Summary
finding that plaintiffs' allegations that their right to equal protection was violated by township's application of zoning regulations were sufficient to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right
Summary of this case from Advantage Point, L.P. v. Borough of KutztownOpinion
Civil Action No. 03-cv-6040.
May 20, 2004.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, (Doc. No. 5), and Defendants' Motion for Leave to Submit a Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 9). We will grant Defendants' Motion for Leave to Submit a Reply Brief. For the following reasons, we will grant in part, and deny in part, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a zoning dispute. Plaintiffs Jackson Teed and Marilyn Teed are a married couple who own property in Hatfield, Pennsylvania (the "Property"). (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 12.) The Property is located in Defendant, Hilltown Township. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Also named as Defendants are: The Board of Supervisors of Hilltown Township (the "Board of Supervisors"), which is the governing body of Hilltown Township with responsibility for, inter alia, granting and issuing land use and building permits in accordance with the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code ("MPC"), 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101, et seq., and the Hilltown Township Zoning Ordinance ("ZO"), ( id. ¶ 5); Gregory J. Lippincott, the Hilltown Township Manager and Zoning Officer to whom the Board of Supervisors has delegated responsibility and authority for issuing zoning and building permits, ( id. ¶ 6); the Hilltown Township Zoning Hearing Board (the "Zoning Board"), which is the governmental agency of Hilltown Township that has the responsibility and authority to determine appeals from decisions of Lippincott, ( id. ¶ 7); Betty Snyder, Ken Bennington, and John Bender, members of the Board of Supervisors, ( id. ¶ 8); John Snyder, Timothy Browning, and Richard Manfredi, members of the Zoning Board, ( id. ¶ 9); Jeffrey G. Trauger, the Solicitor for the Zoning Board, ( id. ¶ 10); and Jack D. Wuerstle, the Solicitor for Hilltown Township, ( id. ¶ 11).
Since approximately 1994, Plaintiffs have operated a landscaping business which involves the installing of new flower beds, retrofitting existing flower beds, tilling gardens, eliminating low areas, planting various sizes of trees and shrubs, preparing yards for seeding, constructing dry block retaining walls, installing patios and concrete pavers, and performing small clearing jobs. All of these activities are conducted from locations other than the Property. ( Id. ¶ 14.) In early 1996, Plaintiffs made the decision to concentrate their efforts on a nursery business which they wanted to operate from the Property, while continuing to conduct a landscaping business as a secondary and incidental use to the nursery. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Pursuant to ZO § 406(a)(2), Plaintiffs were permitted to operate a nursery business with a secondary landscaping business on the Property. However, Hilltown Township refused to issue a nursery permit to Plaintiffs. As a result, Plaintiffs were required to file a request for a use variance. ( Id. ¶ 16.)
In a decision dated April 29, 1996, the Zoning Board denied Plaintiffs' application for a use variance. ( Id. ¶ 18.) As a result of that decision, Plaintiffs were required to move their landscaping equipment and vehicles from the Property to another location that they were required to rent. ( Id. ¶ 19.) Hilltown Township later issued an enforcement notice and brought a civil enforcement action against Plaintiffs alleging that they continued to operate their landscaping business on the Property. ( Id. ¶ 20.) Without admitting that they violated the ZO, Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement and release with Hilltown Township to resolve the enforcement action. ( Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs allege that these actions by the Zoning Board and Hilltown Township were designed to deny Plaintiffs the rightful use of the Property, and were taken with knowledge that other properties in Hilltown Township were being used for the same or similar purpose without permits or interference from Defendants. ( Id. ¶ 22.)
On November 21, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a zoning application with Hilltown Township that requested approval of a nursery permit that would permit the operation of a nursery and a landscaping business incidental to the nursery on the Property. ( Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also filed an application with Hilltown Township that requested approval for a home occupation and a home occupation sign. ( Id. ¶ 24.) By letter dated November 27, 2001, Lippincott, in his capacity as the Hilltown Township Manager and Zoning Officer, denied Plaintiffs' application, listing several reasons for his denial including Plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. ( Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs allege that the settlement agreement limited the application of that agreement to matters relating to events that took place prior to December 1, 1996. ( Id. ¶ 27.) Therefore, Plaintiffs claim that Hilltown Township and Lippincott acted arbitrarily and unreasonably by citing Plaintiffs' alleged violation of that agreement to support the denial of Plaintiffs' application. ( Id. ¶ 28.)
On January 28, 2002, Plaintiffs filed three applications with Hilltown Township requesting building permits that would enable them to construct a pole barn, garage, and several small outbuildings on the Property. ( Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that they are permitted under the ZO to construct those buildings. ( Id. ¶ 30.) To date, Lippincott and Hilltown Township have failed and/or refused to issue the building permits, stating that they are not doing so on the advice of their Solicitor, Wuerstle. ( Id. ¶ 31.)
On January 25, 2002, Plaintiffs appealed Lippincott's November 27, 2001 decision to the Zoning Board. ( Id. ¶ 39.) After several hearings, the Zoning Board issued an opinion and order dated December 13, 2002, granting Plaintiffs' requests for a nursery permit and home office, but denying Plaintiffs' request to conduct a landscaping business on the Property as incidental to the nursery. The Zoning Board's opinion and order are attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. The Zoning Board found that the ZO permitted Plaintiffs to conduct a landscaping business on the Property only if that business was secondary and incidental to Plaintiffs' nursery. (Compl., Ex. A at 8.) The evidence presented at the hearing before the Zoning Board convinced the Zoning Board that Plaintiffs' landscaping business would not be secondary and incidental to the nursery. ( Id. at 9.)
In addition to denying Plaintiffs' request to conduct their landscaping business on the Property, the Zoning Board imposed various conditions on Plaintiffs' use of the Property. ( Id. ¶ 40.) The conditions they imposed mirrored provisions of the ZO that would restrict Plaintiffs' use of the Property whether or not the conditions were explicitly mentioned in the Zoning Board's order. According to Plaintiffs, however, conditions may only be imposed on an applicant by a zoning board when the applicant applies for a variance or special exception. In the instant case, Plaintiffs did not apply for a variance or special exception. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim that the conditions the Zoning Board imposed were illegal. ( Id. ¶¶ 41-42.)
On January 9, 2003, Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the Zoning Board to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, arguing that the Zoning Board erred and/or committed an abuse of discretion in denying their request to conduct a landscaping business on the Property. ( Id. ¶ 48.) By order and opinion dated June 12, 2003, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed the decision of the Zoning Board. The Court of Common Pleas' opinion is attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint. In that opinion, the Court found no abuse of discretion by the Zoning Board when it concluded that Plaintiffs' landscaping business was not secondary and incidental to the nursery. ( Id., Ex. B at 5.) In support of that conclusion, the Court cited testimony by Mr. Teed before the Zoning Board that his landscaping business represented eightyfive percent of his business, while the nursery represented just fifteen percent of his business. ( Id. at 4-5.) The Court also found no error in the Zoning Board's decision to attach conditions to Plaintiffs' use of the Property, since the conditions the Zoning Board attached were identical to provisions of the ZO that would limit Plaintiffs' use of the Property regardless of the Zoning Board's decision. ( Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiffs appealed the Court of Common Pleas' decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. On January 27, 2004, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas. In that opinion, the Commonwealth Court also noted that the ZO permitted Plaintiffs to operate a landscaping business on the Property only if it was secondary and incidental the nursery. Plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the landscaping business would be a secondary and incidental use and failed to meet that burden. Teed v. Hilltown Township Zoning Hearing Board, No. 2119 C.D. 2003, mem. op. at 5 (Pa.Commw.Ct. Jan. 27, 2004). In sum, the Commonwealth Court found no error or abuse of discretion in the Zoning Board's decision to deny Plaintiffs a permit to operate a landscaping business on the Property. Id. at 6-7. The Commonwealth Court also found that the Zoning Board erred by imposing conditions on the use of Property, because it did not have the authority to impose conditions while acting in its appellate capacity. However, the Court found this error to be harmless because the conditions the Zoning Board imposed were identical to provisions in the ZO that would limit Plaintiffs' use of the Property regardless of the conditions imposed by the Zoning Board. Id. at 7-8.
We can take judicial notice of the Commonwealth Court's January 27, 2004 opinion even though Plaintiffs did not attach it to the Complaint. We only take judicial notice that the opinion exists, not of the truth of any facts in that opinion. See Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 222 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004).
On October 31, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint. Plaintiffs assert three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' due process rights through the invalid exercise of their police power, by improperly interpreting and administering the ZO, and by engaging in a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of the rightful use and enjoyment of the Property. (Compl. ¶ 59.) Count II alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws by arbitrarily discriminating against them by failing to issue Plaintiffs the permits they requested. ( Id. ¶ 63.) Count III asserts a claim for inverse condemnation to recover compensation from Defendants for their alleged taking of Plaintiffs' Property without just compensation. ( Id. ¶¶ 66-69.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on numerous grounds. In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss all of their claims against the Zoning Board, and John Snyder, Timothy Browning, and Richard Manfredi in both their individual capacities and official capacities as members of the Zoning Board. (Doc. No. 7 at 5.) Plaintiffs have also agreed to dismiss all of their claims against all individual defendants in their official capacities. ( Id. at 6.) Under the circumstances, Plaintiffs' remaining claims are against Hilltown Township, the Board of Supervisors, the members of the Board of Supervisors (Betty Snyder, Ken Bennington, and John Bender) in their individual capacities, the Hilltown Township Manager and Zoning Officer (Lippincott) in his individual capacity, the Solicitor for the Zoning Board (Trauger) in his individual capacity, and the Solicitor for Hilltown Township (Wuerstle) in his individual capacity.
In their brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs make it clear that this claim asserts a violation of their substantive due process rights, not their procedural due process rights. ( See Doc. No. 7 at 10) (stating that Plaintiffs do not dispute that they had a "speedy and adequate remedy under State law to dispute the decisions pertaining to their zoning permits and building permit applications.").
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Because Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, we must "accept as true the facts alleged in the [C]omplaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988)). We will only dismiss the Complaint if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
Defendants urge that we dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and the understanding that "a United States District Court has no authority to review judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in [the United States Supreme] Court." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated in state court or are "inextricably intertwined" with such claims. Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000). A federal and state claim are inextricably intertwined when the state court judgment would be effectively voided if the federal claim succeeds. Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
With respect to Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, in their appeals to the Court of Common Pleas and the Commonwealth Court, Plaintiffs argued that the Zoning "Board erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in refusing to permit them to operate their landscaping business from the [P]roperty as a secondary and incidental use to the nursery." Teed, mem. op. at 4-5; (Compl., Ex. B at 3.) Both the Court of Common Pleas and the Commonwealth Court analyzed the ZO and the evidence presented to the Zoning Board and agreed that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing that they were entitled to a permit for a secondary landscape business. Teed, mem. op. at 5-6; (Compl., Ex. B at 4-5.) Both courts found "no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the [Zoning] Board in reaching this conclusion." Teed, mem. op. at 6-7; (Compl., Ex. B at 5.) In their Complaint in this Court, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their substantive due process rights "through the invalid exercise of police power by improperly interpreting and administering the ZO and by engaging in a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving the Teeds of the rightful use and enjoyment of their Property." (Compl. ¶ 59.) Should Plaintiffs prevail on this claim, the decisions of the Court of Common Pleas and the Commonwealth Court that the Zoning Board properly interpreted and applied the ZO would be effectively voided. Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim is inextricably intertwined with the claims Plaintiffs litigated in the state courts. We therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. Since we lack subject matter jurisdiction the claim must be dismissed. See, e.g., Holland Transp., Inc. v. Township of Upper Chester, No. 00-397, 2002 WL 31518836, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2002) (concluding that federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim when a state court had already rejected their claim that the zoning official's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion), aff'd, 2003 WL 22183554 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2003).
Having concluded that Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we must also dismiss Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. There is no cause of action for conspiracy under § 1983 in the absence of an underlying substantive due process claim or other constitutional violation. See Holt Cargo Sys., Inc. v. Delaware River Port Auth., 20 F. Supp.2d 803, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Mody v. City of Hoboken, 959 F.2d 461, 466 (3d Cir. 1992)).
With respect to Plaintiffs' other claims, we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude our exercise of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs did not argue before the state courts that Defendants denied Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws by denying their permit applications while granting permits to persons similarly situated to Plaintiffs. Should Plaintiffs prevail on this claim, the judgments of the state courts would not be effectively voided. Plaintiffs' equal protection claim was not previously litigated nor is it inextricably intertwined with any claims in the state courts. The same can be said with respect to Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs' equal protection and inverse condemnation claims.
B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Exhaustion
Defendants argue that we should dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims because Plaintiffs failed to pursue adequate state remedies. In general, "the exhaustion of state remedies, whether judicial or administrative, is not required prior to the commencement of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court." Hochman v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 1094, 1096 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963)). Accordingly, we will not dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection claim for lack of exhaustion. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (concluding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was not required prior to bringing equal protection claim in federal court under § 1983).
We reach a different conclusion with respect to Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim. A claim for inverse condemnation is a claim against a government defendant in which a landowner seeks just compensation for a taking of his property under the Fifth Amendment. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n. 2 (1980). A landowner may bring a claim for inverse condemnation against a local government if its zoning ordinance severely diminishes the value or impairs the use of a parcel of land and the state or local government refuses to pay the landowner just compensation. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Rogin v. Bensalem Township., 616 F.2d 680, 690 (3d Cir. 1980)). However, "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). This is because a state does not actually violate the Takings Clause until it fails to provide just compensation for a taking of property. Id. An inverse condemnation claim is not ripe when a plaintiff fails to allege that he pursued adequate state procedures for seeking just compensation for the taking of his property. See Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of inverse condemnation claim as not ripe when the plaintiffs failed to allege that they had pursued their claim in state court).
"Pennsylvania's Eminent Domain Code provides inverse condemnation procedures through which a landowner may seek just compensation for the taking of property." Cowell, 263 F.3d at 290 (citing 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-408, 1-502(e), 1-609). Landowners involved in zoning disputes have used these procedures to obtain compensation for the taking of property. See, e.g., Shaner v. Perry Township, 775 A.2d 887, 893 ( Pa. Commw. 2001) (affirming decision of trial court to appoint viewers pursuant to Pennsylvania's Eminent Domain Code when plaintiff involved in zoning dispute alleged de facto taking of property). In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not allege that they attempted to use Pennsylvania's inverse condemnation procedures to obtain just compensation before filing their Complaint. Accordingly, we agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim is not ripe, and must be dismissed.
C. Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiffs' only remaining claim is their equal protection claim. Plaintiffs allege that the decision of Defendants to deny Plaintiffs the permits they requested was arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory. (Compl. ¶ 64.) They also allege that Defendants have issued unconditional nursery permits to other similarly situated properties in Hilltown Township, and permitted other landowners on similarly situated properties to operate nursery and/or landscaping businesses without requiring those landowners to obtain permits. ( Id. ¶¶ 22, 46.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally discriminated against them. ( Id. ¶ 45.)
"[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has "recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a `class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. In Olech, the plaintiff alleged that the Village of Willowbrook intentionally demanded a thirty-three-foot easement as a condition of connecting her property to a municipal water supply but required only a fifteen-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners. Id. at 565. The Supreme Court found these allegations sufficient to state a claim for violation of the plaintiff's right to equal protection. Id. Plaintiffs' equal protection allegations are indistinguishable from those the Supreme Court found sufficient in Olech. Accordingly, we will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection claim for failure to state a claim.
D. Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that we should dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection claim against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity generally protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages." United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether qualified immunity applies, we must ask "(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. United Artists, 316 F.3d at 398 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)).
Here, Plaintiffs' allege a claim for violation by Defendants of their right to equal protection of the law in the application of zoning regulations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs for the purpose of depriving them of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 45.) These allegations are sufficient to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (intentionally discriminating against landowner in applying zoning regulations violates equal protection clause); see also Windsor Jewels of Pa., Inc. v. Bristol Township, No. 01-cv-0553, 2002 WL 31999367, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2002) (denying claim of qualified immunity based on allegations that the defendant intentionally and maliciously discriminated against the plaintiffs in the context of a zoning dispute). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied.
E. Motion to Dismiss Based on Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Defendants next argue that we should dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection claim based on quasi-judicial immunity. "Quasi-judicial absolute immunity attaches when a public official's role is `functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 785 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). "To determine this, a court must consider whether the official acted independently and what procedural safeguards attended his/her decision-making process." Hamilton, 322 F.3d at 785 (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985)). "The proponent of a claim to absolute immunity bears the burden of establishing the justification for such immunity." Antoine v. Byers Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993).
1. Plaintiffs' claim against Hilltown Township and the Board of Supervisors
With respect to Plaintiffs' equal protection claim against Hilltown Township and the Board of Supervisors, we will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss based on quasi-judicial immunity. Governmental entities are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from a suit under § 1983. Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 51 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("[T]he only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the governmental entity possesses."); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (holding that municipalities have no immunity from § 1983 suits); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that absolute immunity of individual defendants does not preclude liability of municipality).
2. Plaintiffs' claim against the remaining individual defendants
With respect to Plaintiffs' equal protection claim against the remaining individual defendants (who are sued in their individual capacity), we will also deny Defendants' motion to dismiss based on quasi-judicial immunity. It is unclear from the Complaint what role the remaining individual defendants played in denying Plaintiffs' permit applications. Accordingly, we are unable to determine from the present record whether those defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Discovery may reveal that some or all of those defendants are entitled to immunity. However, it is clear at this stage that Defendants have not met their burden of showing a justification for the immunity. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss based on quasi-judicial immunity is denied. See Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1976) (ordering district court to allow parties to develop evidentiary record before deciding whether officials were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity).
F. Motion to Dismiss Claim for Punitive Damages
Finally, Defendants argue that we should dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. With regard to the punitive damages claim against Hilltown Township and the Board of Supervisors, we will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss. Municipalities and other governmental entities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1991). With regard to the punitive damages claim against the individual defendants, we will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss. An individual defendant may be held liable in his individual capacity for punitive damages if his actions are the result of "evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Here, Plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs in refusing to issue them permits. These allegations are sufficient at this stage to support a claim for punitive damages against the individual defendants.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, (Doc. No. 5), and Defendants' Motion for Leave to Submit a Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 9), it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Leave to Submit a Reply Brief is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. It is further ORDERED that:
1. All of Plaintiffs' claims against the Zoning Board, and John Snyder, Timothy Browning, and Richard Manfredi, in both their individual capacities and official capacities as members of the Zoning Board, are DISMISSED.
2. All of Plaintiffs' claims against Gregory J. Lippincott, Betty Snyder, Ken Bennington, John Bender, Jeffrey G. Trauger, and Jack D. Wuerstle, in their official capacities, are DISMISSED.
3. Counts I and III are DISMISSED in their entirety.
4. Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim against Hilltown Township and the Board of Supervisors is DISMISSED.
5. In all other respects, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.