Opinion
22-cv-294-GLJ
09-17-2024
CHLOE THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. CAESAR RENTIE, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Angelo Bradford Luckett, Jr., deceased, Defendant.
ORDER
GERALD L. JACKSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on motions in limine by both Plaintiff and Defendant. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion in Limine and Brief in Support [Docket No. 77] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, that Plaintiff Chloe Thomas' Motions in Limine [Docket No. 78] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that Plaintiff Chloe Thomas' Fourth Motion in Limine [Docket No. 88] is DENIED.
PROCEDUREAL HISTORY
Plaintiff brings this action for compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery. Plaintiff alleges her grandmother's husband struck her in the head causing her migraine headaches and required her to undergo continuous neurological treatment. See Docket No. 2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on October 17, 2021 at her grandmother and Mr. Luckett's home, she playfully swatted Mr. Luckett's hand away from a biscuit on her plate when Mr. Luckett suddenly struck her in the back of the head with a “karate chop” like motion. Id., ¶¶ 13-17. Plaintiff alleges that she spent ten days in concussion protocol, began experiencing migraine headaches and can no longer play on the University of Oklahoma's women's softball team. Id., ¶¶ 32-43. On or around November 9, 2023, Defendant Angelo Bradford Luckett, Jr. passed away and subsequently Mr. Rentie was substituted as Defendant as the personal representative of Mr. Luckett's estate. See Docket Nos. 54, 64 & 65.
ANALYSIS
I. Applicable Law
“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 103(c); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e)). As such, “[t]he purpose of a motion in limine is to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.” Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 587 F.Supp.2d 1201, 1208 (D. Kan. 2008), aff'd, 402 Fed.Appx. 337 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); see also Dry Clean Super Ctr., Inc. v. Kwik Indus., Inc., 2012 WL 503510, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2012) (“The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the Court to decide evidentiary issues in advance of trial to avoid delay and ensure an evenhanded and expeditious trial.”). Motions in limine “are designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Graves v. Dist. of Columbia, 850 F.Supp.2d 6, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
To exclude evidence on a motion in limine “the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). However, “the district court may change its ruling at any time for whatever reason it deems appropriate.” Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 (“The ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds . . . [E]ven if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.”). Alternatively, a judge may decline to rule on an issue raised via limine motion, preferring to “await developments at trial before [so] ruling” to allow the “decision [to] be better informed by the context, foundation, and relevance of the contested evidence within the framework of the trial as a whole.” Graves, 850 F.Supp.2d at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
II. Defendant's Motions in Limine
As an initial matter, it is apparent that Defendant did not comply with LCvR 7.1(f) before filing his motion. Specifically, “[w]ith respect to all non-dispositive motions or objections (including all discovery matters and motions in limine), the Court shall refuse to hear any such motion or objection unless counsel for movant first advises the Court in writing that counsel personally have met and conferred in good faith and, after a sincere attempt to resolve differences, have been unable to reach an accord.” LCvR 7.1(f). Nowhere in Defendant's motion does he indicate he complied with LCvR 7.1(f) and, indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleges Defendant failed to do so. See Docket Nos. 77 & 81, p. 1. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will address Defendant's motion.
Both parties are hereby put on notice that any future failure to comply with LCvR 7.1(f) or any other local rule may result in the pleading being stricken or denied consideration.
A. Boilerplate Objections
In motion in limine numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7, Defendant makes boilerplate and nonspecific objections to various categories of evidence. The Motion seeks exclusion of evidence related to: reference to any insurance policy; the motion in limine; hearsay medical evidence; financial condition or wealth of any party; and offers of settlement.
“Courts look with disfavor on motions in limine ‘the gist of which is that the opposing party should be required to comply with the rules of evidence . . . without identifying specific evidence which there is reason to believe may be introduced.'” Kimzey v. Diversified Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 131614, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 2017) (quoting Graham v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WL 4643292, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 17, 2008)) (denying a “purely generic” motion in limine); Walsh v. United States, 2009 WL 3755553, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009) (“A court is within its discretion to deny a motion in limine that fails to identify the evidence with particularity or to present arguments with specificity. Motions in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be granted. The better practice is to address the issues of admissibility as they arise.”). Defendant does not offer any specific evidence related to the categories listed above and in many instances is simply moving for application of the rules of evidence. Therefore, Defendant's Motions in Limine 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are DENIED. The Court fully expects the parties to be familiar with and to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the local rules of the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the pretrial order that is entered in this case as it relate all evidentiary and trial issues.
B. Rebuttal Evidence
Defendant seeks to exclude rebuttal evidence that it anticipates Plaintiff will withhold that should be included in Plaintiff's case-in-chief. In so moving, Defendant does not identify any specific evidence about which he is concerned Plaintiff might withhold and use in rebuttal. Plaintiff notes that she cannot know what evidence she might use in rebuttal without knowing the arguments and evidence Defendant will introduce at trial.
Rebuttal evidence is evidence that attempts to “disprove or contradict” the evidence to which it is contrasted. Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed.1999)). Similarly, rebuttal expert testimony is limited to evidence that is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party” in its expert disclosures. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). “[W]here the evidence rebuts new evidence or theories proffered in the defendant's case-in-chief, that the evidence may have been offered in the plaintiff's case-in-chief does not preclude its admission in rebuttal.” Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1124 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d 1507, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991)). When a plaintiff, however, seeks to rebut defense theories which she knew about or reasonably could have anticipated, the Court is within its discretion in disallowing rebuttal testimony. Id. (citing Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tel., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 664 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Because plaintiffs were warned that rebuttal evidence would be restricted and because they reasonably could have anticipated defendants' evidence . . . [i]t was within the district court's discretion to disallow plaintiffs' rebuttal evidence.”).
Defendant does not identify any specific evidence it anticipates Plaintiff might withhold for use as rebuttal evidence or what evidence that Plaintiff might attempt to rebut. Therefore, the Court is in no position to evaluate whether Plaintiff knows or should know of the evidence for purposes of determining admissibility as rebuttal evidence. As such, it is better for the Court to “await developments at trial before [so] ruling” to allow the “decision [to] be better informed by the context, foundation, and relevance of the contested evidence within the framework of the trial as a whole.” Graves, 850 F.Supp.2d at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Walsh, 2009 WL 3755553, at *2. Defendant's Motion as to rebuttal evidence is DENIED without prejudice to reurging at trial.
C. Golden Rule and Reptile Theory
Defendant seeks to prohibit Plaintiff from making any argument under the “Golden Rule “or “Reptile Theory.” By Golden Rule, parties typically mean offering evidence or making closing argument in which the plaintiff asks the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff. See Iser v. CSAA Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2024 WL 1466785, at *4 (N.D. Okla. April 4, 2024). Similarly, the “Reptile Theory” is derived from a book on jury persuasion that encourages lawyers representing injured plaintiffs to appeal to the “reptilian” portion of jurors' brains, i.e., that which “impel[s] the juror to protect himself and the community.” Baxter v. Anderson, 277 F.Supp.3d 860 (M.D. La. 2017); David Ball & Don Keenan, Reptile, The Attorney's Manual of the Plaintiff's Revolution (2009). Plaintiff does not object to excluding any Golden Rule evidence or argument and further argues that the Reptile Theory is irrelevant in this case. Moreover, because Plaintiff's claim is for assault and battery rather than negligence, it is not clear how any arguments as to standard of care would be relevant.
Nonetheless, the Court notes that while it is widely recognized that “golden rule” arguments are improper in some cases, they are permissible in others. For example, “such arguments should never be made when asking a jury to consider the appropriate amount of damages.” Sandhur v. CSAA Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2646307, at *2 (N.D. Okla. March 27, 2023) (citing Shultz v. Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 651-52 (10th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). However, “several courts have permitted ‘golden rule'-type arguments when the question of liability turns on the reasonableness of a party's conduct.” Id. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff agrees she will not engage in any “golden rule” argument and emotional appeals under the “reptile theory” are not relevant in this case, Defendant's motion in limine on this issue is GRANTED.
D. Medical Expenses Under 12 O.S. § 3009.1
Defendant seeks to limit any evidence of medical expenses to those permitted under 12 O.S. § 3009.1. Plaintiff responds by citing Boyer v. Price, 2021 WL 5772318 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 2021), for the proposition that the Oklahoma statute does not limit Plaintiff's proof as to the amount she personally paid for medical treatment or care. The Court follows the reasoning of Boyer and Defendant's motion in limine on this point is DENIED.
E. Evidence Regarding Injuries Not Supported by Medical Evidence
Defendant seeks to exclude any testimony regarding Plaintiff's injuries, including any complaints or symptoms, other than that provided by “competent medical evidence.” Plaintiff again notes that Defendant does not identify any specific testimony he seeks to exclude and that she should be allowed to testify as to what she was physically experiencing.
As general matter, Fed. R. of Evid. 701 permits lay witnesses to offer opinion testimony within certain parameters. In some circumstances, lay opinions as to the cause or nature of an injury are admissible under Rule 701. See, e.g., Osterhout v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of LeFlore Cnty., Oklahoma, 10 F.4th 978, 997 (10th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that the plaintiff's testimony as to the connection between a beating and his depression and anxiety constituted permissible lay testimony); Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1973) (concluding that lay testimony regarding observations of an injured party's bodily actions and sounds was relevant to whether the party suffered conscious pain and suffering). Because no specific opinions have been presented to the Court to review, the Court RESERVES any ruling on the matter until such time as lay opinion evidence is presented and reviewed under Fed. R. Evid 701.
III. Plaintiff's Motions in Limine
Like Defendant's motion, there is no indication in Plaintiff's motions in limine that she complied with LCvR 7.1(f).
A. Exclusion of Statements by Mr. Luckett
Plaintiff argues that any statements made by Mr. Luckett other than his answers to written discovery should be excluded as hearsay. As noted above, Mr. Luckett passed away during the pendency of this litigation and was never deposed. Defendant does not object to Plaintiff's motion in limine number 1 and, therefore, it is GRANTED.
B. Mr. Luckett's Physical or Mental Health
Plaintiff seeks to exclude any evidence regarding Mr. Luckett's mental or physical health. Again, Defendant does not object to Plaintiff's motion in limine number 2. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.
C. Mr. Luckett's Past Violent Acts
Plaintiff seeks the admission of evidence regarding past alleged incidences of violence perpetrated by Mr. Luckett against various family members, although apparently not Plaintiff. Plaintiff specifically seeks to introduce testimony of witnesses that Mr. Luckett physically abused his first wife, grabbed and shook his fourth wife a few months before the alleged incident in this action, and that he pulled guns on family members when angered. See Docket No. 78, p.4. Plaintiff argues that such evidence is relevant and admissible under Fed. R. Evid 404 because it is offered for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motion should be denied because such character evidence is impermissible to prove that a person acted in conformity with the character trait.
“Rule 404(b)(1) provides that ‘[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.'” United States v. Armajo, 38 F.4th 80, 84 (10th Cir. 2022). “But Rule 404(b)(2) provides that such evidence ‘may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.' This list of permissible purposes is illustrative, not exhaustive.” Id. Further, Rule 404(b) is inclusive, it “admits all other-act evidence except that tending to prove only propensity.” Id. (citing United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001)).
To determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, the Court follows a four-part test: “(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a Rule 403 determination of whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.” United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 762 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999)). See United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1488 (10th Cir. 1996)(citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988). When “bad act evidence is both relevant and admissible for a proper purpose, ‘the proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.'” United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court must “identify specifically the permissible purpose for which such evidence is offered and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985)). “[A] broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule 404(b) will not suffice.” United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d at 1436.
To support the admissibility of allegations of Mr. Luckett's past acts, Plaintiff argues that “[s]uch testimony is extremely relevant to Plaintiff's claims and bears on Luckett's motive, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or lack of accident to physically harm Plaintiff as he had done or attempted to do to others....” See Docket No. 78, p. 5. However, this is simply a broad statement merely reciting the rule. In her Reply, however, Plaintiff further states that such evidence is offered “to show Luckett intended to hit Plaintiff, and that it was not a mistake or accident....” See Docket No 84, p. 2. Defendant responds that Plaintiff's use of prior bad acts to show that what Mr. Luckett did to Plaintiff he had done or attempted to do to others is prohibited propensity evidence as she attempts to show Mr. Luckett conformed with the character trait of being violent and angry. See Docket No. 80, pp. 2-3.
Based on the limited information regarding the allegations of Mr. Luckett's past acts, the Court cannot fully analyze the first step of the four-step test to determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper purpose. Mr. Luckett denies striking Plaintiff “with injurious force or with an intent to injury”, denies the allegation of assault and battery, and asserts the affirmative defenses that any contact was not an intentional assault and battery, or he acted in self-defense. See Docket No. 15, ¶¶ 17, 28 and Affirmative Defenses 2 and 3. It is not apparent how these alleged prior bad acts fit into a chain of logical inferences that, because of his past conduct, Mr. Luckett was acting with the requisite intent when he struck Plaintiff. Without such a connection, Mr. Luckett's general anger and violent tendencies would seem to fall into the category of general character evidence. Moreover, without information regarding the similarly of the acts to the one alleged in this case, the Court cannot determine the probative value of such information to engage in the necessary weighing of such probative value with its prejudicial effect under Fed.R.Evid. 403 as required under the four-part test. Therefore, the Court RESERVES ruling on this motion so as to “await developments at trial before [so] ruling” to allow the “decision [to] be better informed by the context, foundation, and relevance of the contested evidence within the framework of the trial as a whole.” Graves, 850 F.Supp.2d at 11 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In addition to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), Plaintiff also appears to argue that evidence of Mr. Luckett's past bad acts should be admitted to impeach his credibility because he denied striking Plaintiff in the head. As noted above, while character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that a person acted in accordance with the particular character trait, it may be admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 607, 608 and 609. Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(3). Under Fed.R.Evid. 607, any party may attack a witness' credibility. However, the ability to attack a witness' credibility at trial is subject to certain limitations. “‘Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), specific unrelated instances of a witness's prior misconduct may be used to impeach the witness at the discretion of the court, however, only to the extent the misconduct reflects on the witness's character for truthfulness.'” Montoya v. Shelden, 898 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1292 (D.N.M. 2012) (quoting United States v. Beltran-Garcia, 338 Fed.Appx. 765, 770 (10th Cir. 2009)) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 608(b)). Not every bad act is probative of veracity. See United States v. Aranda-Diaz, 2014 WL 459607, at *8 (D.N.M. Jan. 8, 2014). Based on what is presented in Plaintiff's motion, there is no indication that the alleged past acts of Mr. Luckett are probative of his character for truthfulness. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED as to the use of the proposed evidence for the purpose of impeaching Mr. Luckett's character for truthfulness.
D. Evidence Regarding Julie Thomas and the Estates of Suzie Luckett and Angelo Bradford Luckett, Jr.
In her Fourth Motion in Limine, Plaintiff seeks to exclude all evidence regarding Julie Thomas and the estates of Suzie Luckett and Mr. Luckett. See Docket No. 88. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks the exclusion of evidence related to issues surrounding Ms. Thomas losing power of attorney over Mr. Luckett and being removed as executor of her mother's, Suzie Luckett, estate. Plaintiff alleges that she only recently learned that Defendant may allege the litigation is a sham and essentially a proxy for a dispute between Luckett's estate and Julie Thomas, Plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff argues that Defendant never asserted an affirmative defense that this lawsuit is a sham created by the Plaintiff's mother and that issues regarding Ms. Thomas, a non-party in this action, and the estates of Mr. and Mrs. Luckett should be addressed in the probate proceedings for those estates. Defendant responds that Ms. Thomas incorrectly testified in deposition about contesting Caesar Renti's appointment as executor of Mr. Luckett's estate and why she was removed as executor of Mrs. Luckett's estate and, therefore, the evidence is relevant for impeachment of Ms. Thomas under Fed.R.Evid. 607 and to show bias. See Docket No. 89.
Evidence that a witness is biased is “almost always relevant” to the jury's determination of the accuracy of a witness's testimony. Wise v. Bowling, 2024 WL 578954, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2024) (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self interest.”). Because bias is never collateral, “it is permissible to [prove bias] by extrinsic evidence.” Montoya v City of Albuquerque, 2004 WL 3426435, at *4 (D.N.M. May 18, 2004). Bias is described, based on its definition at common law, as “the relationship between a witness and a party which might cause the witness to slant his testimony for or against the party.” United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abel, 469 U.S. at 52). Ms. Thomas' dispute over her mother and Mr. Luckett's estates, although likely collateral to the issues in this case, may nonetheless be relevant for purposes of showing possible bias. Therefore, Plaintiff's Fourth Motion in Limine is DENIED.
Although not raised by Defendant, Ms. Thomas may also be subject to impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement under Fed.R.Evid. 613.
Conclusion
Accordingly, as set forth herein, that Defendant's Motion in Limine and Brief in Support [Docket No. 77] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, that Plaintiff Chloe Thomas' Motions in Limine [Docket No. 78] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that Plaintiff Chloe Thomas' Fourth Motion in Limine [Docket No. 88] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED