Opinion
A-13656
10-26-2022
CARL THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Carl Thompson, in propria persona, Kenai, Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Brent E. Bennett, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-19-01380 CI
Appearances:
Carl Thompson, in propria persona, Kenai, Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
HARBISON Judge.
Carl Thompson was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree murder and tampering with physical evidence after he killed his former wife and disposed of her body. On appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions.
Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 128-29 (Alaska App. 1989).
Id.
In January 2019, Thompson filed an application for post-conviction DNA testing of physical evidence under AS 12.73. The superior court dismissed the application without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Thompson's application failed to establish a prima facie case that a favorable DNA test result would raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense of first-degree murder.
In this appeal, Thompson challenges the superior court's ruling. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the superior court's order dismissing Thompson's application.
Background facts and proceedings
The following facts are taken from this Court's opinion on direct appeal:
On September 10,1986, two moose hunters found the body of a dead woman floating in a gravel pit lake off the Elliott Highway. The hunters notified the Alaska State Troopers. The troopers discovered that the woman had been stabbed twenty-nine times. The body had been thrown into a water-filled gravel pit after being wrapped in chains, a bedspread, and a tent fly. The troopers advertised for information concerning the identity of the body, and directed the public's attention to a unique tattoo on the body. At the urging of his girlfriend, Carl Thompson called the troopers and reported that his former wife fit the description of the
body which they had found and told the troopers that she had been missing since mid-August. Thompson told the troopers that he had taken his former wife to the airport in mid-August and that he had not seen her again. Through a dental examination, the body was conclusively identified as Thompson's former wife, Dixie Thompson.
On September 15,1986, the trooper investigation had focused upon Carl Thompson as the person who had killed Dixie Thompson. Trooper Cris Stockard contacted Thompson and asked him to come to the trooper office to identify some property belonging to Dixie Thompson. However, Trooper Stockard's primary reason for contacting Thompson was to question him. Thompson went to the police station and was questioned extensively by Trooper Stockard. During the questioning, Trooper Stockard consistently assured Thompson that he was not under arrest and that he was free to go at any time. Thompson ultimately confessed to killing his former wife. Following his statement to the troopers, Thompson was allowed to leave the trooper headquarters. However, he was arrested approximately two hours later and was charged with murder in the first degree.
While Trooper Stockard was interviewing Thompson at the trooper headquarters, other troopers were executing a search warrant at Thompson's residence on Chena Hot Springs Road. The troopers seized a handgun during the search. Additionally, Luminol testing was done to check for the presence of blood in the residence. The test revealed a large concentration of blood in the kitchen area of the residence. The troopers also seized Thompson's truck. The tires of Thompson's truck were of similar size and tread design to the tire impressions that the troopers had found near where Dixie Thompson's body had been discovered.
At trial, Thompson defended on the ground that he initially stabbed Dixie Thompson in self-defense. Thompson
claims that he then lost control and killed Dixie in the heat of passion.
Id.
When Thompson presented his defense at trial, he relied on evidence of statements he made to the troopers describing how Dixie was killed. In these statements, Thompson claimed that, after he told Dixie about his relationship with another woman, she went "wild." She picked up a gun that was in the room and cocked it. Thompson was afraid that she would shoot him, so he stabbed her with a knife, and he continued stabbing her because she kept screaming.
In response, the State presented evidence that blood was found throughout the kitchen of Thompson's residence but that no blood was found on either the gun or the holster that were recovered from the residence. The prosecutor argued that this suggested that Dixie had not held the gun or holster and had not threatened Thompson with the gun.
As we have explained, the jury convicted Thompson of first-degree murder and tampering with physical evidence, and this Court subsequently affirmed those convictions.
In January 2019, Thompson filed an application for post-conviction DNA testing of physical evidence under AS 12.73. The application included an affidavit in which Thompson asserted that he is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, as well as any lesser included offenses.
In his application, Thompson requested testing of: (1) the handgun and leather shoulder holster that were found at the crime scene, and (2) the seat cover from his pickup truck. Thompson acknowledged that, at the time of the original investigation, the FBI had tested the handgun and holster for the presence of blood but did not find any blood on either one. But he argued that the ability to test for blood has significantly improved since then. He argued that, if the gun and the holster were tested again, the test result would demonstrate that there was blood on either the gun or the holster, and that this would establish a reasonable probability that he had acted in self-defense.
Thompson also acknowledged that, at the time of the original investigation, testing of the seat cover of his pickup truck showed that there was human blood on the seat cover. But in his application, he claimed that retesting the blood found on the seat cover would demonstrate that the blood on the seat cover was animal blood rather than human blood. According to Thompson's application, the blood on the seat cover was from his Malamute dog who was in heat and had bled on the seat, and a favorable DNA test result would undermine the suggestion that he covered up the killing, and accordingly would support his self-defense claim.
Confusingly, Thompson also stated in his application that he "does not deny transporting Dixie's body in his pickup to where it was ultimately concealed [], and later discovered by troopers[.]" Thompson stated that he disposed of Dixie's body because Dixie's brother was the president of the Hells Angels and Thompson believed that the brother would kill him in retaliation, regardless of whether he had killed Dixie in self-defense.
In February 2019, the superior court sent out a form notice to the State, setting deadlines for the State to file an answer or a motion. The State then filed a motion to dismiss Thompson's application. One of the State's arguments in support of dismissal was that Thompson had not shown that DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. Thompson filed a written opposition to the State's motion to dismiss, and the superior court held oral argument on the motion.
The superior court granted the State's motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court ruled, inter alia, that favorable DNA test results would not create a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Thompson not guilty because: (1) the presence or absence of blood on the gun and holster was only tangentially relevant to Thompson's guilt or innocence, (2) the absence of human blood on the seat cover was not probative of the circumstances of Thompson's use of force against Dixie, and (3) the evidence of Thompson's guilt was strong.
Thompson moved for reconsideration, but the superior court denied reconsideration without explanation. This appeal followed.
Why we reject Thompson's challenges to the superior court's order dismissing his application for failure to state a claim for relief
Under AS 12.73.020(7) and (9), an application for post-conviction DNA testing must explain: (1) how the proposed DNA testing could produce evidence that would be materially relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence; and (2) why favorable DNA test results would raise "a reasonable probability" that the defendant did not commit the offense. On appeal, Thompson argues that the superior court erred in finding that his application did not establish that the proposed DNA testing, if favorable, would have impacted the outcome of his trial.
Lambert, 435 P.3d at 1016-17.
Id. at 1019-20.
Thompson first asserts that the superior court erred by finding that the presence or absence of human blood in his truck was only tangentially relevant to his case and that a favorable DNA testing result would not have raised a reasonable probability that he did not murder Dixie. As we have explained, Thompson claims that DNA testing would show that the blood on the seat of his truck was from a dog, not a human, and that this would undermine the State's claim that he had attempted to cover up the murder by transporting and disposing of Dixie's body.
But the superior court correctly found that the presence or absence of Dixie's blood on the seat of his truck was "unrelated to [the question of] whether [Thompson's] use of force was necessary or justified." And the court similarly did not err in finding that the "evidence regarding the transportation and disposal of Dixie Thompson's body was particularly strong." Indeed, Thompson did not deny that he disposed of Dixie's body - instead, he explained that he had done so because he believed that Dixie's brother (the president of the Hells Angels) would kill him in retaliation for his actions, regardless of whether he killed Dixie in self-defense. We accordingly perceive no error in the court's finding that the presence or absence of human blood in Thompson's truck was only tangentially relevant to his case and that a favorable DNA test result would not have raised a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense.
Next, Thompson asserts that the superior court erred by finding that the presence of blood on the gun or holster would not establish a reasonable probability that he acted in self-defense. He contends that, although the FBI could not find any blood on the gun or holster when it tested these items prior to the trial, modern DNA testing would establish that there was a trace amount of blood on either the gun or the holster and that this would establish a reasonable probability that he acted in self-defense.
As we have explained, the State argued at trial that, because blood was found throughout the kitchen area of Thompson's home, the absence of blood on the gun or holster suggested that Dixie had not held the gun or holster and had not threatened Thompson with the gun. For this reason, the absence of blood on the gun and holster was relevant only when compared to the significant amount of blood that was found throughout the kitchen. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in determining that the presence or absence of a small, previously unmeasurable, amount of blood on the gun or holster would neither reduce the impact of the State's argument nor alter the jury's view of the evidence.
Lastly, Thompson contends that the superior court's analysis of his application improperly considered the relative strength of the State's evidence in its assessment of whether he had met the "reasonable probability" standard set out in AS 12.73.020(9)(B). According to Thompson, the court's consideration of the strength of the State's evidence suggested that the superior court was acting as "yet another adversary in the proceedings rather than as an impartial arbiter of conflicting claims."
Willie v. State, 829 P.2d 310, 312 (Alaska App. 1992).
But, as we stated in Lambert v. State,
The relative strength of the State's evidence and the importance of the evidence to be tested has clear import in analyzing whether the reasonable probability standard has been met in a given case. Thus, in cases where the evidence to be tested could be dispositive on the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, the strength of the State's evidence will be largely irrelevant. However, in cases where the evidence to be tested is only tangentially relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence, the relative strength or weaknesses in the State's evidence will become more determinative of whether the standard has been met.
Lambert, 435 P.3d at 1020-21 (citing In re Towne, 86 A.3d 429, 435-36 (Vt. 2013), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) ("[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.")).
In Thompson's case, the presence or absence of human blood in Thompson's truck was only (at best) tangentially relevant to his case. Similarly, a favorable DNA test result of the gun and holster would not be dispositive of the question of Thompson's guilt. As a result, the relative strength of the State's evidence and the importance of the evidence to be tested were proper considerations for the superior court. For these reasons, we reject Thompson's challenges to the superior court's finding that his application did not establish a prima facie case that the DNA test results, if favorable, would raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense of first-degree murder.
On appeal, the State suggests that Thompson's application may not have met the statutory prerequisites to obtaining DNA testing set out under AS 12.30.020(3) and (8). But we have rejected Thompson's challenges to the superior court order dismissing his application, and we accordingly need not reach these additional legal issues.
Thompson's claim that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
Thompson's final argument is that the language of AS 12.73.030 entitles him to an evidentiary hearing and that the superior court erred by dismissing his application without first conducting such a hearing. Alaska Statute 12.73.030 provides:
(a) If an application under AS 12.73.010(a) does not set out the specific facts necessary for the court to make the findings required under AS 12.73.020 or does not comply with AS 12.73.010(b), the court shall deny the application without further proceedings.
(b) If an application filed under AS 12.73.010(a) is not denied under (a) of this section, the prosecuting authority shall file a response within 45 days after service of the application. The court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any disputed facts.
Thompson contends that, under subsection (b) and principles of due process, there must be an evidentiary hearing if the court does not deny the application without further proceedings under subsection (a). According to Thompson, because the court sent a notice to the State, informing it that the application had been filed and of the deadlines to respond to the application, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
But we do not construe the statute or the constitution in this manner. Instead, we conclude that the statute requires the superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing only if there are disputed facts. A court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing simply because it entered an order setting deadlines for the State to respond to an application for DNA testing.
Thompson alternatively argues that, in the present case, the court's decision depended on the resolution of disputed facts and, as a result, an evidentiary hearing was required. But the "facts" Thompson identifies are the superior court's findings that the State's evidence was strong and that the issues Thompson raised in his application were only tangentially related to his innocence. These findings are not "disputed facts" requiring an evidentiary hearing but rather are a retrospective assessment of the trial record. We accordingly reject this claim of error.
As support for his position, Thompson relies on our opinion in Lambert v. State, 435 P.3d 1011 (Alaska App. 2018). But in Lambert, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the evidence had been contaminated, which is a factual question. In the present case, there are no disputed issues of fact and, for this reason, Lambert does not provide support for Thompson's contentions.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.