Opinion
No. 07-19-00034-CR
07-20-2020
JOSE TRINIDAD, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 290th District Court Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018CR2027; Honorable Melissa C. Skinner, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Jose Trinidad, was charged via a two-count indictment with the felony offenses of continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child by contact. In December 2018, following a bench trial, he was convicted of each offense. He now appeals those convictions and the resulting concurrent sentences of twenty-five years and twenty years respectively. Appellant challenges his convictions through three issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support Appellant's conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child; (2) the trial court erred in finding the child witness to be competent; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Appellant committed any offense in Bexar County. For reasons we do not understand and do not approve, the State did not favor us with a brief. We will affirm the trial court's judgments.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West 2019). The indictment alleged that during a period from August 1, 2015, through August 1, 2017, Appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse, via three different criminal acts: (1) SEXUAL ASSAULT by penetration of the female sexual organ of a child; (2) SEXUAL ASSAULT by causing the sexual organ of a child to contact the mouth of the defendant; and (3) INDECENCY WITH A CHILD by touching the genitals of a child with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2019). The indictment alleged that on or about August 26, 2017, Appellant committed the offense of INDECENCY WITH A CHILD by touching the genitals of a child.
BACKGROUND
The child complainant, the child's mother, the responding officer, and Appellant testified at trial. Appellant is the complainant's grandfather and he lived in the home with the child and her mother (his daughter) at the time the child made the allegations against him. The outcry that led to Appellant's prosecution in this matter began when the child (nine years old at the time of trial) was watching television with her mother. The two had a conversation about families and when the child's mother asked about the child's grandfather, the child began to cry. The mother asked why the she was crying and the child told her that her grandfather had been coming into her bedroom while she was asleep and touching her on her genitals with his fingers. According to the mother, the she also said that when her mother leaves the house, her grandfather pulls her legs apart and kisses her on her vagina.
The child's mother discussed with the child the seriousness of her allegation and told her the police would have to talk with her. At that point, the child was scared and recanted her accusations. The next day, however, the mother felt something was wrong and spoke with the child again. At that time, the child told her mother that the accusations she made against her grandfather were true. The mother called police and the mother and child then spoke with the responding officer. The child was also later interviewed by a forensic interviewer. When the police interviewed Appellant after his arrest, he denied all of the child's accusations. Similarly, during his trial testimony, he again denied the allegations.
ANALYSIS
ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION FOR CONTINUOUS SEXUAL ABUSE OF A YOUNG CHILD
Appellant contends the State failed to set forth sufficient evidence to show that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration. According to Appellant's evaluation of the evidence, "only speculation can lead to a conclusion that two acts occurred more than thirty days apart."
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, our inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 686-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). It is the role of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, to be given to their testimony. Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 686-87; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). The State may prove the elements of an offense by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
In a sufficiency review "circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Id. If a record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the fact finder resolved the conflict in favor of the verdict rendered and we defer to that resolution. Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 687. We also measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
To establish continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State must prove (1) the defendant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse, (2) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, and (3) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the defendant was seventeen years of age or older and the victim was a child younger than fourteen years of age. Jimenez v. State, No. 07-13-00303-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10951, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 26, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.)). As relevant to the indictment in this cause, for purposes of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child, an "act of sexual abuse" means any act that constitutes the offense of (1) sexual assault by causing the penetration of the sexual organ of the victim, (2) sexual assault by causing the sexual organ of the victim to contact the mouth of the defendant, and (3) indecency with a child by touching the genitals of the victim with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(c)(2) and (3).
As to the predicate offense of indecency with a child, the specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person may be inferred from the defendant's conduct, remarks, or the surrounding circumstances. Garcia v. State, No. 13-15-00232-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11988, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, Nov. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863, 873 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.)). Where the conduct itself is sufficient to support an inference of intent, the law does not require any oral expression by the defendant. Garcia, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11988, at *4 (citing Moore v. State, 397 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.); Bazanes v. State, 310 S.W.3d 32, 40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd)).
The testimony of a child complainant alone is sufficient to establish the essential elements of an offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West Supp. 2019); Jimenez, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10951, at *5-6 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a); Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd)). Furthermore, as to the date of an offense, a child victim is not required to be specific about the dates the abuse occurred. Jimenez, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10951, at *5-6 (citing Ruiz v. State, Nos. 05-12-01703-CR, 05-12-01704-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7083, at *27 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). It is well settled that the "on or about" language of an indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment so long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and not otherwise barred by the applicable period of statutory limitation. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). There is no statute of limitations for the offense of continuous sexual abuse. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 12.01(1)(D) (West Supp. 2019). Here, the indictment was presented on February 22, 2018, and the time frame alleged was "on or about the 1 st day of August, 2015, through the 1st day of August, 2017"; therefore, the time frame alleged was both anterior to the presentment of the indictment and not barred by limitations.
While the exact dates of the individual acts of sexual abuse need not be proven, the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two or more acts of sexual abuse and that those acts occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d); Turner v. State, 573 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (holding that the first and last act of sexual abuse must occur "more than thirty days apart"); Williams, 305 S.W.3d at 890-91 (holding the State must prove two acts of sexual abuse "committed over a span of thirty or more days").
Here, the child was the first witness to testify. She testified she was nine years old and in third grade. She said her grandfather had previously lived with her but no longer did. She also testified she did not know why he no longer lived with her family. When asked who Jose Trinidad was, she was unable to say and she stated she did not know who that was. She also said she did not see her grandfather in the courtroom; however, she later answered "Yes" when asked whether her grandfather's name was "Jose."
When asked by the prosecutor whether someone she lived with touched her, the child responded, "I don't want to say." When later asked, "Was it your grandfather?" the child responded "Yes." When the prosecutor began asking questions specific to the offenses with which Appellant was charged, she asked the child to show on a diagram where the child had been touched. The child did so and described them as her "private parts" on the "front." The child then reluctantly testified that her grandfather touched her private parts with his hand and mouth. She could not say, however, whether he moved his fingers when he touched her because she was "asleep." Her testimony was also unclear regarding exactly how he touched her and how and where he used his mouth to contact her. She answered affirmatively, however, when the prosecutor asked whether her grandfather touched her more than ten times. On cross-examination, the child said she did not know how many times Appellant touched her because she was "just in bed . . . [and] was barely six."
The child was not able to provide any details regarding any specific incidents of touching; however, she did testify, albeit vaguely, to several incidents of sexual contact by Appellant. On cross-examination, the child answered "No" when counsel asked whether Appellant had touched her with anything other than his finger. The mother testified the child told her Appellant "had kissed [her] between her legs" and that these incidents of touching occurred over the child's clothes.
The child was not able to say how old she was when she was first touched, or what grade she was in, or if it occurred in her previous house. She also could not say how long her grandfather lived with her. She was able to identify her mother as the first person she told about the touching, and on cross-examination, she said the last time her grandfather touched her was the same day she told her mother about the incidents.
The child's mother testified that Appellant was her father and he lived with the family in their previous home for two years. She told the court her father had his own room and her two children shared a room. Her daughter slept in the top bunk of the bunk beds in that room. The mother sometimes worked evenings driving for Uber and when she did so, her father stayed with her children. She testified she began driving for Uber in April 2017.
The mother testified that on September 5, 2017, she and the child were watching television and discussing families. When the mother mentioned the child's grandfather, the child began to cry. The mother was surprised by her reaction and asked her what was wrong. The child told her that "Grandpa's touching me" and pointed between her legs. The mother said she took that to mean he was touching the child's private parts. The child told her that her grandfather touched her while the mother was gone. The child told her mother that Appellant "had kissed her between her legs, and that he would touch her over her clothes with the finger." The mother said the child told her Appellant touched her when the mother was not there in the evenings, but also related one specific incident in which the family had finished watching a movie. The mother left the children with her father while she went to return the movie. The mother testified this incident occurred at the end of August 2017. During cross-examination, counsel referred to a statement the mother provided to police after she learned of her child's allegations. In that statement, the mother referenced two instances of sexual abuse by the grandfather as related to her by the child. One occurred on August 26, 2017, and one occurred about a week prior to that. The last instance of abuse allegedly occurred on September 5, 2017, the day the child told her mother. Neither the mother nor the child ever testified that the acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period that was more than thirty days in duration, nor did they testify as to any penetration.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. The record shows that he was sixty-six at the time the child told her mother about the touching. He testified he moved in with his daughter and her two children in 2015 and lived with them for two years. He denied all of the child's accusations against him and said he never touched or "played" with the child in a sexual manner. He denied playing with the child, hugging her, or showing her affection in any way. During both his police interview and his trial testimony, he said he did not play with the child because of the "trouble" he could get into. When asked what kind of trouble, Appellant answered, "Like this. Look where I am." During Appellant's interview with police, the officer told Appellant that a child the age of the complainant in this case would not know how to make up these types of allegations in order to get someone in trouble. Rather, the officer said, a child of that age would make statements like, "Grandpa hit me" or "Grandpa took my toys." Appellant did not have a response to this discussion and kept going back to the type of "trouble" he could get into, that the child said these things to get him in trouble but he did not touch her at all, and that the child did not like him.
Appellant made the same denials during his interview with police. A recording of that interview was admitted at trial.
Appellant testified he worked at night so it would not have been possible for him to touch the child when the child said he touched her. He also did not recall the specific incident related by the child that allegedly occurred the day the family watched a movie together. During cross-examination, Appellant recalled being left in the home to watch the children, sometimes at night. Appellant repeatedly said he believed the child did not like him.
By his first issue, Appellant argues (1) the State failed to prove that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration because none of the witnesses testified that any of the alleged incidents occurred thirty or more days from one another and (2) the State failed to offer any evidence he penetrated the sexual organ of the child. We will discuss these two sub-issues in a logical rather than a sequential order.
As to the sub-issue regarding penetration, the court explicitly found no proof of penetration as charged in Count I of the indictment. It did, however, find that Appellant engaged in acts of indecency with a child by sexual contact, namely that Appellant touched the child's genitals by kissing her genitals with his mouth over the child's clothing. The court further found this act of sexual contact to be separate and apart from the act that supported Appellant's conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact under Count II of the indictment. As such, while we agree with the second part of Appellant's first issue, that finding does not afford him any appellate relief because, as discussed below, we disagree with the first part of his first issue.
As to the first part of Appellant's first issue, whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration, the mother testified the child told her one instance occurred on or about August 19, 2017, another instance occurred on August 26, 2017, and the third occurred on September 5, 2017; however, the details of any given incident were not expounded on. While these were the only specific dates testified to by any of the witnesses, and while we agree those instances did not occur during a period that was thirty or more days in duration, we must carefully examine other inferential evidence to determine if the evidence is indeed insufficient to support the verdict.
Other inferential evidence in the record that might show incidents occurring during a period that was thirty or more days included the child's comment that she did not know how many times Appellant touched her because she was "just in bed . . . [and] was barely six." At the time of trial in 2018, the child was nine years old and thus, would have been six years old in 2015. Therefore, if the trial court, as the sole trier of fact, believed the testimony of the child, as it was fully entitled to do, and inferred from that testimony that Appellant had started touching the child when she was six, and that such touching occurred more than once over a period lasting more than thirty days, and that such touching involved either the contact of the sexual organ of the child by the mouth of Appellant or the genitals of the child with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, then the evidence was sufficient to show two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period that was more than thirty days in duration. Furthermore, even if the child were mistaken as to her age when the assaults began, she also testified that the touching occurred on more than one occasion and when her mother left to drive for Uber. Because the mother testified she began driving for Uber in April 2017, an inference could be drawn that the first incident occurred as early as that date.
Given the evidence before the trial court in this case, we find the trial judge could have reasonably found from Appellant's actions that he intended to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire by touching the child, particularly considering the fact that there was nothing in the record to indicate a valid non-sexual reason for the contact between Appellant's mouth and the child's genitals.
While we acknowledge that throughout the child's testimony, she was very unsure, provided vague information and scant detail about any specific incident of sexual abuse, was unable to provide specific dates of the alleged early incidents of sexual abuse, her age when those incidents occurred, what grade she was in at school or even where she was living at the time the incidents occurred, such weaknesses in the testimony did not conclusively refute or make impossible a finding of guilt. It was the trial judge's responsibility in this bench trial to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, both its strengths and its weaknesses, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Following a review of the entire record, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trial judge, acting as the sole fact finder in a bench trial, could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant did commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against the child, during a period that was thirty or more days in duration, and that at the time of the commission of each of those acts of sexual abuse, Appellant was seventeen years of age or older and the child was younger than fourteen years of age. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for the offense of continuous sexual assault. Appellant's first issue is overruled.
ISSUE TWO—COMPETENCE OF CHILD TO TESTIFY
By his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the child was competent to testify at trial. In support of his contention, he notes the child's mental health issues, that she spoke like a "baby," that she will be attending the third grade for a second time, that she struggled with reading and writing, and that she told the forensic interviewer she did not know the difference between the truth and a lie. Appellant also points to the mother's statements that the child lies "all the time." Appellant further asserts the child's answers during the in-court hearing show she was not competent to testify.
We review a trial court's determination of whether a child witness is competent to testify under an abuse of discretion standard. Baldit v. State, 522 S.W.3d 753, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2017, no pet.) (citing Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Torres v. State, 424 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd)). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion in finding a child competent to testify, we consider the child witness's entire testimony, not just her responses to qualification questions. Baldit, 522 S.W.3d at 761 (citation omitted).
Generally, a witness is presumed to be competent to testify. TEX. R. EVID. 601. Rule 601(a)(2) provides that children are incompetent to testify if the court examines them and finds that they lack "sufficient intellect to testify concerning the matters in issue." TEX. R. EVID. 601(a)(2). Under this provision, "[t]he party seeking to exclude the witness from testifying must raise the issue of his competency and shoulders the burden of establishing incompetency." Gilley v. State, 418 S.W.3d 114, 120-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citation omitted). Accordingly, it was Appellant's burden to raise the issue and establish the child's incompetency.
The competency of a child witness is a preliminary question for the trial court to determine under Rule 104(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, and the trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in making that determination. Id. (citations omitted). In addition to "gauging the sufficiency of the child-witness's cognitive ability to relate relevant facts, as specifically contemplated by Rule 601(a)(2), a trial court should also inquire whether the child-witness possesses the capacity to appreciate the obligations of the oath—or can at least distinguish the truth from a lie." Id. (citation omitted). The trial court has discretion to permit the parties to participate in the Rule 601(a)(2) examination, and may even allow the parties themselves to propound the questions, so long as the trial court itself "makes an independent ruling on competency" based on that questioning. Id. (citation omitted).
Here, before the child testified, Appellant challenged the child's competency and the trial court conducted a hearing. The judge asked the child if she understood the difference between a truth and a lie. She said she did. The judge then asked, "[i]f I make something up, I say something that didn't happen, is that the truth or is that the lie?" The child answered, "[t]hat's the lie." The judge then asked, "[i]f I say what really happened, I don't make anything up, I say exactly what really happened, is that the truth or is that a lie?" The child answered, "[t]ruth."
The court then permitted the parties to ask questions of the child to assist in the determination of the child's competency to testify. The State declined to ask additional questions but counsel for Appellant made several inquiries. The two engaged in the following colloquy:
Q. [Child], do you always tell the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you ever tell a lie?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever told a lie?
A. No.
Q. What is a lie?
A. When you're not telling the truth.
Counsel then asked the child to provide an example of a lie. She was unable to do so, even after being asked the question several times in different ways. The child was also unable to explain the consequences of telling a lie.
On redirect, the State asked a sequence of questions. Those included:
Q. [Child], can you see this highlighter that I am holding?
A. Yes.
Q. What color is it?
A. Yellow.
Q. If I said it was red, would that be the truth, or would that be a lie?
A. A lie.
Q. Okay. And why is it a lie?
A. Because—because the highlighter's not red.
Q. If I say it was yellow, is that the truth or a lie?
A. The truth.
Following redirect, the judge asked for argument on the competency issue and when the parties declined, the judge made a finding that the child was competent to testify. On appeal, Appellant challenges that finding.
While the examination here was short, the question-and-answer sequences by the judge and the parties demonstrate the child had a rudimentary understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie. She also indicated she understood she was required to tell the truth in court and promised to do so. Her responses were similar to those of the child witness in Torres in which the complainant said the truth was "real" and a lie was "not real." Torres, 424 S.W.3d at 255.
Appellant argues that the court's competency hearing was too cursory to show the child was competent and that her subsequent testimony indicated she was incompetent because she could not recall specific incidents, where and when the incidents occurred, and because she refused to answer some of the questions. Appellant also points to the fact that when asked, the child could not identify her grandfather in the courtroom and could not verify that her grandfather's name was Jose Trinidad.
While we agree the child's testimony was not the model of clarity, we find the competency hearing and the child's testimony as a whole demonstrated the child's competence to testify. The child was able to answer questions posed by counsel and appeared to understand what was asked of her. She was able to describe, albeit in somewhat vague terms, how Appellant touched her. With respect to one of the alleged incidents, she was also able to testify that Appellant touched her on an occasion when her mother was gone returning a movie. The mother corroborated the fact that on one occasion the family had watched a movie together and she did leave the child home alone with Appellant while she returned the movie. While we agree that the child was not able to provide specific dates, times, or locations of the sexual touching, this lack of detail goes to the child's credibility as a witness, not her competence. Torres, 424 S.W.3d at 255. Furthermore, her reluctance in answering some questions and her "refusal" to answer others by saying "I don't want to say," appears, in context, to indicate she was afraid to say what occurred, not that she was unable to testify to the events. Those facts alone do not make the child incompetent to testify. And, the child's apparent confusion over her grandfather's name appeared to be simply that she was asked about her grandfather's full name. Not all children know their relatives' full names and the child was able to answer correctly when asked whether her grandfather's name was "Jose." Lastly, while it is unclear why the child said she could not identify her grandfather in the courtroom, we do see in the record a reference that the child was "terrified" so that may have caused her inability to identify Appellant. Also, we do not know whether Appellant appeared to look different in court than how the child had previously seen him. Irrespective of those arguments, her confusion on the subject is more a matter of credibility than it is competence. Given the state of the record, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling finding that she was competent to testify and we overrule Appellant's second issue.
ISSUE THREE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING THE OFFENSES OCCURRED IN BEXAR COUNTY
Via his third issue, Appellant contends the State failed to satisfy its burden to show the alleged acts by Appellant against the child were committed in Bexar County. Appellant points out that this case was indicted by a Bexar County Grand Jury and it was tried in the 290th District Court of Bexar County, Texas. Further, Appellant asserts the indictment alleged and the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offenses, if any, occurred in Bexar County, Texas.
As we stated in our analysis of Appellant's first issue, to "determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court views all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 686-87 (citation omitted). In meeting that burden, the State may prove the elements of an offense by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
In support of his position, Appellant notes that neither the child nor the investigating detective ever mentioned the county in which the offenses were alleged to occur. Appellant further contends that the mother's testimony regarding the subject was too speculative to meet the State's burden.
We disagree. The record shows the mother testified to her address and that the address was in Bexar County. She further said she lived in Bexar County in 2017, when these allegations came to light. She also told the court her daughter, the complainant in this case, resided with her and that Appellant lived with them for a period of two years. In addition, the child testified the incidents of sexual abuse occurred at the apartment where she lived with her mother, brother, and grandfather.
While we agree that the mother's testimony is not as clear as it might have been regarding the county in which these acts took place, we recognize, as we stated in our analysis of Appellant's first issue, that it is the role of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. As such, we conclude the trial court could have drawn a reasonable inference from the mother's testimony that the offenses occurred in Bexar County. As such, we overrule Appellant's third issue.
CONCLUSION
Having resolved each of Appellant's issues against him, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice Do not publish.