Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2583-L
August 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Defendant's (Mesquite Independent School District, or "MISD") Motion to Dismiss, filed January 25, 2001; Plaintiff's (Texas State Teachers Association, or "TSTA") Motion to Amend, filed June 14, 2001; and Plaintiff's Motion for Referral of Matter to Magistrate Judge, filed August 20, 2001. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, replies, and supporting briefs, the court denies without prejudice the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Amend, and denies as moot the Motion for Referral.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5thCir. 1992).
TSTA brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of its rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, for actions taken by MISD's Superintendent, Dr. John Horn ("Horn"). TSTA seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys' fees. MISD's Motion to Dismiss asserts that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because TSTA does not allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was a result of a "custom or policy" of MISD. In response, TSTA argues that Superintendent Horn is a "policymaker" and that therefore his actions can be attributed to MISD for purposes of § 1983. The court agrees with MISD that TSTA has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted regarding a policy or custom of MISD, and TSTA will be required to replead.
The Superintendent is referred to in the parties' briefs, the Joint Status Report, and the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") sometimes as "John Horn" and sometimes as "James Horn."
To resolve this issue, the court first cites the relevant authority which serves as a backdrop under which a local government can be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A governmental entity cannot be liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Id.; see also Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979). Official policy is defined as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the [district] . . . or by an official to whom the [district] ha[s] delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of [district] officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [district] policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the district or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995) (alterations in original) (citing Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996); see also Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) ( en banc) ( per curiam); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) ( en banc) ( per curiam), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself, and show that his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). A plaintiff must establish that the governmental entity through its deliberate conduct was the moving force behind the injury or harm suffered and must establish a direct causal link between the governmental entity's action and the deprivation of a federally protected right. Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 403-04.
Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the governmental entity's policy, and not the policy of an individual official. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. The official complained of must possess
[f]inal authority to establish [school district] policy with respect to the action ordered. . . . The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the [school district] can be held liable. . . . [W]hether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1986). Under Texas law, the final policymaking authority in an independent school district rests with the district's trustees. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993). An employee, agency, or board of a governmental entity is not a policymaker unless the governmental entity, through its lawmakers, has delegated exclusive policymaking authority to that employee, agency, or board and cannot review the action or decision of the employee, agency, or board. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (5th Cir. 1989).
The court notes that as a matter of law the Board, rather than the Superintendent, is the policymaking authority for MISD absent specific arrangements to the contrary. See Jett, 7 F.3d at 1245. Horn is a policymaker only if he had final policymaking authority — that is, a specific delegation of authority by the Board, the exercise of which by Horn was not subject to review by the Board. See Worsham, 881 F.2d at 1340-41. The First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") fails to allege any facts supporting a conclusion that such a delegation of final policymaking authority was made. Without such, actions by Horn cannot be attributed to MISD for purposes of assessing liability.
TSTA relies on provisions in the Texas Education Code that reference the Superintendent's duties. "The superintendent is the educational leader and the chief executive officer of the school district." Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.201(a) (Vernon 1996). "The duties of the superintendent include: (1) assuming administrative responsibility and leadership for the planning, operation, supervision, and evaluation of the education programs, services, and facilities of the district . . .; (5) managing the day-to-day operations of the district as its administrative manager;. . . ." Id. § 11.201(d). TSTA notes that Jett mentioned in a footnote that § 11.201(a) [then § 13.351] was enacted after the events at issue in that case. See Jett, 7 F.3d at 1245 n. 8.
The court concludes that TSTA's reliance on these provisions of the Education Code is misplaced. The determination in Jett that the Board is the final policymaking authority was based on a number of provisions in the Education Code. There have been changes since the events at issue in Jett, but not so significant as to change the conclusion. For example, the Education Code back then provided that "trustees shall have the exclusive power to manage and govern the public free schools of the district" and that "trustees may adopt such rules, regulations, and by-laws as they may deem proper." Jett, 7F.3dat 1245 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in Jett). "Nothing in the Texas Education Code purports to give the Superintendent any policymaking authority or the power to make rules or regulations. . . ." Id.
The current Texas Education Code differs only slightly. The Board has "the exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools of the district. All powers and duties not specifically delegated by statute to the agency or to the State Board of Education are reserved for the trustees. . . ." Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.151(b). The Board may "adopt rules and bylaws necessary to carry out the powers and duties provided by Subsection (b)." Id. § 11.151(d). The Superintendent's duties include, in addition to those cited by TSTA, "developing or causing to be developed appropriate administrative regulations to implement policies established by the board of trustees" id. § 11.201(d)(8) (emphasis added) and "preparing recommendations for policies to be adopted by the board of trustees and overseeing the implementation of adopted policies." Id. § 11.201(d)(7) (emphasis added). The court concludes from these provisions that the Superintendent is, as a general rule, a policy implementer rather than a policymaker. As TSTA has pointed out, the Texas Education Code specifies that the Superintendent's duties include "assuming administrative responsibility and leadership for the . . . operation [of] . . . facilities of the district," id. § 11.201(d)(1), and "managing the day-to-day operations of the district as its administrative manager," id. § 11.201(d)(5). The court does not read these provisions, in the context of the other provisions concerning both the Board and the Superintendent, to mean that the Board could not establish a policy with respect to the actions at issue here, or review and overturn any particular decision by the Superintendent such as that of which TSTA complains. Accordingly, the court concludes that the holding in Jett is still good law, and the Board, rather than the Superintendent, is the policymaking authority for MISD absent specific arrangements to the contrary.
Thus, under the literal terms of the statute, the Superintendent cannot unilaterally establish regulations, before the Board has first established the underlying policy. Even this form of "legislative power" is limited and made subject to the Board's overall direction.
The court concludes that the allegations in the Complaint are inadequate with respect to final policymaking authority by Horn. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The holding in Jett, however, does not preclude a determination that Horn was the policymaking authority with respect to the specific decision of which TSTA complains. TSTA may maintain its claim by pleading specific facts that show that MISD delegated exclusive policymaking authority to Horn with respect to this specific issue. Accordingly, the court denies without prejudice MISD's Motion to Dismiss and will allow TSTA to replead the Complaint to repair this deficiency. An amended complaint must be filed within thirty days of the date of this order, and must include specific factual allegations which satisfy the standards set forth above regarding final policymaking authority. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of the Complaint without further notice.
The court has reviewed the proposed Second Amended Complaint submitted by TSTA with its Motion to Amend. This proposed pleading would not cure the deficiency noted above, as it makes only conclusory statements concerning policymaking authority. Specific factual allegations are required. Guidry, 954 F.2d at 281. Because the proposed amendment would be futile, the court denies without prejudice the Motion to Amend. See Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Clearly, if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal, leave to amend need not be given."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981). TSTA's Motion for Referral requested the court to refer the Motion to Amend to United States Magistrate Judge Paul Stickney. Because the court has now ruled on the Motion to Amend, the Motion for Referral is denied as moot.