Opinion
CV 20-03220-JFW (AS)
04-20-2021
JOE ALFRED TAYLOR, III, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF ALEX VILLANUEVA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
ALKA SAGAR, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 2020, Joe Alfred Taylor, III (“Plaintiff”), a California inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's Request to Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fees was subsequently granted. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 5). The Court screened the Complaint as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. On April 17, 2020, the Court issued an Order Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend (“Order”) because the Complaint was insufficient to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff was ordered, if he wished to pursue this action, to file a First Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of the Order. Plaintiff was admonished that he must correct the deficiencies of his Complaint as described in the Court's Order, or the Court may recommend that the action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with court orders. (Id. at 15-16).
Citations to the Complaint refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court's electronic case filing system (CM/ECF).
Plaintiff filed numerous requests for extensions of time, (Dkt Nos. 7, 12, 14, 18, 21, 33), and missed his deadline to file an amended pleading. On February 1, 2021, the District Judge, noting that it had been “approximately eight months since the Court dismissed the initial Complaint and ordered Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint, ” issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) why the action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute because Plaintiff had failed to show why he was unable to file an amended pleading. (Dkt. No. 32). The District Judge admonished Plaintiff that this was his final extension of time in which to file a First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 3). On March 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Response to the OSC (Dkt. No. 35) and a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 36). The OSC was then vacated. (Dkt. No. 37). In his Response, Plaintiff stated that he had been deprived of access to the law library, and he felt “coerced into submitting the FAC.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 1-2).
The Court now has screened the FAC as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's FAC WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
In his FAC, Plaintiff names the following Defendants connected with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (“LASD”) Men's Central Jail (“MCJ”): (1) Supervising Line Deputy Doe No. 1; (2) Watch Sergeant Doe No. 2; (3) Deputy Sheriff Flores, MCJ Module 1700/1750; and (4) Deputy Sheriff Awad, Safety Check Deputy, MCJ Module 1700/1750. All Defendants are once again sued in their official as well as individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 36 at 3-4). Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 47).
Plaintiff purports to assert two claims, both arising from his allegations that Defendants failed to respond to a fire in MCJ Module 1700 on April 7, 2019. (Id. at 3, 5, 7). Plaintiff alleges that he awoke to smoke “filling” his cell and an “active fire on the tier.” Plaintiff and other inmates screamed for help for “20 to 30 minutes.” (Id. at 5). During the fire, Plaintiff “attempted to obtain help by contacting Plaintiff's wife via phone, ” and his wife called MCJ to report the fire. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that he inhaled smoke for “close to an hour.” Deputies Doe No. 1 and Doe No. 2 “failed to initiate LASD's emergency fire suppression procedures, ” which caused Plaintiff to suffer “lung injuries.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, and all of them, were present during the duration of the fire and deliberately disregarded their sworn oaths to ‘preserve the peace' allowing the fire to burn itself out.” (Id.). Further, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants and each of them . . . fail[ed] to report to the scene of the fire.” (Id.). In addition, “[a]s a result of the negligence of all Defendants, Plaintiff, and similarly situated persons, were deprived by each individual Defendant of the right to medical care after fire [sic] subsided.” The “aid to smoke inhalation victims extended into separate [sic] shift of jail officials.” (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Awad filed “false reports” and is documented as the “Reporting Deputy” but he “never actually reported to the fire.” (Id. at 8). Defendants Doe No. 1 and Doe No. 2 were “both present during the fire” and “failed to act reasonably in the emergency, . . . ignoring the smoke.” (Id.).
In his “Claim I, ” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's “prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, breach of ‘duty of care,' inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, right to medical care, ” and several provisions of state law. (Id. at 5 (capitalization altered from original, internal citations omitted)).
In his “Claim II, ” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference in “disregarding the immediate danger” the inmates faced while “experiencing smoke inhalation.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff incorporates the factual allegations set forth in his preceding ten paragraphs (which are the allegations stated in his “Claim I”). (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendants, and each of them, ” acted with “deliberate indifference” and “discriminated against Plaintiff due to his classification as” a “problematic” inmate. (Id.). Further, Defendants Flores and Awad completed their “safety checks by scanning the locations at the front door and back door of the tier during the fire.” (Id.). Defendants “failed to act reasonably in an emergency.” (Id.).
Plaintiff inserted numerous exhibits within his FAC (id. at 9-46), and he references Exhibits A-J within the body of the FAC. In Plaintiff's attached Exhibit A, Plaintiff stated in a complaint that he filed with the LASD that “[n]o LASD custody personnel responded with their fire suppression training.” (Id. at 10).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the court concludes that the complaint: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b); see also id. § 1915(e)(2) (The court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if a pleading fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of his claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [complaint] need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citation and alterations omitted). In addition, dismissal may be appropriate if a complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Moreover, pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards” than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's FAC warrants dismissal because it again violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and fails to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff is granted one more opportunity to amend, however, because it is not “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).
A. The FAC Violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Rule 8 governs how to plead claims in a complaint. Specifically, Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 686. While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3 (citation and quotation marks omitted). A complaint is subject to dismissal for violating Rule 8 if “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178.
Plaintiff's FAC violates Rule 8 because it does not clearly set forth factual allegations sufficient to provide fair notice to each Defendant of the claims asserted against that Defendant and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Plaintiff purports to raise two claims in the FAC, but each claim references multiple grounds for relief. In his Claim I, Plaintiff cites the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, but he alleges that his rights were violated by “inhumane conditions, ” he was denied his “right to medical care, ” and unspecified Defendants breached a “duty of care.” Plaintiff also cites several provisions of state law within this same “claim.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 5). An alleged violation of state law, however, fails to give rise to a federal civil rights claim. See, e.g., Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (an alleged violation of California law fails to state a claim under § 1983).
Further, although Plaintiff explicitly alleges that “no LASD personnel” responded to the inmates' calls for help, he also alleges that “Defendants and all of them, were present during the duration of the fire and deliberately disregarded their sworn oaths to ‘preserve the peace' by allowing the fire to burn itself out.” (Id. at 5-6, 10). Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts showing that any Defendant was “present” at the time of the fire. Further, Plaintiff additionally alleges that “Defendants and each of them” failed to “report to the scene of the fire.” (Id. at 6). These allegations appear to be an attempt to raise Plaintiff's Claim I against all Defendants, but such general allegations are insufficient to support a claim against a specific Defendant. In order to state a federal civil rights claim against a specific Defendant, Plaintiff must allege that a Defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].'” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis and alteration in original). As the Supreme Court has made clear, in order to state a claim against an individual Defendant, Plaintiff must allege sufficient factual allegations against that Defendant to nudge each claim Plaintiff wishes to raise “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff's allegations against “Defendants and each of them” are insufficient to meet this burden.
Plaintiff additionally incorporats into his Claim II all of the paragraphs that he alleged to support his Claim I. (Dkt. No. 36 at 7). In his Claim II, Plaintiff cites the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but he also cites the Eighth Amendment. In this claim, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, and each of them, with deliberate malice [sic] (deliberate indifference) discriminated against Plaintiff.” Confusingly, Plaintiff also appears to be raising a claim under the Eighth Amendment in Claim II with his allegation that deliberate indifference by Defendants Flores and Awad “is evidenced” by their conduct of “disregarding the immediate danger” Plaintiff “faced experiencing smoke inhalation.” (Id.). Further, within this same claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Awad generated “false reports to cover-up Defendants', and each of them, misconduct.” (Id. at 8). It is not clear how such “false reports” are alleged to have violated Plaintiff's civil rights. Accordingly, it is not clear against which Defendants Plaintiff wishes to raise a claim or claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is not clear how Plaintiff's claim or claims under the Eighth Amendment as raised in his Claim I differ from the claims that he appears to be raising under the Eighth Amendment in Claim II. Thus, the FAC fails to provide fair notice to Defendants of what claims plaintiff is raising against which Defendant.
In addition Plaintiff cites his “right to medical care” and alleges that he was “deprived by each individual Defendant of the right to medical care after fire subsided, ” but Plaintiff does not name any medical official as a Defendant in this action. (Dkt. No. 36 at 5-6). Plaintiff's FAC also does not allege any facts to support that any named Defendant ever denied a request for medical care from Plaintiff at any relevant time.
Further, Plaintiff appears to be naming Defendants Doe No. 1 and Doe No. 2 in their role as supervisors. Supervisory officials, however, are not liable based simply on their supervisory role or due to the acts of their subordinates. Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). In his FAC, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that either Doe No. 1 or Doe No. 2 set “in motion a series of acts by others, ” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff also does not allege that he had any personal contact with either the Supervising Line Deputy or the Watch Sergeant during or immediately following the fire. Plaintiff states the unsupported and conclusory allegations that these Defendants “failed to initiate LASD's emergency fire suppression procedures” and were “present during the fire [and] failed to act reasonably, ” but no facts are alleged raising a reasonable inference that either Defendant was present in MCJ Module 1700 during the approximately 20 to 30 minutes that Plaintiff alleges inmates screamed unsuccessfully for help or before the fire had burned itself out. (Dkt. No. 36 at 5-6, 8).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's FAC does not comply with Rule 8 because it does not set forth “simply, concisely, and directly [the] events” that plaintiff believes entitle him to relief from each defendant. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). Plaintiff once again fails to include specific factual allegations against each named Defendant sufficient to provide each Defendant with fair notice of what actions he or she is being sued for under which of the several legal theories that Plaintiff references in his claims. Accordingly, the FAC is dismissed, with leave to amend, for violation of Rule 8. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed on any federal civil rights claim in this action, then he must set forth a simple, concise, and direct statement of the events that he alleges entitle him to damages from each named Defendant.
B. The FAC Fails to State a Claim for Relief
The FAC appears to raise multiple civil rights claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's allegations, however, are insufficient to state any viable claim for relief under these Amendments.
First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because, as discussed above, he does not allege what each individual Defendant did, or did not do, at which time, to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. Allegations regarding § 1983 causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. “Sweeping conclusory allegations [regarding causation] will not suffice . . . .” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
Second, Plaintiff's allegations in the FAC fail to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under either the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Prison officials therefore have a “duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to ensure inmate safety when: (1) an inmate is incarcerated under conditions posing “a substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2) the prison official deliberately “disregards the risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 847; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040-42
(9th Cir. 2005). Under this standard, “[a] prison official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference.” Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (“[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).
In addition, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberately indifferent” to an inmate's serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1976). “A ‘serious' medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (“examples of serious medical needs” include “a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities, ” or “the existence of chronic and substantial pain”; citation and internal quotations omitted).
As stated above, to meet the “deliberate indifference” standard of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prison official must “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” if the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). This requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's” safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, inadequate treatment due to accident, mistake, inadvertence, or even gross negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (“even gross negligence” does not “rise to the level of constitutional violation”).
Here, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims based on the alleged failure by Defendants to respond adequately to a fire in Plaintiff's housing unit. Plaintiff's FAC, however, once again provides very little information about the fire itself. Among other things, he does not allege how it started, where it was located, how large it was, or how long it burned. As a result, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing how any Defendant became aware of the fire before it had burned itself out. Nor do Plaintiff's allegations show that any prison official who did become subjectively aware of the existence of the fire while it was still burning became aware of any facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed to inmates who were housed in the housing unit but not in the cell or cells where the fire was burning. Finally, plaintiff does not allege any facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that any Defendant actually drew the inference that the fire created a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. To the contrary, Plaintiff's allegations that all Defendants failed to respond to fire, and specifically that Defendant Awad “never actually reported to the fire, ” raise a reasonable inference that no Defendant was subjectively aware of any risk. (Id. at 6, 8).
Moreover, Plaintiff explicitly alleges that Defendants Flores and Awad completed their safety checks “by scanning the locations at the front door and back door of the tier during the fire, ” thus raising the inference that neither Defendant was in a position to become aware of the fire. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Flores and Awad disregarded the danger, which raises a reasonable inference that these Defendants failed to draw the inference that a risk of serious harm existed. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff further alleges that all Defendants acted negligently. (Id. at 6). Even construing Plaintiff's factual allegations liberally and giving Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt, if Plaintiff could allege facts showing that the fire created a significant risk to Plaintiff, no facts give rise to a reasonable inference that any Defendant was subjectively aware of that risk and failed to take reasonable steps to abate it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
A prison official who fails to perceive a significant risk, even if he or she should have been aware of the risk, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's FAC fails to allege that any named Defendant acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take action to alleviate a significant risk to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334 (deliberate indifference requires “more than mere negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect”).
Plaintiff also appears to raise one or more claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment for an alleged failure to treat Plaintiff's injuries caused by the fire. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured by “smoke inhalation” during the fire and “sustain[ed] lung injuries.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 6-8). Plaintiff also alleges that he now utilizes a “maintence [sic] inhaler” because of his injuries. (Id. at 8). The Court assumes for purposes of this screening only that such allegations are sufficient to allege injuries constituting a serious medical need. Plaintiff, however, does not set forth any factual allegations about the medical treatment that he received for his lung injuries following the fire. Further, Plaintiff does not allege how the treatment that was provided by medical officials was constitutionally inadequate.
Plaintiff's FAC only includes unsupported and general allegations such as that he was “deprived by each individual Defendant of the right to medical care after [the] fire subsided” and that this was “a result of the negligence of all Defendants.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 6). Plaintiff also alleges that a “substantial delay in rendering aid to smoke inhalation victims extended into separate shift of jail officials.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court discounts Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that are unsupported by any factual allegations in determining whether Plaintiff's FAC states a plausible claim. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (“a court discounts conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the presumption of truth, before determining whether a claim is plausible”). Construing Plaintiff's allegations liberally, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that he experienced a delay in receiving medical treatment until the next shift at the MCJ. Plaintiff does not allege that he personally suffered additional harm because of this brief delay in receiving medical treatment. See, e.g., Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (a “mere delay” in medical care, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that any named Defendant was subjectively aware that Plaintiff required medical treatment at the time of the fire, and he does not allege that any Defendant took any action to deny or delay Plaintiff's medical treatment prior to the next shift.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's FAC fails to state any claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants and each of them . . . discriminated against Plaintiff due to his classification as ‘high power' (problematic).” (Dkt. No. 36 at 7). Plaintiff appears to be raising a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court previously admonished Plaintiff, his allegations are insufficient to allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because he does not allege that a specific Defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of Plaintiff's membership in a protected class such as race.In order to state such a claim, Plaintiff must show that he was treated differently than other “similarly situated” inmates, and that a specific defendant “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. In the absence of a protected class, Plaintiff must allege that a specific Defendant intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Here, Plaintiff's claims all arise from a single incident, and Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Flores and Awad intended to allow Plaintiff and “similarly situated” inmates to “sustain lung injuries” during that one fire. (Dkt. No. 36 at 7-8). No factual allegations show that any inmate exposed to the fire was treated differently than Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff's allegations in the FAC remain insufficient to state any claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prisoners are not a protected class. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999).
C. The FAC Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities
Plaintiff names all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. As the Court previously admonished Plaintiff, official capacity suits provide “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). If the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 n.14 (1985). Thus, the claims that Plaintiff raises in this FAC against LASD officials in their official capacities are effectively claims against the County of Los Angeles (“County”).
A local government entity, such as the County, is liable under § 1983 only for constitutional violations occurring as the result of an official government policy, practice, or custom. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (a municipality is liable under § 1983 only “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury”). To establish municipal liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must show both a deprivation of a constitutional right and a departmental policy, custom, or practice that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). There must be a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity, ” or even a series of isolated or sporadic incidents, will not give rise to liability under § 1983. Gant v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014). Rather, liability “must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
In his FAC, Plaintiff names all Defendants in their official capacities, but he alleges that Defendants failed to follow existing LASD procedures, policies, and regulations by not responding appropriately to the fire. Plaintiff clearly alleges that Defendants failed to act “[d]espite existing policy, procedures, and regulations” and that they “failed to initiate LASD's emergency fire suppression procedures.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 6). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an official-capacity claim against any Defendant because he does not even purport to allege that the violations of his civil rights were caused by a policy, custom, or practice of the County or the LASD. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to follow the County's existing policies, procedures, and regulations. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations against all Defendants arise from a single incident that occurred on April 7, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 36 at 3, 5). An isolated or random event such as the alleged failure to suppress one nighttime fire that was “believed to be set by an inmate” and which burned “itself out” (id. at 5-6), does not give rise to a reasonable inference that any resulting harm was caused by “practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct” had become “a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. Accordingly, Plaintiff's factual allegations in the FAC simply cannot give rise to a federal civil rights claim against the County. Therefore, Plaintiff's allegations in the FAC fail to support a claim against any Defendant in his or her official capacity. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, 535 Fed.Appx. 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court's dismissal of Monell claim based only on conclusory allegations that lacked factual support) (now citable for its persuasive value pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, and in light of Plaintiff's statement in his Response that he has faced difficulties in obtaining access to legal resources to proceed with this action, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's FAC WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court admonishes Plaintiff that this is Plaintiff's final opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his pleading as discussed herein.
If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, then he shall file a Second Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of this Order. The Second Amended Complaint must cure the pleading defects discussed above and shall be complete in itself without reference to the Complaint. See L.R. 15-2 (“Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseding pleading.”). This means that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims in the Second Amended Complaint again.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate legal claim against each Defendant and confine his allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. For each separate legal claim, Plaintiff should state the civil right that has been violated and the supporting facts for that claim only. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, Plaintiff is advised that the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint should be consistent with the authorities discussed above. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint may not include new defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that his failure to timely file a Second Amended Complaint and failure to correct the deficiencies described above, will result in a recommendation that this action, or portions thereof, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) . Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with respect to particular Defendants or claims, then he may voluntarily dismiss all or any part of this action by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit Omitted)