Opinion
339 M.D. 2018
09-13-2021
T.P.B., Petitioner v. Pennsylvania State Police, Megan's Law Section, Respondent
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: September 11, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Before the Court, in our original jurisdiction, is the amended Application for Summary Relief filed by T.P.B. (Petitioner's Application) seeking relief from his lifetime sexual offender registration requirement in Pennsylvania under the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27 (Act 10), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.74, as amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140 (Act 29) (collectively, Act 10 or SORNA II). The Petitioner's Application alleges (1) that SORNA II is an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it increases T.P.B.'s (Petitioner) sex offender registration period from 10 years to the duration of Petitioner's lifetime, and (2) that SORNA II violates Petitioner's right to the protection of his reputation. See Petitioner's Application. Also before the Court is Respondent's Application for Summary Relief (Respondent's Application) filed by the Pennsylvania State Police (Respondent). For the reasons stated herein, we deny Petitioner's Application and grant Respondent's Application.
An application for summary relief may be granted if a party's right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b); Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514 (Pa. 2008); Eleven Pa., LLC v. Commonwealth, 169 A.3d 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). When ruling on an application for summary relief, this Court "view[s] the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and enter[s] judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the right to judgment is clear as a matter of law." Eleven, 169 A.3d at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On October 31, 2019, this Court filed a memorandum opinion regarding Petitioner's amended Application for Summary Relief filed December 18, 2018, Petitioner's First and Second Amendments thereto, and Petitioner's September 29, 2019, September 30, 2019, October 1, 2019, and October 18, 2019 filings, respectively styled as "Petitioner's application in Support of Rule 1532(b) Special and Summary Relief", "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018**", "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018 second amendment **", and "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018 second amendment ** - third amendment", which denied Petitioner's request for summary relief as well as these attendant filings because an outstanding issue of material fact remained regarding Petitioner's sex offender registration status and reporting requirements in Texas upon his 2009 relocation to Pennsylvania. See T.P.B. I, slip op. at 9. Since T.P.B. I, and in addition to separate filings related to his attempt to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (which appeal our Supreme Court quashed by order dated March 23, 2020), Petitioner has also now filed the following additional applications relative to this matter, all of which remain outstanding: Petitioner has filed a multitude of motions and applications in this Court relative to the instant matter. See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018. As they all effectively raise the same claims, this Court previously treated Petitioner's many filings collectively as the "Application." See T.P.B. v. Pa. State Police, Megan's Law Section (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 339 M.D. 2018, filed Oct. 31, 2019) (T.P.B. I), slip op. at 3 n.2. We treat Petitioner's filings collectively again herein, although under the collective title of "Petitioner's Application" to distinguish from the Respondent's Application for Summary Relief filed by the Pennsylvania State Police, which we also address herein.
• "Application for Emergency Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) for Summary Relief" filed May 8, 2020;
• "Application for Emergency Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) for Summary Relief First-Amendment" filed May 11, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) NEW MATTERS" filed May 14, 2020;
• "Withdraw May 14, 2020 Application for Summary Relief Name: Application for Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532(b) New Matters" filed May 26, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief by law right now by Rule 123" filed May 26, 2020;
• "PETITIONER'S BRIEF-PRO SE Rule 1532 Summary Relief Re-emphasized on Clarity" filed June 1, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief by Rules 1028(c)(1) & 1029(a), (d)" filed June 2, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Amended Application for Review by R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) Summary Relief AS ORDERED" filed July 21, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Application for Rule 1542 Evidentiary Hearing" filed July 31, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Motion to Strike for non service of opposition Brief which is dispositive to case 339 MD 2018" filed September 2, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Motion of Demurrer of Respondents opposition brief By Rule 123" filed September 2, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS" filed December 24, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS (first Amedment)" filed December 29, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS (Second Amendment)" filed January 6, 2021; and
• "-NEW MATTERS- Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) and Rule 69.311 By Reply to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Petitioner's Application for Relief Filed 01-06-2021" filed January 13, 2021.See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018 (all filing titles verbatim).
As we previously explained:
[B]eginning in 1995, Pennsylvania's General Assembly has enacted a series of statutes and amendments requiring sex offenders living within the Commonwealth to register for varying periods of time with the Pennsylvania State Police based on their convictions for certain sexual offenses. The General Assembly enacted the first of these statutes, commonly known as Megan's Law I, former 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, in 1995, followed five years later, in 2000, by what is commonly known as Megan's Law II, former 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7. In 2004, the General Assembly enacted what is commonly known as Megan's Law III, former 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9, which remained in effect until the enactment of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA I), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, in 2012. On July 19, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down the decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), which held that SORNA I violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions by increasing registration obligations on certain sex offender registrants. Thereafter, in 2018, to clarify that sex offender registration provisions were not ex post facto punishment, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II.T.P.B. I, slip op. at 1-2.
Petitioner's Application also raised a claim that the General Assembly failed to comply with the Revival and Amendment Provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Pa. Const. art. III, § 6) in enacting Act 10 and Act 29. See T.P.B. I, slip op. at 5 & 9. This Court denied this claim in T.P.B. I. See id.
This Court previously outlined the factual and procedural history of this matter in its memorandum opinion filed October 31, 2019, which we expressly incorporate by reference into this opinion. See T.P.B. v. Pa. State Police, Megan's Law Section (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 339 M.D. 2018, filed Oct. 31, 2019) (T.P.B. I). We need not restate the background of this matter beyond noting that T.P.B. I denied Petitioner relief because at that time the factual record did not allow the Court to discern whether Petitioner was a lifetime registrant in Texas at the time he relocated to Pennsylvania in 2009. See T.P.B. I, slip op. at 5-9. The Court noted, however, that once Petitioner's Texas registration status was known, his outstanding ex post facto and reputation claims could be easily determined, as each was premised on an alleged increase in Petitioner's registration period. See id., slip op. at 8-9; see also Adams v. Pa. State Police, __A.3d__, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 572 M.D. 2018, filed June 14, 2021), 2021 WL 2405400 at *2 (citing Bill v. Noonan (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 437 M.D. 2017, filed May 16, 2019), slip op. at 12-13) (unreported) (stating that a claim is not stated that SORNA I or SORNA II violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions or that there are violations of reputation rights where sex offender registration requirements are simply continued, not extended).
On March 19, 2021, this Court filed an order directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing: (1) whether an outstanding issue of fact exists regarding Petitioner's sex offender registration status in Texas as a result of his 1999 conviction of Indecency With a Child and the resulting effect upon his sex offender registration status in Pennsylvania upon his 2009 relocation to the Commonwealth; (2) Petitioner's current sex offender registration obligations in Pennsylvania; and (3) the ramifications on this matter of our Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), and order in T.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 241 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2020). See Order dated March 19, 2021 at 2-3 (pagination supplied). Petitioner filed his supplemental brief on March 30, 2021. See Petitioner's Supplemental Brief filed March 30, 2021 (Petitioner's Supplemental Brief). Respondent filed its supplemental brief on May 19, 2021. See Respondent's Supplemental Brief Regarding Plaintiff's SORNA Status filed May 19, 2021. Thereafter, on July 16, 2021, Respondent filed Respondent's Application, to which Petitioner filed a response on July 27, 2021.
We note that, in addition to Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, Petitioner also filed the following additional filings after this Court's March 19, 2021 order, all of which, like the filings outlined in note 2, supra, remain outstanding, to the extent they require rulings:
• "Petitioner's Supplemental Brief (First Amendment)" filed March 29, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Reply - Brief" filed April 2, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Preliminary Objection" filed April 9, 2021;
• "Petitioner's FINAL Application for Summary Relief by R.A.P. 1532(b)" filed May 12, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion to Strike off Interlocutory order of Judgment By Rule 311(a)(1)" filed May 17, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion on Contempt of Court's Order 463 MD 2017 Rule 1030 New Matter" filed May 17, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion to Open \ Vacate Decree by Rule 3331 & 3332" filed June 24, 2021;
• "Motion to Object" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Objection to PSP's Misclassification Strike Declaration of Trooper Matthew Webb, his credibility" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Application by R.A.P. 1517 to apply Rule 1033 to Amend Petition on Misclassification under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9799.56(b)(4)(i)" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion for Summary Relief" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Brief In Support of Summary Relief" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Reply Brief In Opposition to Respondent's Summary Relief" filed July 26, 2021; and
• "Petitioner's Reply To Respondent's Supplemental Brief As to Rule 1532(b) on Response" filed September 1, 2021.See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018 (all filing titles verbatim). We note that on July 12, 2021, Respondent filed "Respondent's Omnibus Response to Petitioner's Applications for Relief," which denied that Petitioner is entitled to any relief as a matter of law. See id.
On May 26, 2021, Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Supplemental Brief As to Rule 1035.3(d) on Response." See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018.
Petitioner also filed "Petitioner's Reply To Respondent's Supplemental Brief As to Rule 1532(b) on Response." See id. Petitioner styled his response as "Petitioner's Reply Brief In Opposition to Respondent's Summary Relief". See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018. On September 1, 2021,
The determination of Petitioner's outstanding claims depends on whether Petitioner was a lifetime registrant in Texas when he relocated to Pennsylvania from Texas in 2009. See T.P.B. I, slip op. at 5-9. As we previously explained:
Megan's Law III was in effect in 2009 when Petitioner relocated to the Commonwealth. For offenders with out-of-state convictions, Megan's Law III required an equivalency comparison to determine the offender's Pennsylvania registration period. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(4)(ii)-(v) (effective Jan. 1, 2007 through Feb. 20, 2012). In 2009, the arguably comparable crime of indecent assault was a 10-year registration-equivalent crime in Pennsylvania. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(1) (effective Dec. 8, 2008 through Dec. 19, 2011). However, Megan's Law III also required that individuals with out-of-state 10-year equivalent registration convictions register for the greater of either 10 years or "a period of time equal to the time for which the individual was required to register in the other jurisdiction[.]" Former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(4)(iii)-(v) (effective Jan. 1, 2007 through Feb. 20, 2012). As such, Megan's Law III required individuals with lifetime sexual offender registration requirements in foreign jurisdictions to also register for life in Pennsylvania. Id. Therefore, regardless of whether his Texas felony conviction for Indecency With a Child - Sexual Contact was equivalent to Pennsylvania's 10-year registration-equivalent crime of indecent assault, as he claims, if Petitioner was a lifetime registrant in Texas, he would have also been a lifetime sexual offender registrant in Pennsylvania as of his 2009 relocation. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(4)(iii)-(v) (effective Jan. 1, 2007 through Feb. 20, 2012).Id., slip op. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). Thus, as we noted, a determination of Petitioner's sex offender registration status in Texas at the time of his relocation to Pennsylvania in 2009 would determine his then-existing sex offender registration requirements under Megan's Law III, and could potentially render the matter easily determinable as to his current obligations under SORNA II, as successor to Megan's Law III. See id., slip op. at 9.
In support of Respondent's Application, Respondent has submitted exhibits that clearly indicate Petitioner was a lifetime sex offender registrant in Texas at the time he relocated to Pennsylvania. Specifically, Respondent has submitted the affidavit of Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Matthew Webb of the Pennsylvania State Police's Bureau of Records and Identification, Megan's Law Section (Webb Affidavit). See Webb Aff. The Webb Affidavit explains that Petitioner was a lifetime sex offender registration registrant in Texas at the time he relocated to Pennsylvania, and that Petitioner remains so to this day. See id. at 2. The documents attached to the Webb Affidavit illustrate that, since his relocation to the Commonwealth in 2009, Respondent has always considered and treated Petitioner as a lifetime sex offender registrant based on his status as an out-of-state lifetime sex offender registrant. See id.
This Court may consider affidavits submitted in support of an application for summary relief in determining the application. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Bedford Cnty. v. Ling, 92 A.3d 112, 117 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (considering allegations of uncontradicted affidavit filed in support of application for summary relief considered by Court in determining application); see also Prop. Owners, Residents, and/or Taxpayers of Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 552 A.2d 769 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (motion to dismiss properly granted where moving party's uncontradicted affidavit and non-moving party's failure to respond left no issue of material fact).
Respondent has also submitted the affidavit of Jeanine C. Hudson (Hudson Affidavit), the managing attorney in the Crime Records Legal Operations section of the Office of the General Counsel of the Texas Department of Public Safety. See Hudson Aff. The Hudson Affidavit further dispels any ambiguity regarding Petitioner's sex offender registration status in Texas upon his relocation to Pennsylvania. Ms. Hudson explains that Petitioner was, at the time he relocated to the Commonwealth in 2009, and remains to this day, a lifetime sex offender registry registrant. See id. at 1-2 (pagination supplied). Further, the Notice of Sexual Offender Registration Requirement included as an attachment to the Hudson Affidavit states that, "[f]or offenders dispositioned for offenses under Texas Penal Code Section[] 21.11(a)(1), . . . the duty to register [as a sex offender registrant] does not expire." See Notice of Sexual Offender Registration Requirement at 11. Having signed the Notice of Sexual Offender Registration Requirement in 1999, Petitioner was fully aware of his lifetime sex offender registration status. See id.
With this information regarding Petitioner's sex offender registration obligations in Texas now part of the record, the present matter is easily determinable. Petitioner's Indecency With a Child conviction made him a lifetime sex offender registrant in Texas. See Notice of Sexual Offender Registration Requirement at 11. Because Petitioner was a lifetime sex offender registrant in Texas in 2009 when he relocated to Pennsylvania, he was also a lifetime sex offender registrant in Pennsylvania. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(b)(4)(iii)-(v) (effective Jan. 1, 2007 through Feb. 20, 2012). Under these circumstances, Respondent was not required to perform an equivalency determination comparing Petitioner's Texas convictions to Pennsylvania law. See id. Petitioner's Pennsylvania sex offender registration requirements under SORNA I and SORNA II merely continued and did not increase his existing requirements - he remained a lifetime registrant. Thus, Petitioner's Pennsylvania registration requirements under SORNA I or SORNA II did not constitute ex post facto laws as applied to Petitioner. See Adams, __A.3d__ at, 2021 WL 2405400, at *2 (finding Muniz inapplicable and overruling as-applied challenge to SORNA I and SORNA II where application of SORNA I or SORNA II did not increase existing registration obligations).
Further, Petitioner's right to protection of reputation claim fails for the same reason. See T.P.B. I, slip op. at 8-9. As noted in T.P.B. I, Petitioner's claim, pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. 1, § 1, was premised on the notion that Petitioner's reputation was harmed when he was subjected to an increased sexual offender registration requirement under SORNA II. See id., slip op. at 8-9. SORNA II did not subject Petitioner to increased registration requirements, as noted herein. As such, the reputation claim fails. See Adams, __A.3d__ at, 2021 WL 2405400, at *2.
Additionally, since Petitioner first filed the Petitioner's Application, our Supreme Court has made further definitive pronouncements regarding the ex post facto implications of sex offender registration requirements. In Lacombe, the Supreme Court held that the application of subchapter I of Act 29 did not constitute criminal punishment and did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws for crimes committed prior to the enactment of SORNA. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-27. Thereafter, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order extending the determination in Lacombe to individuals whose crimes were committed before the enactment of any sexual offender registrations schemes. See T.S., 241 A.3d at 1091. Accordingly, in addition to being factually incorrect as discussed supra, Petitioner's ex post facto claim fails based on the Supreme Court's determinations in Lacombe and T.S. that the application of sex offender registration requirements does not offend the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Because Petitioner was a lifetime sex offender registrant in 2009 when he relocated to Pennsylvania, and because our Supreme Court has ruled that sex offender registration requirements do not violate ex post facto laws, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims that subjecting him to the registration requirements of SORNA II or subsequent sex offender registration schemes violates ex post facto prohibitions and/or violates his constitutional right to the protection of his reputation. For these reasons, we deny Petitioner's Application and grant Respondent's Application.
Accordingly, Petitioner's Application is denied, Respondent's Application is granted, and Petitioner's additional outstanding filings are dismissed as moot.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of September, 2021, to the extent they were not ruled on in this Court's October 31, 2019 memorandum opinion, Petitioner T.P.B.'s (Petitioner) amended Application for Summary Relief, Petitioner's filing styled "Petitioner's application in Support of Rule 1532(b) Special and Summary Relief," and Petitioner's filings styled "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018**," "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018 second amendment**," and "Rule 1532(b) Special Summary Relief by MANDAMUS ** Re-emphasis for clarity with application for leave of Court to brief under SP-480-2018 second amendment** - third amendment" (collectively, Petitioner's Application) are DENIED in their entirety.
The "Respondent's Application for Summary Relief" filed by the Pennsylvania State Police on July 16, 2021, is GRANTED.
Petitioner's "WRIT of MANDAMUS ** FIRST - AMENDED PETITION **," filed July 23, 2018, is DISMISSED with prejudice.
To the extent they contain applications and/or requests for relief, all of T.P.B.'s remaining outstanding filings are DISMISSED as moot.
T.P.B.'s remaining outstanding filings include the following motions and applications filed by T.P.B. since this Court's October 31, 2019 memorandum opinion:
• "Application for Emergency Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) for Summary Relief" filed May 8, 2020;
• "Application for Emergency Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) for Summary Relief First-Amendment" filed May 11, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) NEW MATTERS" filed May 14, 2020;
• "Withdraw May 14, 2020 Application for Summary Relief Name: Application for Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532(b) New Matters" filed May 26, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief by law right now by Rule 123" filed May 26, 2020;
• "PETITIONER'S BRIEF-PRO SE Rule 1532 Summary Relief Re-emphasized on Clarity" filed June 1, 2020;
• "Application for Summary Relief by Rules 1028(c)(1) & 1029(a), (d)" filed June 2, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Amended Application for Review by R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) Summary Relief AS ORDERED" filed July 21, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Application for Rule 1542 Evidentiary Hearing" filed July 31, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Motion to Strike for non service of opposition Brief which is dispositive to case 339 MD 2018" filed September 2, 2020;
• "Petitioner's Motion of Demurrer of Respondents opposition brief By Rule 123" filed September 2, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS" filed December 24, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS (first Amedment)" filed December 29, 2020;
• "Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b)-NEW MATTERS (Second Amendment)" filed January 6, 2021;
• "-NEW MATTERS- Application for Special Summary Relief Under R.A.P. Rule 1532 (b) and Rule 69.311 By Reply to Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Petitioner's Application for Relief Filed 01-06-2021" filed January 13, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Supplemental Brief (First Amendment)" filed March 29, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Reply - Brief" filed April 2, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Preliminary Objection" filed April 9, 2021;
• "Petitioner's FINAL Application for Summary Relief by R.A.P. Rule 1532(b)" filed May 12, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion to Strike off Interlocutory order of Judgment By Rule 311(a)(1)" filed May 17, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion on Contempt of Court's Order 463 MD 2017 Rule 1030 New Matter" filed May 17, 2021.
• "Petitioner's Motion to Open \ Vacate Decree by Rule 3331 & 3332" filed June 28, 2021;
• "Motion to Object" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Objection to PSP's Misclassification Strike Declaration of Trooper Matthew Webb, his credibility" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Application by R.A.P. 1517 to apply Rule 1033 to Amend Petition on Misclassification under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 9799.56(b)(4)(i)" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Motion for Summary Relief" filed June 30, 2021;
• "Petitioner's Brief In Support of Summary Relief" filed June 30, 2021; and
• "Petitioner's Reply Brief In Opposition to Respondent's Summary Relief" filed July 27, 2021.
• "Petitioner's Reply To Respondent's Supplemental Brief As to Rule 1532(b) on Response" filed September 1, 2021.See Commonwealth Court Docket No. 339 M.D. 2018 (all filing titles verbatim).