Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2475, SECTION "K"(3)
January 9, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint filed by Judge Lloyd J. Medley, Jr., ("Medley"). Medley seeks dismissal of the instant complaint in which plaintiff seeks to collaterally attack the state court judgment denying his application for pauper status in his state court suit. Medley relies on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15 (1983) which stand lot the proposition that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a suit attacking the validity of a state court judgment. Medley also argues that under the doctrine of judicial immunity, the suit must be dismissed. Plaintiff, Vernon J. Tatum, Jr. ("Tatum") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Medley's actions constitute "obstruction of justice and complainant's deprivation of its' (sic) due process of law and civil rights" such that a cause of action lies under the federal statute.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to be evaluated only on the pleadings; however a complaint sought to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) may generally be amended to cure its deficiencies. Jackson v. Procumer, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986). In testing the sufficiency of a 1983" complaint, as is the case here the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1418-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981)). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent a motion to dismiss. Hingle v. Hebert, No. 99-1123, 2000 US. Dist. LEXIS 7054 at *4 (E.D La. May 16, 2000).
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 10 be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person withing the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Judicial Immunity
Absolute immunity protects "officials whose special functions or constitutional stains requires complete protection from suit." officers engaged in adjudicative functions, whether state or federal. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). It is well settled that judicial officers are immune from liability for damages occasioned by their activities in the course and scope of their judicial function. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554(1967); see also Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993) (judicial others are entitled to absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions). The alleged magnitude of the judge's errors or the mendacity of his acts is irrelevant. Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991). Judicial immunity can only be overcome by showing that the actions complained of were non-judicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991). A judge's acts are judicial in nature if they are "`normally performed by a judge'" and the parties involved "`dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Boyd v. Blggers, V F 3d 279, 2S5 (5th Cir. 1 994) (quoting Miracles. 502 U.S at 11). Judicial immunity is a question, to be resolved as early in the proceedings as possible. Boyd. 31 F.3d at 284.
In the instant case, to overcome judicial immunity per the Mireles standard, the plaintiff must show that the actions taken by the defendant were of a non-judicial nature-that the actions complained of were not those "normally performed by a judge." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13 (1991). A judge's acts are judicial in nature if they are performed by a judge throughout the normal exercise of the judge's functions and if the parties involved "dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." A/.
Alternatively plaintiff could also attempt to show that the actions were taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13 (1991). This is done by alleging that the parties involved did not deal with the judge in the judge's judicial capacity. Plaintiff admits that at all times germane to the instant complaint defendant was the presiding judge in Section C of the Criminal District Court of New Orleans and plaintiff has made no allegations that any party ever came before Judge Hunter in any non-judicial forum or proceeding. As such the issue of whether the parties involved ever dealt with ex-Judge Hunter in a non-judicial capacity is not relevant
Defendant's actions as alleged prejudicial in nature. Normal judicial functions which occur in a judge's court or chambers and center around a case pending before the judge qualify as judicial acts. See generally, Brewer v. Blackavell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 19S2). Issues such as the denial of pauper status clearly are related to the defendant's judicial duties.
In addition, in plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, he contends that the motion itself is infirm because the counsel who filed the motion had not enrolled. Since the filing of the opposition, previous counsel has withdrawn and counsel that filed the instant motion have enrolled as counsel of record. Regardless, this Court would have to dismiss this matter as a matter of law as no such cause of action lies. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 5) is GRANTED and judgment shall be entered dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice each party to bear his own costs.