Opinion
22A-CR-2195
08-15-2023
Amy D. Thornbury, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT J. Patrick Wright Brandon E. Murphy Cannon Bruns &Murphy Muncie, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Alexandria N. Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Jay Circuit Court The Honorable Brian D. Hutchison, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 38C01-2108-F5-31
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT J. Patrick Wright Brandon E. Murphy Cannon Bruns &Murphy Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Alexandria N. Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Amy D. Thornbury ("Thornbury") appeals her conviction of possession of methamphetamine, an offense elevated to a Level 5 felony based on evidence that Thornbury had a prior conviction for drug dealing. Thornbury contends there was insufficient evidence to identify Thornbury as the person who had been convicted of the prior drug-dealing offense. Concluding there was sufficient evidence identifying Thornbury as the convicted person, we affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (b)(2).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2021, the State charged Thornbury with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony, alleging Thornbury was "previously convicted of Dealing in a Schedule III Controlled [S]ubstance, a [C]lass B felony[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13. The Jay Circuit Court later conducted a bifurcated jury trial.
[¶3] The initial phase of the jury trial concerned whether Thornbury committed possession of methamphetamine. During this phase, the State presented evidence about a traffic stop involving Thornbury. The stop progressed to a search of Thornbury's pocket, which disclosed a plastic bag containing a clear, rock-like substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the possession of methamphetamine offense.
The phase also concerned two other charges, for which Thornbury was found not guilty.
[¶4] The next phase of the trial commenced to determine whether an enhancing circumstance applied. In Exhibit 8, the State presented certified copies of documents from a 2012 criminal cause in the Jay Circuit Court. In that case, the State alleged a defendant named Amy D. Bailey committed Dealing in a Schedule III Controlled Substance by knowingly delivering dihydrocodeinone. The defendant eventually pleaded guilty to Class B felony Dealing in a Schedule III Controlled Substance, a lesser-included offense.
[¶5] The State presented testimony from the Prosecutor Investigator of Jay County, Curt Compton ("Compton"), for the purpose of identifying Thornbury as the same person as Amy D. Bailey, who pleaded guilty to the 2012 dealing offense. Compton has worked for the prosecutor's office since 1987. His work duties include reviewing criminal records to verify identifying information, including the accused's date of birth and social security number. When asked whether he was familiar with the documents contained in Exhibit 8, Compton replied: "Yes. I made those." Tr. Vol. II at 110. Compton later explained he knew Amy D. Bailey because he was "familiar with some of her history," in that he would "type up the charges" and "investigate who she is" as part of his administrative role. Id. at 112. He added: "She's had . . . some name changes." Id. At that point, the State asked Compton if he knew "whether or not [the] Amy D. Bailey that's listed on those documents is the same person as Amy Thornbury who's present in the courtroom[.]" Id. He said: "Yes it is." Id.
[¶6] There was the following exchange:
Q And as part of your duties have you verified that th[e] individual that's listed on those documents is one in the same [sic] as the individual here today in the courtroom?
A Yes.
Q And how is it that you do that?
A Well their . . . ID[s].
Q Okay.
A Date of birth. Social security numbers. I've looked at the pre[-]sentence investigations. Their name changes.... [S]he was a Thornbury, I believe, before she was a Bailey. I think . . . she was a Staver at one point in time. ....
Q So . . . you've been familiar with various name changes over the years . . .
A . . . Yes . . .
Q . . . As part of your duties with the prosecutor's office?
A Yes.Id. at 112-13.
[¶7] The jury found Thornbury had previously been convicted of the 2012 dealing offense and returned a guilty verdict as to possession of methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony. The trial court later imposed a four-year sentence.
[¶8] Thornbury now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] "When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses." Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). Rather, "we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact." Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). "We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
[¶10] Here, Thornbury does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence that she possessed methamphetamine, conduct that is generally a Level 6 felony under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6.1(a). She instead focuses on the elevation of the offense under subsection (b) of the statute, which states in pertinent part: "The offense is a Level 5 felony if . . . the amount of the drug involved is less than five (5) grams and an enhancing circumstance applies." Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(b). In Indiana Code Section 35-48-1-16.5, our legislature set forth several potential enhancing circumstances. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-117.5. Among them: "The person has a prior conviction for dealing in a controlled substance that is not marijuana, hashish, hash oil, or salvia divinorum." I.C. § 35-48-116.5(1).
[¶11] To prove there was a prior conviction, "the State must introduce into evidence proper certified and authenticated records" of the conviction. Dexter v. State, 959 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis removed). The State must also introduce "additional supporting evidence . . . to prove the identity of the defendant[.]" Id. As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, although "there must be supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents, the evidence may be circumstantial." Hernandez v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999). Ultimately, "[i]f the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown." Id.
[¶12] On appeal, Thornbury does not dispute that the State properly introduced records showing a person named Amy D. Bailey had a prior conviction. However, she alleges there was insufficient evidence that Thornbury was the person convicted.
[¶13] To connect the certified records to Thornbury, the State presented testimony from Compton, who was personally familiar with the records. Compton confirmed he "verified that th[e] individual that's listed on those documents is . . . the individual . . . in the courtroom" at trial. Tr. Vol. II p. 112. When asked about his verification processes, Compton indicated that he compared identifying information: "Date of birth. Social security numbers. I've looked at the pre[-]sentence investigations. Their name changes.... [S]he was a Thornbury, I believe, before she was a Bailey. I think . . . she was a Staver at one point in time." Id. at 113. Compton also said he was "familiar with some of [the defendant's] history," because he would "type up the charges" and "investigate who she is[.]" Id. at 112.
[¶14] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Thornbury directs us to cases where the identification evidence included "photographs, fingerprints, physical descriptions, and testimony of an arresting officer." Appellant's Br. at 12. Thornbury asserts Compton's testimony was inadequate, and she suggests that the State should have called "the investigating officer to verify that the person arrested in the prior case was the same person that was on trial." Id. at 14.
[¶15] Thornbury's appellate arguments amount to requests to reweigh the evidence. We must decline. All in all, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence that Thornbury was the person convicted of the prior offense, and therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to support her conviction for Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.