statute for said crime and Article I Sections 9 & 10, U.S.C. prescribes and prohibits the judicial interpretation of laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused. Beazell v. State of Ohio, 269 U.S.167, 170; Stogne, 539 U.S. 607; Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 49.
12. The Circuit Court of Cook County (herein "State Court"), October 21st, 1998, under Cause No. 97CR29533, found Turner guilty and consecutive sentenced him, ten (10) years, to Illinois Department of Corrections (herein "IDOC") for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), ("(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he...(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration...and (2) The person knows he...is related to the other person as ...(iii) Stepfather...when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed... Class 3 Felony." (West 1997).), no date Turner committed said convicted offense, was stated nor promulgated by said 97CR29533 State Court, See Attachment "A", and said 97CR29533 court found Turner not guilty and acquitted him of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and sexual abuse. Turner, August 7th, 2002, was lawfully released from prison, IDOC, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (herein "The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act"), 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) and 150/3, as ordered October 21st, 1998, by said 97CR29533 State Court.
13. Upon Turner's August 7th, 2002 lawfully released from prison, IDOC, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act. The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act requires and prescribes: Duty to register...Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register....any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997. Establishing law enforcement authorities have no descretion to determine which offender would be an offender prescribed by, subject to nor sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, Thereof said, due to Turner's October 21st, 1998, conviction and acquitted offenses, as rendered by said 97CR29533 State Court, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act requires and prescribes, August 7th, 2002, Turner is not an offender prescribed by nor subjected to nor required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, not during Turner's prison incarceration, between Oct. 21st, 1998 and August 7th, 2002, not on nor before nor after August 7th, 2002, immune thereon.
14. Upon Turner's, August 7th, 2002, lawfully released from IDOC, in conspiracy, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, IDOC, under 730 ILCS 150/4, descretionary, selectively enforced, unlawfully promulgated Turner is an offender defined by, prescribed by, subject to and required to register, sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8), due to Turner was convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual relations within family, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, See Attachments "B", in concert, agreement and combination, The ISP promulgated Turner is an offender defined by, prescribed by, subject to and required to register, sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, due to Turner was convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations with person 13 years of age, See Attachments "C" and The CPD, August 20th, 2002, descretionary, selectively enforced and promulgated Turner to register under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, due to Turner is an offender defined by, prescribed by, subject to and required to register, sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act.. See Attachments "D". When law enforcement authorities have no descretion to determine which offender would be an offender prescribed by, subject to nor sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8), 150/3, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8), 150/3, legal definition, "Duty to register...Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register....any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997," sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) not a sex offense, said 97CR29533 State Court Oct. 21st, 1998 orders and judgment, convicted Turner of the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii)-(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he...(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration...and (2) The person knows he...is related to the other person as ...(iii) Stepfather...when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed... Class 3 Felony. (West 1997)-no date Turner committed said convicted offense is stated nor promulgated by said 97CR29533 court, Said 97CR29533 Circuit Court found Turner not guilty and acquitted him of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse and Turner completing his, October 21st, 1998, ordered, ten (10) years, said 97CR29533 Circuit Court ordered, consecutive sentence, was lawful release from prison, IDOC, August 7th, 2002, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act. See Lanni, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854; Logan, 705 N.E, 2d 152. Establishing and substantiating, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, The Captioned Defendants, in conspiracy, descretionary, through deception, acts and actions of fraud, selectively enforced and illegally promulgated misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, knowingly and internally unlawfully prescribed Turner to be an offender subject to and unlawfully required Turner to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act.
15. On August 22nd, 2002, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) was amended to state, "Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997. S.H.A. Pub. Act 92-928 Section 5 eff. August 22,2002. See 2016 IL App(1st) 133536-U. Removing the part, "when the victim was a person under 18 years of age". See Attachments "E". Amendments to The Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., are not retroactive nor punitive and does not apply to the offender to whom was subjected to the section before it was amended. See Barberg, 311 F. 3d 862; Craig, 374 Ill. App. 3d 375. Which can not be retroactively nor punitively purport to make The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) requirement and definition that Turner's convicted offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), is not a sex offense to a sex offense resulting from the altered by legislative enactment, August 22nd, 2002, after The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8), legal definition, "Duty to register...Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register....any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997," of the offense, after the fact The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) , defines Turner as an offender not defined nor prescribed nor subject to nor required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) , to the disadvantage of Turner of not being a sex offender defined by The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) See Beazell, 269 U.S.167, 170; Stogne, 539 U.S. 607; Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 49.
Statement of Facts:
16. During proceeding, before The Circuit Court Of Cook County under Causes No. 05CR25895, No.10CR5017 & No.11CR18762, said State Court rendered its decision based on The Captioned Defendants' active steps of conspiracy, descretion, deception, fraud and unlawful and illegal promulgated misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, Turner was/is convicted by 97CR29533 State Court for sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual relations within family, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, who said convicted offense is defined, prescribed, subjected to and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, Fraud Upon Said State Court, (In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393) violations of due process, and any resulting judgment to be void. Sterling,337 Ill. 354; Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill.2d at 245. Void order or judgment are void even before reversal. [Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine, Inc., 254 U.S. 348]. Which may be challenged through direct review or in collateral proceedings. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149; C.J.S. Criminal Law Section 150; H. Black, The Law of Judgments, Section 258; Armstrong v. Obucino , 300 Ill. 140, 143-33. Any order or judgment based on a void order or judgment is void. English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736; Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343. Obstructions of justice, through denials of due process of and equal protection under the laws, in violations of the U.S. Code Titles 42 Sections 1985(2) & 1986, Article I sections 9 & 10, 5th & 14th Amendments, U.S. Constitution. Res Judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment, Allcock v. Allcock , 62 Ill.Dec. 865, 437 N.E.2d 392.
17. During proceedings, December 8th, 2016, before the First Judicial District Appellate Court of Illinois, Appeal Case No. 1-15-1764, See Attachments "E", it was found and substantiated, by said Appellate Court, Turner has been and is being, retroactively and punitively, purportedly selectively enforced to be defined, prescribed, subjected and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, due to and caused by The Court's judicial interpretation of the amendment to The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), altered by legislative enactment, effective as of August 22nd, 2002, after the facts: Turner, August 7th, 2002, lawful released from prison, IDOC, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act; The Captioned Defendants, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, descretionary, selectively enforced, Turner to be an offender defined, prescribed, subjected and required to register under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), based on and caused by their, Captioned Defendants', descretionary selectively enforced promulgated misrepresentations, misinformation and false facts, Turner was/is convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; when The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), defined, prescribed and described Turner not to be a sex offender due to and caused by Turner was convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), no date Turner committed said convicted offense was/is stated nor promulgated by said 97CR29533 court and said 97CR29533 court found Turner not guilty and acquitted him of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and sexual abuse, to the disadvantage of Turner. See Barberg, 311 F. 3d 862; Craig, 374 Ill. App. 3d 375; Beazell v. State of Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170; Stogne, 539 U.S. 607; Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 49.
18. Each Captioned Defendants, in conspiracy, through descretion, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, knowingly and internally selectively enforced, committed deception, fraud, took active steps, to illegally and unlawfully, determine, establish and substantiate, misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts, Turner was/is convicted in 1998 for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-11, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age and upon his, Turner's, August 7th, 2002, lawful release from prison, IDOC, a sex offender as defined, required and prescribed by The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, promulgated and selectively enforced, August 7th, 2002, Turner was/is convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual relations within family, violating 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Turner was convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations with person 13 years of age, August 20th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016 Turner is an offender defined by, prescribed by, subject to and required to register, sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, due to Turner was/is convicted in 1998 for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-11, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age and upon his, Turner's, August 7th, 2002, lawful release from prison, IDOC, a sex offender as defined, required and prescribed by The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, caused and brought about fraud upon said 05CR25895, 10CR5017 & 11CR18762 State Court and fraud upon this court.
19. The Captioned Defendants, May 3rd, 2016, after failing to convict Turner, October 21st, 1998 in 97CR29533 State Court, of child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and sexual abuse, in conspiracy, took active steps of deception, fraud, selective enforcement, unlawful promulgated misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts, before This Court, complaining of injuries caused by 97CR29533 State Court October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment, inviting This Court to review and rejection of the said 97CR29533 State Court October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment. The Captioned Defendants selectively enforced and illegally promulgated, before This Court, deception, fraud, unlawful misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts, The said 97CR29533 State Court, October 21st, 1998, convicted Turner for violation of Illinois, Criminal Code of 1961, Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, prescribing and describing the offense of sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, upon Turner's release from IDOC, August 7th, 2002, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, prescribes and describes the offense, violating said Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, of sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, as a criminal and sex offense, which subjects and requires Turner to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, on August 7th, 2002 and after. The Captioned Defendants, also claims, Turner before This Court, as Turner has done before many other courts, filed claims seeking relief, due to he should not have been convicted of the sexual relations within family offense, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, criminal and sex offense, violating said Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11 & 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., and seeks to overturn his, Turner's, October 21st, 1998 97CR29533 State Court conviction offense of sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating said Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11. Turner can not seek to over turn a conviction for an offense he, Turner, was not convicted nor an offense not defined nor prescribed nor described by Illinois Statute nor Criminal Code of 1961 nor The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., Fraud Upon This Court and denying This Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction. See Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284; Rooker v. Fidelity Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16; GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F. 2d 726, 728.
20. Each Captioned Defendants, in conspiracy, May 3rd, 2016, knowingly and internally unlawfully and illegally promulgated and selectively enforced deception, fraud, misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts: Turner was convicted in 1998 for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-11, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, When official documentation in their possession, establishes and substantiates State Court, October 21st, 1998, under Cause No. 97CR29533, found Turner guilty and sentenced him to IDOC for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), there is no offense sexual relations within family prescribed nor described by Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 nor the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 nor The Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq.; and The Captioned Defendants, after his, Turner's, August 7th, 2002, lawful release, knowingly and internally promulgated and selectively enforced misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts Turner is a sex offender as defined, required and prescribed by The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) and due to the amendment to The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, altered by legislative enactment, effective August 22nd, 2002, causes Turner to be defined, prescribed, subjected to and required to register, sex offender, under The August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act. When Said 97CR29533 State Court, records, establishes and substantiates no date Turner committed said convicted offense is stated nor promulgated, found Turner not guilty and acquitted him, Turner, of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and sexual abuse and Turner, August 7th, 2002, was lawfully released from prison, IDOC, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, as ordered October 21st, 1998, by said 97CR29533 State Court. The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) and 150/3, August 7th, 2002, requires and prescribes: Duty to register...Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register....any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997 and does not define nor describe nor prescribe any sex offense of sexual relations within family, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq. Thereof said, where clearly established standards of Illinois law, Lanni, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854; Logan, 705 N.E, 2d 152, requires and prescribes law enforcement authorities have no descretion to determine which offender would be an offender prescribed by, subject to nor sex offender under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., due to Turner's, October 21st, 1998, said 97CR29533 State Court ordered conviction and acquitted offenses, his, Turner's, August 7th, 2002, lawful release from prison, IDOC, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act and The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8) and 150/3, defines, requires and prescribes, August 7th, 2002, Turner is not a sex offender, not an offender prescribed by nor subjected to nor required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, not a sex offender, not during Turner's prison incarceration, between Oct. 21st, 1998 and August 7th, 2002, nor on nor before nor after August 7th, 2002. S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/3-4; 720 ILCS 5/3-3; 720 ILCS 5/1-3; See People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516; People v. Franklin, 159 Ill. App. 3d 56; United States v. Barberg, 311 F. 3d 862; People v. Craig, 374 Ill. App. 3d 375; Beazell v. State of Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170; Stogne, 539 U.S. 607; Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 49. Federal law prohibits the judicial interpretation of laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the Turner. Beazell, 269 U.S.167, 170; Stogne, 539 U.S. 607; Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 49. The Captioned Defendants, May 3rd, 2016, knowingly and internally committed Obstructions of Justice, present void orders and judgments, as caused by their fraud upon, said 05CR25895, 10CR5017 & 11CR18762 State Court and Fraud Upon This Court and This Court based and rendered its final orders and judgment, dismissing these proceedings, May 3rd, 2016, through void orders and judgments, violations of the 14th Amendment, U.S.C., Obstructions of Justice and Fraud Upon This Court, committed and carried-out from and by The Captioned Defendants.
21. Each Captioned Defendants, in conspiracy, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, took active steps of unlawful descretion, selective enforcement, deception, fraud, committed unlawful promulgation of misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts and fraud upon said 05CR25895, 10CR5017 & 11CR18762 State Court , in violations of the 14th Amendment, U.S.C., deprived and denied Turner rights, privileges, and immunities granted and secured him by and under due process of said 97CR29533 State Court Oct. 21st, 1998 orders and judgment, conviction of the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) and acquittals of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and sexual abuse, Federal law, not to be placed in jeopardy twice for convicted and acquitted offenses, not to be prosecuted for an innocent acts made criminal after the legal definition of the offense and State laws, not to be prosecuted for an offense nor a crime, not prescribed nor described by Illinois Statute nor Criminal Code nor The Act, not to be prosecuted twice for the same offense, based upon the same facts, and Equal Protection under Illinois Statutes, 720 ILCS 5/1-3, 5/3-3, 5/3-4, 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), August 7th, 2002 in effect Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8), 150/3 & 150/6, Fifth Amendment U.S.C. and Article I Sections 9 & 10, U.S.C., in violations of The 14th Amendment of The U.S. Constitution. The Captioned Defendants, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, conspired and impeded, hindered, obstructed and defeated the due course of justice with intent to deny Turner equal protection of the laws and to injure him. S.H.A. Title 42 Sections 1985(2) & 1986; See People v. Thomann, 197 Ill. App. 3d 516; People v. Franklin, 159 Ill. App. 3d 56. The Captioned Defendants, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, and before This Court, knowingly and internally committed and carried-out acts of deception, obstruction, intimidation and selective enforcement in connection with these judicial proceedings, denying Turner due process, the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, access to This Court, obstructing justice and injured Turner.
22. During these proceedings and before this Court, May 3rd, 2016, Each Captioned Defendants, in conspiracy, knowingly and internally, unlawfully promulgated and selectively enforced deception, fraud, misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts, Turner was convicted in 1998 for violating 720 ILCS 5/11-11, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age. That after his, Turner's, lawful release, August 7th, 2002, due to said conviction, a sex offender defined, prescribed and required by The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. In order to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy, Turner is not required to provide direct evidence of the agreement between conspirators, circumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy, absent the testimony of a co-conspirator, it is unlikely that direct evidence of conspiratorial agreement will exist. Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can infer from the circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had a meeting of the mind and thus reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objective. See Adickes, 90 S. Ct. At 1609; Hoffman-LaRoche, 447 F. 2d at 875; See Also United States v. Varelli, 407 F. 2d 735, 741-42. Turner can provide adequate proof that The Captioned Defendants, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, in conspiracy, took active steps of deception, selective enforcement, fraud, misinformation, misrepresentations and false facts to cause Turner to be illegally and unlawfully defined, prescribed, subjected and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act and Turner was denied an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, before This Court, to present said proofs. Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487. This Court based and rendered its final orders and judgment, dismissing these proceedings, May 3rd, 2016, through denying Turner an opportunity to be heard before a jury and present said proofs of said conspiracy of The Captioned Defendants. This Court usurps its power, render orders and judgment, without due process of law.
23. This Court, May 3rd, 2016, based on The Captioned Defendants' active steps of conspiracy, deception, selective enforcement, fraud, misrepresentations, misinformation, false facts and void orders and judgments rendered from and by Cook County Circuit Court under Cases No.05CR25895, No.10CR5017 No.11CR18762, reviewed, changed and rejected the October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment rendered by said 97CR29533 State Court, without subject matter jurisdiction, finding and ordering: October 21st, 1998 said 97CR29533 State Court could not and did not convict Turner of nor for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii) and did not acquitted Turner of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), does not and did not prescribes nor describes the offense, "(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he...(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration...and (2) The person knows he...is related to the other person as ...(iii) Stepfather...when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed... Class 3 Felony." (West 1997); and this court found that in facts, said 97CR29533 State Court, convicted Turner of and for committing the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 prescribes and describes the offense, sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age; sexual relations within family is a criminal offense prescribed and described by The Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, Criminal Code of 1961 and The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act; upon Turner's release from IDOC, August 7th, 2002, The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) does not and could not prescribes and describes the offense sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), nor defines nor prescribes nor describes "Duty to register, Section 3, (730 ILCS 150/3), A sex offender, as defined in Section 2....shall register.... any person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this Article because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned in Illinois on or after January 1, 1996, of The Act, shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole or release; Section 2, (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8)) "For purposes of this Section, "convicted" shall have the same meaning as "adjudicated"... (B) As used in this Article, "sex offense" means...(1.8) A violation or attempted violation of Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families) [720 ILCS 5/11-11] of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the offense was committed on or after June 1, 1997. (West 2002)." not a sex offense; The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) as amended, that took effect August 22nd, 2002, prescribes and describes the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offense; Turner being convicted by said 97CR29533 State Court for committing the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, a sex offender subjected to and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, upon Turner's release on August 7th, 2002; and This Court, May 3rd, 2016, found Turner sought to over turn his conviction by said 97CR29533 State Court of and for the offense sexual relations within family, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11. This Court based and rendered its final orders and judgment, dismissing these proceedings, May 3rd, 2016, hearing appeals from said 97CR29533 State Court decision, reversing and modifying said 97CR29533 State Court orders and judgment. This Court usurps of its power, rendered orders and judgment over matters beyond the scope of authority granted This Court by law and Constitution, on void orders and judgments, without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, acts inconsistence with due process of and in denials of equal protection under the laws.
Conclusion:
24. Thereof said, This Court, May 3rd, 2016, usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, through selective enforcement, based on void 05CR25895, 10CR5017, 11CR18762 State Court orders and judgments, by reviewing, rejecting and changing 97CR29533 State Court October 21st, 1998 orders and judgment, denying due process of orders and judgment, rendered October21st, 1998, 97CR29533 State Court, Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), The August 7th, 2002 in effect, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8) and denying equal protection under Illinois Statutes 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), The August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq., 150/2 et seq., 150/2(B)(1.8) &150/3, U.S. Title 42 Sections 1985(2) & 1986, Article I Sections 9 & 10, 5th and 14th Amendments, U.S.C. through judicial interpretation of Illinois laws and Statutes, 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), The August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8) to descretionary purport, a defined, prescribed and described, non-sex offense to be a defined, prescribed and described, sex offense, after the fact, to the disadvantage of Turner, over matters beyond the scope of authority granted to This Court by law and Constitution:
(1) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, dismissing these proceedings, May 3rd, 2016, by hearing appeals from said 97CR29533 State Court decision, reversing and modifying said 97CR29533 State Court orders and judgment, in violations of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine;
(2) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, without subject matter jurisdiction, based on Fraud Upon This Court, Turner sought to over turn his conviction for the offense, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual
relations within family, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, he, Turner, was not convicted, an offense not defined nor prescribed nor described by Illinois Statute, 720 ILCS 5/11-11 nor Criminal Code of 1961 nor The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq.;
(3) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, based on fraud upon This Court, from and by, officials of this court, The Captioned Defendants, between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016, descretionary, selective enforcement, that Turner is an offender defined, prescribed, subjected and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), based on fraud Turner was/is convicted, by the said 97CR29533 Circuit Court, for sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual relations within family, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11;
(4) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, denying Turner equal protection under Illinois laws and statutes 720 ILCS 5/1-3 and 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), found the offense, sexual relations within family, defines and describes sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, is prescribed and described by Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11, in the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 and The Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq.;
(5) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, through judicial interpretation of the amendment to The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), altered by legislative enactment, effective as of August 22nd, 2002, to retroactively, punitively and descretionary purportedly define Turner to be an offender prescribed, subjected and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, after the fact The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8) defines, prescribes and describes Turner not an offender defined nor prescribed nor required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, to the disadvantage of Turner;
(6) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, based on and caused by The Captioned Defendants' conspiracy between August 7th, 2002 and May 3rd, 2016 and denied Turner due process of the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner to provide adequate proof of The Captioned Defendants' continuance conspiracy;
(7) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, based on void 05CR25895, 10CR5017, 11CR18762 State Court orders and judgments, which were and are obtained through Captioned Defendants' continuance, August 7th, 2002 through May 3rd, 2016, active steps of conspiracy, descretion, selective enforcement, deceptions, fraud and unlawful and illegal promulgated misrepresentation, misinformation and false facts, Turner was/is convicted by 97CR29533 State Court for sexual relations with victim under 18 years of age, sexual relations within family, violating Illinois Statute 720 ILCS 5/11-11 and due to said convicted offense Turner is defined, prescribed, subjected to and required to register,
sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, Fraud Upon Said State Court and This Court;This Court's, May 3rd, 2016, orders and judgment, are rendered through Conspiracy, State Court void orders and judgments, by fraud upon the court, misrepresentation and misconduct committed and carried-out from and by The Captioned Defendants, without subject matter jurisdiction, acts inconsistence with due process, by denying Turner the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, through violation of The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, denials of due process of, equal protection under, the laws and Obstructions of justice, are void.
(8) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, by descretionary, selective enforcement, that Turner is an offender defined, prescribed, subjected and required to register, sex offender, under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8); and
(9) This Court usurps its power, renders orders and judgment, May 3rd, 2016, by denying Turner equal protection under The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.8), defining, describing and prescribing Turner's October 21st, 1998 conviction offense, by said 97CR29533 State Court, for committing the offense, sexual relations, without force nor threats of force, with person 18 years of age or over, sexual relations within families, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-11(a)(1)(2)(iii), no date Turner committed said convicted offense is stated nor promulgated by said 97CR29533 State Court, said 97CR29533 State Court, found Turner not guilty and acquitted him of any and all child sex offenses, sexual relations with victim, person under 18 years of age, sexual assault, criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse, through judicial interpretation of laws to purport said innocent acts criminal, Turner not convicted of the offense sexual relations within family and lawfully released from prison, IDOC, August 7th, 2002, under the requirements and in effect statutes of The, August 7th, 2002 in effect, Act, 730 ILCS 150/2 et seq., 150/2 (B)(1.8), which defines, prescribes and describes Turner not a sex offense.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth and stated above, the plaintiff, Deion L. Turner, Turner, prays This Honorable Court to issue and enter orders: The Captioned Defendants committed conspiracy and Fraud Upon This Court; This Court rendered its May 3rd, 2016 orders and judgment based on Conspiracy and Fraud Upon This Court; This Court's May 3rd, 2016 orders and judgment are Void; and Any Other Relief This Court Deems Just.
VERIFICATION OF FACTS
I, Deion L. Turner, Plaintiff above captioned cause, under penalty of perjury, declare I have fully read the above 'Motion For Relief From Fraud And Void Orders and Judgment' I have a fully understanding knowledge of issues and matters set forth therein and they are true and correct in fact and substance to the best of my knowledge.
PROOF OF SERVICE
On the 11th day of August, 2017, I, Deion L. Turner, plaintiff, on oath state that I served this notice and true and correct copies of the 'Motion For Relief From Fraud And Void Orders And Judgment' by delivering copies personally to each entity to whom they are directed and/or by mailing copies to each entity to whom they are directed by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, proper postage full prepaid, at the U.S. Postal Depository located at 77TH & Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, on the 11th day of August, 2017, before the hour of 5:00 p.m. Date: August 11th, 2017
/s/_________
Deion L. Turner, 821 East 81st Street Apt 1B
Chicago, Illinois 60620, 312-238-8994
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