Opinion
24-CV-4150 (PAM/JFD)
02-12-2025
RAYCO TRAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. WITTE, Correctional Officer, individual/official capacity; CHAD MECURE, Correctional Lt./PREA Manager, individual capacity; HILL, Correctional Lieutenant, individual/official capacity; ALU ESSON, Nurse, individual capacity; JOHNS/JANE DOES, presently unknown to Plaintiff, individual capacity; MATTHEW STANLEY, individual capacity; ALEJO, individual capacity; KAMALDEEN, individual capacity; CHRIS PAWELK, AWO, individual/official capacity; CAPTAIN CONNORS, AWA, individual/official capacity; KATHY HALVORSON, Warden, individual/official capacity; MN DOC, individual capacity; LAURA KAVITZ, individual capacity; and THE NURSE SUPERVISOR AT HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR, individual capacity, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN F. DOCHERTY, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Rayco Traylor, a prisoner, alleges that when he was incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Oak Park Heights, Minnesota (“MCF-Oak Park Heights”), he was subjected to excessive force, unlawful strip searches, and constitutionally deficient medical care, among other constitutional violations. (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Mr. Traylor did not pay the statutory filing fee. Instead, he asked to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2.) This Court previously ordered Mr. Traylor to submit a certified copy of his prisoner trust fund account statement or the equivalent financial information so that this Court could calculate his initial partial filing fee as required by law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). (Order, Dkt. No. 5.) Having received that information, (Dkt. No. 6), this matter is now back before this Court on review of Mr. Traylor's IFP application. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon that review, this Court recommends that most of Mr. Traylor's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, except that his individual capacity excessive-force claims against Defendants Witte and Hills and his individual capacity failure-to-intervene claims against Defendants Hills and Kamaldeen should proceed.
I. IFP Application
Because Mr. Traylor is a prisoner, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), his IFP application is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), which requires that prisoners seeking IFP status pay an initial partial filing fee upon initiating a civil action, see Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1998). The initial partial filing fee owed by the prisoner-litigant is twenty percent of the greater of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff's facility trust account or the average balance in the plaintiff's account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). But “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
In this case, Mr. Traylor's signed certificate of authorized prison official form shows that the average monthly deposits to his trust fund prison account in the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint was $0.11 and that the average balance in his account during that same period was $8.16. (Dkt. No. 6-1.) Mr. Traylor also claims under penalty of perjury that he cannot pay any portion of the filing fee at this time. (Dkt. No. 6.) This Court concludes that Mr. Traylor currently has no means and no assets by which to pay any initial partial filing fee. Mr. Traylor, therefore, may proceed with this action without first submitting an initial partial filing fee.
But Mr. Traylor is cautioned that the entire remaining balance of the $350.00 statutory filing fee will have to be paid in installments. Officials at the facility where Mr. Traylor is confined will be notified of this requirement and will be authorized to withdraw funds from his facility trust account and remit those funds to the Court, consistent with § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this action.
II. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) Preservice Review
While Mr. Traylor may pursue this action without paying an initial partial filing fee, his Complaint is nevertheless subject to preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides that the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A. Legal Standard
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted will be found if a complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Federal courts have dismissed claims as malicious for abuse of judicial process. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that courts have discretion “to place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who files non-meritorious actions for obviously malicious reasons and who generally abuses judicial process”); see also Ealy v. CCA, Case No. 5:15cv305 (MMP/EMT), 2015 WL 9647546, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015) (“A plaintiff's affirmative misrepresentation regarding his prior litigation history, when complaint form required disclosure of such history and plaintiff's statements were made under penalty of perjury, constitutes abuse of the judicial process warranting dismissal of the case without prejudice as ‘malicious' [].”) (listing cases), R&R adopted by 2016 WL 75074 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2015). Although a “pro se complaint must be liberally construed,” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014), pro se plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible or their complaint must be dismissed,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 56970.
B. Background
Over a year ago, nerve pain in Mr. Traylor's foot caused him to fall in the TV room at MCF-Oak Park Heights. Mr. Traylor was treated by Nurse Alu Esson, who omitted from Mr. Traylor's medical records that he required a wheelchair and staff assistance to return to his cell. Mr. Traylor says that this omission is important because the very next day Officer Matthew Stanley charged him with a prison violation, and he was not permitted a wheelchair while being escorted to segregation. This was a problem for Mr. Traylor because he was still experiencing nerve pain in his foot and could not walk without assistance. For their part, prison officials thought he was feigning a medical injury-and there was no note in Mr. Traylor's medical file to corroborate his self-report-so Defendant Doe activated “ICS” for “refusing staff directives” and a “WRAP” restraint-a belt used to restrict movement- was brought to the unit.
Officials told Mr. Traylor he could either be escorted to segregation in the “WRAP” restraint or he could walk there independently. While Mr. Traylor again attempted to walk, he asked for a wheelchair after he descended stairs, a request that was denied. Lt. Hills then gestured for him to be placed in the WRAP restraint, and Mr. Traylor was ordered to kneel. Even though Mr. Traylor complied, Lt. Witte started to press and kneel on Mr. Traylor's injured foot, causing him pain, but Lt. Witte did not stop, falsely claiming that Mr. Traylor was “resisting.” Lt. Hills was present during this incident and did not intervene. The WRAP restraint exacerbated Mr. Traylor's injuries and was not necessary because he was not refusing to walk. After being restrained in the WRAP device, Mr. Traylor was placed in the “stryker chair” and transported to segregation.
When Mr. Traylor got to segregation, Lt. Hills directed officers to conduct an unclothed strip search of him even though he was compliant and other inmates could see him naked. Mr. Traylor was also compliant during the search, but Lt. Witte nevertheless twisted his wrist, causing it to swell. The other officers present, including Officer Alejo Kamaldeen, did not intervene. Mr. Traylor was then seen by Nurse Laura Kavitz, who minimized his injury in her reports and did not order any follow up treatment. Mr. Traylor continues to complain of numbness, coldness, and pain in his wrist.
Two days later, Mr. Traylor was placed on constant observation status and Lt. Hills subjected him to a second unclothed body search. While being escorted to the new cell, Mr. Traylor was compliant. Officers placed Mr. Traylor in a cell that smelled of feces, and then Lt. Hills subjected him to a third unclothed body search in the presence of oppositesex staff. Mr. Traylor filed grievances about staffs' conduct, but those grievances were not addressed. He also filed a PREA complaint against Hills for sexual harassment, but Lt. Mercure fabricated reports and concluded that his complaint was unfounded.
C. Discussion
Mr. Traylor asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To allege a plausible section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must “allege a violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006). Further, “[p]ublic servants may be sued under section 1983 in either their official capacity, their individual capacity, or both.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)).
In this case, Mr. Traylor identifies fifteen public officials as defendants: Witte, Mercure, Hills, Esson, John/Jane Does, Stanley, Kamaldeen, Pawelk, Connors, Halvorson, MN DOC, Kavitz, Nurse Supervisor, Health Services Supervisor, and Monio. (Dkt. No. 1.) He identifies Witte, Hills, Pawelk, Connors, and Halvorson as defendants in their individual and official capacities. He identifies all other defendants-with the exception of Monio-in their individual capacities only. Mr. Traylor does not identify the capacity in which Shelly Monio is being sued. (Dkt. No. 1.)
While the docket only identifies fourteen defendants, this appears to be an error. The docket incorrectly identifies Alejo Kamaldeen as two defendants (Alejo and Kamaldeen) as opposed to one; identifies the Nurse Supervisor at Health Services Administrator as one defendant as opposed to two defendants (the Nurse Supervisor and the Health Services Administrator); and neglects to identify Shelly Monio as a defendant even though allegations against her are pleaded in the Complaint. Further, the docket incorrectly spells Chad Mercure's last name as “Mecure.” This Report and Recommendation uses the correct spelling: Mercure.
Mr. Traylor spells Hills's name incorrectly in his Complaint as Hill. Upon review of the Complaint and accompanying exhibits, Hills is the correct spelling. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 with Ex. at 3, Dkt. No. 1-1.) This Report and Recommendation uses the correct spelling: Hills.
With respect to these defendants, this Court views Mr. Taylor as asserting seven grounds for relief: (1) Lt. Hills subjected him to unclothed strip searches in violation of his constitutional rights and sexually harassed him; (2) Lt. Witte, Ofc. Kamaldeen, Lt. Hills, and John Does used excessive force against him and failed to intervene to stop the use of excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; (3) Nurse Esson's failure to include necessary information in his medical records constitutes negligence and medical malpractice; (4) the failure to properly investigate his grievances constitutes deliberate indifference, negligence, and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) Nurse Kavitz failed to order x-rays and falsified medical reports to cover up staff misconduct; (6) Monio lied to him when she told him that she could not provide him with copies of incident reports concerning the events giving rise to his claims in violation of his rights under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”); and (7) the Minnesota Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Wardens, AWO/AWAs, and captains fail to properly train, supervise, and discipline their subordinates. (Compl. at 7, Dkt. No. 1.) Before addressing each claim, this Court first considers Mr. Traylor's claims against the Minnesota Department of Corrections and his official capacity claims.
1. Minnesota Department of Corrections
It is well settled that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Mr. Traylor's § 1983 claims against the State of Minnesota and its entities, including the Minnesota Department of Corrections. Murphy v. State of Ark., 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997).
While sovereign immunity does not apply where Congress has abrogated the state's immunity or in situations where the state has consented to suit or waived its immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996), neither exception applies here. Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for § 1983 actions, Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (concluding that Congress did not intend to override sovereign immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the State of Minnesota has not consented to suit, see McCormack v. Minnesota Dept. of Commerce, Case No. 10-CV-4135 (SRN/FLN), 2011 WL 753861, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2011). Furthermore, neither the State of Minnesota, nor its entities, including the Minnesota Department of Corrections, is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70 (“[S]tate and governmental entities . . . are not persons subject to liability for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.”). Accordingly, Mr. Traylor's section 1983 claims against the Minnesota Department of Corrections should be dismissed.
Additionally, Mr. Traylor asserts no other plausible grounds for relief against the DOC, and, upon close review of Mr. Traylor's Complaint, this Court finds none. See Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A district court [] is not required to divine the litigant's intent and create claims that are not clearly raised, and it need not conjure up unpled allegations to save a complaint.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Traylor's claims against the DOC should therefore be dismissed.
2. Section 1983 Official Capacity Claims
In section 1983 actions, “[c]laims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those in their official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the type of defense that is available.” Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)). “A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
Here, each defendant is alleged to be an agent of the State of Minnesota. “Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983” when sued for money damages. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Rather, a private party may only sue a state officer in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). In determining whether the complaint requests prospective injunctive relief, “a court conducts ‘a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'” Id. (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
In this case, Mr. Traylor explicitly seeks monetary and injunctive relief. State officials, however, cannot be sued in their official capacities for money damages. Here, moreover, the facts giving rise to Mr. Traylor's claims concern discrete incidents of purportedly unconstitutional conduct that occurred when Mr. Traylor was incarcerated at MCF-Oak Park Heights. He is currently incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater, Minnesota. Thus, even if Mr. Traylor's allegations could be construed as an ongoing constitutional violation (and this Court has its doubts), Mr. Traylor has been transferred to a different facility and is therefore no longer subject to the conditions that gave rise to his claims in the first place. See Roberts v. Lombardi, 512 Fed.Appx. 645, 648 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 345-56 (8th Cir. 2001)). Mr. Traylor's section 1983 official capacity claims therefore fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
This leaves Mr. Traylor's individual capacity claims.
3. Unclothed Body Searches (Claim One)
Mr. Traylor contends that Lt. Hills retaliated against him by subjecting him to unclothed body searches. He describes the body searches as “unnecessary, sexually harassing, and unreasonably malicious” and sadistic. (Compl. at 7.)
To establish a plausible retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) officials took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” De Rossitte v. Correct Care Sol., LLC., 22 F.4th 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2022). At bottom, Mr. Traylor's retaliation claim fails to pass the plausibility threshold because he does not describe what protected activity prompted Lt. Hills's purportedly retaliatory conduct. See Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The retaliatory conduct need not be a constitutional violation; the violation is acting in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Simply asserting that Lt. Hills acted with a retaliatory motive is insufficient to establish a § 1983 retaliation claim. Mr. Taylor must assert some plausible facts linking the retaliatory conduct to the protected activity itself. De Rossitte, 22 F.4th at 804.
Federal courts have routinely held that unclothed body searches are not, by themselves, unconstitutional. See Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing cases). Instead, courts focus on the manner in which the search was conducted to determine whether it was unreasonable and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In this case, Mr. Traylor says that staff pat-searched him before he was escorted to segregation, Lt. Hills conducted an unclothed body search of him when he entered his segregation cell, Lt. Hills conducted a second unclothed body search of him two days later when he left segregation to be placed on constant observation status, and Lt. Hill conducted a third unclothed body search of him when he entered his cell to be placed on constant observation status. As a threshold matter, courts have previously held that unclothed searches of inmates moving cells is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 366-67 (concluding that policy of visual body cavity searches of inmates moving outside their living units was reasonable); see also Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that it was not unreasonable to perform visual body cavity searches on inmates in putative segregation even if they did not move cells).
But Mr. Traylor also takes issue with the manner in which these searches were conducted. He says that during one of the searches, other inmates were able to see him naked, and that an opposite sex officer was present during a different search. The Fourth Amendment, however, generally “does not require officers to use the least intrusive or less intrusive means to effectuate a search but instead permits a range of objectively reasonable conduct.” Story, 782 F.3d at 972 (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Traylor asserts no facts establishing that the presence of other inmates rendered his body search unreasonable because, for example, there was a less public place to conduct the search that was also consistent with institutional security. See id. (discussing case law). Indeed, Mr. Traylor says that officers eventually “switched-in” the other inmates, providing him with more privacy.
Further, the presence of an opposite-sex officer does not render a body search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit has held that inmates do not have a constitutionally protected privacy right preventing them from being observed by guards of the opposite sex. Bell v. Conard, 749 Fed.Appx. 490, 491 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming preservice dismissal and holding that “prison officials did not violate a clearly established constitutional right by allowing female guards to monitor Bell through surveillance cameras”) (citing Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Whatever minimal intrusions on an inmate's privacy may result from [opposite-sex] surveillance, whether the inmate is using the bathroom, showering, or sleeping in the nude, are outweighed by institutional concerns for safety and equal employment opportunities.”)). Mr. Traylor, therefore, has failed to assert a plausible claim that these unclothed body searches violated his constitutional rights.
Separately, with respect to claim one, Mr. Traylor also claims that Hills “winked” at him, thereby “sexually harassing” him when he escorted him to a “constant observation status” cell. While “sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer . . . can, in certain circumstances, constitute the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, . . . sexual harassment, absent contact or touching, does not constitute unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Howard v. Everett, 208 F.3d 218, 20000 WL 268493, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (table opinion) (quoting Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997)). Here, Mr. Traylor claims that Hills winked at him. He does not allege that Hills inappropriately contacted or touched him. Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Traylor claims that Hills sexually harassed him in violation of his constitutional rights, that claim fails.
4. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene (Claim Two)
Mr. Traylor makes a two-part claim, alleging that excessive force was used against him and that officers failed to intervene when that was done.
Beginning with the excessive-force claims, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “Factors relevant to this determination include the threat the officials reasonably perceived, the need for the use of force, the efforts made to minimize the force used, the relationships between the need for using force and the amount of force used, and the degree of injury inflicted.” Id.
In this case, Mr. Traylor points to three incidents of alleged use of excessive force: (1) Lt. Hills ordered him to be placed in a WRAP restraint for his escort to segregation even though he said he would try to walk; (2) Lt. Witte intentionally pressed down upon and knelt on his injured foot even though he was not resisting; and (3) Lt. Witte twisted his left wrist, injuring it. (Compl. at 3, 4, 5.) For the limited purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court concludes that Mr. Traylor has established colorable claims of excessive force against Lt. Hills and Lt. Witte for this purported conduct.
The second part of claim two alleges that (1) Lt. Hills did not intervene when Lt. Witte was pressing down on his injured foot, causing him pain; and (2) Ofc. Kamaldeen did not intervene when Lt. Witte was purportedly twisting his wrist. (Compl. at 3, 5.) “A prison official may be liable for failure to protect an inmate from a use of excessive force if he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.” Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1395 (8th Cir. 1997) (listing cases). For the limited purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court concludes that Mr. Traylor has established a colorable claim that Lt. Hills and Ofc. Kamaldeen failed to intervene when excessive force was used against him.
One final matter requires some discussion: Mr. Traylor also identifies John/Jane Doe defendants to this claim. But Mr. Traylor does not describe what, specifically each John/Jane Doe defendant did (or failed to do) that constitutes excessive force or failure to intervene. “In a claim under § 1983, there must be evidence of a causal connection between the misconduct complained of and the official sued.” Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 2002). With respect to the John/Jane Doe defendants, Mr. Traylor asserts no such connection. The claims against them should therefore be dismissed.
5. Failure to Provide Constitutionally Adequate Medical Care (Claims Three and Five)
Mr. Traylor asserts two separate claims of failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care-Nurse Esson failed to properly document his medical records (claim three) and Nurse Kavitz failed to provide him proper medical care for his injured wrist (claim five).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. State officials violate this prohibition when they are “deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs.” De Rossitte,22 F.4th at 802.To establish a claim for deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) he had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) [the defendants] knew of and disregarded that need.” Id. “An objectively serious medical need is one that has been ‘diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment' or one ‘so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'” Id. (quoting Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018)). “The second subjective element requires [defendants] to have ‘recognized that a substantial risk of harm existed and known that their conduct was inappropriate in light of that risk.'” Id. (quoting Shipp v. Murphy, 9 F.4th 694, 703 (8th Cir. 2021)). This subjective standard is “akin to that of criminal recklessness, requiring more than negligence.” Id. (quoting Blair v. Bowersox, 929 F.3d 981, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2019).
a. Nurse Esson
Nurse Esson treated Mr. Traylor after he fell in the TV room due to nerve pain. While Mr. Traylor claims that Nurse Esson omitted pertinent information from his medical records, he makes no claim that this omission somehow impacted the medical care Nurse Esson provided him following the fall. Indeed, he asserts no facts suggesting that Nurse Esson provided him with constitutionally inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Mr. Traylor, moreover, does not identify a specific independent constitutional right requiring medical records to contain certain information and this Court finds none.
Accordingly, Mr. Traylor has failed to establish a plausible § 1983 claim against Nurse Esson.
Mr. Traylor also asserts that Nurse Esson's conduct constitutes negligence and medical malpractice under Minnesota state tort law. (Compl. at 7.) But Mr. Traylor's allegations are wholly conclusory. To establish a claim for medical negligence under Minnesota law, Mr. Traylor must show “(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical community as applicable to the defendant's conduct, (2) that the defendant in fact departed from that standard, and (3) that the defendant's departure from the standard was a direct cause of the patient's injuries.” Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 329 (Minn. 2013). Here, Mr. Traylor asserts no facts establishing the standard of care recognized in the medical community or how Nurse Esson deviated from that standard. Mr. Traylor's state law medical negligence claims should therefore also be dismissed without prejudice.
b. Nurse Kavitz
Mr. Traylor claims that Nurse Kavitz examined his wrist after Lt. Witte twisted it, but she failed to order any follow-up treatment or tests. Even if the injury to Mr. Traylor's wrist satisfies the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test, Mr. Traylor has failed to establish a plausible claim that Nurse Kavitz acted with criminal recklessness in treating his wrist.
Mr. Traylor concedes that Nurse Kavitz examined his wrist. Mr. Traylor's disagreement with her treatment decision not to order additional testing does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (to establish deliberate indifference, “[t]he prisoner must show more than negligence, more than even gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)). Further, Mr. Traylor asserts no facts suggesting that Nurse Kavitz knew his wrist required additional treatment, and that it was inappropriate to fail to provide him with that treatment. Mr. Traylor's individual capacity claim against Nurse Kavitz for failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical care should therefore fail as a matter of law.
To the extent that Mr. Traylor asserts a claim against Nurse Kavitz for medical negligence under Minnesota state tort law, such a claim fails. As with his claim against Nurse Esson, Mr. Traylor asserts no facts establishing the applicable standard of medical care for a swollen wrist or how Nurse Kavitz allegedly deviated from that standard. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 329 (discussing elements of medical negligence claim).
c. Defendants Nurse Supervisor and Health Services Supervisor
This leaves the Nurse Supervisor and the Health Services Supervisor. Liability in a § 1983 case is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). “[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). From this it follows that to the extent that Mr. Traylor seeks to establish liability against Defendants Nurse Supervisor and Health Services Supervisor because of their supervisory responsibilities, “a supervising officer can be liable for an inferior officer's constitutional violation only if he directly participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.” Id. (quoting Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up)).
Here, Mr. Traylor does not specifically assert any facts establishing what Defendants Nurse Supervisor and Health Services Supervisor allegedly did (or failed to do) in violation of his constitutional rights. To establish a claim against these defendants for their purported failure to train or supervise their subordinates, Mr. Traylor must show that the supervisory defendants: “(1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by the subordinates; (2) demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the offensive acts; (3) failed to take sufficient remedial action; and (4) that such failure proximately caused injury to [him].” Id. at 1002 (citing Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Mr. Traylor's claims do not pass the first element. Mr. Traylor has failed to assert a plausible claim that medical personnel violated his constitutional rights in treating his medical conditions because he asserts no facts suggesting that these supervisory officers were aware of a pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct by their subordinates. Mr. Traylor's claims against the Nurse Supervisor and the Health Services Supervisor should thus fail.
6. Failure to Investigate Grievances (Claim Four)
Mr. Traylor asserts that Lt. Mercure fabricated reports and concluded that his PREA complaint was unfounded. (Compl. at 6-7.) Mr. Traylor has failed to assert a plausible violation of a constitutional right.
First, a false report against an inmate, by itself, is not actionable under section 1983. See McChristian v. Hampton, 48 F.3d 1224, 1995 WL 51084, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 1995) (table opinion) (“[F]alse disciplinary and witness reports allegedly filed to conceal unlawful behavior by defendants did not implicate a constitutional right.”) (citing Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (false report against inmate not actionable under § 1983 unless filed in retaliation for exercise of constitutional right)). Second, courts in this District have concluded that PREA, which this Court understands to be a reference to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 et seq., does not by itself provide a private right of action to litigants. Smith v. Youngbird, Case No. 21-CV-2249 (DSD/ECW), 2022 WL 3648700, at *7 (D. Minn. July 29, 2022) (listing cases), R. & R. adopted, 2022 WL 3647862 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2022).
With respect to Ofc. Stanley, Mr. Traylor says that Ofc. Stanley issued a disciplinary report against him for “disobeying a direct order, interference with security procedures, [and] inciting a riot.” (Compl. at 1.) But Mr. Traylor does not specifically assert how Ofc. Stanley violated his constitutional rights. To the extent that Mr. Traylor contends that Ofc. Stanley issued a false report, recall that a false disciplinary report is not by, itself, actionable under § 1983. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452. Mr. Traylor's claims against Ofc. Stanley should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Filing a false disciplinary report may certainly be actionable under § 1983 if done in retaliation for the inmate engaging in some protected activity. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008). But as addressed above, Mr. Traylor has failed to assert a plausible retaliation claim. Further, while a corrections officer filing a false disciplinary report against an inmate may cause the corrections officer to suffer adverse employment consequences, to establish a plausible § 1983 claim, the focus is on whether the plaintiff has asserted a plausible constitutional violation.
7. Shelly Monio (Claim Six)
Mr. Traylor names Shelly Monio as a defendant to his Complaint, claiming that she lied to him, telling him that she could not provide him with copies of incident reports about the events that gave rise to his Complaint (claim seven).
First, it is well established that a prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon prison inmates. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[N]o constitutional right was violated by the defendants' failure, if any, to process all of the grievances he submitted for consideration.”). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit has held that inmates cannot sue under section 1983 for allegedly false statements in a grievance response. Dockery v. Houston, 22 Fed.Appx. 428, 428 (8th Cir. 2007).
Second, Mr. Traylor says that Monio's response violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). To the extent Mr. Traylor asserts a separate cause of action under FOIA, there are several problems with such a claim. The most efficient way to analyze this claim is to note that FOIA “requires that federal government information, including agency records, be made available to the public.” State of Missouri, ex rel. Garstang v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 297 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). In this case, Mr. Traylor requested records being held by MCF-Oak Park Heights, a state- not federal-entity. Mr. Traylor's claim against Monio under FOIA, therefore, should also be dismissed.
8. Failure to Train or Supervise (Claim Seven)
Mr. Traylor names Pawelk, Connors, and Halvorson as defendants in their individual capacities, but he does not assert any facts suggesting that they were personally or directly involved in violating his constitutional rights. To the extent, moreover, that Mr. Traylor endeavors to attach liability to these supervisory defendants for their purported failure to “train or supervise” their subordinates, here again Mr. Traylor has failed to establish that the defendants even knew about the purported constitutional violations of their subordinates, let alone that this conduct constituted part of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, Mr. Traylor's claims against Defendants Pawelk, Connors, and Halvorson should similarly fail.
Mr. Traylor's section on relief requests relief from additional officials-namely, “Zina, Siruk, Ian Sinclair, Amsden, Michael Kaiser, Joshua Brown, David Launderville, Chang Vue, Kaytoinette Stock, Lt. Danielle Kruse, the Watch Commander on 12/14/23 at 14:29, and Diana Stortz.” (Compl. at 8, Dkt. No. 1.) But Mr. Traylor does not specifically assert what any of these officials allegedly did or failed to do in violation of his constitutional rights. To the extent, therefore, that Mr. Traylor seeks to assert claims against these officials in their individual capacities, such claims fail as a matter of law. See Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”). If Mr. Traylor is inviting the Court to comb through the forty-two pages of exhibits attached to his Complaint to discern causes of action against these officials on his behalf, the invitation is declined. See Gregory, 565 F.3d at 473.
9. Conditions of Confinement
While not specifically identified as a separate cause of action, in the body of the Complaint, Mr. Traylor claims that when he was placed on “constant observation status,” he was moved to a “bug infested” cell covered in “feces, grime, blood traces all on walls, toilet, and windows.” (Compl. at 6.) Mr. Traylor, moreover, asserts he remained in that cell for an unspecified amount of time. Id. This Court, therefore, considers whether Mr. Traylor has asserted a plausible conditions of confinement violation.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” extends to conditions of confinement. Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017). To state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim, the inmate must first show that the alleged violation is “objectively and sufficiently serious.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994)). “An alleged violation is objectively and sufficiently serious when the inmate ‘is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Second, the inmate must show that “the defendant acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Id. at 643 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “In a case challenging conditions of confinement, the requisite state of mind is ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. “An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she actually knows of the substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.” Id. (quoting Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007)). “Mere negligence or inadvertence does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Id.
“[P]risoners certainly have an Eighth Amendment right to sanitary prison conditions including ‘reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time.” Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989)). But even if the conditions, as Mr. Traylor has described them, give rise to a question about the sanitation of the cell in which he was housed, Mr. Traylor's conditions of confinement claim fails on the subjective prong-he fails to assert any facts showing that the defendants failed to reasonably respond to (or were deliberately indifferent to) the risk of harm those conditions posed to his health. Notably, moreover, he asserts no facts suggesting that these conditions affected his physical health in any way. Therefore, even if this Court construes Mr. Traylor's Complaint as asserting a claim alleging that he was exposed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while placed under constant observation status, the claim fails as a matter of law.
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff Rayco Traylor's claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, except the following claims should proceed:
a. the individual capacity excessive force claims against Defendants Lt. Witte and Lt. Hills; and
b. the individual capacity failure to intervene claims against Defendants Lt. Hills and Ofc. Kamaldeen.
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge's proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).