Opinion
4:25-cv-26-WS-MAF
01-23-2025
GEORGE IVES TAY, D.O.C. # F60214, Plaintiff, v. RON DESANTIS, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint alleging various constitutional violations associated with his criminal conviction. ECF No. 1. He has paid the filing fee. ECF No. 3. The Court has now reviewed the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C § 1915A and construed it liberally. Because Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted and any amendment would be futile, this case should be dismissed.
I. Allegations of the Complaint, ECF No. 1
Plaintiff challenges the facts underlying his criminal conviction in Polk County Case No. 2017-CF-6057. ECF No. 1 at 1, 7-13. He sues several officials associated with his criminal prosecution-Judge James Yancey of Florida's 10th Judicial Circuit Court, Assistant State Attorney for Polk County Bradford Copley, and Lakeland Police Detective Jason Leggett-as well as Governor Ron DeSantis and Attorney General Ashley Moody. Id. at 3-5. All are sued in their official capacity. Id. Plaintiff asserts claims of due process violations, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Id. at 11. He seeks “immediate release and exoneration from his illegal arrest and confinement,” compensatory, and punitive damages. Id. at 12-13.
Though Plaintiff lists Moody, his claim identifies her as leading “the Office of the State Attorney” that prosecuted him. See ECF No. 1 at 7, 8. Even assuming Plaintiff was confused and intended to sue the State Attorney for the 10th Circuit (Brian Haas), the Court's ultimate conclusion would not change.
Plaintiff was arrested in 2017 by the Lakeland Police Department and subsequently charged with multiple counts of Possession of Child Pornography. Id. at 7, 20-21. Plaintiff alleges that the State Attorney's Office “maliciously” incarcerated, charged, and convicted him, and participated in a sentencing hearing in his case between 2017 and 2018. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims Defendants Copley and Leggett “solicited a guilty plea from Plaintiff's attorney [on or before July 9, 2018] based solely on evidence the Lakeland Police Department cannot confidently claim exists.” Id. at 7. He claims that at other proceedings in November and December 2018, those Defendants presented “fabricated” statements or evidence to the Court. Id. at 8. He claims Defendant DeSantis has “ultimate responsibility for the actions of the State, including pardoning power, but has refused.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff also takes issue with several legal rulings made by Defendant Yancey between 2017 and 2024. Id. at 8-9.
II. Discussion
The Court is required to dismiss a complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e); 28 U.S.C § 1915A; see also Wright v. Miranda, 740 Fed.Appx. 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018). Rule 12(b)(6) standards apply in reviewing the sufficiency of claims under § 1915(e)(2). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff's claims are barred for several reasons.
III. Time-Barred
Even assuming several of Plaintiff's civil rights claims are or could be sufficiently pled, many are time-barred. The statute of limitations governing § 1983 and related state law claims arising in Florida is four years. Ellison v. Lester, 275 Fed. App'x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Typically, that means a civil rights action must be initiated within four years of the date Plaintiff “has a complete and present cause of action.” Heard v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 808 Fed.Appx. 904, 907 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff had a complete cause of action for false arrest and/or unlawful detention beginning the day after his arrest in 2017. The four-year statute of limitations expired in 2022. These claims are time-barred and must be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim of false arrest is intertwined with a claim of fabrication of evidence. See ECF No. 1 at 7-8. He also brings a claim of malicious prosecution. Id. A due process claim regarding fabrication of evidence used to secure a conviction, along with the claim of malicious prosecution, require Plaintiff to show his prosecution and/or conviction has been favorably terminated. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 118-119 (2019). In other words, Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action for those claims until “his conviction [has] been invalidated in some way.” Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). “Only once the criminal proceeding has ended in the [criminal] defendant's favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated. ..will the statute of limitations begin to run.” Id. at 120. Plaintiff is still in custody pursuant to the state court conviction of which he complains. Further, that conviction has not been overturned. Any claim for fabrication of evidence resulting in his conviction or malicious prosecution would be premature and barred for the time being under Heck. See Tillman v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 519 Fed.Appx. 632, 635 (11th Cir. 2013).
IV. Immunity
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from several Defendants who are immune. As to Defendant Yancey, well-established law provides “absolute immunity” to a judge who is acting within his or her judicial capacity. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). This immunity also applies to prosecutors, and therefore Defendant Copley and the 10th Circuit Office of the State Attorney. Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
Defendant DeSantis had no individual involvement in Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's suggestion that he has the “ultimate” authority over prosecutions by duly sworn and elected local prosecutors is misplaced. Even if he had stated a claim against Defendant DeSantis, an official capacity claim is just “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Absent limited exceptions which are not present here, the State of Florida and its agencies are immune from suit in federal court by force of the Eleventh Amendment. Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). Assuming Plaintiff did intend to sue the Attorney General of Florida, she too would have Eleventh Amendment immunity.
V. Other Bar to Relief
In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks release from custody. ECF No. 20 at 12. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Plaintiff has previously brought a habeas action for the conviction at issue in the instant complaint. See Tay v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., Case No. 8:22-cv-63-MSS-TGW (M.D. Fla. November 27, 2024). It was denied. Id. The relief he seeks is barred in this action.
VI. Res Judicata
Plaintiff's claims are also precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. In December 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court against Defendants Moody, Leggett, and Copley. The Court takes judicial notice of that case: Tay v. Moody, Case No. 2023-CA-2866 (Fla. 2nd Cir. Ct.). Plaintiff brought claims relating to the unconstitutionality of his detention, prosecution, and conviction, as well as claims of fabrication of evidence in his Polk County criminal case. Id. The state court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim based on Heck. See Id. at Order of Dismissal (February 22, 2024). Plaintiff did not appeal. See Id. at Docket.
“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as res judicata.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
The docket, complaint, and order of dismissal are available online at the Leon County Clerk's website: <https://cvweb.leonclerk.com/public/onlineservices/searchcourts/ searchbyname.asp.
“Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause... [i]t is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal marks omitted, citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). This Court must “give preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as would courts of the state in which the judgment was entered.” Kahn v. Smith Barney Shearson Inc., 115 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir.1997). This applies to § 1983 suits. Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1194 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff's claims of unlawful detention and fabrication of evidence were raised his state lawsuit. He was “given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims.” Woodson v. Eleventh Jud. Cir. in & for Miami Dade Cnty., FL, 791 Fed.Appx. 116, 118-20 (11th Cir. 2019). His claims were dismissed by the state court judgment for failure to state a claim, “which is a final judgment on the merits.” Id. Therefore, these claims are barred in federal court.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. Because any amendment would be either futile or precluded under res judicata, the dismissal should be with prejudice. The dismissal should also count as a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on January 23, 2025.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other parties. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court's internal use only and does not control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge's findings or recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court's order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).