Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-0704-BH-L.
March 20, 2001.
JUDGMENT
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be and is hereby GRANTED and that JUDGMENT be and is hereby entered in favor of the defendants, Alvin E. King, Joyce Yeager, Janie Mae Crocker, Henry Ervin and Rosa Hollins, in their official capacities as members of the Linden Board of Education, and Larry Huckabee in his official capacity as Superintendent of Linden City Schools, and against the plaintiff, Alfred E. Taylor, the plaintiff to have and recover nothing of these defendants. Costs are taxed against the plaintiff.
FINDING OF FACT; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
This action is before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docs. 24, 25 and 26) and the following related motions: plaintiff's motion for leave to file his opposition to the motion for summary judgment five days late (Doc. 29); the motion filed by defendant Larry Huckabee to strike plaintiff's response in opposition as untimely (Doc. 28); and the similar motion to strike filed by the remaining defendants (Doc. 33). The Court first concludes and it is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for an extension of time within which to file his opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment is due to be and is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, defendants' motions to strike (Docs. 28 and 33) are MOOT.
In addition, at the Pretrial Conference conducted on October 26, 2000, in Selma, Alabama, plaintiff agreed to dismiss all members of the City of Linden Board of Education and Superintendent Larry Huckabee in their individual capacities. Pursuant to that agreement, it is therefore ORDERED that the claims against these defendants in their individual capacities be and are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Upon consideration of defendants' motion for summary judgment as it now relates to the defendants in their official capacities, plaintiff's response in opposition thereto (Docs. 30 through 32) and all pertinent portions of the record, the Court further concludes that no material issue of fact exists and defendants' motion is due to be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court specifically finds, based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the parties and all other pertinent portions of the record, that the following material facts are undisputed:
1. Defendant, Larry Huckabee, is currently the superintendent for the Linden city school system. (Agreed Facts at 1). Huckabee officially assumed the superintendent position on September 1, 1998. (Agreed Facts at 2). Prior to assuming the duties of superintendent, Huckabee served as principal at Linden Elementary School and has worked for the Linden city school system for twenty-five years. ( Id.).
2. Plaintiff does not dispute that, from June 8, 1998 until June 24, 1998, Linden city school system posted a job vacancy notification for the Linden High School principal position. At the end of the job vacancy posting period, two applicants had applications on file for the Linden High School principal position. (Agreed Facts at 3). These applicants consisted of: (1) a white male science teacher who had taught at Linden High School for approximately six to seven years prior to applying for the principal position; and (2) an applicant who taught at the Linden Middle School as a vocational teacher. (Agreed Facts at 4).
3. A biracial and mixed gender committee consisting of a white male, white female, and two black males interviewed each of the two applicants for principal at Linden High School. (Agreed Facts at 5). Each of the four members this committee were currently employed as teachers at Linden High School at the time of the interviews. (Agreed Facts at 6). After interviewing each candidate, the committee reached a unanimous decision to recommend the white male for the Linden High School principal position. (Agreed Facts at 7). The superintendent's recommendation to the Linden Board of Education concurred with the committee's recommendation. (Agreed Facts at 8). On July 15, 1998, the Linden Board of Education approved the white male applicant as acting principal for Linden High School. (Agreed Facts at 9).
4. Although the plaintiff, Alfred E. Taylor, alleges that he submitted an application for the Linden High School principal vacancy, he has presented no evidence to establish that his application was ever received by any official of the Linden city school system. Taylor does not dispute that neither Huckabee nor any member of the selection committee or Linden Board of Education were ever presented with an application completed by Taylor for the Linden High School principal vacancy.
5. From July 10, 1998 through July 27, 1998, the Linden city school system posted a job vacancy for the Linden Elementary School principal position. (Agreed Facts at 10.). The Linden city school system received and filed four applications for the elementary principal position. (Agreed Facts at 11). The application completed and submitted by Taylor and the other applicants for the position of elementary school principal did not ask for the applicant's race and/or national origin and did not require the submission of any other materials other than the application. (Agreed Facts at 21). Taylor, however, submitted his resume along with his application. (Agreed facts at 22). It is on this resume that Taylor stated, essentially as a footnote, that he is of "Native American Ancestry." Taylor Affidavit (Doc. 32) at Exh. 3.
6. On July 27, 1998, each of the four applicants were contacted in an attempt to arrange interviews for the following day. (Agreed Facts at 12). Although Taylor contends he was never advised that time was of the essence, he does not dispute defendants' contention that it was imperative to have a principal in place at the elementary school as soon as possible because teachers reported to school on August 17, 1998, and students reported to school on August 20, 1998. Nor does Taylor dispute that Huckabee telephoned Taylor at 9:23 a.m., 5:06 p.m., and 6:20 p.m. on July 27, 1998, at the number listed on his application, to set up an interview on July 28, 1998. Instead, Taylor concedes only that he received a recorded telephone message from Huckabee. Taylor Affidavit (Doc. 32). It is actually undisputed that Huckabee left voice messages on Taylor's answering machine on two of the aforementioned three telephone calls. Taylor did not attempt to contact Huckabee until July 29, 1998, two days after Huckabee called to set up an interview and one day after the interviews actually took place.
7. On July 28, 1998, a five-member biracial, mixed-gender committee made up of teachers from the elementary school met with and interviewed each of the applicants who were contacted the previous day. This committee recommended a black female for the position who had worked in the Linden city school system for approximately twenty years and, in the opinion of the committee, met each of the objective criteria required for the position. The Linden City Board of Education hired the committee's selection upon the superintendent's recommendation. See, Agreed Facts at 23 and 24.
To the extent Taylor has not specifically agreed to the designation of all these facts as undisputed, he has nonetheless failed to submit any evidence to contradict the evidence submitted by the defendants.
8. Taylor admits that he never spoke to any member of the Linden City Board of Education about his application. (Agreed Facts at 25). Taylor further admits that he has no knowledge that any of the five Board members either saw his application or were aware that he applied. (Agreed facts at 30). Taylor also admits that he has never even heard any rumors that Huckabee discriminated against anyone because of their race. (Agreed Facts at 29). Taylor has proffered no evidence that Huckabee, any member of the Linden Board of Education or any member of the bi-racial, multi-gender selection committee has in any manner demonstrated racial animus or discriminated on the basis of race. Taylor concedes that the individually named defendants, Janie Mae Crocker, Alvin E. King, Henry Ervin, Rosa Hollins, and Joyce Yeager, have never met Taylor, were not aware of plaintiff's race and/or had no personal knowledge of his application for elementary school principal.
9. On March 2, 1999, Taylor filed an EEOC charge alleging that the Linden City Board of Education discriminated against him on the basis of his race, national origin, gender and age. (Agreed Facts at 26). On July 29, 1999, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Huckabee, among others, in both Huckabee's official and individual capacity. (Agreed Facts at 27). Despite the drafting of the Complaint, Taylor does not make any allegations against Huckabee individually. (Agreed Facts at 28).
10. The only evidence Taylor has proffered that Huckabee, or the Linden City Board of Education, discriminated against him because of his race and/or national origin is evidence that he applied for a job and did not get hired for that job.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Taylor requests, inter alia, relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United Stated Constitution. Taylor alleges that the defendants discriminated against him because of his race and/or national origin. Taylor has failed, however, to present any evidence establishing an official custom or policy of discrimination either by the Linden City Board of Education or any of its members in their official capacities. Taylor's § 1983 claims against the Linden City Board of Education cannot, as a matter of law, be premised on respondeat superior liability. In addition, the claims asserted against Huckabee in his official capacity and against the individual members of the Linden Board of Education in their official capacities are indeed the functional equivalent of the claims against the Board of Education. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly."). Taylor concedes as much in his response by acknowledging, inter alia, "Official-capacity lawsuits are, `in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.'" Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition (Doc. 31) at unnumbered page 7, quoting, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Consequently, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law in their favor on Taylor's § 1983 claims.
It is unnecessary for the Court to address defendants' qualified immunity defense in light of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of all claims against the individually named defendants in their individual capacities. Taylor clearly recognized that he had failed to present the requisite "specific non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive and . . . [failed to] identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden by proving improper motive". Brown v. Cochran, 171 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1999).
Taylor's Title VII claims are not premised on any direct evidence of discrimination but, at best, the allegation of circumstantial evidence. Consequently, Taylor's Title VII claims are analyzed under a shifting burden framework established in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 289, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under this framework, Taylor has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Eskra v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997). If he has met that burden, then an inference arises that the challenged action was motivated by a discriminatory intent. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989). The burden would then shift to the defendants as his employer to "articulate" a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95. If the defendants successfully articulates such a reason, then the burden shifts back to Taylor to show that the proffered reason is really pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1095-96. In this "failure-to-hire" case, Taylor "establishes a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for a position for which the defendant was accepting applications; (3) despite his qualifications, he was not hired; and (4) after his rejection the position remained open or was filled by a person outside his protected class." Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999), citing, Welborn v. Reynolds Metals Co., 810 F.2d 1026, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence, that, "if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption." Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). "[D]irect evidence is composed of "only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate" on the basis of some impermissible factor. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989). See also, Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990) (in Title VII race discrimination case brought by a white woman who was terminated from her program director position, statement by decision-maker that the program needed a black director was direct evidence of discrimination). If an alleged statement at best merely suggests a discriminatory motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence. Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1393.
As applied to this case, Taylor has failed to establish a prima facie case with respect to the Linden High School principal vacancy. Specifically, Taylor has failed to establish that his application was received by the defendants. The fact that he mailed the application and it was not returned to him by the United States Post Office is simply insufficient in itself to establish that he applied for the position. Taylor has certainly failed to refute the overwhelming evidence that the defendants did not receive an application from Taylor for the principal position at the Linden High School. Absent such contradictory evidence, their is no basis on which any jury could infer that Taylor's application for this position was rejected for improper reasons.
Taylor has, according to the defendants, established a prima facie case with respect to the Linden Elementary School principal vacancy. Taylor indeed submitted an application for this position. The burden of production therefore shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. In this case, the defendants have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision. It is undisputed that Taylor did not interview with the biracial selection committee for the position at issue and that Huckabee attempted on three separate occasions to contact Taylor in order to schedule that interview. The biracial, mixed gender selection committee recommended the appointment of a black female applicant to the position based not only upon her application but her interview with the committee. As the Eleventh Circuit has made abundantly clear:
[I]t is not the role of federal courts to second-guess the hiring decisions of business entities. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). The reason offered by an employer for an action "`does not have to be a reason that the judge or jurors would act on or approve.'" Id. (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1979)). Instead, all that matters is that the employer advance an explanation for its action that is not discriminatory in nature. Id.Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1269.
"Once a defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the initial inference of discrimination `drops' from the case." Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1269, citing, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The Eleventh Circuit describes the process as follows:
The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was pretext for intentional discrimination and that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. A plaintiff may show pretext and survive summary judgment by "presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth or falsity of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons." Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ("The fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.").Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1269.
As applied to this case, Taylor argues that defendants' employment decision must be pretextual because Huckabee did not attempt to reach him at any other number provided other than his residence. Taylor acknowledges, however, that Huckabee left a message on Taylor's telephone answering machine which Taylor did not timely respond to. Taylor also fails to cite any legal support for the asserted proposition that an employer must do more than attempt to contact an applicant at his residence to schedule a necessary interview. Taylor has simply failed to submit any evidence of pretext and, instead, merely contends that he was discriminated against because he applied for the position and was not hired. Taylor has presented no evidence to establish that any of the decision-makers in this case even knew his ancestry let alone made their decision based on that knowledge and some ethnic animus. Taylor's mere "conclusory" allegations of discrimination, without more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext or intentional discrimination. By contrast, the Court agrees that defendants have offered extensive and clear evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions. There is simply no evidence in this record from which a rational fact finder could conclude that the defendant's proffered reason for selecting the black female candidate in lieu-of Taylor for the principal position at Linden Elementary School was false.
It is undisputed that the application form completed by the applicants did not request information concerning race or ethnic origin. Taylor's reliance on the footnote reference to his ancestry on a resume he attached to the application is insufficient to raise a presumption that the decision-makers were aware of the matter.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that there exists no material issues of fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is therefore ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be and is hereby GRANTED and that JUDGMENT be entered in favor of the defendants, Alvin E. King, Joyce Yeager, Janie Mae Crocker, Henry Ervin and Rosa Hollins, in their official capacities as members of the Linden Board of Education, and Larry Huckabee in his official capacity as Superintendent of Linden City Schools, and against the plaintiff, Alfred E. Taylor, the plaintiff to have and recover nothing of these defendants. Costs are taxed against the plaintiff.