Opinion
Appellate Case No. 28933
03-26-2021
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS REVOCABLE TRUST Plaintiff-Appellant v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION Defendant-Appellee
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406 Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se J. SAYRE PAYNE, Atty. Reg. No. 0098117, 255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
Trial Court Case No. 2020-CV-3062 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINION
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406 Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se J. SAYRE PAYNE, Atty. Reg. No. 0098117, 255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Travis Lanier Williams Revocable Trust ("Trust"), appeals "pro se" from a trial court judgment dismissing its complaint against PNC Bank, National Association (PNC). The Trust's notice of appeal was filed by a non-attorney, however, and therefore was a nullity. As a result, the appeal was not properly perfected within 30 days of the trial court's order, and our appellate jurisdiction was never invoked. Furthermore, even if we could consider the merits of this case, the trial court correctly found that Appellant's complaint failed to state a claim. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} As a preliminary point, we note that Travis Williams is representing the Trust, pro se. The brief that Williams has submitted is essentially unintelligible, does not raise any assignments of error, and fails in other ways to comply with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have often said that " '[l]itigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and correct procedure, and are held to the same standards as other litigants.' " Williams v. City of Dayton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28318, 2019-Ohio-4190, ¶ 6, quoting Yocum v. Means, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1576, 2002-Ohio-3803, ¶ 20. Furthermore, pro se litigants " 'cannot expect or demand special treatment from the judge, who is to sit as impartial arbiter.' " Yocum at ¶ 20, quoting Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363, 676 N.E.2d 171 (8th Dist.1996). With these thoughts in mind, we turn to discussion of the trial court proceedings.
{¶ 3} In August 2020, Williams, as a trustee, filed an action on the Trust's behalf against PNC. According to the complaint, Williams had given PNC a "Bond Indenture and Security Agreement and Indemnity Bond, as and [sic] public Debt Obligation to be paid in United States Currency dollar for dollar." Complaint, p. 2. This "bond," which was not attached to the complaint but to a pro se form indicating what Williams wanted from the court, was a "Securitization; Non-negotiable, Private Bond for Travis Lanier Williams, Principal; Surety bond, Holder in Due Course & Registered." Pro Se Filing (Aug. 13, 2020), Ex. A. The bond further stated that "This Private Master Discharging and Indemnity Bond shall be entered as an asset to the United States Department of Treasury in the amount of - ONE HUNDRED BILLION DOLLARS." Id.
{¶ 4} The bond's issue date was listed as April 2, 2018, and the maturity date was April 2, 2023. The bond further indicated that the Registered Holder and Fiduciary was "THE U.S. Department of the Treasury, bureau of the fiscal services surety Bond program * * *." Id. Williams asserted that the indemnity bond was a public security and a negotiable instrument payable to the Trust. Complaint at p. 8.
{¶ 5} On September 8, 2020, PNC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for two reasons: (1) Williams, as a pro se trustee, was barred from bringing claims on the Trust's behalf; and (2) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After both sides filed further memoranda, the trial court filed a decision on September 28, 2020, granting the motion to dismiss on both grounds. Williams then filed a pro se notice of appeal for the Trust on October 8, 2020.
II. Discussion
{¶ 6} As indicated, Williams does not assert any assignments of error, and it is nearly impossible to tell from his brief what he claims is error. In its brief, PNC framed the assignment of error as follows:
The Trial Court Erred in Granting PNC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint.Appellee's Brief, p. 1.
{¶ 7} Before we consider the merits of this argument, we must discuss whether the appeal has been properly perfected. "It is elementary that an appeal, the right to which is conferred by statute, can be perfected only in the mode prescribed by statute. The exercise of the right of appeal conferred is conditioned upon compliance with the accompanying mandatory requirements." Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 151 Ohio St. 123, 125, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949), citing Collins v. Millen, 57 Ohio St. 289, 291, 48 N.E. 1097 (1897). "No one would contend that a notice of appeal need not be filed within the time fixed by statute. Compliance with a requirement that a notice of appeal shall be filed within the time specified, in order to invoke jurisdiction, is no more essential than that the notice be filed at the place designated and that it be such in content as the statute requires." (Citations omitted.) Id.
{¶ 8} In this respect, App.R. 4(A)(1) provides that "a party who wishes to appeal from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry." See also R.C. 2505.07 (mandating a 30-day period for perfecting appeals). However, even if a notice of appeal has been filed within 30 days, an appeal has not been perfected as required if the notice itself is a nullity. In such a situation, our jurisdiction would not have been properly invoked.
{¶ 9} Concerning filings by non-attorneys, R.C. 4705.01 provides in pertinent part that:
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action or proceeding in which the person is not a party concerned, either by using or subscribing the person's own name, or the name of another person, unless the person has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its prescribed and published rules.
{¶ 10} As a result, "only a licensed attorney may file pleadings on behalf of another party in court." State ex rel. Army of Twelve Monkeys v. Warren Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 156 Ohio St.3d 346, 2019-Ohio-901, 126 N.E.3d 1113, ¶ 5, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Givens, 106 Ohio St.3d 144, 2005-Ohio-4104, 832 N.E.2d 1200, ¶ 7. This includes trustees. Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Ross, 154 Ohio St.3d 328, 2018-Ohio-4247, 114 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 1. See also Williams v. Global Constr. Co., 26 Ohio App.3d 119, 120, 498 N.E.2d 500 (10th Dist.1985); Bank of New York v. Miller, 185 Ohio App.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6117, 923 N.E.2d 651, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.) (noting that "[a] trustee of a trust, who is not a licensed and registered attorney at law, may not file pleadings, argue, or otherwise represent the trust as its counsel in a court").
{¶ 11} In Army of Twelve Monkeys, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissal of a mandamus petition, while modifying the dismissal to be without prejudice. Army of Twelve Monkeys at ¶ 8. In affirming the dismissal, the court noted that the inmate of a correctional institution (who had filed the petition), was not listed as an attorney on the court's website and was not permitted to file on behalf of the Army of Twelve Monkeys, which was an unincorporated nonprofit corporation registered with the State of Ohio. Id. at ¶ 2, 7, and fn. 2.
{¶ 12} Likewise, Williams is not listed on the website of the Supreme Court of Ohio as an attorney and is not permitted to file pleadings on behalf of the Trust. See The Supreme Court of Ohio Attorney Directory, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttorneySearch/#/search (accessed Feb. 23, 2021).
{¶ 13} Here, while Williams did file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court's order, the document he filed was a nullity, because " 'any filing by a non-attorney is viewed as a legal nullity.' " Cannabis for Cures v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-12, 2018-Ohio-3193, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Handcock, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-3, 2016-Ohio-7096, ¶ 11. "Indeed, 'courts throughout the state have consistently held that a complaint, or other pleading undertaken on behalf of a corporation by a non-attorney, is a legal nullity.' " Id., quoting DiPaolo Indus. Dev., L.L.C. v. Blair & Latell Co., LPA, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0006, 2014-Ohio-4317, ¶ 14.
{¶ 14} A "nullity" is defined as "an act void of legal effect." See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nullity (accessed Feb. 25, 2021). See also Collegiate Communities LLC v. Kilbane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108903, 2020-Ohio-926, ¶ 9, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed.) (a " 'nullity' [is] an act in a cause that has 'absolutely no legal force or effect.' It is to be treated as though it had not taken place.")
{¶ 15} In Talarek v. M.E.Z., Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007088, 1998 WL 713226 (Sept. 10, 1998), the court of appeals encountered a situation like the one involved here. The appellant in Talarek filed a notice of appeal on behalf of both himself and a clinic. Id. at *1. After the appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the appellant was not an attorney, the court ordered the appellant to show why he was entitled to represent the clinic. Id. Notably, the appellant hired an attorney after the motion to dismiss was filed, but this was insufficient to preserve the appeal. Id.
{¶ 16} In resolving the matter, the court first discussed R.C. 4705.01 and the fact that in Ohio, non-attorneys are not allowed to represent corporations. The court then said:
Although Mr. Faymore has now hired an attorney to represent Doctors Clinic Inc., he did so only after he had purported to file the notice of appeal on behalf of the corporation. Inasmuch as Mr. Faymore was not authorized to file any documents on behalf of the corporation, the notice of appeal, to the extent it relates to Doctors Clinic Inc., is a nullity and is stricken from the record. Because no notice of appeal on behalf of Doctors Clinic Inc. is before this Court, it failed to perfect a timely appeal and is dismissed as a party.Id. at *1.
{¶ 17} Applying the above principles, we conclude that the notice of appeal Williams filed on the Trust's behalf was a nullity. As a result, the appeal was not properly perfected, and therefore no timely appeal was taken from the trial court's judgment. Consequently, our jurisdiction was never invoked, and the appeal must be dismissed.
{¶ 18} Furthermore, even if we were to consider the appeal's merits, the trial court properly dismissed the Trust's complaint. Again, because Williams is not an attorney, he was not permitted to file pleadings on the Trust's behalf, and the documents he filed in the trial court, including the complaint, were also nullities.
{¶ 19} As noted, the second ground for the trial court's decision was that the complaint failed to state a claim. "The function of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim, generally contained in the complaint." (Citation omitted.) Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., 2011-Ohio-6712, 969 N.E.2d 1284, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). "The defense of failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted asserts that the pleader has failed to plead the operative legal grounds relating to a claim." Id., citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).
{¶ 20} "In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. "In construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Mitchell at 192. While courts typically are restricted to the allegations in the complaint, they may also consider materials that the complaint references. Thomas at ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 248, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997), and State ex rel. Keller v. Cox, 85 Ohio St.3d 279, 707 N.E.2d 931 (1999).
{¶ 21} In turn, when we review trial court orders granting Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss, we do so on a de novo basis, which means we apply the same standards as the trial court. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5.
{¶ 22} PNC contends that the complaint was properly dismissed because no set of facts exists that would entitle the Trust to a disbursement of one hundred billion dollars. PNC notes that courts have dismissed similar legal fantasies brought under a "Redemptionist" theory. The trial court agreed that such claims have been routinely rejected. Decision, Order and Entry Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 3, citing Bryant v. Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F.Supp.2d 753, 757-761 (W.D.Va.2007), and Bank of New York as Tr. v. Markos, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-906, 2006-Ohio-2073, ¶ 13-18.
{¶ 23} In Bryant, the federal district court explained this theory as follows:
The foundation of Plaintiff's claim is equal parts revisionist legal history and conspiracy theory. Supposedly, prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were no U.S. citizens; instead, people were citizens only of their individual states. Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. citizenship remains optional. The federal government, however, has tricked the populace into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into "contracts" embodied in such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the U.S. citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person. Through these contracts, individuals also unknowingly pledge themselves and their property, through their newly created fictitious entities, as security for the national debt in exchange for the benefits of citizenship. However, the government cannot hold the profits it makes from this use of its citizens and their property in the general fund of the United States because doing so would constitute fraud, given
that the profits technically belong to the actual owners of the property being pledged (i.e., the real people represented by the fictitious entities). Therefore, the government holds the profits in secret, individual trust accounts, one for each citizen.
Because the populace is unaware that their birth certificates and such are actually contracts with the government, these contracts are fraudulent. As a result, the officers of government are liable for treason unless they provide a remedy that allows an individual to recover what she is owed - namely, the profits held in her trust account, which the government has made from its use of her and her property in the commercial markets. In 1933, the government provided just such a remedy with House Joint Resolution 192, and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides the means for a person to implement it. The fact that virtually no one is aware of this remedy or how to use it is all part of the government's scheme - if no one takes advantage of the remedy, the government can keep the money, so it is in the government's interest that the remedy be obscure. However, one such as Plaintiff, who learns of and is able to implement the remedy, can supposedly use the debt owed to her by the government to discharge her debts to third parties with Bills of Exchange that are drawn on her trust account.
Thus, Plaintiff undertook the arduous process of implementing the supposed remedy, a process its adherents sometimes refer to as "redemption." This consisted primarily of filing various UCC Financing
Statements (Forms UCC1 and UCC3) with the Secretaries of State of both Michigan and Virginia. In these financing statements, Plaintiff lists herself as both the secured party and the debtor, her apparent intent being to register a security interest in the fictitious entity that was created by her birth certificate and other government documents (i.e., the U.S. citizen "MAUREEN FRANCES BRYANT"). In addition, Plaintiff mailed a copy of a "UCC3 claim" and the original Bill of Exchange to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. After receiving the signed certified mail return receipt, Plaintiff then sent a copy of the Bill of Exchange to Washington Mutual along with "simple processing instructions so that the funds could be fed-wired to them by the Treasury." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) According to Plaintiff, "this transaction has already been approved by Treasury," and Washington Mutual's failure to follow the processing instructions "is the only reason that [it] has not received the funding of the Bill of Exchange." (Id.)(Footnotes omitted.) Bryant, 524 F.Supp.2d at 758-60.
Thus viewed in its entirety, Plaintiff's claim that her Bill of Exchange is a legitimate negotiable instrument is clearly nonsense in almost every detail. Most importantly, the alleged legal bases for her claim, House Joint Resolution 192 and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247, 59 S.Ct. 847, 83 L.Ed. 1266 (1939), address nothing more than the U.S. monetary shift away from the gold standard and provide absolutely no support for her position. Neither mentions nor even alludes to secret trust accounts, a remedy for governmental fraud, Bills of Exchange, the UCC, or any of the other implausible elements of Plaintiff's claim.
{¶ 24} Although the Trust's negotiable instrument is labeled as a "Bond Indenture and Security Agreement and Indemnity Bond," rather than a bill of exchange, the legal theory here is similar to the scheme in Bryant. From what can be gleaned from the complaint's garbled nature, the Trust appears to assert that it gave the United States Treasury "one hundred billion dollars" and, in return, received a negotiable instrument (the bond), which PNC, as an authorized "public depository," is required to redeem on the Treasury's behalf. Complaint, p. 1-6. And, among the barrage of citations included in the complaint is H.J. Resolution 192, which was mentioned in Bryant. Complaint at p. 6; Bryant at 760.
{¶ 25} We recently rejected Williams's claim that he was entitled to present self-prepared international bills of exchange drawn on the United States Treasury to pay his water bills. See Williams v. Dayton Water, 2020-Ohio-4332, 158 N.E.3d 654, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). Among other things, we discussed Williams's argument under 12 U.S.C. 95a, which he has also raised here. See Complaint at p. 8; Appellant's Brief, p. 7. In this vein, we observed that:
That section formerly granted, in time of war, authority for the president to regulate transactions in the foreign exchange of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and transfers of property in which any foreign country or a foreign national has any interest. See former 12 U.S.C. 95a(1)(A) and (B). The section upon which Williams relies, former 12 U.S.C. 95a(2), provided:
Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery
of property or interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States, * * * shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this section, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.
(Footnote omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15-16. Accordingly, as in Williams, the trial court here properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. at ¶ 21-22.
12 U.S.C. 95a was in effect until November 30, 2015. As of December 1, 2015, that section has no content and is entitled "Omitted." In short, Section 95a is no longer valid. Accordingly, Williams now cannot state a claim based on that statute, as a matter of law.
{¶ 26} In Williams, we also discussed the Redemptionist theory, as articulated in Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.2008). Id. at ¶ 17. Monroe described the theory as follows:
One instruction book, Cracking the Code, calls for the use of commercial law to resist authority, including the correctional and judicial systems. The book adheres to the "Redemptionist" theory, which propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." The "strawman" purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 1993, and,
instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.Id. at 203, fn. 4.
{¶ 27} The difficulty caused by these schemes was discussed in Monroe, where the court offered the following example:
These liens and judgments, accessible on financing statement forms, are easy to file. Once registered, however, the fraudulent liens are very burdensome to remove. For example, in a New Jersey incident, criminal defendants registered a fraudulent $14.5 million lien with the New Jersey Department of Revenue against a federal prosecutor and a $3.5 million lien against a federal judge for using their "copyrighted" names in court papers and hearings; it took a federal court order to remove them. In addition to the substantial effort and expense required to expunge the liens,
the fraudulent filings ruined the victims' credit reports.Monroe at 203.
{¶ 28} We mention these points for two reasons. First, based on the documents included with the complaint, the Trust's "bond" appears to have been registered with the Montgomery County Recorder as a mortgage against the United States of America. See File Number 201800031244, page 1 of 2, attached to Pro se Filing (Aug. 13, 2020). Secondly, the Brief filed in our court states that:
Introduction:Appellant's Brief at p. 1.
Plaintiff herein Mr. Williams is before the appellate court for the misconduct of office of Hon. Timothy N. O'Connell, for violating federal law and the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶ 29} The statement that the trial judge committed misconduct is untrue. This incorrect implication is troubling, as is the fact that an improper mortgage has apparently been filed with the Montgomery County Recorder. In Bryant, the court commented that "people frequently end up in prison for pursuing these sorts of schemes." Bryant, 524 F.Supp.2d at 763. We noted the same point in Williams, and we repeat it here. Williams, 2020-Ohio-4332, 158 N.E.3d 654, at ¶ 8.
{¶ 30} Based on the preceding discussion, this case is dismissed. DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. Copies sent to: Travis Lanier Williams
J. Sayre Payne
Hon. Timothy N. McConnell