Opinion
No. 04-04-00650-CV
Delivered and Filed: July 6, 2005.
Appeal from the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-CI-02954, Honorable Andy Mireles, Judge Presiding.
The Honorable Johnny D. Gabriel, Jr. is the presiding judge of the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas. The Honorable Andy Mireles presided over the trial and signed the final judgment in this case.
Reversed and Rendered.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Texas Workforce Commission ("TWC") and Alamo Community College District ("ACCD") appeal the trial court's judgment reversing the Texas Workforce Commission's administrative decision to deny unemployment benefits to Angela Campos. We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment in favor of the TWC and ACCD.
Background
On April 9, 2001, pursuant to an investigation of allegations of misconduct which had been made against Angela Campos, the director of human resources for the ACCD contacted Campos and requested a meeting to discuss the allegations with her. When Campos refused to meet with the human resources director, Campos' direct supervisor, Dr. Ernest Martinez, sent Campos a memo instructing Campos that she must meet with him later that day to discuss the allegations and warning her that failure to comply with this directive would be considered an act of insubordination. Campos was also advised in the memo that she would be permitted to bring a witness with her to the meeting, but that she would not be permitted to have an attorney attend the meeting with her.
Campos reported for the meeting later that afternoon accompanied by her work-study student. When asked to identify the student, Campos refused, stating only that the woman was a student and that she was there to take notes during the meeting. Dr. Martinez ended the meeting shortly after this exchange without having addressed any of the substantive issues regarding the misconduct allegations against Campos. The following day, Dr. Martinez sent Campos a memo advising Campos that he found her behavior at the meeting to be both insubordinate and unprofessional, and that her refusal to identify the person accompanying her and to discuss the allegations was in direct disregard of the directive that she had been given. The memo advised Campos that she was being placed on administrative leave with pay effective immediately.
There was conflicting evidence at trial on the issue of who asked for the student to be identified, how she was identified, and by whom. Campos and the student testified in the trial court that the student was introduced to Dr. Martinez by name in the hallway before they entered the meeting room. This conflicted with Campos' testimony before the TWC. There was also evidence before the court that both Dr. Martinez and the human resources director asked for the student to be identified once all of the parties were in the meeting, and that Campos refused to give the student's name at that time.
On April 20, 2001, Dr. Martinez sent Campos another memo advising her that the investigation of the allegations against her had been completed, and that it had been determined that she had violated several of ACCD's policies and procedures. As a result of these findings, Campos was terminated from her position as ombudsman with the ACCD.
Following her termination, Campos applied for unemployment benefits from the TWC. The Commission concluded that the individual who had made the initial allegations of misconduct against Campos was not credible, and, therefore, those allegations could not form the basis of Campos' discharge. However, the Commission also concluded that Campos' conduct in initially refusing to meet with the human resources director and in refusing to identify her work-study student during the meeting with her supervisor constituted insubordination. Because insubordination was a ground for potential discharge under ACCD's policies, Campos' termination was considered a discharge for misconduct connected with her work and Campos was denied benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.044 (a) (Vernon 1996). Campos then appealed this administrative decision to the district court. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201 (Vernon 1996).
The trial court reversed the TWC's denial of benefits, finding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and ordered ACCD to pay Campos' attorney's fees. The trial court held a hearing on a motion for new trial filed by TWC and ACCD challenging both the court's reversal of the TWC decision and the award of attorney's fees, and denied the motion in its entirety. This appeal followed.
Analysis
TWC and ACCD raise two issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in reversing the denial of unemployment benefits; and (2) the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees against ACCD.
Review of Texas Workforce Commission Decision
Standard of Review
Judicial review of a final decision by the TWC is available pursuant to section 212.201 of the Texas Labor Code. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201. Such a review requires a trial de novo at which the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence exists to support the administrative ruling based solely on the evidence presented in the trial court, and not on the record created by the TWC. Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986); Instant Photo, Inc. v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 650 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, or some evidence, but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Beaumont v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 753 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Evidence in support of a finding may be substantial even though the evidence greatly preponderates the other way. Olivarez v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 693 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. 1985); Levelland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Contreras, 865 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied). Resolution of factual conflicts is the province of the administrative body and the substantial evidence rule is intended to safeguard that function. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984). The TWC has the discretion to make credibility determinations and to attach whatever weight it considers appropriate to various pieces of evidence. Dozier v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 41 S.W.3d 304, 309 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on controverted issues of fact. Olivarez, 693 S.W.2d at 932. Whether the administrative ruling is supported by substantial evidence is a question of law for the court only. Bank of N. Am. v. State Banking Bd., 492 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex. 1973); Arrellano v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 810 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
The action of the TWC carries a presumption of validity and the party challenging the TWC's determination has the burden to show that it was not supported by substantial evidence. City of San Antonio v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1966). The reviewing court may not set aside the TWC's decision merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831. The TWC's decision may only be set aside if the reviewing court finds the decision to have been made without regard to the law or facts and therefore to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Id. The reviewing court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the agency's decision, not its correctness. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956.
Evidence in Support of Denial of Benefits
In Campos' case, the TWC determined that she was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits because she was terminated from her job for misconduct connected with her work. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.044 (Vernon 1996). We must determine if the denial of benefits under section 207.044 was supported by substantial evidence of the factual determinations necessary for the TWC to deny benefits. Dozier, 41 S.W.3d at 310. In other words, we must decide whether the evidence in the record is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion reached by the TWC. Tex. Employment Comm'n v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 775 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied); see also Dozier, 41 S.W.3d at 309 n. 4.
Campos presented the testimony of two witnesses before the trial court — herself and her work-study student. Campos acknowledged in her testimony that she had refused to attend the first meeting with the director of human resources because the director was not her immediate supervisor and would not detail the allegations that had been made against Campos over the phone. Both Campos and her student testified that prior to the subsequent meeting with Dr. Martinez, the student was introduced to Dr. Martinez by name in the hallway prior to their entering the meeting room. Campos' testimony, however, contradicted what she had stated on the record at the TWC hearing where she testified that she had informed Dr. Martinez prior to the meeting only that the woman with her was a student who was there to take notes. Campos further testified before the TWC that she reiterated this same statement during the meeting when both Dr. Martinez and the human resources director requested the woman be identified. These excerpts from the TWC record were introduced in the trial court by the TWC's counsel to impeach Campos. The portions of the TWC record admitted into evidence establish that there was some evidence that Campos had failed to respond to a directive from her employer — either by failing to attend the first meeting when requested, or by failing to identify the student and respond to questions during the second meeting — which would constitute insubordination, a terminable offense according to ACCD's policies. Campos failed to carry her burden to establish that the TWC's determination was not supported by substantial evidence. While the evidence was disputed, there was certainly more than a scintilla of evidence regarding the factual bases for Campos' termination. Accordingly, we hold there was substantial evidence to support the TWC's denial of benefits to Campos.
Campos' attorney also testified on the issue of attorney's fees.
Attorney's Fees
On appeal, the TWC and ACCD contend that Campos was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees because there is no statutory authorization for an award of attorney's fees in this type of lawsuit. Campos contends that section 207.007 of the Texas Labor Code authorizes the court's award of attorney's fees against ACCD. We agree with the appellants.
It is well established that an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party must be based on some statutory or contractual authority. Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999); Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). The authorization to award attorney's fees may not be supplied by implication, but must be provided for by the express terms of the statute in question. Holland, 1 S.W.3d at 95. Section 207.007 of the Labor Code does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees, and we will not extend its language to authorize such an award by implication. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.007 (b) (Vernon 1996) (providing that an individual claimant before the TWC or a court may be represented by counsel and that any fee charged or received by such counsel may not exceed an amount approved by the commission); see also Tex. Employment Comm'n v. Brasuell, 235 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1950, writ dism'd) (recognizing that provision setting limitation on fees which counsel for claimant may charge or receive in worker's compensation suit does not authorize a trial judge to set an attorney's fees or compensation). Other provisions in the Labor Code expressly authorize claimants to recover attorney's fees under certain circumstances; therefore, we conclude that had the legislature intended to authorize recovery of attorney's fees in this type of lawsuit, it would have so provided. See, e.g., Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.208 (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (authorizing award of fees to commission in action for judicial enforcement of order by the commission); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.147 (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (authorizing fees in contest of supplemental income benefits by insurance carrier); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 411.083 (c) (Vernon 1996) (authorizing fees for employee who prevails in suit for relief after termination in retaliation for a good faith report of alleged violation of health and safety laws). Because there is no such clear authorization in section 207.007, or anywhere else in the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act, we hold the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees against ACCD in this suit. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 201.001-.101 (Vernon 1996 Supp. 2004-05).
Campos also contends that ACCD forfeited its challenge to the award of attorney's fees by failing to object to counsel's testimony before the trial court regarding his fees. Because ACCD raised the issue regarding lack of statutory authority for an award of attorney's fees in their motion for new trial, the issue was preserved for appellate review. See Holland, 1 S.W.3d at 94; Luna v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 724 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1987) (motion for new trial is an appropriate method for preserving error regarding a defect in the final judgment).
Conclusion
We conclude that the TWC's decision to deny Campos unemployment benefits was reasonably supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, or made without regard to the law or facts. Further, the evidence presented by Campos at trial does not eliminate the evidence supporting the TWC's finding that Campos was terminated for misconduct related to her work. Because the TWC's ruling is supported by substantial evidence, we reverse the trial court's judgment and affirm the decision of the TWC denying Campos unemployment benefits.