Opinion
02-23-00147-CR 02-23-00148-CR
02-01-2024
Sofya Tsygankova, Appellant v. The State of Texas
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 432nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1449284, 1449285.
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Walker, Justice.
Appellant Sofya Tsyangkova appeals the trial court's order renewing her involuntary commitment pursuant to Article 46C of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We will affirm.
In July 2018, Tsygankova was found not guilty by reason of insanity for two offenses of capital murder of two individuals under ten years old. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(8). The trial court found that these offenses involved conduct that caused serious bodily injury to another person, placed another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, or consisted of a threat of serious bodily injury to another person through the use of a deadly weapon. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 46C.158. Pursuant to Articles 46C.251 and 46C.256 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court ordered that Tsygankova be committed to an inpatient treatment facility. The trial court has renewed annually its inpatient commitment order. See id. art. 46C.261.
Most recently, the trial court's commitment order was set to expire on May 25, 2023. On May 9, 2023, the institution at which Tsygankova is committed filed with the trial court a request for the commitment order to be renewed for another year. In writing and at the May 24, 2023 hearing on this request, Tsygankova objected to the trial court's jurisdiction. She argued that, because the institution filed its request less than thirty days before the expiration of the commitment order as required by Article 46C.261(b), the trial court had no jurisdiction to further renew the order. The trial court overruled her objection and renewed the order for another year. This appeal followed.
In a single issue on appeal, Tsygankova contends, as she did below, that the trial court had no jurisdiction to renew its commitment order because the institution failed to file its renewal request more than thirty days prior to the order's expiration. The State counters that the trial court retained jurisdiction over Tsygankova pursuant to Article 46C.158 of the Code regardless of when the request was filed. We agree with the State.
Commitment proceedings for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity are civil in nature. Campbell v. State, 85 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. 2002); In re Gonzales, No. 13-22-00179-CV, 2022 WL 3652494, at *3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 25, 2022, no. pet.) (mem. op.). The question of jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo. Gleason v. Taub, 180 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
A trial court may order that a person acquitted by reason of insanity be committed to inpatient treatment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.256. It must determine on an annual basis whether to renew its commitment order. Id. art. 46C.261(a). Article 46C.261 provides:
(b) Not later than the 30th day before the date an order is scheduled to expire, the institution to which a person is committed, the person responsible for providing outpatient or community-based treatment and supervision, or the attorney representing the state may file a request that the order be renewed.Id. art. 46C.261(b). Upon receiving a renewal request, the trial court must set the matter for a hearing, appoint an attorney to represent the person, and act on the request before the then-active order expires. Id. art. 46C.261(d), (e). After the hearing, the trial court can renew the order for another year if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that continued mandatory supervision and treatment are appropriate." Id. art 46C.261(h).
Importantly, Article 46C.158 specifically provides for the trial court's continuing jurisdiction if it finds that the acquitted person's conduct was dangerous:
If the court finds that the offense of which the person was acquitted involved conduct that caused serious bodily injury to another person, placed another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, or consisted of a threat of serious bodily injury to another person through the use of a deadly weapon, the court retains jurisdiction over the acquitted person until either:
(1) the court discharges the person and terminates its jurisdiction under Article 46C.268; or
(2) the cumulative total period of institutionalization and outpatient or community-based treatment and supervision under the court's jurisdiction equals the maximum term provided by law for the offense of which the person was acquitted by reason of insanity and the court's jurisdiction is automatically terminated under Article 46C.269.Id. art. 46C.158.
Here, the trial court found that Tsygankova's conduct was dangerous pursuant to Article 46C.158. Thus, it retained jurisdiction over her until (1) it terminated its jurisdiction under 46C.268 or (2) her period of commitment equaled the maximum term provided by law for a capital murder offense. Id. It is not disputed that either of these conditions exist here-the trial court has not terminated its jurisdiction and Tsygankova has been committed for fewer than six years, which does not equal the maximum possible term for a capital offense. See id. art. 37.071 (providing that punishment for capital murder is either death or life imprisonment). Accordingly, the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction to renew its commitment order.
In her appellant's brief, Tsygankova ignores the explicit grant of trial-court continuing jurisdiction under Article 46C.158. Instead, she invites us to liken this situation to that of a motion for new trial in which a trial court loses plenary jurisdiction if the motion is not timely filed within thirty days of the judgment's entry. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a), (e), (f); Rawls v. La Fogata Mexican Grill, 658 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2022, pet. denied) ("A trial court loses subject matter jurisdiction thirty days after a judgment is signed if no party to the judgment files a motion extending the trial court's plenary power."). In Tsygankova's view, because the late renewal request here was akin to an untimely new-trial motion, the trial court "lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider the request and [she] must be discharged" from commitment.
We decline Tsygankova's invitation because we see no correlation between the rules governing motions for new trial and the statutory scheme governing the commitment of people found not guilty by reason of insanity. Nor is there a need to explore such a correlation: the commitment scheme draws the exact boundaries of the trial court's jurisdiction, and the trial court here acted within those bounds. Cf. State v. Roland, 973 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1998) (applying an older version of the commitment statute and explaining that "[t]he concern motivating the judicial release requirement-protecting the public from a dangerous and mentally unstable individual-is far too important to ignore due to a failure to observe statutory time limits, especially when the State is otherwise able to show that [the person] should not be released").
For these reasons, we overrule the sole issue on appeal, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.