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Trailer, Inc. v. Bowers

Supreme Court of Ohio
Dec 14, 1955
130 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1955)

Summary

In Trailer Mart, a dealer in house trailers obtained certificates of title and registration for all the vehicles it sold. It failed to include these vehicles in its average inventory.

Summary of this case from Zalud Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Limbach

Opinion

No. 34402

Decided December 14, 1955.

Taxation — House trailers in possession of seller — Titled in seller's name and license fees paid — Subject to taxation under Section 5701.03, Revised Code — Seller a "dealer," not "owner."

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals.

Appellant is engaged in selling house trailers. In 1951, appellant caused all house trailers in its possession to be titled in its name and secured licenses for them, paying the annual license tax prescribed therefor under Sections 6291 and 6292, General Code (Sections 4503.02 and 4503.04, Revised Code). Appellant also secured 1952 licenses for its house trailers but did not, in either 1951 or 1952, pay the tax levied on house trailers under Section 6292-2, General Code (Section 4503.06, Revised Code). As house trailers were sold, appellant would cause a transfer of registration, so that at all times during 1952 all house trailers in appellant's possession were registered and licensed according to statute.

In making its tax return for 1952, appellant did not include in its average inventory the value of licensed house trailers in its possession from time to time during the year 1951, on the premise that such trailers were exempt from personal property taxation under the provisions of Section 5325, General Code (Section 5701.03, Revised Code), defining personal property for purposes of taxation, and Section 6292, General Code, fixing the rate of license tax for house trailers.

The Tax Commissioner included the value of such licensed house trailers in the computation of appellant's average inventory, and issued for the year 1952 an increased assessment reflecting such action. After hearing upon an application for redetermination, the Tax Commissioner confirmed the assessment.

The Board of Tax Appeals, on appeal, affirmed the order of the Tax Commissioner.

An appeal from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals brings the cause to this court for review.

Messrs. Carney Carney and Mr. Howard W. Broadbent, for appellant.

Mr. C. William O'Neill, attorney general, and Mr. W.E. Herron, for appellee.


The issue presented by this appeal is whether the house trailers held by appellant for sale are included in the basic definition of "personal property," in Section 5325, General Code (Section 5701.03, Revised Code), or whether they were excluded from such definition by appellant's payment of the annual license tax levied under Sections 6291 and 6292, General Code (Sections 4503.02 and 4503.04, Revised Code), and its nonpayment of the tax on house trailers levied under Section 6292-2, General Code (Section 4503.06, Revised Code).

Section 5325, General Code, defining personal property for purposes of taxation, excludes "motor vehicles registered by the owner thereof."

Section 6290, General Code (Section 4501.01, Revised Code), defines the "owner" of a motor vehicle as including "any person, firm or corporation other than a manufacturer or dealer having title to a motor vehicle," and "dealer" as including "all persons, firms and corporations regularly engaged in * * * selling, displaying, offering for sale or dealing in motor vehicles."

Section 6292, General Code, prescribing the license tax rates, reads in part: "Taxes at the rates provided in this section shall be in lieu of all taxes on or with respect to the ownership of such motor vehicles, except as provided in Section 6292-2 of the General Code."

Section 6292-2, General Code, which levies a tax on house trailers, provides that "the tax so levied shall become due and payable upon the occupancy for human habitation of the house trailer."

Since it is disclosed by the agreed statement of facts that appellant "is engaged primarily in the selling of house trailers," it is clear from the foregoing statutory definitions that appellant is a "dealer" in motor vehicles and not an "owner" of motor vehicles as that term is used in Section 5325, General Code (Section 5701.03, Revised Code), supra, and, therefore, can not claim the exemption, as prescribed therein, from ad valorem taxation on house trailers held by it for sale.

Furthermore, the facts that appellant caused the house trailers in its possession to be titled in its name, secured licenses for them under Section 6291, General Code (Section 4503.02, Revised Code), and paid the annual license tax prescribed therefor under Section 6292, General Code (Section 4503.04, Revised Code), did not change appellant's status as "dealer" to one of "owner."

The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is not unreasonable or unlawful, and it is, hereby, affirmed.

Decision affirmed.

WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, STEWART and BELL, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Trailer, Inc. v. Bowers

Supreme Court of Ohio
Dec 14, 1955
130 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1955)

In Trailer Mart, a dealer in house trailers obtained certificates of title and registration for all the vehicles it sold. It failed to include these vehicles in its average inventory.

Summary of this case from Zalud Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Limbach
Case details for

Trailer, Inc. v. Bowers

Case Details

Full title:TRAILER MART, INC., APPELLANT v. BOWERS, TAX COMMR., APPELLEE

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Dec 14, 1955

Citations

130 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1955)
130 N.E.2d 793

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