Opinion
5-21-0200WC
04-01-2022
THE AMERICAN COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al. (Michael W. Frerichs, State Treasurer and Ex Officio Custodian of the Rate Adjustment Fund and Winston Robinette, Appellees).
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. No. 19-MR-1 Honorable James L. Roberts, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Cavanagh, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HUDSON JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: (1) The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that claimant suffered from an occupational disease (coal workers' pneumoconiosis) arising out of and in the course of his employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that respondent suffered a timely disablement pursuant to sections 1(e) and 1(f) of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that respondent was entitled to a wage-differential award was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Claimant, Winston Robinette, a coal miner, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2008)) seeking benefits from respondent, The American Coal Company. The arbitrator found that claimant suffered from occupational diseases including coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP), asthma, and emphysema which arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. The arbitrator further found that claimant's condition of ill-being was causally related to his employment, that claimant's disablement was timely under the Act, and that claimant was entitled to a wage-differential award in the amount of $248.91 per week for the duration of his disability. A majority of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. On judicial review, the circuit court of Montgomery County set aside the Commission's decision and remanded the matter for a finding whether claimant suffered from CWP arising out of and in the course of his employment without considering any other occupational diseases. Upon remand, a majority of the Commission vacated its earlier decision. Further, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator as modified. Specifically, the Commission concluded that claimant established that he suffers from CWP but it struck any finding regarding asthma or emphysema. Thereafter, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision on remand. In this appeal, respondent argues that the Commission's findings with respect to occupational disease, disablement, and the nature and extent of the injury are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In May 2011, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim seeking benefits from respondent. In his application, claimant alleged that due to the inhalation of coal-mine dust for a period in excess of 29 years, he experiences shortness of breath and exercise intolerance. An arbitration hearing on claimant's application for adjustment of claim was held on July 16, 2015, before arbitrator Michael Nowak. The issues in dispute included occupational disease, causal connection, disablement, and the nature and extent of the injury. The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing.
¶ 5 At the time of the arbitration hearing, claimant was 72 years old and lived in Litchfield, Illinois. Claimant graduated from high school and had some schooling "here and there" after high school. Claimant worked 30 years in the coal mining industry, all underground. Claimant testified that in addition to coal dust, he was exposed to silica dust, roof bolting glue fumes, diesel fumes, trowel (a two-part epoxy), and smoke from coal fires.
¶ 6 Claimant started his mining career with Crown Coal Company in 1966. His first job was a shooter, which is the person who shoots the coal down so that it can be loaded out. Claimant described the shooter position as a "real dusty" job. Claimant also ran a shuttle car at that mine. The shuttle-car position required him to work at the face of the mine. Claimant then worked at a motorcycle shop from 1969 until 1973, and managed a motorcycle dealership from 1973 until 1977. Claimant started working for Peabody Coal Company in January 1975. Claimant worked as a loading machine operator for three years and then went into management. Claimant was a section foreman. Claimant testified that he was exposed to even more dust than the miners because he had to take air readings every so often. These readings were taken at the face of the mine where the miners were working. Claimant left Peabody in August 1994, when the mine where he was working shut down. Claimant then went to work as a foreman for Amax from 1996 until 1997. The Amax mine had a lot of diesel equipment, and it was running two units so claimant was exposed to a lot of diesel fumes in that mine. Claimant went to work for the Black Beauty Mine in 2001. He worked there through 2006 as a ram car operator. Claimant worked at Monterey Coal from 2006 through 2007 as a frontline foreman. Claimant then worked for respondent from November 2007 through April 2008, also as a frontline foreman. Claimant's position for respondent included taking air readings and being up at the face of the mine "to make sure everything [was] right before everything [got] rolling."
¶ 7 Claimant last worked a shift in respondent's coal mine on April 28, 2008. Claimant was 65 years old on that date and he was exposed to dust on that day. Claimant testified that April 28, 2008, was his last day of work for respondent because he got into an argument with his supervisor. Claimant testified that the supervisor called him and two other foremen liars, and he just decided to quit. Claimant signed up for Social Security when he left the mine. He also began receiving a "small" pension from the United Mine Workers of America and from some of the coal mines where he worked.
¶ 8 Soon after he left the coal mine, claimant worked for three to four months delivering false teeth in Springfield. In that job, claimant worked part-time and earned $7 per hour. Claimant also worked for five or six months delivering air conditioners and furnaces for Rogers Supply in Springfield. Claimant earned $14 per hour in that job. In his job with Rogers Supply, he worked in the warehouse. Anything that came in he would stack up with a forklift. He also made deliveries two days a week to different places in Illinois. When he made the deliveries, he would pull a little ramp out and slide the HVAC units down the ramp and tell the people "here it is." Claimant testified that these items weighed 100 to 110 pounds. Claimant also picked parts for customers in this position.
¶ 9 Claimant testified that he first noticed breathing problems in 1994, when he was a shift manager. Claimant noticed that he was getting shorter and shorter of breath and that when he would go outside in the high humidity and heat, he could hardly breathe. Claimant testified that from the time that he first noticed his breathing problems until he left the mine, his breathing problems got "a lot worse." Claimant further testified that since leaving the mine his breathing problems have gotten even worse. He testified that he can walk half a block at most on level ground before becoming short of breath and that he can climb six or seven stairs before having to rest. Claimant testified that his breathing difficulties affect his daily life because he cannot do too much. Claimant testified that if he picks something up and tries to carry it, by the time he gets to where he is going, he has to sit down because he cannot get any air. Claimant testified that he likes to dance and sing karaoke. Claimant testified that he can do one dance at a time and then has to sit down for three. Claimant testified that he does not take breathing medication.
¶ 10 Claimant testified that his primary-care physician is Dr. Roger Wujek with Litchfield Family Practice. Claimant has discussed his breathing problems with Dr. Wujek. Claimant testified that he has been honest with Dr. Wujek whenever he questioned him about any complaints or symptoms that he had. Claimant testified that he smoked for about 10 years from 1984 to 1994. He smoked about half a pack a day. Claimant takes medication for blood pressure and arthritis.
¶ 11 Claimant testified that from time to time while he was a coal miner, he underwent chest X ray screenings for black lung by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The last time that was done was just five months before he last worked for respondent. NIOSH would send him reports and tell him what the films showed. Claimant did not bring any of those letters to the arbitration hearing.
¶ 12 Claimant testified that he saw Dr. Glennon Paul at the request of his attorney. Dr. Paul caused spirometry to be performed on him. Claimant testified that he also saw a Dr. Cohen at the Coal Miners' Clinic in Springfield, where he also had spirometry performed. Claimant went to see Dr. Cohen in Springfield because of an advertisement in the newspaper. Claimant testified that the report from Dr. Cohen's testing was in his car at the time of the arbitration hearing. Dr. Cohen arranged for claimant to undergo an analog chest X ray. Claimant did not get a report from that chest X ray, but he got the film back. He testified that he gave that film to his attorney.
¶ 13 Medical records from Litchfield Family Practice were admitted into evidence. They begin with an office visit of August 25, 1998. At that time, claimant complained of sinus drainage. His lungs revealed some minimal respiratory wheezing. The diagnosis was upper respiratory infection, rule out pneumonia. Claimant was seen for upper respiratory infections and sinusitis multiple times throughout 1998 and 1999. At a visit on May 25, 2006, a review of claimant's respiratory system revealed no cough or difficulty breathing. His chest exam was normal. Claimant was seen on March 5, 2008, at which time he complained of cough which had been present for three days. The cough was characterized as both dry and productive of mucoid sputum. Review of the respiratory system revealed the cough but no dyspnea. Claimant returned on September 11, 2008, for a physical examination. Claimant's respiratory system was negative for cough and difficulty breathing. During an annual physical on December 16, 2009, claimant reported no complaints and stated he had a "good energy level." Claimant was seen on May 5, 2010, for hypertension management. At that time, he denied dyspnea. Claimant was seen on September 8, 2010, with a complaint of cold symptoms including sneezing, nasal congestion, scratchy throat, sore throat, productive cough, and facial pressure and pain with headache. The onset was two days prior to the visit. Claimant denied any wheezing or shortness of breath. A review of claimant's respiratory systems revealed the presence of a mild cough, but no dyspnea. A physical examination of the chest revealed breath sounds to be normal with no adventitious sounds. The assessment was pharyngitis and acute sinusitis. Claimant was seen on December 8, 2010, for an annual physical. At that time, claimant denied a cough or difficulty breathing and an examination of the chest revealed normal breath sounds with no adventitious sounds. Claimant presented for a colonoscopy on September 26, 2011. A review of claimant's respiratory symptoms at that time revealed no cough and no difficulty breathing. On December 15, 2011, claimant was seen for a complaint of cold symptoms including nasal congestion, scratchy throat, facial pressure, and facial pain with headache. The onset was two weeks earlier. Claimant denied any wheezing or shortness of breath. Claimant was diagnosed with sinusitis.
¶ 14 Medical records from Litchfield Family Practice further revealed that claimant had a black lung screening in April 2012 "and some of the results were abnormal." On October 18, 2012, claimant presented with sinusitis. A review of claimant's respiratory symptoms at that time revealed no cough, no dyspnea, and normal breath sounds. On November 18, 2013, claimant presented with cold symptoms, including a dry cough, a productive cough, wheezing, and shortness of breath. Diagnosis was acute sinusitis and cough. Claimant presented with sinusitis on December 14, 2013. At that time, respiratory symptoms revealed mild bronchovesicular in both lung fields. Claimant presented for hypertension management on October 3, 2014, complaining of dyspnea, headaches, and lightheadedness. Examination of chest and lungs revealed a "quiet, even and easy respiratory effort with no use of accessory muscles and on auscultation, normal breath sounds, no adventitious sounds and normal vocal resonance." Claimant's diagnoses included interstitial fibrosis, emphysema, and chronic obstructive airway disease with asthma.
¶ 15 Dr. Paul examined claimant on April 24, 2012, at the request of claimant's attorney and prepared a report of his findings. Dr. Paul was deposed on August 5, 2013, and provided the following testimony at his deposition. Dr. Paul is the medical director of St. John's Hospital Respiratory Therapy and a clinical assistant professor of Medicine at Southern Illinois University Medical School. Dr. Paul is board certified in internal medicine and allergy and immunology. He concentrates his medical practice in allergies and pulmonary diseases. Dr. Paul is not an A-reader or a B-reader. However, he reads 15 to 20 chest X rays per day and interprets about the same number of pulmonary function tests per day. Dr. Paul noted that CT scans are not recognized by NIOSH for the purpose of making B readings.
¶ 16 Claimant told Dr. Paul that he worked as a coal miner for 34 years, always underground. Claimant reported shortness of breath with half a flight of stairs and walking a quarter of a mile. Claimant reported a history of smoking a half a pack of cigarettes per day between 1970 and 1994. Dr. Paul interpreted a chest X ray from an unknown date as showing interstitial fibrosis with fibronodular lesions throughout both lung fields, more so on the lower lungs. Pulmonary function testing showed a moderate-to-severe degree of obstructive airway disease with good reversibility after bronchodilator. Physical examination of the chest revealed a wheeze that was consistent with both emphysema and asthma. The fact that claimant was wheezing on the date of the examination suggested that he had an asthmatic "exacerbation" at that time. Dr. Paul testified that the spirometry and pulmonary function testing he administered suggested emphysema because claimant had a low FEV1 and a decreased carbon monoxide diffusing capacity. Testing also suggested pneumoconiosis because claimant had a decreased total lung capacity and a decreased carbon monoxide diffusing capacity. Testing suggested asthma because claimant had a 33% improvement in his FEV1 after bronchodilators. Dr. Paul's diagnoses were pneumoconiosis, emphysema, and asthma.
¶ 17 Dr. Paul testified that in his opinion, claimant had CWP caused by coal dust and a coalmine environment. Given the diagnosis of CWP, claimant could not have any further exposure to the environment of a coal mine without endangering his health. Dr. Paul testified that in his opinion, claimant had clinically-significant pulmonary impairment in terms of physical examination of the chest and his complaints. Dr. Paul further testified that claimant had radiographically-apparent pulmonary impairment. He also testified that claimant had physiologically-significant pulmonary impairment as shown on the pulmonary function testing. Dr. Paul testified that all of these impairments were caused by the coal mine environment. Dr. Paul testified that when claimant had a presentation as he did, he would be limited to sedentary work.
¶ 18 Dr. Paul testified that to have CWP, one must have, in addition to coal-mine dust deposited in the lungs, a tissue reaction to it. The tissue reaction is called scarring or fibrosis. The scarring of CWP cannot perform the function of normal healthy lung tissue. By definition, if one has CWP, that individual would necessarily have some impairment in the function of the lung at the site of the scarring whether it can be measured by spirometry or not. Dr. Paul testified that a person could have radiographically-significant CWP and have normal pulmonary function tests, normal blood gases, and normal physical examination of the chest. Dr. Paul testified that the scarring of CWP can be both obstructive and restrictive. Dr. Paul testified that simple CWP is typically asymptomatic. He testified that, more likely than not, simple CWP will not progress once the exposure ceases. Dr. Paul testified that the scarring of CWP is permanent. He testified that the impairment from CWP is permanent as well. There is no cure for CWP.
¶ 19 Dr. Henry Smith, a B-reader and board-certified radiologist, interpreted chest X rays for claimant dated January 31, 2002, as positive for pneumoconiosis, profusion 1/0 with P/P opacities in the bilateral middle and lower lung zones. He made an identical interpretation of chest X rays dated November 2, 2007, December 9, 2008, March 5, 2008, and July 5, 2012. He interpreted a chest X ray of April 5, 2011, as positive for pneumoconiosis, profusion 1/0 with P/S opacities in the bilateral middle and lower lung zones. Dr. Smith also reviewed a CT scan of the chest without contrast dated July 5, 2012. He found the CT scan consistent with simple CWP, profusion 1/0 to 1/1 with P/P opacities in the bilateral upper, middle, and lower lung zones.
¶ 20 Dr. Michael Alexander, a B-reader and board-certified radiologist, interpreted a chest X ray of January 31, 2002, as positive for pneumoconiosis, profusion 1/0 with P/P opacities in all lung zones. He made an identical interpretation of chest X rays dated November 2, 2007, March 5, 2008, December 9, 2008, and July 5, 2012.
¶ 21 Records of chest X rays taken of claimant as part of the Coal Workers' Health Surveillance Program were admitted into evidence. A chest X ray of January 16, 1975, was interpreted by an A-reader and a B-reader as negative for pneumoconiosis. A chest X ray of March 28, 2001, was interpreted by two B-readers as negative for pneumoconiosis. A chest X ray of January 31, 2002, was interpreted by two B-readers as negative for pneumoconiosis. A chest X ray of November 2, 2007, was interpreted by an A-reader and a B-reader as negative for pneumoconiosis.
¶ 22 At the request of respondent's counsel, Dr. Christopher Meyer reviewed chest X rays of claimant. Dr. Meyer is a board-certified radiologist and a B-reader. Dr. Meyer testified by deposition that he reviewed films dated January 13, 2002, November 2, 2007, March 5, 2008, December 9, 2008, April 5, 2011, and July 5, 2012. Dr. Meyer testified that the 2002 film showed the lungs to be well expanded with no radiographic findings of CWP. On the 2007 film, the lungs were again clear with no radiographic findings of CWP. Dr. Meyer testified that on the chest X rays from 2008 and 2011, the lungs were clear with no radiographic findings of CWP. He testified that there was a linear band at the left lung base. He opined that the linear parenchymal band was just an area of scarring from a previous inflammatory process and would not be related to an exposure at a coal mine. Dr. Meyer testified that often times it is an area of prior infection such as pneumonia. With regard to the 2012 examination, Dr. Meyer described the lungs as being clear with no radiographic findings of CWP.
¶ 23 Dr. Meyer testified that it is not possible to have CWP without having a tissue reaction to the coal dust. There would be some change in the function of the lung, whether measurable or not. Dr. Meyer agreed that if a coal miner has CWP at any time in his or her life, the miner probably had CWP at some level when he or she left the coal mine inasmuch as the only thing that causes CWP is coal mining exposure. Dr. Meyer testified that the only treatment for a miner with CWP is to remove him or her from any further exposure. Dr. Meyer testified that CWP is "typically an upper zone predominant process." Dr. Meyer testified that NIOSH does not accept CT scans for the purpose of making B readings.
¶ 24 Dr. Jeff Selby examined claimant at the request of respondent's counsel on July 5, 2012. Dr. Selby is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonology, and is also a B-reader. Dr. Selby testified by deposition that his examination of claimant included an occupational and medical history, physical examination, and laboratory testing. Claimant's chief complaint was breathing. He stated that he had noticed breathing problems for 10 years or more. Claimant reported that he did not cough or wheeze, although his wife stated that he wheezed at night or after an upper respiratory infection. Claimant walked one quarter mile four times per week and also worked out four times per week. Claimant started smoking in 1966 at a rate of less than one pack per day and stopped in 1994. He was married for 34 years to a smoker who quit in 1990. Claimant worked as a coal miner for 34 years, all underground. The chest examination showed clear breath sounds with good airflow. Dr. Selby testified that a chest X ray of July 5, 2012, showed no parenchymal or pleural abnormalities consistent with pneumoconiosis and was negative for CWP. Dr. Selby also caused pulmonary function testing to be performed. That testing revealed normal spirometry, lung volumes, and diffusion capacity with a significant improvement post bronchodilator. Exercise testing was performed. Dr. Selby testified based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, claimant was capable of heavy manual labor. Dr. Selby's final assessment regarding claimant was that he did not suffer any respiratory or pulmonary abnormality as a result of coal mine dust inhalation or coal mine employment. Dr. Selby further concluded that claimant does not have CWP. He also concluded that claimant had the respiratory or pulmonary capacity to perform any and all of his previous coal mine duties, including his last job working as a mine foreman. Dr. Selby testified that claimant had a history of pulmonary function testing consistent with asthma which was not caused by nor contributed by coal mine dust inhalation or work in or around the coal mine. Dr. Selby testified that claimant's history of cigarette smoking and exposure to secondary cigarette smoke could be contributing to or entirely causative of any dyspnea he experiences. Dr. Selby also testified that claimant was quite obese, and his large abdomen and general obesity were major contributors to any dyspnea that he experienced.
¶ 25 In addition to his examination, Dr. Selby reviewed claimant's treatment records, including chest X rays dated January 16, 1975, March 28, 2001, January 31, 2002, November 2, 2007, March 5, 2008, December 9, 2008, and April 5, 2011. Dr. Selby found the chest X rays of January 16, 1975, and March 28, 2001, to be unreadable due to underexposure, poor contrast, and poor processing. Dr. Selby found no evidence of pneumoconiosis on the chest X rays of January 31, 2002, November 2, 2007, March 5, 2008, December 9, 2008, and April 5, 2011. Dr. Selby testified that for a person to have CWP, in addition to having coal mine dust in the lungs, a tissue reaction is required. That tissue reaction is called scarring or fibrosis. Dr. Selby testified that by definition, if a person has pneumoconiosis, he will necessarily have an impairment in the function of his lung at the very site of the scarring, whether that impairment could be measured by spirometry or not. He also testified that CWP can be a latent and progressive disease, so, on occasion, it can appear after an individual leaves coal mining. Generally, simple CWP does not progress once exposure ceases, so if someone is diagnosed with CWP during his or her lifetime, he or she would have had the same level of disease upon leaving the coal mine. Removal of any further exposure to coal dust is the only treatment for CWP.
¶ 26 The arbitrator noted that claimant had an audible wheeze at the time of the arbitration hearing.
¶ 27 Based on the foregoing evidence, the arbitrator found that claimant had an occupational disease that arose out of and occurred in the course of claimant's employment by respondent and that claimant's current condition of ill-being was causally related to the disease. In support of these findings, the arbitrator noted that claimant's testimony that he was exposed to diesel fumes, fumes from roof bolting glue, coal dust, and silica dust was unrebutted. The arbitrator found claimant to be a "forthright and credible witness." Moreover, the arbitrator found the testimony and opinions of Drs. Paul, Smith, and Alexander more persuasive than those of Drs. Meyer and Selby. The arbitrator noted that Dr. Paul: (1) found claimant to have clinically-significant pulmonary impairment, radiographically-apparent pulmonary impairment, and physiologically-significant pulmonary impairment; (2) diagnosed claimant with CWP, emphysema, and asthma; and (3) testified that claimant's impairment and diagnoses resulted from his exposure as a coal miner and rendered him permanently precluded from working as a coal miner. As such, the arbitrator found that petitioner met his burden of establishing that he developed occupational diseases, including CWP, emphysema, and asthma, which arose out of and in the course of his employment as a coal miner and that his current condition of ill-being was causally related to said diseases.
¶ 28 Next, the arbitrator determined that claimant's disablement was timely under the Act. The arbitrator noted that for purposes of section 1(e) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/1(e) (West 2008)), an employee is considered disabled from earning full wages at the work in which he was engaged when last exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease or equal wages in other suitable employment when he can no longer work without endangering his life or health. The arbitrator noted that Dr. Paul found claimant to have clinically-significant pulmonary impairment, radiographically-apparent pulmonary impairment, and physiologically-significant pulmonary impairment. Dr. Paul further testified that claimant's impairment and diagnoses resulted from his exposures as a coal miner and rendered him permanently precluded from working as a coal miner. Thus, the arbitrator determined that claimant's occupational diseases caused disablement by both impairment in function and by an inability to return to the environment of a coal mine without endangering his health. As such, claimant's disablement was timely under the Act.
¶ 29 Finally, the arbitrator addressed the nature and extent of the injury. The arbitrator awarded claimant a wage-differential benefit under section 8(d) (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008)). The arbitrator determined that petitioner established an impairment in the function of his lungs and an inability to work further as a coal miner without endangering his life or health. Moreover, the arbitrator determined that claimant had also proven an impairment of earnings. In this regard, the arbitrator noted that the unrebutted testimony showed that, after leaving coal mining, claimant had two positions, with the highest wage in such employment being $14 per hour. Based on this record, the arbitrator awarded claimant a wage-differential of $248.91 per week (2/3 the difference between his average weekly wage as a coal miner and what he was able to earn at $14 per hour) for the duration of the disability.
¶ 30 A majority of the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. Commissioner Coppoletti dissented. Commissioner Coppoletti stated that that she would afford greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Selby and Dr. Meyer, noting that they are both B-readers whereas Dr. Paul is not. Commissioner Coppoletti further stated that the diagnostic X rays performed while claimant was in respondent's employ fail to evidence pneumoconiosis as do the X rays taken previous to claimant's employment with respondent.
¶ 31 On judicial review, the circuit court of Montgomery County set aside the decision of the Commission and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court noted that the Commission found that claimant developed occupational diseases including CWP, emphysema, and asthma. The court further noted that the statute of limitations for CWP claims is five years while the statute of limitations for an occupational disease other than CWP is three years. The court observed that claimant's last day of employment for respondent was April 28, 2008, and his application for adjustment of claim was filed on May 24, 2011, which was more than three years after his last exposure. Thus, while the claim related to disability caused by CWP was timely filed, any claim related to an occupational disease other than CWP was untimely. The court therefore remanded the matter to the Commission for a finding whether claimant suffered CWP arising out of and occurring in the course of his employment without considering any occupational diseases other than CWP.
¶ 32 Upon remand, a majority of the Commission vacated its original decision. Further, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator with one modification. The Commission determined that claimant established that he suffered from CWP, but struck any finding regarding emphysema or asthma. Commissioner Coppoletti dissented for the reasons stated in her original dissent. Thereafter, the circuit court of Montgomery County confirmed the decision of the Commission upon remand. This appeal by respondent followed.
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 On appeal, respondent challenges the Commission's findings with respect to occupational disease, timely disablement, and the nature and extent of the injury. We address each contention in turn.
¶ 35 A. Occupational Disease
¶ 36 Respondent first argues that the Commission's finding that claimant suffers from CWP as a result of his exposure to coal dust and other mining substances was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant in an occupational disease case has the burden of proving both that he or she suffers from an occupational disease and that a causal connection exists between the disease and his or her employment. American Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC; Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21. Whether a claimant suffers from an occupational disease and whether there is a causal connection between the disease and the employment are questions of fact. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC; Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21. It is the function of the Commission to decide questions of fact, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve conflicting medical evidence. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC; Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21; Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 397 Ill.App.3d 665, 674 (2009). This is especially true with respect to medical issues, to which we owe the Commission heightened deference because of the experience it possesses in the medical arena. Long v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ill.2d 561, 566 (1979); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 386 Ill.App.3d 779, 782-83 (2008).
¶ 37 The Commission's determination on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC, ¶ 51. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21; Westin Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n, 372 Ill.App.3d 527, 539 (2007). As a court of review, we cannot reject or disregard permissible inferences drawn by the Commission simply because different or conflicting inferences may also reasonably be drawn from the same facts, nor may we substitute our judgment for that of the Commission on such matters unless the Commission's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Zion-Benton Township High School District 126 v. Industrial Comm 'n, 242 Ill.App.3d 109, 113 (1993). The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's findings, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. Bernardoni v. Industrial Comm'n, 362 Ill.App.3d 582, 597 (2005).
¶ 38 Applying these deferential standards, we cannot conclude that the Commission's findings that claimant suffers from the occupational disease of CWP and that this condition is causally related to his employment as a coal miner were against the manifest weight of the evidence. After examining claimant, taking a medical history from him, conducting pulmonary-function testing, and reviewing a chest X ray, Dr. Paul diagnosed claimant with CWP and opined that these conditions were causally related to his employment. Drs. Smith and Alexander also interpreted claimant's chest X rays as positive for CWP. Although Drs. Meyer and Selby disagreed, the Commission was entitled to credit the opinions of Dr. Paul, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Alexander over those of Dr. Meyer and Dr. Selby. It is the Commission's function to judge the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicting medical evidence, particularly medical opinion testimony. Long, 76 Ill.2d at 566; Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 674. The opinions of Dr. Paul, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Alexander provided sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding.
¶ 39 Respondent concedes that there is evidence in the record supporting the Commission's finding that claimant suffers from CWP and that the disease is causally related to his employment as a coal miner. Respondent argues, however, that Dr. Paul's X ray interpretation should be given no weight because Dr. Paul is neither an A-reader or a B-reader and he did not know the date of the chest X ray he interpreted. The Commission was keenly aware that Dr. Paul was not an A-reader or a B-reader as such evidence was elicited at the arbitration hearing. As noted above, however, Dr. Paul's diagnosis was corroborated by that of Dr. Smith and Dr. Alexander, both of whom are B-readers. Dr. Smith and Dr. Alexander interpreted claimant's chest X rays dated between January 2002 and July 2012 as positive for CWP. In light of this record, we reject respondent's contention that the Commission was required to give Dr. Paul's X ray interpretation no weight. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC, ¶ 66; Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Ill.App.3d 478, 485 (1994).
¶ 40 Next, respondent maintains the X ray interpretations of Dr. Smith and Dr. Alexander are not credible because they made identical interpretations spanning between January 2002 and July 2012, while NIOSH interpreted X rays taken in January 2002 and November 2007 as negative for CWP and Dr. Meyer and Dr. Selby interpreted X rays taken over a course of several years as negative for CWP. There was undoubtedly conflicting evidence in the record regarding the interpretation of claimant's chest X rays and whether he suffers from CWP. As noted above, however, in such situations, we must defer to the Commission, which is uniquely situated to weigh competing medical evidence and to resolve any evidentiary conflicts. Long, 76 Ill.2d at 566; Steak 'n Shake v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2016 IL App (3d) 150500WC, ¶ 43; Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 674. The evidence upon which respondent relies is not so much more persuasive than that evidence supporting the Commission's decision such that the Commission's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 41 Respondent also questions Dr. Smith's diagnosis of CWP because he observed opacities only in the middle and lower lung zones, which was inconsistent with Dr. Meyer's testimony that CWP is generally an upper lung zone predominant process. We point out, however, that while Dr. Meyer testified that CWP is "typically an upper zone predominant process," he did not testify that CWP cannot appear in other lung zones. We further note that Dr. Alexander observed opacities in all lung zones. Again, this merely presented a conflict in the evidence for the Commission to weigh and resolve. Long, 76 Ill.2d at 566; Steak 'n Shake, 2016 IL App (3d) 150500WC, ¶ 43; Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 674.
¶ 42 Next, respondent claims that the Commission failed to consider a high-resolution CT scan taken on July 5, 2012, in making its determination whether claimant suffered from CWP. At his deposition, Dr. Selby noted that a high-resolution CT scan of the chest taken on July 5, 2012, and interpreted by Dr. Anthony Perkins showed no evidence of CWP. However, the arbitrator sustained claimant's objection to Dr. Selby's testimony because Dr. Perkins's assessment was not included in Dr. Selby's report. Moreover, Dr. Paul, Dr. Meyer, and Dr. Selby testified that CT scans are not recognized by NIOSH for the purpose of making B readings. Thus, the Commission had ample reason not to consider the CT scan.
¶ 43 Finally, respondent argues that the Commission's decision is flawed because it failed to provide an explanation why the opinions of Dr. Paul, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Alexander were more persuasive than those of Dr. Meyer and Dr. Selby. It is well settled that the arbitrator and the Commission are required to make findings of fact and law. Skzubel v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 401 Ill.App.3d 263, 269 (2010); J.S. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 369 Ill.App.3d 591, 598 (2006); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Ill.App.3d 681, 686 (1994); Swift & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 150 Ill.App.3d 216, 220 (1986). These findings need not be stated in any particular language and, if possible, may be implied from the Commission's decision. Skzubel, 401 Ill.App.3d at 269; J.S. Masonry, Inc., 369 Ill.App.3d at 598; Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 265 Ill.App.3d at 686; Swift & Co., 150 Ill.App.3d at 221. The Commission may also satisfy the requirement that it make findings of fact and law by adopting the findings of the arbitrator. Swift & Co., 150 Ill.App.3d at 220. The rationale for requiring the arbitrator and the Commission to make findings of fact and law is to allow the reviewing court to adequately review the Commission's decision. See Skzubel, 401 Ill.App.3d at 269 (citing Reinhardt v. Board of Education of Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 61 Ill.2d 101, 103 (1975)). In this case, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. It is clear from a reading of the arbitrator's decision that he found the opinions of Dr. Paul, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Alexander more persuasive given claimant's testimony regarding his history of coal mining and breathing problems. In this regard, we note that the arbitrator began his analysis on this issue with a discussion of claimant's exposure to coal dust and other substances while working as a coal miner. The arbitrator further stated that claimant's testimony was "forthright and credible." Considering this record, we conclude that the Commission's findings were adequate to review its decision.
¶ 44 In the final analysis, based upon a consideration of the totality of the evidence presented, it cannot be said that a conclusion opposite of that reached by the Commission is clearly apparent. Thus, we affirm the Commission's finding that claimant suffers from an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment and that his condition of ill-being is causally related to the disease.
¶ 45 B. Timely Disablement
¶ 46 Respondent next argues that the Commission erred by finding that claimant proved that he suffered a timely disablement pursuant to sections 1(e) and 1(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/1 (e), 1(f) (West 2008)). Section 1(f) provides in relevant part that" [n]o compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational disease unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease." 820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2008). Section 1(e) of the Act provides two ways to establish disablement. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 25; Forsythe v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Ill.App.3d 463, 470 (1994). A claimant can establish disablement by showing "an impairment or partial impairment, temporary or permanent, in the function of the body or any of the members of the body." 820 ILCS 310/1(e) (West 2008). Alternatively, section 1(e) defines disablement as "the event of becoming disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was engaged when last exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease by the employer from whom he or she claims compensation, or equal wages in other suitable employment." 820 ILCS 310/1 (e) (West 2008). Whether a claimant has provided sufficient evidence of timely disablement is a question of fact for the Commission, and its decision in this regard will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 25.
¶ 47 In this case, the Commission determined that claimant showed disablement from CWP within two years after he left coal mining. Specifically, the Commission determined that claimant established disablement by both impairment in function and an inability to return to coal mining without further endangering his health. We agree. Claimant testified that he first noticed breathing problems in 1994, approximately 14 years prior to leaving his employment as a coal miner. Claimant testified that he would get shorter and shorter of breath and that when he would go outside in the high humidity and heat, he could hardly breathe. Claimant further related that since he left mining, his breathing problems have worsened. He explained that he can walk half a block at most on level ground before becoming short of breath and that he can climb six or seven stairs before having to rest. The Commission found claimant to be a "forthright and credible witness." Moreover, Dr. Paul diagnosed claimant with CWP caused by exposure to coal dust. Dr. Paul testified that CWP is a tissue reaction in the form of scarring or fibrosis caused by exposure to coal mine dust. Dr. Paul elaborated that the scarring of CWP cannot perform the function of normal, healthy lung tissue. He further testified that, by definition, if one has CWP, that individual would have some impairment in the function of the lung at the site of the scarring whether it can be measured by spirometry or not. In claimant's case, Dr. Paul noted that pulmonary-function testing showed a decrease in total lung capacity and in carbon monoxide diffusing capacity indicative of CWP. Based on claimant's presentation, Dr. Paul opined that claimant could not have any further exposure to the environment of a coal mine without endangering his health and that he was limited to sedentary work. Dr. Paul's diagnosis of CWP was supported by Dr. Smith and Dr. Alexander, both of whom are B-readers and interpreted X rays dated between January 2002 and July 2012 as positive for CWP. Although Dr. Meyer and Dr. Selby disputed whether claimant suffers from CWP, they both agreed that if a coal miner has CWP at any time in his or her life, the miner probably had CWP at some level when he or she left the coal mine inasmuch as the only cause of CWP is coal mining exposure. Considering the foregoing, we conclude that the Commission's finding of disablement within the statutory time frame was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 48 Respondent complains, however, that there is no evidence that claimant had any difficulty performing his coal-mining duties at the time he left respondent's employ. To the contrary, respondent notes that claimant did not leave work on the advice of a physician. Instead, he voluntarily removed himself from his coal mine employment for reasons unrelated to any respiratory disease or breathing complaints. Thus, respondent reasons, the Commission's decision that claimant suffered a timely disablement was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent cites no authority in support of this position. As such, it is forfeited. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h) (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Ameritech Services, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 389 Ill.App.3d 191, 208 (2009) (noting that arguments on appeal are forfeited in the absence of supporting legal authority). Forfeiture withstanding, we find this contention without merit. As detailed above, claimant testified that he began experiencing breathing problems 14 years prior to leaving his position as a coal miner and that these symptoms left him shorter and shorter of breath. Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Paul supports a finding of impairment in function. Dr. Paul testified that simple CWP is typically asymptomatic. Further, he noted that a person could have radiographically significant CWP and have normal pulmonary-function tests, normal blood gases, and a normal physical examination of the chest. Dr. Paul testified that, even absent an impairment in function, claimant could not have any further exposure to the environment of a coal mine without endangering his health and he limited claimant to sedentary work. While Dr. Selby testified that claimant could return to his previous mining duties, both he and Dr. Meyer acknowledged that the only treatment for a miner with CWP, which the Commission found claimant to have, is to remove him or her from any further exposure. Accordingly, we decline respondent's invitation to disturb the Commission's finding of a timely disablement.
¶ 49 C. Nature and Extent
¶ 50 Finally, respondent argues that the Commission erred in awarding claimant a wage-differential benefit under section 8(d)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008)).
¶ 51 Once a claimant proves that he or she has sustained a disability, the question of compensation arises. Section 8(d) of the Workers' Compensation Act sets out two types of permanent partial disability (PPD) awards. 820 ILCS 305/8(d) (West 2008); Gallianetti v. Industrial Comm'n, 315 Ill.App.3d 721, 727 (2000). Subsection (1) provides a wage-differential award. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008). Subsection (2) provides a percentage-of-the-person-as-a-whole award. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West 2008). Under section 8(d)(1), an impaired worker is entitled to a wage-differential award when (1) he is "partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary employment" and (2) there is a "difference between the average amount which he would be able to earn in the full performance of his duties in the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident." 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008). Section 8(d) (2) provides for a PPD award based on a percentage of the person as a whole when, among other circumstances, the employee's "injuries partially incapacitate him from pursuing the duties of his usual and customary line of employment but do not result in an impairment of earning capacity." 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West 2008). The supreme court has expressed a preference for a wage-differential award over a scheduled award. General Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ill.2d 432, 438 (1982).
¶ 52 The Commission should calculate a wage-differential award based on the amount the claimant would be able to earn at the time of the hearing if he were able to fully perform the duties of the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident. 820 ILCS 305/8(d) (1) (West 2008) (providing wage-differential compensation must be "equal to 66-2/3% of the difference between the average amount which [a claimant] would be able to earn in the full performance of his duties in the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident"); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Ill.App.3d 830, 841 (1994). The issue of whether a claimant is entitled to a wage-differential award is generally a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Dawson v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 382 Ill.App.3d 581, 586 (2008). It is the function of the Commission to decide questions of fact, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve conflicting medical evidence. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC; Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21; Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 674. The Commission's determination on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. American Coal Co., 2020 IL App (5th) 190522WC, ¶ 51. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 2013 IL App (5th) 120564WC, ¶ 21; Westin Hotel, 372 Ill.App.3d at 539.
¶ 53 In the present case, the Commission found that claimant established both prongs necessary for a wage-differential award. We agree. First, claimant proved that he is partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary employment. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008). As noted above, based on Dr. Paul's testimony, the Commission could reasonably conclude that claimant suffers from CWP which caused a reduction in useful functioning of lung tissue and that he cannot work further as a coal miner without endangering his life or health. Dr. Paul further testified that, given claimant's presentation, he would limit claimant to sedentary work. Although Dr. Selby testified that claimant was capable of performing his previous coal-mining duties, the Commission credited the testimony of Dr. Paul over that of Dr. Selby as was its province to do. Hosteny, 397 Ill.App.3d at 674. Second, claimant established a difference between the average amount which he would be able to earn in the full performance of his duties as a coal miner and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident. 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008). At the beginning of the arbitration hearing, the parties stipulated that claimant's average weekly wage working for respondent was $933.37. Thus, claimant established what he would be earning if he continued to work for respondent in his previous position. Additionally, claimant presented evidence of what he was able to earn in some suitable employment after the accident. Claimant testified that after he left respondent's employ, he held two different positions. One position was delivering false teeth. Claimant earned $7 per hour in this position. The other position was working for a heating and ventilation company. Claimant earned $14 per hour in this position. The Commission noted that at $14 per week, one's average weekly wage would be $560. Because this was less than what claimant was making as a coal miner, and because respondent presented no evidence that claimant could earn more, the Commission determined that claimant was entitled to a wage-differential benefit of $248.91 per week (($933.37-$560) x 2/3). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the Commission's finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 Respondent complains that claimant did not qualify for a wage-differential award because he failed to establish that he was partially incapacitated from pursuing his "usual and customary employment" as a coal miner. In support of this position, respondent directs us to Dawson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 581. In that case, the arbitrator determined that the claimant, a coal miner who retired after being laid off, suffered from CWP. The arbitrator, however, declined to award the claimant a wage-differential award, finding insufficient evidence to establish that the claimant was not employable as a coal miner. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator and the circuit court confirmed. On appeal, the claimant argued that the Commission's decision not to award him a wage-differential award was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We upheld the Commission's determination that the claimant did not prove a partial incapacity which prevented him from pursuing coal mining. Dawson, 382 Ill.App.3d at 586-87. In support of this conclusion, we noted, among other things, that there was no testimony that the claimant was unable to perform the work of a coal miner or that his respiratory problems precluded him from working as a coal miner. Dawson, 382 Ill.App.3d at 586-87. To the contrary, the claimant testified that if he had not been laid off, he would have continued to work for the employer. Dawson, 382 Ill.App.3d at 587. Moreover, although there was testimony that additional dust exposure would risk the claimant's health, the two doctors who examined the claimant testified that he was capable of performing heavy manual labor. Dawson, 382 Ill.App.3d at 584-87. The present case is factually distinguishable from Dawson. In this case, Dr. Paul testified not only that further exposure to the environment of a coal mine would endanger claimant's health, but also that he would limit the claimant to sedentary work. Thus, we find the respondent's reliance on Dawson unavailing.
¶ 55 Respondent also suggests that because claimant voluntarily left his employment as a coal miner before he was diagnosed with an occupational lung disease, claimant is not entitled to a wage-differential award as he did not suffer a reduction in earnings as the result of CWP. Stated otherwise, respondent appears to argue that, since claimant left his employment as a coal miner before he was diagnosed by any physician as suffering from CWP, no occupational disease could have manifested itself on April 28, 2008, the day that he left respondent's employment. We find respondent's argument unpersuasive. Respondent has not cited any authority, nor has our research discovered any authority, for the proposition that, in order to be entitled to a wage-differential benefit, an employee must, prior to leaving his or her usual and customary employment, be diagnosed with an employment-related condition which partially incapacitates him or her from pursuing that employment. Indeed, whether an employee has been diagnosed with a partially incapacitating work-related condition, is not the test of whether he has the condition.
¶ 56 Respondent next argues that claimant failed to establish an impairment of earnings because there was no evidence that he tried to find any suitable full-time employment, such as through a job search, after he stopped working for respondent. In this case, claimant's testimony was sufficient to demonstrate an impairment of earnings. Although the extent of claimant's job search is not clear from the record, the fact that he did engage in some type of job search is apparent from the fact that he obtained two positions after he left respondent's employ. Respondent contends that an employee cannot accept a lower-paying job if he is qualified for a higher-paying job. See Forest City Erectors v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Ill.App.3d 436 (1994). However, respondent did not present any evidence showing that claimant's earning capacity was greater than the amount asserted by claimant at arbitration. As our supreme court has noted, "the testimony of the claimant, if not impeached, is sufficient to support an award." Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Ill.2d 459, 463 (1976). We find such to be the case here.
¶ 57 Respondent also directs us to Durfee v. Industrial Comm 'n, 195 Ill.App.3d 886 (1990), in support of its claim that claimant is not entitled to a wage-differential award. In that case, the claimant was a repairman who injured his stomach and groin area while lifting heavy equipment. The claimant's treating physician placed no physical restrictions on him and suggested that he attempt to return to his position as a repairman on a trial basis. Instead, the claimant obtained a position as a school administrator at a church, a job that the claimant enjoyed and coincided with his clerical interests. We noted that while the claimant testified that the school administrator position was "the best job he could find," there was no evidence that he attempted to obtain any other form of employment. Durfee, 195 Ill.App.3d at 890. In light of these facts, we held that the Commission could reasonably conclude that the claimant had not shown a loss if earning capacity. Durfee, 195 Ill.App.3d at 890-91. Durfee was based in part on the fact that the claimant made a personal choice to accept a lower-paying position and failed to prove that he could obtain a higher-paying job. See Copperweld Tubing Products Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 402 Ill.App.3d 630, 634 (2010) (discussing Durfee). Unlike in Durfee, Dr. Paul placed physical restrictions on claimant and opined that he would not be able to carry out his job as a coal miner without further endangering his health. More importantly, we find no evidence that claimant made a "personal choice" to accept a lower-paying job because it coincided with his interests. Indeed, claimant left his first post-mining job after several months and obtained a position paying twice as much per hour as the original job. In light of this record, respondent's reliance on Durfee is misplaced.
¶ 58 In short, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the Commission's decision that a wage-differential award was appropriate. Specifically, claimant submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate both that he was incapacitated from performing his usual and customary line of employment and that he suffered an impairment of earnings. Thus, the Commission's decision that claimant was entitled to a wage-differential award was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 59 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 60 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery County, which confirmed the decision of the Commission upon remand.
¶ 61 Affirmed.